




Fishing for Change in EU Governance





Accepted author manuscript, peer reviewed version
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Hegland, T. J. (2012). Fishing for Change in EU Governance: Excursions into the Evolution of the Common
Fisheries Policy.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 30, 2020
Fishing for Change  
in EU Governance 
 
- Excursions into the Evolution  
























Troels Jacob Hegland 







Fishing for Change  
in EU Governance 
 
- Excursions into the Evolution  



















FISHING FOR CHANGE IN EU GOVERNANCE 
- Excursions into the Evolution of the Common Fisheries Policy 
 
© Troels Jacob Hegland, 2012  
(for Part 1 and the thesis as a whole; for the journal articles and book chapters 
included in Part 2, the copyright remains with the original authors / publishers) 
 





The thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Danish degree of 






Jesper Raakjær, PhD, DSc 
Professor and Head of Centre 
Innovative Fisheries Management, Aalborg University 
 
Thesis co-supervisor: 
Staffan Zetterholm, PhD 




















Innovative Fisheries Management  
– an Aalborg University Research Centre 
Department of Development and Planning 
Aalborg University 
 iii





About the Structure of the Thesis 
  
 
Part 1  MOVING OUT, MOVING DOWN  
- TOWARDS NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE OR ‘MORE OF THE 
SAME’ IN THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY? 
 
 
Part 2  
 
Paper 1 T.J. Hegland & J. Raakjær (2008) 
RECOVERY PLANS AND THE BALANCING OF FISHING CAPACITY 
AND FISHING POSSIBILITIES: PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE 
COMMON FISHERIES POLICY 
  
Paper 2 T.J. Hegland & J. Raakjær (2008) 
IMPLEMENTATION POLITICS: THE CASE OF DENMARK UNDER 
THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY 
 
Paper 3 S.S. Gezelius, T.J. Hegland, H. Palevsky & J. Raakjær (2008) 
THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION IN RESOURCE 
CONSERVATION: COMPARING THE EU/DENMARK AND NORWAY  
 
Paper 4 T.J. Hegland, K. Ounanian & J. Raakjær (Forthcoming 2012) 
WHY AND HOW TO REGIONALISE THE COMMON FISHERIES 
POLICY. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Paper 5 T.J. Hegland, K. Ounanian & J. Raakjær (Forthcoming 2012) 
WHAT DOES ‘REGIONALISATION’ MEAN? AN EXPLORATORY 
MAPPING OF OPINIONS ON REFORM OF THE COMMON 
FISHERIES POLICY 
 
Paper 6 K. Ounanian & T.J. Hegland (Forthcoming 2012) 
THE REGIONAL ADVISORY COUNCILS’ CURRENT CAPACITIES 
AND UNFORESEEN BENEFITS 
 
Paper 7 T.J. Hegland & D.C. Wilson (2009) 
PARTICIPATORY MODELLING IN EU FISHERIES MANAGEMENT. 






I have been fascinated by the sea and the creatures that live in it since I was small. But 
besides recreational fishing when vacationing in the family cottage in Norway, I have 
never had any particular contact with fishing in practice—least of all commercial fishing. 
It was therefore not written in the cards that fisheries would one day come to play such a 
large part of my career. However, sometimes the world works in mysterious ways… 
The present PhD thesis represents the latest step in an academic career, which has 
so far turned out to have a significant focus on issues of European fisheries management 
and European Union (EU) policy-making. Whereas the interest for European Union 
policy-making resonates with my studies at the Master Programme of European Studies at 
the Department of International Affairs at Aalborg University from 2002 to 2004, 
fisheries management first caught my attention during an internship at the European 
Anglers’ Alliance in Brussels in 2003 at a time where the outcome of the 2002 reform of 
the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the EU was heavily debated among fisheries 
stakeholders in Brussels and across Europe.  
After having returned to Denmark and finalised my Master thesis on the subject of 
the reform of the CFP at European Studies in May 2004, I became employed at the 
Institute for Fisheries Management and Coastal Community Development (IFM), an 
independent, Danish research foundation, from November the same year. Later I became 
employed at Aalborg University when activities in IFM were transferred to a newly 
established research centre, Innovative Fisheries Management—an Aalborg University 
Research Centre (IFM-AAU), in 2007. At Aalborg University I became enrolled as a PhD 
student in 2008, and the last three years I have been working on the thesis that I am now 
submitting. 
At this point I would like to thank all those without whose assistance, 
encouragement, understanding and patience, this PhD thesis would not have materialised. 
First, I would like to express my gratitude to my two supervisors, Jesper Raakjær and 
Staffan Zetterholm. Without your immense support—in particular in the latest year, I 
severely doubt that I would have made it this far. Thank you for being at my side! 
I am of course also particularly indebted to those with whom I have co-authored the 
papers constituting Part 2 of the thesis: Stig S. Gezelius (Norwegian Agricultural 
Economics Research Institute), Hilary Palevsky (University of Washington), Douglas C. 
Wilson (IFM-AAU), Jesper Raakjær (IFM-AAU) and Kristen Ounanian (IFM-AAU / 
University of Rhode Island). Of these, who have all been a great help in my PhD work, a 
special credit has to go to the two latter, Kristen and Jesper, who have been my closest 
colleagues in the little more than three years where I have been enrolled as a PhD. Thank 
you for putting up with me! 
However, my academic support team extends much wider than supervisors and co-
authors, and I would therefore also like to extend my gratitude to former and present 
colleagues at IFM and IFM-AAU, as well as to external colleagues, which I have been 
collaborating with on different research projects. None mentioned, none forgotten. 
Finally, I remain forever grateful to those who have perhaps had to put up with the 
most when it comes to the frustrations, which are definitely also part of being enrolled as 
a PhD: my wife, Lotte, my son, Noah, and my mother, Lissy. Thank you for standing 
behind me all the way! As I hand in this thesis, my thoughts also go to my late father. I 
hope that you are somewhere rejoicing and watching over me… 
 
Troels J. Hegland 
Aalborg, January 2012 
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About the Structure of the Thesis 
 
There are within my area of research in principle at least two distinct approaches (incl. an 
unlimited number of variations and combinations) to writing a PhD thesis: the monograph 
approach and the article-collection approach. The typical ‘traditional’ PhD thesis is 
presented in the form of a monograph starting with an introduction outlining the topic and 
research questions followed by a logical flow from chapter to chapter ending up in a 
concluding chapter summarising the findings and concluding on the research questions. 
The typical ‘modern’ PhD thesis, however, comes in the form of a collection of papers 
(often published in one way or the other) tied together in some way by a brief synthesis 
article.  
Each approach has its merits. As an example, where the monograph approach might 
facilitate that the PhD project remains one coherent, large research endeavour, the article-
collection approach might in this respect entail a risk of the PhD project becoming 
fragmented and divided into smaller research endeavours, which are ultimately only 
marginally and with difficulty tied together by the synthesis. Oppositely, where the 
article-collection approach might be in harmony with recent years’ increased focus on 
(and emerging distribution of research funds based on) publications in peer reviewed 
outlets as well with securing on-going—broader than the supervisor(s)—peer review of 
parts of the PhD thesis, the monograph approach might entail a risk of not leading to 
publications.  
For my PhD thesis I have—between the two approaches described above—decided 
on a variation of the article-collection approach that serious the aspiration of ‘one large 
research endeavour’, which is the hallmark of the monograph. Consequently, my PhD 
thesis is, as it should be evident to the reader, presented in two parts: Part 1, which in 
many ways follows the logic of the traditional monograph PhD thesis though in a much 
shorter, more condensed format of a substantial synthesis-article, supplemented by Part 2, 
which consists of a collection of papers dealing with the overarching theme of changes 
and challenges related to the way the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union 
arrives at decisions and implements them.  
Part 1 can be read in isolation but draws, nonetheless, on material obtained and 
published in the context of three distinctly different research projects, SAFMAMS, ITAC 
and MEFEPO. In practice this means that the bulk of empirical data-gathering were 
carried out in connection with the specific research projects and publications. 
Subsequently, the empirical materials, as well as the insights of the publications as such, 
are put to use in the new context of Part 1 and answers pursued therein. The three 
research projects together with the research techniques used in them are further 
introduced in an appendix placed at the end of Part 1.  
The seven papers included in Part 2 of this thesis include one published journal 
article, three published book chapters, as well as three draft journal articles submitted for 
review.* However, the commitment to developing Part 1 with its own distinct topic has 
ensured that the material obtained in otherwise diverse research projects has been put to 
use in a joint context and contribute to academic thinking in a broader sense.  
                                                 
* The papers in Part 2 are reproductions of how they appeared when published (or when submitted) in the 
first instance. Consequently, in some papers invalid references can be found due to the paper being out of 
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Part 1 of the PhD thesis draws on insights from research carried out in the context of three 
different research projects and subsequently reported in seven different papers included in 
Part 2 of the thesis—as well as of course on a large pool of own and others’ material 
beyond this thesis.  
What constitutes the link between the different papers (and for that sake also 
between projects) and makes it possible actually to synthesise the research and put it to 
play in a joint context is the papers’ common preoccupation with changes and challenges 
related to the way the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU) 
arrives at decisions and implements them. In this regard the papers are concerned with 
changes that have indeed taken place throughout the history of the policy-framework, 
which extends back to at least 19831 when a full CFP for the EU fisheries sector2 was 
initially adopted, as well as with changes that could potentially be made to improve the 
performance of the policy in the future. For a general overview of the history of the CFP, 
please refer to Hegland and Raakjær (2008a, Part 2:1)3.
  
1.1 The Paradox of the Reforms of the CFP 
One of the great paradoxes of the history of the CFP is the amount of ‘reform’ compared 
to the amount of ‘change’. Due, in principle, to the existence of a time-limited derogation 
to a general rule of equal access rights for fishing vessels from one member state in the 
waters of another member state contained in the basic framework regulation for the CFP, 
presently Council Regulation 2371/2002 (Council, 2002), the CFP is subjected to a 
regime of decadal reforms—basically because the derogation call for reconfirmation in 
order for it to be upheld. Since 1983 the policy has, consequently, undergone reform in 
1992/93 (Council, 1992), in 2002/03 (Council, 2002), and the next reform is scheduled 
for 2012/13.  
In practice this regime has by and large led to a situation where the CFP is either in 
the process of implementing a reform or, as is the case at the time of writing, on the way 
to a new reform—or in fact it might be fair to say that the CFP is continuously doing both 
at the same time. As an example, the latest reform (2002/03) introduced long-term 
management plans (LTMP) for commercially exploited fish stocks. However, developing 
good management plans is demanding and time-consuming and it has therefore been 
necessary to develop and adopt management plans for stocks in an order determined by 
importance and perceived emergency. As a consequence, LTMPs have not in fact been 
developed for all the relevant stocks yet. 
Anyhow, that the CFP is continuously under reform does of course not in itself 
constitute a paradox; in fact looking back at the changes that has happened in the fisheries 
sector and the context within which it is operating, it seems quite logical to evaluate the 
                                                 
1 The CFP was in its present, comprehensive form, covering conservation, markets, structures and external 
relations, basically completed in 1983 (Council, 1983). The first acts relating to markets and structures 
were, however, adopted as early as 1970 (Council, 1970a, 1970b). 
2 The ‘fisheries sector’ can be defined as economic sector consisting of the catching (recreational, 
subsistence and commercial harvesting of wild, living aquatic resources), the aquaculture and the 
processing sub-sectors. The catching sub-sector consists predominantly of fleets, the aquaculture sub-sector 
consists predominantly of rearing facilities, and the processing sector consists predominantly of factories. 
3 ‘Part 2:1’ indicates that the paper is included in Part 2 of the thesis as paper number 1. This will constitute 
the standard for referring to papers included in Part 2. 
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situation every once in a while and adapt the policy-framework accordingly. What does 
constitute a paradox, however, is the fact that over an almost 30-year period surprisingly 
little has apparently changed in the way the CFP arrives at decisions, implements them, as 
well as the nature of the interventions agreed. Although everything around it has been 
changing, the CFP has proved itself extremely resilient to change.  
A tendency of the rhetoric surrounding reform surpassing actual results has left an 
impression of ‘much ado about nothing’ when looking back at previous reforms. The 
apparent ‘reform-resistance’ of the CFP has been the focus of and noted by several 
scholars (e.g. Gray and Hatchard, 2003; Hegland, 2004; Hegland and Raakjær 2008a, Part 
2:1; Raakjær, 2009). Both Raakjær and Hegland provide analyses of why the CFP is 
resistant to reform by pointing in particular to path-dependence rooted in historical 
experiences, the political environment and the cleavages within it, as well as the original 
institutional design of the policy. Actually, to a large extent it can be argued that the CFP 
rests today on the same fundamental principles as it did when adopted in 1983; an 
impressive stability of a policy-regime, which likely would—in circumstances of good 
performance vis-à-vis objectives—attract envious eyes from other policy-domains.  
Unfortunately, however, the CFP has not been performing particularly convincing 
and significant problems have been continuously apparent since at least the late 1980s 
(Hegland and Raakjær, 2008a, Part 2:1) and the results that the CFP has delivered in 
respect to core objectives of fisheries management have been far from impressive. 
Following an evaluation by Sissenwine and Symes (2007), the situation under the CFP is 
characterised by:  
 
• significant overcapacity4 in the EU member states’ fishing fleets compared to 
available resources;  
• poor profitability in large parts of the catching sub-sector; 
• stocks overfished5 more than in comparable places elsewhere in the world;  
• lack of legitimacy of the management framework among fisheries sector 
stakeholders and conservationists alike;  
• continuation of environmentally destructive practices of fishing; and  
• uneven and generally poor implementation and enforcement of conservation 
measures. 
 
Although the magnitude of the failure cannot exclusively be blamed on the internal 
properties of the policy, which arguably is operating within a particularly complicated 
context of ‘mixed and multi-everything’6, there seems as of today to be broad agreement 
                                                 
4 Overcapacity: In the short-term, fishing capacity that exceeds the capacity required to capture and handle 
the allowable catch. In the long-term, fishing capacity that exceeds the level required to ensuring the 
sustainability of the stock and the fishery at the desired level. Fishing capacity in excess of what is required 
to reach the agreed catch or effort objectives materialised by agreed target reference points (shortened from 
glossary of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: 
http://www.fao.org/fi/glossary/default.asp, accessed 6 April 2009). 
5 Overfished: A generic term used to refer to the state of a stock subject to a level of fishing effort or fishing 
mortality such that a reduction of effort would, in the medium term, lead to an increase in the total catch 
(shortened from glossary of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: 
http://www.fao.org/fi/glossary/default.asp, accessed 6 April 2009). 
6 The CFP covers the waters of more than 20 coastal member states with very diverse fishing fleets; the 
fleets of the member states apply a multiplicity of fishing practices and gears; many of the important 
fisheries inside the EU are ‘mixed fisheries’ (i.e. fisheries where multiple species are caught at the same 
time), a feature that is known to be a challenge for any fisheries management system due to the inability to 
fully control the composition of the catch. 
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on the fact that the policy regime seen in isolation has functioned far from optimally over 
the years and that much still needs to be done (e.g. Raakjær, 2009; Sissenwine and 
Symes, 2007; Hegland and Raakjær, 2008a, Part 2:1; European Court of Auditors, 2007), 
a perspective shared by the Commission of the European Union’s (Commission) own unit 
responsible for fisheries, the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG 
MARE), itself (Commission, 2008a; 2009).  
To be fair, it has to be mentioned that the situation varies across fisheries and fleets 
and that the very latest years have shown improvements towards sustainable fishing7, 
which may be ascribed to the results of the previous reform. The main message of the 
latest Green Paper8 was, nevertheless, that the overall objectives agreed in 2002 had not 
been met to a satisfactory degree and that this was not likely to happen without resorting 
to “whole-scale and fundamental” (Commission, 2009, p. 4) reform in 2012/2013.  
However, while fully subscribing to the fact that changes to the CFP over the years 
has been modest; it would on the other hand be unreasonable to claim that the CFP of 
1983 is the same as the CFP of 2011. Changes have been made and, maybe more 
importantly, we are at the time of writing, where the Commission’s proposal for reform 
has been released (Commission, 2011a), seeing indications that significant new steps 
towards change might be taken in the coming years, although expecting ‘whole-scale and 
fundamental’ reform might be optimistic in light of the many factors working against this. 
 
1.2 Scope and Aims of Part 1 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis is broadly concerned with changes to and challenges 
related to the way the CFP arrives at decisions and implements them. This interest is 
reflected both here in Part 1, as well as in the accompanying papers in Part 2. However, 
rather than attempting to provide a broad analysis of change in the CFP, Part 1 will focus 
on two specific macro-developments related to respectively the ‘moving down’ and the 
‘moving out’ of governance with the intention to explore whether the analysed processes 
show evidence of a shift towards what is commonly referred to as ‘new modes of 
governance’ (more on the concept of ‘governance’ to follow in Section 3.1).  
Where the idea of ‘moving down’ in the CFP basically refers efforts to decentralise 
selected authorities currently held at the central EU level to lower politico-administrative 
levels, such as smaller groups of member states working in cooperation, individual 
member states, or subnational regional or local authorities, the idea of ‘moving out’ refers 
to efforts related to shifting authorities from the ‘original’ institutional actors—most 
prominently the Commission, European Parliament (Parliament), the Council of the 
European Union (Council), and the member states’ authorities—involved in classic style 
EU governance or government to increasingly taking advantage of alternative set-ups, in 
the shape of for instance semi-independent, central-level agencies, structures of public-
private cooperation, or private self-governance (Raakjær and Hegland, Forthcoming 
2012). Efforts to move governance down and out have in recent years increasingly begun 
to be viewed as key elements in the attempt to reform the CFP.  
                                                 
7 Sustainable fishing: Fishing activities that do not cause or lead to undesirable changes in the biological 
and economic productivity, biological diversity, or ecosystem structure and functioning from one human 
generation to the next (Comment: Fishing is sustainable when it can be conducted over the long-term at an 
acceptable level of biological and economic productivity without leading to ecological changes that 
foreclose options for future generations) (glossary of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations: http://www.fao.org/fi/glossary/default.asp, accessed 24 April 2009). 
8 In 1991, 2001 and 2009 the Commission issued reports on the state of the CFP as a point of departure for 
reform—though in 1991 the report was not entitled a Green Paper. 
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More specifically, the two macro-developments that Part 1 will be dealing with are the 
developments towards respectively increased stakeholder involvement (as an instance of 
moving out) and regionalisation9 (as an instance of moving down). These macro-
developments have been central to the research work behind the papers in Part 2, and they 
are, furthermore, developments that have had a relatively high profile in the previous 
reform, as well as in the process towards the coming reform. In addition, the two 
developments are intimately intertwined in practice and therefore constitute a good match 
for analysis. 
 Consequently, the aim of Part 1 is to investigate whether the selected macro-
developments within the CFP show evidence of new modes of governance, and, if 
affirmative, whether the identified changes towards new modes of governance are 
substantial enough to qualify as real, qualitative changes, or if they are, rather, 
superficial changes that in reality makes little difference.  
Studying new modes of governance specifically in the CFP gives us the opportunity 
to study the development of a very particular type of policy-area, namely an area in part 
under the exclusive competence of the EU.10 A feature the CFP shares only with a 
handful of other policy areas.  
Particularly interesting in this regard is that increased use of new modes of 
governance are commonly interpreted as upwards steps on a ‘ladder’ ranging from 
national authority at the bottom to classical hierarchical EU decision-making at the top, 
typically in the shape of the Community Method, or as Bartolini (2011, p. 7) describes it 
“classic Community government”, including “initiatives coming from the Commission, 
mediated and modified by the inter-governmental process and applied by national 
administrations” and under which exclusive competence, which key elements of the CFP 
fall under, could be interpreted as the supreme form.  
In the conventional interpretation new modes of governance are embodiments of 
innovative governments trying to limit harmonisation tendencies but at the same time 
reap the benefits of increased cooperation without actually surrendering authority in areas 
perceived as core national activities where solutions have to take into consideration the 
complexity of the issues; examples of policy areas could be employment or social policy 
(Héretier, 2003; Diedrichs, 2008).  
However, the CFP is the quite opposite of an area on its way towards 
harmonisation. Rather, the CFP is widely considered as being overly harmonised11, which 
means that the CFP contributes—if a development towards new modes of governance is 
indeed present—to an alternative perspective, namely how new modes of governance can 
assist in transforming a policy-area characterised by inefficient top-down, command-
control management towards a possibly more flexible, legitimate and efficient approach.12 
Although what might be at play in the CFP and policy-areas such as those mentioned 
                                                 
9 Regionalisation, as the term has been employed in the context of the CFP, can be thought of as a particular 
instance of decentralisation, where the level between the EU central level and the member states is at the 
centre of interests. In addition, regionalisation is also often envisioned as entailing an element of ‘moving 
out’, which is not necessarily part of decentralisation efforts. 
10 Exclusive competence on behalf of the EU “means that the member states cannot adopt their own 
legislation within the area […]  unless that power has explicitly been given back to them” (Hegland and 
Raakjær, 2008a, Part 2:1, p. 164). 
11 This seems at least to be the case in relation to the overall regulatory framework for conservation; in 
terms of control and enforcement, which is the competence of the member states, the picture is less clear. 
12 Together with a colleague I have previously characterised the current CFP as the “most top-down 
command and control fisheries management regime in the developed world”(Hegland and Wilson, 2009, 
Part 2:7, p. 79).  
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above, where the member states are reluctant towards harmonisation, are basically 
manifestations of the same search for solutions in-between classic types of national 
authority and EU authority, it is worth noting that in the CFP this might be entailing a 
process of de-harmonisation and de-integration (at least in parts of the policy) while in 
many other areas new modes of governance represents a movement towards increased 
integration and harmonisation.   
Approaching reform, as the CFP is, it seems likewise to be the appropriate time to 
take stock of the development of new modes of governance in the CFP. Ultimately, it is 
an aim of the thesis to provide food for thought in relation to where the CFP could and 




The current section is intended to provide the reader with a degree of insight in the 
methodological considerations behind the thesis as a whole (that is both Part 1 and the 
papers included in Part 2). 
In the first sub-section, the strategy for the analysis in Part 1 will be outlined. In 
other words, the intention is to provide the reader with an overview of how the task of 
delivering on the aims outlined in the previous section will be approached, as well as the 
motivations behind this choice. The second sub-section provides a brief introduction to 
my view on choice of research techniques with particular emphasis on the individual 
values of respectively qualitative and quantitative techniques.  
As it is, the analysis here in Part 1 draws primarily on work carried out and 
published in connection with three research projects that I have been involved with over 
these last years. These research projects are in this thesis represented by the collection of 
seven papers included in Part 2. An introduction to each of the three research projects can 
be found in the Appendix placed at the end of Part 1. In addition, the Appendix contains a 
lengthier description of how different research techniques have been employed in the 
different projects and why.  
The intention is that the two sub-sections and the Appendix in combination will 
provide the reader with enough background information to enable him or her to form an 
own opinion on the solidity of the work upon which my conclusions both in Part 1 and 
the papers in Part 2 rest. 
 
2.1 Strategy for the Analysis in Part 1 
As outlined in the Section 1.2, the key objects of analysis in Part 1 are two macro-
developments (towards stakeholder involvement and regionalisation). The analysis 
departs from the understanding that ‘macro-developments’ can be understood as 
processes that have encompassing implications for the CFP, insofar that they potentially 
impinge on all the categories of components that together make up the CFP, as illustrated 





Figure 1: Constitutive Components of the CFP 
 
The three categories of components can be thought of as the independent variables, 
whereas ‘the CFP’ can be viewed as the dependent variable. ‘Actors’ are the actual 
players in the CFP (such as fishers, scientists, environmentalists, but also more complex 
entities like member states or the Parliament), ‘institutions’ are the formal and informal 
rules, norms, structures etc. that determine how the actors come together in order to arrive 
at collective decisions, and the ‘interventions’ are the outputs that eventually comes out of 
the system in the shape of adopted measures but also new institutional structures with 
implications for which and how actors can engage in the CFP in the future. However, it 
should be emphasised that, although the three categories of components can be thought of 
as independent variables vis-à-vis the shape of the CFP, which is in essence a function of 
the combination of actors, institutions and interventions, they are not independent of each 
other but are rather mutually interlinked and constitutive.  
The practical consequence of this understanding of the CFP is that the analysis in 
principle has to be encompassing, paying due notice to relevant changes related to any 
category of constitutive elements, in order to be able to identify whether the processes 
exhibit features characteristic of new modes of governance, which Section 3.1 will 
provide an understanding of.  
Moreover, to provide a baseline enabling the identification of something as being 
‘new’, Section 4 provides a brief introduction to the ‘traditional mode’ of governance 
under the CFP focussing in particular on actors and institutions. Consequently, Section 5, 
which contains the actual analysis, will take as its starting point this understanding of 
traditional mode of governance of the CFP and its shortcomings, which have been amply 
documented in recent years (e.g. Symes and Sissenwine, 2007; Raakjær, 2009) and are 
also generally acknowledged within the system itself, as illustrated by the Commission’s 
recent Green Paper (Commission, 2009).  
 
2.2 Research Methods 
To me the choice of research methods has always been a matter of looking first at the 
object of my research and subsequently looking at what methods to apply to learn about 
the object. Consequently, I have never bought into the idea of some methods being 
inherently superior to others; rather using a variety of methods on the same object is, I 
believe, often the most awarding. In that sense, I am a believer in methodological 
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pluralism. Clearly, this does not mean that I believe that all methods are equally 
appropriate in any case and at any time. It all depends on the nature of the object under 
investigation, as well as what the researcher is trying to learn about the object—and this 
might very well develop over time even within one research endeavour.  
In the work behind this thesis, I have employed a range of qualitative techniques, 
most significantly observations and interviews. A qualitative technique—or simply 
qualitative research—is often found to be appropriate whenever the objective is to get an 
in-depth understanding of an issue, as has basically been the case in most of the research 
behind this thesis. As an example, in one of the projects contributing to this thesis, 
Making the European Fisheries Ecosystem Plan Operational (MEFEPO) (see Appendix 
for more information), we observed people discussing the issue of ‘regionalisation’ 
during meetings as well as carried out a series of interviews. This enabled us to obtain 
rich and detailed information about perceptions and issues relating to regionalisation—
albeit from a relatively limited number of people. Nevertheless, the small ‘sample’ was of 
limited concern as our objective was primarily to identify and map the issues and 
perceptions at play, something which could be achieved by carefully selecting the 
meetings to attend and the people to interview. 
However, qualitative techniques such as interviews or observations can be time-
consuming in relation to both completing the data collection and analysing the often 
lengthy text-based material. As a consequence these techniques are not necessarily as 
well-equipped to measure for instance the general level of support for certain ideas or the 
degree of variation across different groups of individuals where larger samples are 
needed. This, however, was a primary objective of another part of the MEFEPO project, 
in which we wished to investigate how widespread certain perceptions of regionalisation 
were and evaluate the level of support for certain models of regionalisation. In respect to 
these objectives, a quantitative research technique was needed. In opposition to 
qualitative techniques, quantitative techniques enable the researcher to work efficiently 
with much larger samples, which we took advantage of by developing a classical survey 
for the purpose (see the Appendix for more information).  
The survey technique exemplifies the usefulness and shortcomings of quantitative 
techniques in general quite well. By developing a questionnaire, which—with relative 
ease—can be administered to a large number of respondents, the researcher is able to get 
hold of data from a much larger population than if he or she had to talk to people 
personally. Moreover, the quantitative researcher will make sure that the options for 
answering are fixed—as opposed to open-ended—so that the answers can be associated 
with numerical values and treated statistically. This way of doing research provides a high 
level of reliability in the sense of the research being replicable. However, respondents are 
unable to add new aspects as they would have been able to in an interview situation; 
likewise the respondents have to answer according to the predetermined options—no 
matter if they would like to answer in another way or qualify their answer.  Moreover, it 
can be difficult to ensure that the questions are interpreted similarly by all respondents as 
the one asking the question is not available for consultation.  
Personally I am of the opinion that it can often be fruitful to combine qualitative 
techniques with quantitative techniques in order to make them complement each other. 
Qualitative research often scores high on validity (whether the researcher is actually 
investigating what he or she thinks he or she is investigating), while quantitative research 
often scores high on reliability (whether the research can be replicated with the same 
result). An appropriate integrated usage of the two approaches can, I would argue, often 
ensure a better ‘score’ on these measures than the combined score of the two approaches 
performed in isolation. 
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In the context of my research, qualitative and quantitative approaches have been different 
ways of learning about different governance processes and elements within the CFP and 
EU governance; and each approach has had its strengths and weaknesses. Although most 
of the research has involved qualitative techniques, the survey employed in MEFEPO and 
the valuable insights it provided clearly illustrates how the two approaches can cross-
fertilize each other. Had we not started MEFEPO with a period of thorough qualitative 
research, we would definitely not have been in a position to carry out a particularly 
successful survey; we would simply not have known as well what to ask nor would we 
have had the same fundament for analysing the data collected. And likewise, had we 
continued solely using qualitative methods, we would in the end not have been able to say 
much about for instance the level of support for different models of regionalisation, 
something that we had a clear intension of doing. Anyway, there is always an element of 
trade-off in the choice of methods. Good qualitative research is time-consuming, and 
good quantitative research is time-consuming. And time is a scarce resource.  
Looking back at the projects that I have been engaged with since I started my 
academic employment career seven years ago, there are certainly instances where I feel 
that more methodological pluralism could have been in its place. However, the three 
projects that have contributed with papers to Part 2 of this thesis figure in my mind as—
well perhaps not perfect—but at least high-end research projects, where the results have 
both been significant and solid as well as have attracted interest from both stakeholders 
and other researchers.  
 
3 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
 
In the following two sections, my theoretical and conceptual framework for the analysis 
of change in the CFP is outlined. The framework consists of two parts: a general 
framework relating to the concept of ‘governance’ and a more specific framework for 
approaching the CFP, introducing the ‘fisheries system’ as well as a generic 
understanding of CFP fisheries governance objectives, which will not be fully unfolded 
here but is further discussed in Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær (Forthcoming 2012a, Part 
2:4). 
 
3.1 Governance and New Modes of Governance 
What we are dealing with, when looking at issues such as the way the CFP arrives at 
decisions, implements them, as well as the nature of the interventions agreed, is broadly 
captured by the rather elusive concept of ‘governance’.  
Over the last decades the term governance has spread to referring to an incredibly 
wide range of phenomena and, as such, it is not straightforward to get a grasp of the 
concept. For the purpose of Part 1 of the thesis, I will in respect to the conceptualisation 
of governance take departure in the outcome of a recent, large EU research project, 
NEWGOV13, which specifically studied new modes of governance in the context of the 
                                                 
13 The NEWGOW project was an Integrated Project on New Modes of Governance funded under the 
European Union’s Sixth Framework Programme. The project was co-ordinated by the European University 
Institute’s Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and included 24 projects and 2 transversal task 
forces involving more than 50 participating researchers from some 35 institutions in Western and Eastern 
Europe. The project ran from 2004 top 2008 and examined transformation of governance in and beyond 
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European Union. Supporting the perception of governance as a multi-faceted concept, 
Bartolini (2011, p. 2) in the introduction to the ‘NEWGOW book’ (Héretier and Rhodes, 
2011) rules the academic community guilty of “promiscuous proliferation of concepts” 
when he tries too circle in on the meaning of ‘governance’. The proliferation of the 
governance terminology means that the concept is not easily defined and that a very 
specific, narrow definition is—at best—meaningless.  
Building on the experiences of the NEWGOV project, a way to get hold of the term 
governance is to start from the perspective of what governance is not. A key point in this 
respect is that ‘governance’ is not ‘government’: 
 
It differs from government defined as forms of ‘command and control’, 
characterised by the role of central public institutions, hierarchical relationships, 
electoral responsibility, hard legal instruments and erga-omnes binding decisions. 
[…] The classic national government model assumes that demands from citizens, 
voters, consumers and taxpayers are transferred and aggregated by the political 
system and then generate a policy response, the implementation of which is the task 
of the public administration. The classic Community [EU] government assumes 
initiatives coming from the Commission, mediated and modified by the inter-
governmental process and applied by national administrations. Any departure from 
these pure mechanisms deserves the title of governance.  
(Bartolini, 2011, p. 7) 
 
Likewise, Bartolini argues, governance does not cover instances of purely private 
dealings, traditional norms and social routines as long as these do not extent obligations 
to others than those (re-)producing them and that they do not require direct or indirect 
involvement of public authorities. 
However, between the purely public governing and the purely private dealings, a 
space emerges in which governance plays out. Thus, governance can be broadly defined 
as “a system of co-production of norms and public goods where the co-producers are 
different kinds of actors” (Bartolini, 2011, p. 8). Nevertheless, how governance actually 
plays out varies tremendously. Based on insights from the NEWGOW project, the 




Figure 2: The Space for Governance and its Dimensions of Variation  
(adapted from Bartolini, 2011, p. 13) 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Europe by researching in the emergence, execution, and evolution of 'New Modes of Governance' 
(www.eu-newgov.org/, accessed 26 January 2011). 
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Consequently, a specific mode of governance can be perceived as a co-production mode 
represented by a specific set of ‘choices’ within each of the dimensions of variation 
(Bartolini, 2011).  
Although the labels of some of these dimensions of variation are more or less 
telling, a brief explanation of each of the dimensions with examples seems appropriate:  
‘Identity of co-producers’ refers to the fact that governance as co-production entails 
the involvement of different types of actors. This includes co-production by public and 
private actors, national as well as international, but likewise combinations of public actors 
at different policy-levels (from local to international) and various combinations of these. 
Further, acknowledging that there is always an element of government in governance, the 
‘level of involvement of public authorities’ refers to the specific role that public 
authorities play in the facilitation of a governance co-production arrangement. This could, 
as examples, be as equal partner, the one overseeing outcomes, or as facilitator by paying 
the costs of initiating co-production etc. The ‘level of involvement of partners’ varies 
tremendously under different governance arrangements, ranging from merely providing 
information to true empowerment. ‘Ways of achieving co-production’ refers to the 
various non-hierarchical, cooperative ways in which co-production can happen, such as 
through negotiation or deliberation. The ‘institutional context’ refers, as an example, to 
the variation in relation to the degree of formalisation of the co-production process, from 
informal to highly institutionalised. The ‘mode of implementation’ relates to the way that 
implementation takes place in the co-production process. Are there for instance 
procedures for adjustment to circumstances, or consultation or renegotiation during 
implementation? ‘Content of co-production’ can take a large variety of shapes from 
deciding on binding decisions to a variety of softer instruments. Likewise, the ‘nature and 
role of sanctions’ is highly variable and notably closely linked to the shape of the 
outcome, ranging from strict enforcement with defined sanctions to voluntary adherence 
to agreed measures due to mechanisms of naming and shaming or other ways by which 
voluntary adherence can potentially be assured (Bartolini, 2011).  
Diedrichs, Reiners and Wessels (2011) describe the three dimensions of change 
most relevant in the analysis of EU governance as: the ‘sphere of authority between the 
public and the private’, the ‘nature of instruments between hard and soft law’, and the 
‘pattern of decisions-making between intergovernmental cooperation and supranational 
procedures’. Where the first two of the dimensions mentioned by Diedrichs, Reiners and 
Wessels (2011) as most pertinent in the study of the EU are reflected in the variables by 
Bartolini (2011), the third one is less straightforward. The distinction between 
intergovernmental and supranational refers to one of the most long-living debates in the 
study of European Integration.14 
From the ‘supranational’ perspective it has been argued that the member states’ 
governments once they instigated the integration process lost the ability to control it—that 
the process has taken on a life of its own. This perspective has its roots in the ‘liberal’ 
school of international relations and was first applied to the European setting with Haas’ 
(1958; 1961) neo-functionalism, which emphasised among other things functional 
dependencies and spill-over between policy areas (which would lead to integration 
spreading from one area to another and so forth), as well as the power and interests of 
supranational EU institutions and domestic non-state actors (and interactions between 
those) to explain why the European implementation process was an evolving process 
outside the control of member states’ governments. After a standstill in EU integration 
                                                 
14 The introduction to intergovernmental and supranational perspectives builds heavily on ‘own grey 
material’ in the form of Hegland (2009). 
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that undermined the central concepts of functional dependencies and quasi-automatic 
spill-over, important parts of neo-functionalism were later revitalised and developed 
further primarily by Sandholtz and others (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; Sandholtz and 
Stone Sweet, 1998). 
The opposing perspective, the ‘intergovernmental’, has continuously argued that the 
process of integration remains under the control of the member states’ governments. 
Based on what is determined to be in their national interest they negotiate and decide on 
the pace and direction of European integration. Developments in European integration 
are, consequently, due to convergence of the interests of member state governments—not 
the power of non-state actors or supranational institutions. This perspective developed 
from the ‘realist’ school of international relations and were applied to the European 
setting first and foremost by Hoffman in the middle of the 1960s (Hoffman, 1966). 
Hoffman’s theory was coined intergovernmentalism and adopted a state-centric view on 
the dynamics behind European integration, which was primarily depicted as the product 
of unitary states trying to protect their relatively stable geopolitical interests. States will 
be highly reluctant to give up sovereignty in areas of high politics, traditionally linked to 
geopolitical concerns, as opposed to areas of low politics, and this is a major explanation 
of the varying degrees of integration across policy areas.  
Intergovernmentalism was later refined by Moravcsik (1993; 1995; 1998), who in 
his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, which draws on both realist and liberal 
international relations theory, keeps the state-centric perspective but divides the EU 
decision process into two stages: In the domestic arena a pluralist political process 
involving domestic interest groups takes place upon which national government adopts a 
position. As a result—in contrast to the more ‘realist’ intergovernmentalism—liberal 
intergovenmentalism regards economic interests as more important than geopolitical and 
holds that national preferences change over time. The government brings the national 
position into the negotiations with the other governments and the negotiations can in the 
interpretation of liberal intergovernmentalism produce positive-sum outcomes. 
Importantly, however, liberal intergovernmentalism keeps the state, which is regarded as 
a unitary actor, at the centre and supranational actors are thought to play minor roles, 
mainly as facilitators of interstate bargaining (Hix, 1999; George, 2004).  
Anyway, having introduced the concept of governance and its dimensions of 
variation—and provided a small digression with the discussion of intergovernmental and 
supranational perspectives, Part 1 of the thesis promises to investigate ‘new modes’ of 
governance and it is therefore necessary to discuss a bit more in length what distinguishes 
‘old modes’ of governance from ‘new modes’ of governance. 
On a very general level it would of course be possible to define new modes of 
governance as any change from whatever governance arrangement was before. Clearly 
this would serve only to further reduce the usefulness of the governance concept by 
basically equating new modes of governance to any change during any time period. As a 
consequence, a requirement for a certain ‘novelty’ (Bartolini, 2011) or level of 
‘innovation’ (Diedrichs, 2008) can be added. Specifically in respect to the European 
Union, Diedrichs (2008, p. 8) explains new modes of governance as present when: 
- innovative modes of decision-making, initially outside the existing treaty 
provisions are introduced, such as the OMC [Open Method of Coordination; 
an EU soft law based governance mechanism resting on voluntary agreements 
and peer pressure rather than formal decision-making and sanctioning / 
command-control]  
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- “old institutional and procedural provisions on decision-making” are 
transformed or further developed, particularly by up- or downgrading existing 
modes into more hierarchical patterns 
- the mixture between different old and/or innovative ways of decision-making is 
changed by enhancing certain modes in favour of others, 
- the nature of the policy-instruments (binding / non-binding decisions) is 
modified into using particularly soft law 
- the involvement of public and private actors and institutions is extended and 
strengthened 
Thus, in a particular policy-area, new modes are identified as innovative in the 
sense that they have so far been un-experienced and un-tested. But it may also 
mean that already familiar ways of decision-making in certain policy-areas are 
introduced in other areas, that old modes are incrementally adjusted, or that the 
mixture of modes has changed over time. 
This means that what is a new mode of governance in one policy area might be an old 
mode of governance in another area, and what is a new mode of governance in the 
context of the EU might be an old mode of governance at the national level or vice versa. 
This also means that whether something qualifies as a new mode of governance is not 
only determined by the particular content of that mode of governance, e.g. it being a soft 
law instrument such as the OMC, but also by its relation to previous modes of governance 
in the area.  
One particular current of thinking under the broader heading of governance, which 
is often argued to be particularly apt in the study of the EU and hence deserves a few 
words here, is ‘multi-level governance’.15 Since coined by Marks in 1993, multi-level 
governance has claimed a strong position in the debate over how to understand and 
describe EU policy-making and governance. Marks (1993, p. 392) defines multi-level 
governance as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several 
territorial tiers” . Multi-level governance includes a vertical dimension, where 
governments operating at different territorial levels are becoming increasingly 
interdependent, and a horizontal dimension, represented by growing interdependence 
between various types of governments and non-governmental actors at and across various 
territorial levels (Bache and Flinders, 2004). This is a development that seemingly 
penetrates the member states’ central administrations, as Egeberg (2006) describes how 
semi-independent national state agencies increasingly become ‘double-hatted’ in the 
sense of sharing the loyalty to the national government with a degree of loyalty to 
supranational EU institutions.  
Like in the case of new modes of governance, there is not necessarily one true way 
of describing what characterises multi-level governance. However, the following 
characteristics, which are primarily inspired by Bache and Flinders (2004), Bache (2008) 
and Marks and Hooghe (2004), may be taken as my perception:  
 
• Significant or increasing interdependence between various types of governmental 
and state actors as well as non-state actors in decision-making at various territorial 
levels (horizontal interdependence). 
                                                 
15 The introduction multi-level governance builds heavily on ‘own grey material’ in the form of Hegland 
(2009). 
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• Significant or increasing interdependence of actors (various types of governmental 
and state actors as well as non-state actors) across territorial layers (vertical 
interdependence). 
• Lower territorial layers are (increasingly) not necessarily neatly nested in upper 
layers and there might be overlapping jurisdictions and memberships. This picture 
emerges because of the establishment of task-specific jurisdictions as opposed to 
general-purpose jurisdictions. 
• Significant or increasing dispersion of power in the decision-making process from 
the central state governments to other empowered actors (various types of 
governmental and state actors as well as non-state actors) across various territorial 
levels.  
 
There is a clear overlap between Diedrichs’ (2008) description, quoted above, of when 
new modes of governance are present and the above characteristics of multi-level 
governance. However, what defines multi-level governance as a separate current is the 
particular focus on (the implications of) scale and layers, which has in general also been 
of significant interest to scholars studying management of natural resources, hereunder 
not least specifically fisheries. 
 
3.2 The Fisheries System and Objectives of CFP Governance 
Drawing on Charles (2001) and Raakjær (2009), an initial step of establishing the basis 
for understanding the CFP is the ‘fisheries system’, where the term system is defined as a 
group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a complex whole.  
As depicted in Figure 3 beneath, a fisheries system is in my visualisation made up 
of four constituent parts: three subsystems (a governance arena (or system), a natural 
system, and a socio-economic system) and the activities of the fisheries sector, which are 
affected by the interventions of the governance system and complex interactions of 




Figure 3: A Fisheries System  
(inspired by Charles, 2001, and Raakjær, 2009) 
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Following from the discussion in Section 3.1, the governance system can be understood 
as an arena in which governance co-production plays out. Figure 3 above provides a 
generic understanding of potential key activities in the governance arena taking departure 
in a relatively conventional perception of policies being generated in a cyclical process. 
Recalling Figure 2, how this cyclical process is executed can vary over a range of aspects, 
including the types of actors involved, the modes of interventions, how agreement is 
fostered, etc.—and in  reality the process might not at all be that cyclical. The natural 
system, on its side, consists of the aquatic ecosystem16 (and wider), including—and this is 
of course of particular relevance to the fisheries sector—exploitable living aquatic 
resources17, and the socio-economic system consists of the fisheries sector and, in a wider 
sense, communities that depend fully or in part on the activities of the fisheries sector, 
and ultimately human society at large. 
As evident, the three subsystems and the activities of the fisheries sector are, in this 
simplified visualisation, interrelated in what is in principle a cycle where the governance 
process produces interventions that affect the activities of the fisheries sector. The 
activities of the fisheries sector, subsequently, impact both the natural and the socio-
economic systems. However, this relationship goes both ways as developments in the 
natural and socio-economic systems have an impact on the activities of the fisheries 
sector, as well.18 Finally, information on developments in the natural and socio-economic 
systems is fed back into the governance system, which prepares new responses in the 




Figure 4: A Typology of CFP Governance Objectives 
(Figure from Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær, Forthcoming 2012a, Part 2:4, p. 6) 
                                                 
16 Ecosystem: A spatio-temporal system of the biosphere, including its living components (plants, animals, 
micro-organisms) and the non-living components of their environment, with their relationships, as 
determined by past and present environmental forcing functions and interactions amongst biota (glossary of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: http://www.fao.org/fi/glossary/default.asp, 
accessed 24 April 2009) 
17 Living aquatic resources: Living elements of the aquatic ecosystem, such as fish, seaweed, shellfish, 
marine mammals, etc. 
18 Climate change can serve as an example of an impact on the activities of the fisheries sector coming out 
of the natural system even though climate change is likely only marginally affected by the activities of the 
fisheries sector. Likewise, an example for the socio-economic system could be oil prices, which are of vital 
importance for the activities of the fishing sector but only to an insignificant extent affected by those. 
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Finally, following Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær (Forthcoming 2012a, Part 2:4), I will 
furthermore in this analysis depart from an understanding of three basic theoretical 
performance objectives of the governance system of the CFP as a subsystem of the 
fisheries system, namely the 1) ability to take up and balance preferences (process 
legitimacy), 2) efficiency of the system, and 3) effectiveness of the policies and measures 
(content legitimacy), as outlined in Figure 4 above.  
As evident from Figure 4, the three main objectives are not one-dimensional, 
however, but associated with sub-objectives, which can in practice often be difficult to 
reconcile. For a lengthier discussion of these objectives, I refer to Hegland, Ounanian and 
Raakjær (Forthcoming 2012, Part 2:4). 
 
4 Traditional EU Fisheries Governance in Brief 
 
For the purpose of the analysis to follow in Section 5, a brief introduction to the EU 
fisheries system seems appropriate, not least to establish a baseline to discuss ‘newness’ 
from. In the following, I will focus on the actors and institutions of the CFP without going 
in details, as a lengthier, general introduction to the CFP, its history, and its political 
dynamics can be found in Hegland and Raakjær (2008a, Part 2:1) and to a lesser extent in 
Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær (Forthcoming 2012a, Part 2:4), both included in Part 2 
of the thesis. Similarly, a more specific introduction to the dynamics between the central 
level and the member states and the CFP related processes going on in an EU member 
state can be found in a third publication (Hegland and Raakjær, 2008b, Part 2:2) also 
included in Part 2.19  
The CFP is often described as consisting of four main pillars related to respectively 
conservation, fleet structures, organisation of the market for fish products, and the 
external dimension. It should in relation to this be noted that the description here is 
mainly concerned with the conservation pillar, which is also generally considered the 
main element of the CFP, although much of any generic description is of course also valid 
for other pillars.  
However, before actually introducing the EU fisheries system and the main 
elements of the CFP, let me initially list some of the peculiarities that in several ways 
makes the fisheries and the CFP somewhat unique among the policies of the EU—and 
might in part explain why fisheries policy has developed into such a challenge for the EU, 
as indicated by the continuous reform efforts and poor general performance described 
earlier in Section 1.1: 
 
 The CFP deals with the management of somewhat unique renewable but 
nonetheless depletable living aquatic resources, which are—for the most part—
able to move unhindered across boundaries of national jurisdictions.  
 The CFP is among the most science dependent policies in the portfolio of the EU 
and there are high degrees of uncertainty involved in fisheries science20.  
                                                 
19 The introduction to the CFP in this section draws to a significant extent on the mentioned publications. 
20 Fisheries science: Multidisciplinary research aimed at understanding and managing fishing and the 
effects of fishing. Fisheries science encompasses expertise from oceanography, marine biology, 
mathematics, economics, sociology, anthropology, etc. 
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 It is a high stakes policy area where effects of decisions can in many cases be read 
directly on the bottom lines of the resource users as subordinates of the fisheries 
management regime.  
 The public profile of the policy area is high compared to its macroeconomic 
importance; traditionally because of the cultural aspect of fishing but today 
increasingly because of fishing’s (environmental) impacts on aquatic ecosystems.  
 Although being of insignificant macro-economic importance in most EU member 
states, the fisheries sector and ancillary activities21 contributes significantly to 
economic activity in many peripheral, coastal areas across the EU. 
 Conservation of living, aquatic resources—a key component of the CFP—is under 
the exclusive competence of the EU, as one of only a handful of policy areas. 
 
Figure 5 beneath depicts in a simplified way the fisheries system of the CFP as of 2011 
with its main actors of the governance arena, the sector and the natural system, as well as 
the streams between them of knowledge, legal processes, policy/management 
interventions and impacts. It should be noted, however, that Figure 5 is a simplification of 
what is in reality the situation, namely the existence of a considerably more complex 
governance setting, as evidenced elsewhere in both Part 1 and Part 2 of the thesis. 
 
 
Figure 5: The EU Fisheries System  
(Figure from Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær, Forthcoming 2012a, Part 2:4, p. 7) 
 
In Figure 5, scientific bodies are depicted as triangles, legal bodies as hexagons, 
stakeholder bodies as ellipses, and policy/management bodies as rectangles with rounded 
corners. All these bodies operate in the governance arena, which stretches across several 
                                                 
21 Ancillary activities: Economic activities (in part) dependent on—but not included in—the activities of the 
fisheries sector (e.g. shipbuilding and maintenance). 
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levels of a politico-administrative scale. In this model three levels of the scale are 
included: EU level, EU regional seas level and EU member state level.22  
Several abbreviations employed in the figure have already been introduced, 
however, ICES is the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, an independent 
body supplying scientific advice to the EU on issues relating to fisheries and marine 
management; STECF is the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries, 
which validates (and to some extent adds to) and forwards scientific advice received to 
the Commission; ACFA is the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture, a 
central EU level stakeholder body providing advice on fisheries management issues; 
RACs are the seven Regional Advisory Councils, which provide stakeholder advice on 
fisheries management issues from a regional (or specific type of fishery) perspective; and, 
finally, the ECJ is the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which rules in 
disputes over the interpretation of CFP legislation. ‘Adv.’ stands for ‘advice’.  
In the natural system (in the figure represented by fish stocks), the politico-
administrative levels described above have counterparts in the different levels of the 
biogeophysical scale of the marine environment. One such scale could be a fiord or a bay 
etc., and in the other end of the spectrum are oceans or ultimately the global marine or 
aquatic ecosystem. In between we have the scientifically defined category of large marine 
ecosystems (LME)23, of which for instance the North Sea is an example. Notably, the 
levels of the natural system are not necessarily reflected by corresponding levels on the 
politico-administrative scale. The most prominent impact on the natural system, 
consisting of fish stocks and in a broader sense the marine ecosystem, is the extractive 
activities of the fishing fleets of the various member states, which target fish stocks 
connected to any level of the natural system. Other impacts caused by fisheries include 
potentially the degradation of the marine environment resulting from destructive fishing 
practices.24  
A key to understanding the CFP as a policy regime is its strong hierarchical 
structure where policy-proposals are—notwithstanding the general multi-level character 
of the system—developed in the Commission and the majority of decisions are taken at 
the top level of the system in the Council (or in committees of high-ranking civil servants 
under the Council)—since the Lisbon Treaty, increasingly jointly with the Parliament. 
The CFP is, consequently, subject to the Community Method of decision-making, which 
generally entails that the Commission—specifically in the case of the CFP based on work 
in DG MARE—initiates legislation, i.e. makes proposals, that are then dealt with by the 
Parliament and the Council following one of four different decision-making procedures 
determined by the relative position of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Council in the specific 
policy-area.  
                                                 
22 Above the EU level there is a global international level, on which the EU has signed a number of treaties, 
conventions and declarations dealing with fisheries policy and management among other issues. In the other 
end of the spectre it would in relation to a number of EU member states be relevant to add a regional and/or 
local politico-administrative level beneath the member state level. 
23 The concept of LMEs was pioneered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, United 
States Department of Commerce, and an LME is defined as an area “of the ocean characterized by distinct 
bathymetry, hydrology, productivity and trophic interactions” 
(http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/worldsummit/lme.html, accessed 25 February 2011). 
24 The marine environment and fish stocks are of course also affected by other aspects of human society, 
such as agricultural runoff, oil spills, sea water temperature change as a result of climate change caused by 
human activity and so on—these examples, however, being outside the scope of the model. Likewise, 
compared to the illustration of a generic fisheries system depicted in Figure 3 further above, the illustration 
of the CFP fisheries system does not include the wider socio-economic system, which is, however, also to 
be considered an integral part of the CFP fisheries system, in particular in relation to the activities of the 
sector. 
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Traditionally the procedure for the CFP has been the consultation procedure, which 
obliges the Council to consult the Parliament for its opinion but is not bound to act upon 
it. Consequently, the Parliament has traditionally been considered a minor player in the 
CFP (Hegland, 2006). As a consequence, the Agriculture and Fisheries Council, 
consisting of the relevant minister from each member state, occupied a completely central 
position in the decision-making system. After adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, it 
has been the co-decision procedure under which the Parliament acts as co-legislator, 
which has been the norm within the CFP.   
Like in the case of the Parliament, the role of stakeholders has traditionally been 
relatively limited at the EU level, where the only dedicated stakeholder forum until the 
reform in 2002 was ACFA, which—before a reform to its membership in 1999 and to a 
lesser extent in 2004 to include a wider spectrum of non-governmental organisations 
(NGO)—has traditionally been a forum for the commercial part of the fisheries sector 
(Hegland, 2006). However, ACFA did not have a reputation for being particularly 
influential vis-à-vis the Commission. According to Lequesne (2004), the main, traditional 
role of ACFA was one of mutual legitimisation between on one side the Commission and 
on the other side national fishers’ organisations. Following the reform of 2002, seven 
different RACs were set up to facilitate stakeholder input to the CFP. The issues of the 
RACs and stakeholder involvement are thoroughly discussed in the analysis. 
However, what has traditionally been a weak relationship between fishers’ 
organisations (and more generally the fisheries sector at large) and the Commission (the 
policy-initiator) should not conceal the fact that fishers’ organisations have generally 
been quite influential at national level and have in this way had a route into the Council 
(being the primary policy-maker). This has been facilitated both through domestic, formal 
structures for interest representation but also by more direct lobbying efforts prior to 
Council meetings to secure support for their views by their minister, as an example. 
Describing the traditional situation for the fishers’ organisation, Lequesne (2004, p. 43) 
argues that “the segmentation of professional organisations and the legitimacy of 
corporatist practices at the national level have not really allowed them to break free of 
state ties to defend their interests in the Community arena.” However, the ability to 
influence one’s own representatives in the Council has often proven quite crucial in a 
policy-area, where the lowest common denominator has often been what determined the 
outcome.  
On a side note relating to the actors and institutions of the CFP, it should be recalled 
that fisheries policy remains one of the most science dependent policies in the portfolio of 
the EU. When it comes to scientific matters, the Commission has been—and continues to 
be—supported by the STECF, which has traditionally been heavily tilted towards natural 
sciences vis-à-vis other kinds of expertise, such as for instance economic or sociological. 
Although it is formally STECF that lends scientific support to the Commission, most of 
the science emanates in reality from ICES—the forum in which national fisheries 
institutes pool their resources, which has traditionally also been highly tilted towards 
natural sciences and for a large part towards the narrow area of fish stock assessments 
(Hegland, 2006).  
In its approach to management, the CFP has for various reasons traditionally had 
and continues to have a preference for one-size-fits-all solutions and command-control 
approaches. Although being a textbook example of the Community Method, which is in 
many areas of EU policy the ultimate aspiration for integration proponents, the CFP has 
increasingly come to be viewed as too centralised, too remote from stakeholders, too 
insensitive to local particularities, too costly to enforce, and too driven by short-term 
political considerations. To a large extent the above issues are—at least rhetorically—
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recognised both by the managers in the Commission and the policy-makers in the 
Parliament and Council; and the same issues were—by and large—objects of the reform 
attempt in 2002 and will be again in 2012. However, progress towards change has been 
slow and indeterminate and the general perception of the CFP to a large extent remains. 
 
5 Moving Out and Moving Down 
 
As already described, the analysis will focus on two macro-developments related with 
respectively moving CFP governance out and down. However, before turning to the two 
developments, I will initially discuss enlargements of the EU as one of the main drivers 
behind the increasing need of thinking in terms of moving out and down. Subsequently, 
the RACs will be presented in a separate section, as these stakeholder bodies can be 
viewed simultaneously as the most tangible example of both macro-developments and 
therefore a basic introduction to these bodies provides a good point of departure for the 
more detailed analysis.  
 
5.1 The Increasing Diversification of the CFP Fisheries System 
The continuous rounds of enlargements have had important implications for governance 
under the CFP. Figure 6 beneath illustrates how the European Community (EC), later the 
EU, has grown since 1973, when Denmark, United Kingdom and Ireland had just joined 
the original six founding members, until 2007 where Romania and Bulgaria joined in the 
latest round of enlargements. In 2013 Croatia is scheduled to become the 28th member of 




Figure 6: Enlargements of the European Community / Union 1973 to 2007 
(Adapted from Kolja21, Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported) 
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As evident, the EC / EU has grown enormously over the years and this has had multiple 
implications for governance under the CFP; in some respect the enlargements might be 
considered the major underlying drivers behind many of the changes that has happened to 
governance under the CFP.   
The most direct result has been the associated increase in the number of seats in the 
Council, which has grown from nine in 1973 to 27 today. This increase in the number of 
member states involved in Council decision-making has resulted in an on-going effort to 
optimise voting rules and arrangements in the Council. Similarly, both the Parliament and 
the Commission have been adapted to accommodate the new situation. This is, however, 
more of a general crosscutting implication rather than specifically for the CFP. 
Another direct implication of the enlargements, which has in turn had more specific 
effects for the CFP governance system, is the growth of the ‘common pond’, which the 
combined sea area within the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of the EU member states 
is often referred to. Where the sheer size of the sea area in itself has not necessarily 
fundamentally changed the context of governance in the CFP, the associated 
diversification of waters, stocks, fisheries, fleets, interests and cultures definitely has. As 
a result of the enlargements, the CFP has over time come to cover “one of the world’s 
largest and most complex fishing zones” (Symes, Forthcoming 2012).  
Referring to my introduction to the CFP in Section 1.2 earlier, it is striking that the 
management of this fishing zone continues to be decided based on principles and 
governance structures that in many ways have not been fundamentally changed since the 
CFP was adopted 1983. But, of course, although still being maybe the “most top-down 
command and control fisheries management regime in the developed world” (Hegland 
and Wilson, 2009, Part 2:7, p. 79), the CFP governance system has not been left 
unaffected by this course of events. In particular, the establishment of the RACs can be 
seen as an attempt to handle the diversity resulting from enlargements.25 
 
5.2 A Tangible Example: The Regional Advisory Councils 
The seven RACs set up under the CFP figure among the most tangible results of the 
previous CFP reform. Being stakeholder fora, the RACs consist of representatives of the 
fisheries sector, in this context defined as “the catching sub-sector, including shipowners, 
small-scale fishermen, employed fishermen, producer organisations as well as, amongst 
others, processors, traders and other market organisations and women's networks” 
(Council, 2004, art. 1), which according to the legal provisions should occupy 2/3 of the 
seats; the remaining 1/3 is set aside for representatives of other interest groups, “amongst 
others, environmental organisations and groups, aquaculture producers, consumers and 
recreational or sport fishermen” (Council, 2004, art. 1). Naturally, the members of the 
RACs are primarily from the countries facing up to the sea area covered by the specific 
RAC, but any member state can in principle declare its interest in any sea area and 
thereby have stakeholders included in that RAC (Council, 2004; Hegland and Wilson, 
2009, Part 2:7). The RACs are either organised along specific sea areas roughly 
corresponding to LMEs (five RACs26) or specific types of fisheries (two RACs27) (see 
Figure 7 beneath).  
                                                 
25 The description of RACs builds heavily on ‘own grey material’ in the form of Hegland (2009) and own 
work in Nolan et al. (2010). 
26 Baltic Sea RAC, North Sea RAC, South Western Waters RAC, North Western Waters RAC and 
Mediterranean RAC. 





Figure 7: The Regional Advisory Councils 
(DG MARE, http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/partners/regional_advisory_councils/rac_en.pdf,  
accessed 21 October 2011) 
 
RACs were proposed by the Commission, and later set up, as purely advisory bodies. 
They provide recommendations to DG MARE or to national authorities of involved 
member states, and the RACs are in this respect authorised to submit recommendations 
on request from the Commission or from member states, as well as of their own accord 
(Hegland, 2006). If the RAC is not able to arrive at a compromise that is acceptable to all 
members, then decisions can be taken by a majority vote but dissenting opinions should 
then be recorded in the recommendation (Council, 2004). 
The Commission (or member state authorities for that sake) is not obliged to follow 
a recommendation from a RAC and, therefore, in practice the advantage of following a 
recommendation from the RAC will always be weighed against other preferences of the 
recipient. In this respect it is clear that consensus recommendations carry considerably 
more weight in the decision-making process compared to recommendations including 
dissenting opinions; particularly if a broad selection of RAC members both from the 
sector and other interests has been active in the process of drafting it. Recommendations 
including dissenting opinions can more easily be disregarded in the decision-making 
process as being unbalanced and voicing a partisan opinion. 
Based on a study of a process of developing a long-term management plan (LTMP) 
within the Pelagic RAC, Hegland and Wilson (2009, Part 2:7) identified a number of 
challenges that the Pelagic RAC faces in its work. In particular, as a general challenge to 
the RACs, the issue of the limited access to funding emerged, not least in relation to the 
participation of environmental NGOs, and the ability to work more proactively on issues 
of own choice. At the same time, however, a considerable capacity of the organisations 
and the RACs to overcome these challenges was also documented. 
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The RACs were established in response to a critique of the traditional CFP arguing that 
local and regional stakeholders and concerns were not to a sufficient degree included in 
the decision-making process or reflected in measures adopted. The intention was that 
including local or regional stakeholders more and earlier in the process would lead to 
better decisions and a higher degree of compliance due to an increased feeling of 
ownership over the rules by those subjected to them. In reference to the theoretical 
objectives of CFP governance introduced above, the RACs were consequently intended to 
improve the performance (or at least perception of performance) of the CFP in relation to 
both its ability to take up and balance preferences (thereby creating process legitimacy) as 
well as the effectiveness of policies and measures (thereby creating content legitimacy). 
Additionally, Ounanian and Hegland (Forthcoming 2012, Part 2:6) also point to 
additional benefits of the RACs, which are often not sufficiently recognised. In particular, 
they point to processes of increasing trust and understanding between various stakeholder 
groups and the fact that the RACs have over a very short period evolved into major 
purveyors of information on EU fisheries policy and management. 
The progressive institutionalisation of RACs has contributed to a significant shift in 
the discourse towards thinking increasingly in regional terms when discussing EU 
fisheries policy. As further expanded in Section 5.4, RAC participants seem to be 
increasingly coalescing on the idea of moving towards more regionalisation; a 
development, which has also in part been propelled by the overall increasing emphasis on 
eco-system based management. However, it seems like the shift in thinking has not yet to 
a similar degree been matched by a change in the scales of action for management under 
the CFP, which largely continue to be executed either from the EU level or from the level 
of individual member states, rather than at regional level. As discussed in Sections 5.4.2 
and 5.4.3, this is potentially an element of the coming reform.  
The RACs are best understood as physical manifestations of broader, more 
fundamental developments towards finding new ways of interacting in CFP governance 
due to continuing diversification. Specifically, in this regard, the RACs are, as already 
mentioned, strongly related both to regionalisation of the CFP governance system and 
associated ambitions of increasing the ability to tailor-make management interventions 
(moving down of governance). Likewise, the RACs relate closely to the perceived need to 
associate stakeholders, in particular fishers, closer to the governance system (moving out 
of governance). In the following, these two macro-developments will be analysed. 
 
5.3 The Widening and Deepening of Stakeholder Involvement 
The macro-development towards widening (referring to involvement in a broader array of 
contexts) and deepening (referring to a more decisive say in the process) of stakeholder 
involvement covers several aspects of ‘moving out’, which relate to respectively the 
increased involvement of fishers at multiple stages of the cycle of the fisheries system, 
the increasingly central role played by environmental NGOs to some extent supported by 
consumers, and the general crowding of stakeholders concerned with the CFP. Finally, a 
development where fisheries stakeholders are progressively squeezed by other 
stakeholders as the EU moves towards integrated marine management may be appearing. 
Although these are in principle different aspects of the development and treated as such 
by being described and characterised in separate sections, I have decided to discuss the 
various changes in relation to new modes of governance in an integrated at the end. 
 29 
5.3.1 Involvement of Fishers in CFP Governance 
Compared to the traditional mode of governance under the CFP where the involvement of 
fishers in EU level governance was in general limited and basically restricted to the 
involvement in ACFA, which has not traditionally been particularly influential, fishers 
are now increasingly exerting influence in different ways with implications for in 
particular the objective of legitimacy of the governance process among fishers, often 
referred to as internal legitimacy (Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær, Forthcoming 2012a, 
Part 2:4). 
The establishment of RACs, which are introduced above, can be considered as a 
turning point in this regard. Although early on criticised for not having been supplied 
with a sufficiently ambitious mandate (Gray and Hatchard, 2003), there seems to be little 
doubt that the RACs have significantly altered the role of fishers’ organisations by 
associating them closer to central stages of the cycle of governance at EU level, in 
particular the stages of policy-design and decision-making (cf. Figure 3). As further 
discussed above in Section 5.2, the RACs are stakeholder forums and thereby not for 
fishers’ organisations alone. However, the RACs remain numerically dominated by 
fishers’ organisations and sector representatives and thereby the influence of the RACs is 
to some extent also a proxy for the influence of fishers’ organisations, though arguably 
most often exerted in combination with other organisations. Moreover, not only does the 
RAC structure represent a quite elaborate formal mechanism for consultation, it also 
seems like opinions channelled through the RACs carry a certain weight in the 
governance process and thereby cannot be disregarded as merely lip-service, as also—
maybe not surprisingly—suggested by DG MARE itself in 2008 in an evaluation of the 
RACs (Commission, 2008b).  
By means of an anonymous survey, Ounanian and Hegland (Forthcoming 2012, 
Part 2:6) document how RAC participants perceive themselves as influential in the 
decision-making process. Not surprisingly, given that the RACs remain advisory and 
generally consists of many different organisations, very few survey respondents indicated 
that their individual participation had ‘greatly impacted’ substantive fisheries 
management decisions. The number of survey respondents indicating that their presence 
in the RAC had ‘no impact at all’ was quite low, as well, scoring between three and ten 
per cent in the four RACs surveyed. Notably, in combination for the RACs studied more 
than half of the respondents indicated that they at least ‘somewhat impacted’ decisions 
rather than indicating that they ‘impacted very little’ the decisions.  
Although Ounanian and Hegland are cautious to draw strong conclusions based on 
these observations, particularly as there is no previous baseline to determine in which 
direction these numbers have been developing, the results can be interpreted positively. 
Not least because the measure used in the survey to investigate RAC influence is quite 
restrictive. The respondents are, consequently, not asked if the RAC as such has had an 
influence but rather if their specific organisation has had an influence through the RAC, 
which should in principle produce more modest results than the alternative question. As 
also cautioned by Ounanian and Hegland, it could, nevertheless, give rise for concern that 
a little less than half of the respondents feel that they impact decisions very little or not at 
all.  
A quite specific example of RAC influence can be found in Hegland and Wilson 
(2009, Part 2:7) where it is described how fisheries sector interests in the Pelagic RAC 
were successful in avoiding a threatening reduction in the total allowable catch (TAC)28 
                                                 
28 Total allowable catch: The quantity that can be taken and landed from each stock each year (Council, 
2009, art. 3(a)).  
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for western horse mackerel by developing a LTMP for the species. Although 
environmental NGOs were aware of the process, this initiative was almost purely driven 
by fisheries sector organisations and in particular fishers’ organisations. The horse 
mackerel case thereby provides an example of how the RACs have provided new 
platforms for fishers’ organisations aspiring to become pro-active de facto partners in 
policy-design and decision-making rather than stay content with a consultative and re-
active role.  
The same process can, as well as constituting an example of how fisheries sector 
actors move closer to the governance stages of policy-design and decision-making, also 
be considered as an example of how fishers’ organisations are increasingly engaging 
themselves with science and scientists, whereby they aspire to have a say in relation to the 
governance stage of evaluation (cf. Figure 3) and the processes around it concerning what 
is fed in as information for the evaluation. In the horse mackerel case, close cooperation 
between the fishers’ organisations and scientists enabled the fishers’ representatives to 
communicate their perspectives and ‘experience-based knowledge’ (Astorkiza et al., 
2006) directly to the scientists, which meant that among a range of alternative harvest 
control rules (HCR) the fishers’ representatives and the scientists were able to come to 
agreement on the HCR rule that produced the best results in the view of fishers and was 
sustainable in the eyes of the scientists (Hegland and Wilson, 2009, Part 2:7). 
Likewise, the increased focus of the EU fisheries sector on engaging with science 
manifests itself by the increasing number of scientists employed by fishers’ organisations, 
as well as experiments with cooperative research where fishers and scientists work 
together on collecting data (Johnson and van Densen, 2007). Similarly, the scientific 
community is, although the feelings within the scientific community towards this are 
mixed, increasingly opening up for stakeholders at various stages of the process in which 
fisheries management advice is prepared. As an example, most ICES meetings are now 
open to observers (Wilson, 2009). 
5.3.2 The Involvement of Environmental NGOs and Others  
Now, turning our attention to in particular environmental NGOs but also other interest 
groups, there has clearly been shift in their level of presence in the CFP governance 
arena, as well, which in contrast to the involvement of fishers might more directly impact 
external legitimacy (Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær, Forthcoming 2012a, Part 2:4). As 
described earlier, the traditional mode of governance of the CFP was in general not 
particularly inviting towards stakeholders—be it from the fisheries sector or elsewhere. 
However, to the extent that there was formal links with stakeholders at EU level, these 
were primarily with sector interests through the pre-1999 version of ACFA; and within 
the fisheries sector, it has traditionally been the fishers’ organisations that have been most 
engaged in the central conservation pillar of the CFP (also with lobbying the national 
representatives in the Council and its lower level working groups), not least due to the 
preponderance of the EU of using annual TACs, which have heavy direct impact on 
fishers—and of course also impact on processing etc. but less directly so. Anyhow, recent 
years have produced a massive increase in stakeholder activity around the CFP, which 





Figure 8: Changes in the Stakeholder Community 
 
Compared to the situation under the traditional mode of governance, the current 
stakeholder community around the CFP seems considerably busier. Like in the case of the 
increasing presence of fishers’ organisations, the RACs have contributed significantly to 
this development, which has, maybe most importantly, let to environmental NGOs 
becoming more influential, effectively claiming a position comparable to that of fishers’ 
organisations. Similarly, the RACs have contributed to strengthening the role of for 
instance traders and processors, while allowing the formalised entry of entirely new 
groups such as recreational fishing interests and aquaculture29 interests, which in the case 
of the latter, however, do not seem to have been particularly active in the RACs yet.30 Th  
reorganisations of ACFA have underpinned and reinforced this development. The same 
can be said for the partial paradigmatic change that seems to have been happening in 
relation to fisheries in Europe where concerns, in light of dwindling stocks and a 
dwindling importance of fisheries in relation to the overall economy, have shifted from a 
focus primarily on social and community concerns to increasingly conservation and to a 
certain extent rationalisation of the fisheries sector (Hegland and Raakjær, 2008, Part 
2:1), a paradigmatic shift which may, moreover, in relation to particularly rationalisation 
of the fisheries sector be reinforced by the deteriorating economic situation in Europe 
following the financial crisis in 2008. 
In particular with the establishment of the RACs, the environmental NGOs—though 
only getting a limited number of the seats compared to commercial fisheries sector 
interests—have positioned themselves favourably, given that the RACs, as mentioned 
earlier, are in general most influential when arriving at a consensus. So even though 
participation is demanding on environmental NGOs and they occasionally have to opt out 
of some processes, as it was for instance the case in relation to the development of the 
LTMP for horse mackerel, the RACs have provided a significant formalised route for 
participation for environmental NGOs.  
However, environmental NGOs continue also to engage in more traditional 
campaigning, which as an apparent novelty in the CFP at the EU level is being 
increasingly facilitated by the internet and the emergence of for instance social media that 
to a certain extent transgress national borders. A recent example of this is ‘Hugh’s Fish 
Fight’, a campaign launched in advance of the coming CFP reform to get the EU to ban 
                                                 
29 Aquaculture: The farming of aquatic organisms including fish, molluscs, crustaceans and aquatic plants 
with some sort of intervention in the rearing process to enhance production, such as regular stocking, 
feeding, protection from predators, etc. Farming also implies individual or corporate ownership of the stock 
being cultivated (glossary of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: 
http://www.fao.org/fi/glossary/default.asp, accessed 24 April 2009). 
30 Likely as a consequence of this, the recent proposal for reform from the Commission proposes 
establishing a dedicated Advisory Council for Aquaculture (Commission, 2011a). 
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the practice of discarding31 unwanted catch. The campaign, which was and is spearheaded 
by British television cook and activist Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall and supported by 
Channel 4 and a range of environmental NGOs, attracted (as of October 2011) more than 
230.000 supporters on Facebook and more than 750.000 supporters on its dedicated 
website, www.fishfight.net. The campaign, which although being massively dominated 
by British supporters is designed as an EU initiative with websites in 12 languages, 
appears to be able to take partial credit for the inclusion of an ambitious plan to ban 
discarding in the Commission’s proposal for reform (Commission, 2011a). 
 Another way, in which the growing use of the internet has increased stakeholder 
presence, is the—now routine—use by DG MARE of the internet to hold open mass-
consultations on new initiatives. As an example, the open consultation on the 
Commission’s 2009 Green Paper (Commission, 2009), which is admittedly related to the 
particularly important initiative of reform, resulted in 382 contributions (plus 1329 
identical e-mails) from sector interests and various NGOs, the RACs, various third 
countries, other EU institutions, scientific institutions, member states’ parliaments / 
governments / administrations, local and regional governments, citizens etc. 
(Commission, 2010). 
Finally, the diversification of routes of influence for stakeholders and the general 
crowding of the stakeholder community around the CFP can also briefly be exemplified 
by the initiative of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), originally a joint initiative of 
the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) and Unilever, which has brought consumers onto 
the governance arena by providing the opportunity to choose certified sustainable fish 
products. However, as argued by Raakjær (2009), the main actors behind the influence of 
the MSC-certificate might, rather than consumers, be large retail chains using the label to 
protect competitiveness by safeguarding themselves from bad publicity. In any case, 
MSC can possibly take credit for a reduced pressure from fisheries sector interests for 
inflated TACs beyond what is advised by scientists as sustainable, as this would void the 
MSC-certification. 
5.3.3 The Squeezing of Fisheries Sector Interests 
Let me in this final sub-section briefly turn the attention to a development, which is only 
just emerging but may prove to become one of the defining differences between the 
current and future modes of governance when discussing the inclusion of stakeholders. 
Figure 9 beneath illustrates changes that can be seen as the possible result of an on-going 




Figure 9: Future Changes in the Stakeholder Community and Focus? 
                                                 
31 Discarding: The practice of releasing or returning unwanted catch in the shape of living aquatic resources 
to the sea, dead or alive. In most cases discarded fish does not survive. 
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As illustrated in Figure 9, the shift towards thinking more holistically rather than sector-
specific about marine management may well lead to a situation, where—rather than being 
attentive towards the CFP—fisheries sector interests will increasingly have to be attentive 
to more encompassing initiatives, such as the Integrated Maritime Policy (Commission, 
2007) or the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (European Parliament and Council, 
2008), which naturally attract a greater variety of stakeholders with an interest in marine / 
maritime management but not fisheries management as such. As it is, a number of these 
interests, for instance oil and gas as well as renewable energy, are economically 
considerably more powerful and macro-economically important than fisheries sector 
interests, which seems to indicate that the fisheries sector faces a challenge in making 
sure that it does not get squeezed among these interests; particularly because fishers, 
unlike most of the other interests claiming a right to the sea, depend on the ability to 
follow fish around large areas rather than being content with confined, designated areas, 
such as shipping corridors or wind farm plots. Notably, recent research by Ounanian et al. 
(Forthcoming 2012) related to recent consultation processes around the MSFD seems to 
indicate that the fishing industry is not necessarily particularly well suited to this 
challenge.  
5.3.4 Impacts of the Changes in Stakeholder Involvement  
In the above, I have dealt with three distinct elements forming an evolutionary trend 
towards increased stakeholder involvement. One of the main weaknesses of the traditional 
mode of governance of the CFP in relation to governance objectives has been the lack of 
legitimacy—not least among fishers—of the governance system as such and the 
management measures more specifically, which has resulted in a number of unfortunate 
side-effects. 
In the following, I depart from the typology to be found in Hegland, Ounanian and 
Raakjær (Forthcoming 2012a, Part 2:4) of variations of stakeholder involvement in EU 
fisheries management, describing situations from top-down, command-control 
management by the state over variations of co-management to extensive industry self-
management with reversal of the burden of proof32. 
In general, stakeholder involvement in policy-design and in particular in decision-
making, continues in the current system in principle to be of the sorts that are 
characterised by quite weak involvement of stakeholders and where there is a clear 
difference between, on one side, stakeholders that provide input and opinions and, on the 
other side, public authorities that take decisions. However, in practice, the establishment 
of in particular the RACs and the way their work has evolved clearly leaves the 
impression that they have contributed to a development where the CFP has in reality 
moved from being firmly rooted in a philosophy of ‘top-down hierarchical management 
by the state’ to a situation where the CFP increasingly exhibits features more clearly 
linked to the characteristics of what Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær (Forthcoming 
2012a, Part 2:4) refers to as ‘co-management by consultation’, where extensive formal 
mechanisms for consultation exists and where consultation extends beyond what can be 
regarded as lip-service. A key observation in this regard is the feeling of actually being 
influential of a great number of RAC participants. In isolation, this change towards more 
                                                 
32 ‘Reversal of the burden of proof’ is strongly linked to ‘results-based management’. In general this 
approach entails that the fisheries sector, rather than being managed in detail, would be subjected to certain 
targets or limits to comply with, and—as long as respecting those limits, which the sector itself would cover 
the costs of documenting—it may decide for itself on how to stay within the limits (Hegland, Ounanian and 
Raakjær, Forthcoming 2012b, Part 2:5). 
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convincing involvement of stakeholders should contribute positively to the legitimacy of 
the CFP. However, the fact that widening and deepening of stakeholder involvement have 
in general led to a need for professionalization of stakeholder representatives entails a risk 
of leaving ‘grassroot’ fishers in a position where they in reality do not necessarily feel 
particularly associated with or represented by their representatives. L k wise, there is in 
some circles a feeling that, notwithstanding the positive developments, stakeholder 
influence does not extent deep enough compared to the resources invested; and—possibly 
as a result of this—stakeholders’ feeling of ownership over CFP measures may remain 
low (Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær, Forthcoming 2012b, Part 2:5).  
As evident from the descriptions in the preceding sections, the evolution towards a 
widening and deepening of stakeholder involvement in relation to the CFP has in part 
been deliberately orchestrated by the EU and/or DG MARE by providing a wider range of 
formal channels for influence. This has been done most importantly by providing the 
legal base and financial support for setting up RACs but also through the reorganisations 
of ACFA and the routine use of open internet consultations. Conversely, other 
developments seem to be outside what the public bodies can control, as for instance the 
Fish Fight campaign or the increasing role played by certifying bodies, most importantly 
MSC. Likewise, the development towards integrated management with the implications 
for fisheries interests that this might have is to a certain extent a result of international 
commitments of the EU, as well as part of a worldwide trend, in which EU managers 
rather than orchestrating the development will have to act on it.  
 
5.4 Regionalisation  
As discussed in Section 4, the traditional and for that matter also the current mode of 
governance under the CFP is for a variety of reasons widely considered too centralised 
and top-down in nature. This criticism has resulted in various discussions on how to 
restructure the CFP to bring it more in accordance with the requirements of the EU 
subsidiarity principle, although this in principle does not in a legal sense apply to a policy 
area under the exclusive competence of the EU.  
In comparison with the earlier discussions of the RACs and the on-going 
development towards widening and deepening of stakeholder involvement in the CFP, the 
following discussion of regionalisation risks appearing less tangible, primarily because 
regionalisation still figures more as a possible governance element rather than something 
that is already an integral part of the CFP; although in particular the RACs could be 
perceived as the first steps towards regionalisation. Moreover, as evidenced by Hegland, 
Ounanian and Raakjær (Forthcoming 2012a, Part 2:4; Forthcoming 2012b, Part 2:5), it is 
not possible to provide a firm definition of what regionalisation of the CFP entails as 
there are many perceptions of this, which clearly also makes the discussion of this 
element more complex and less straightforward.  
However, in general regionalisation is strongly related to the ‘moving down’ / 
decentralisation of authorities (broadly understood) currently exercised by the central EU 
level institutions to lower politico-administrative levels, such as regional areas larger than 
the member states (e.g. the areas covered by the RACs or those outlined in the MSFD), 
the member states themselves, or regions within the member states. Of these 
understandings, the most conventional understanding of regionalisation refers to regional 
structures above the member states, most clearly exemplified by the current RAC regions 
(see Figure 7). However, in the minds of many, although not all, regionalisation is also 
understood as involving an element of ‘moving out’ in the sense of involving 
stakeholders more in the governance process. That these two elements are at play 
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simultaneously in the discussion of regionalisation is one of the elements that makes this 
issue particularly complicated to get a firm grip on and distinguishes it from being 
‘merely’ an instance of decentralisation.  
Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær (Forthcoming 2012a, Part 2:4) refers to these two 
above issues as two of the problem dimensions in the discussion of regionalisation, 
namely the issue of ‘where’ to regionalise to and ‘whom’ to regionalise to. In addition, 
they point to a third and equally important problem dimension, namely ‘what’ to 
regionalise. Recognising that a broad understanding of ‘authority’ ranges from the right to 
give input to a process and all the way to imposing decisions on another party, it is clear 
that regionalisation is shaped by the type of authority regionalised. And, reflecting the 
same development towards integration of management, as discussed above in section 
5.3.3, it is also an issue whether authorities under discussion are fisheries management 
authorities or whether regionalisation should be about marine management authorities. 
Among the range of governance elements or potential elements that could be 
discussed as possible new modes of governance under the CFP, regionalisation can be 
considered as a particular targeted and comprehensive response to the enlargements of the 
EU and the associated diversification, as discussed in Section 5.1. The continuing 
enlargement of the EU territory has led to a situation where the highly centralised 
structure of the CFP has been forced to cater for increasingly different areas and fisheries 
sector structures—and it is exactly this problem that regionalisation offers to solve by 
introducing a governance structure that potentially builds more directly on the way that 
the fisheries sector, as well as the resources it depends on, operates.  
Anyway, having now briefly introduced the concept of regionalisation, I will in the 
following—with particular emphasis on the most recent years from 2008 to 2011, which 
is the period in which the bulk of research reported in the papers in Part 2 has been 
carried out—initially look at the process, which led to regionalisation getting its own 
headline in the Commission’s recent proposal for reform (Commission, 2011a). While 
doing so, I will likewise discuss what objectives of CFP governance that regionalisation is 
seen as a potential answer to, as well as discuss some of the varying conceptions of 
regionalisation that appear to exist vis-à-vis the different problem dimensions introduced 
above. After having described the process, I will provide some thoughts on how this 
process can be understood. Finally, I will subject what appears to be a likely (but 
definitely not certain) outcome of the coming reform vis-à-vis regionalisation to a 
discussion of to what degree such a potential new element of the CFP can be categorised 
as representing a new mode of governance, and what the potentials and problems of this 
new mode might be. 
5.4.1 Towards Regionalisation: 1991 to 2008 in Brief 
As early as 1991, in advance of the first reform of the CFP in 1992/93, the Commission 
formulated in a report—equivalent to the later Green Papers produced in 2001 
(Commission, 2001) and 2009 (Commission, 2009)—an objective for reform of the CFP, 
which in essence reflects the philosophy behind regionalisation:  
 
…distribution of responsibility at all levels, in accordance with the subsidiarity 
principle, conferring responsibility on the parties concerned, in particular the 
fishermen’s organizations, which could be given the task of implementing the 
management measures at the appropriate level… 
(Commission, 1991, p. V) 
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As evident from the quote (as well as other parts of the report) much of the thinking 
behind the regionalisation idea of simultaneously moving authority down (spreading it 
out over all appropriate levels) and out was, consequently, already taken on-board by the 
Commission in 1991; although the reflections at the time did not go as far as considering 
to establish a politico-administrative structure between the central level and the member 
states, which later has become the hallmark of regionalisation. Anyway, as it turned out, 
the outcome of the 1992 reform and in particular the way it was subsequently 
implemented meant that very little changed in the way that the CFP operated; this despite 
the clear awareness in the EU system about the fact that the CFP was not performing 
particularly well, as also concluded in the Commission’s report from 1991 (Hegland and 
Raakjær, 2008a, Part 2:1).   
According to Symes (Forthcoming 2012), the idea of introducing a regional 
structure between the central level and the member states as a means to achieve some of 
the objectives outlined in the quote above through decentralisation without risking 
altogether re-nationalisation of fisheries management, which would bring with a whole 
different set of problems, was brought to the attention of the Commission trough a 
research project in early 1996 (Devolved and Regional Management Systems for 
Fisheries). The idea involved the establishment of regional management committees that 
would be able to advice on all aspects of fisheries management within a given regional 
sea area. At the same time there was a similar pressure emanating from the catching sub-
sector in the United Kingdom (UK) but for an even more devolved system where the 
regional structures were provided with not only advisory functions but rather with actual 
executive functions (Symes, Forthcoming 2012). Historically, in particular the UK 
catching sub-sector has been sceptical towards the CFP because it has felt that the 
concessions given in relation to fisheries management upon entry of the EC in 1973 and 
the compromise on the CFP in 1983—in particular the issue of allowing equal access for 
other member states’ vessels in UK waters outside the 12 nautical miles (nm) zone—were 
not matched by the benefits of the arrangement. 
Originally a part of the UK catching sub-sector did in fact see a potential in entering 
into the EC but that potential was closely linked to the prospect of simultaneous 
Norwegian membership; the perception being that simultaneous Norwegian membership 
would secure UK access to Norwegian waters even if a system of national EEZs would 
become internationally institutionalised, which it actually did a few years after the 1973 
UK accession with the institutionalisation of the 200 nm EEZ regime in the mid to late 
1970s. However, the Norwegians voted ‘no’ in their referendum over EC membership 
and thereby deprived the UK catching sub-sector of its ‘prize’ for entering the EC. 
Instead the UK catching sub-sector had to face a situation where it had ‘lost access’ to 
prolific Norwegian waters and had to accept that the very large sea area around UK could 
not be restricted to UK vessels even though they had now gotten their own EEZ (Hegland 
and Raakjær, 2008a, Part 2:1).  
Consequently, where there was a UK interest in regionalisation to ‘rectify’ what 
was perceived as a historic injustice of the CFP, the interest for regionalisation was in the 
1980s and 1990s barely present in continental Europe where in particular Spain was 
interested in going in the opposite direction towards further centralisation by abolishing 
the derogations to equal access within the 12 nm zone and allow cross-border trade of 
quotas, thereby effectively creating one joint EU exclusive fishing zone (EFZ) with one 
EU fleet. This would allow the Spanish catching sub-sector, which had been very 
restricted by the institutionalisation of the 200 nm EEZ regime, to extend its activities in 
EU waters. In this way, following Symes (Forthcoming 2012), by the mid-1990s a 
cleavage was becoming increasingly clear between those basically content with s atus 
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quo or minor reform and those arguing for major reform; the latter subsequently being 
divided between those arguing for decentralisation (either in the form of regionalisation 
or re-nationalisation) and those, like Spain, effectively arguing for further harmonisation 
and centralisation. 
As it was, the thoughts related to regionalisation were indeed in part taken on-board 
by the Commission in 2001, when it in its Green Paper (Commission, 2001) and later in 
its proposal for reform (Commission, 2002) proposed establishing so-called Regional 
Advisory Committees (in the proposal renamed Regional Advisory Councils) to involve 
stakeholders more in the discussion of EU fisheries management.33 However, already in 
the Green Paper it was also possible to see the first indications of the presence of legal 
issues and concerns, which would—as we shall see—later become a major stumbling 
block for the further development towards  regionalisation, as the Commission when 
outlining the proposed regional structures felt urged to emphasise the importance of 
“ensuring that fisheries governance remains compatible with the legal and institutional 
framework of the Treaty and that it does not affect the global and Community character 
of the CFP” (Commission, 2001, p. 28).  
As already outlined more in detail in Section 5.2, the RACs were proposed as 
purely advisory and should primarily on request provide advice in particular to the 
Commission, which would then take the advice into consideration. And it was made clear 
that neither the Commission nor the member states would be bound by advice from the 
RACs. With such limited mandate and powers vested with them, the RACs, although 
maybe a step towards regionalisation, met little opposition in the decision-making process 
related to the reform—in particularly because all member states were looking for ways to 
include stakeholders more to increase the legitimacy of the CFP (Hegland, 2004). In any 
case, the 2002 reform actually delivered what had been proposed by providing the legal 
mandate for setting up the structure of RACs, which I have extensively dealt with above 
in Section 5.2. However, besides providing the mandate, a procedure for setting them up, 
as well as indicating that fisher’s organisations should have a privileged position in them 
(as a side-remark, it could be mentioned that such an indication did not figure in the 
Commission’s initial proposal); the remaining issues were left to later when 
implementing the reform, which in the case of the RACs happened with the adoption of a 
Council decision in 2004 (Council, 2004). 
As already described in the sections on the RACs and the widening and deepening 
of stakeholder involvement above, the outcome of the reform was a structure that over the 
years from 2004 to 2008 came to include seven different RACs. RACs, which for the 
most part—but at a variable pace—despite their limited mandate, have been successful in 
providing valuable input to the CFP decision-making process as well as contributing to 
developing trust and understanding between fisheries sector representatives from different 
member states as well as between fisheries sector representatives and representatives of 
other interests (Ounanian and Hegland, Forthcoming 2012, Part 2:6). In 2007, the RACs 
were ‘upgraded’ to a status of bodies pursuing an aim of general European interest, which 
enabled them to get access to permanent funding, rather than the time-limited and 
gradually decreasing start-up budget that they had originally been supplied with.  
The case of the RACs, as described above and in Section 5.2, exhibits several 
features characteristic to new modes of governance / multi-level governance. On the most 
fundamental level, the establishment of RACs constitutes the addition of completely new 
politico-administrative layer in CFP governance. In this context, it is noteworthy that, 
                                                 
33 As discussed further in Hegland and Raakjær (2008b, Part 2:2) and in Section 4 above, in particular 
fisheries sector stakeholders have traditionally oriented themselves more towards their national 
administrations than towards the EU institutions. 
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with the introduction of RACs and thereby basically recognition of an existing 
biogeophysical territorial layer, an attempt has been made to match the scales of the 
politico-administrative system better with its natural counterpart (cf. Figure 5). This kind 
of ‘scale-flexibility’ and willingness to create task-specific jurisdictions lies at the heart of 
multi-level governance. Moreover, the main tool of the RACs in relation to gaining an 
impact on the decision-making process remains the alternative instrument of consensus-
building: in the first instance the RAC needs to build consensus among the various 
stakeholder groups within it; at the same time, however, the RAC needs to anticipate the 
Commission’s position so that the RAC’s consensus does not fall too far from that. If a 
consensus or a ‘close-to-consensus’ can be found between the RAC and the Commission, 
the member states (or smaller groups of member states) in the Council would find it less 
opportune to overrule that consensus. It could be argued that this represents a dispersion 
of power from the central state governments to other actors, i.e. the Commission and the 
RACs, which are in turn becoming increasingly interdependent (vertical and horizontal 
interdependence). 
In relation to the process towards regionalisation, the years from 2003 to 2008 was 
primarily busy with getting the RAC structure in place. However, although the structure 
of RACs certainly led to advances in the relationship between the EU institutions and the 
stakeholder community as well as likely to improved legislation, it did not change the fact 
that centralised management continued in a system where it remained very difficult to 
tailor-make management and where the Council continued to apply very detailed top-
down management.  
However, the apparent success of the RACs in terms of associating stakeholders 
closer to the CFP governance process had fed the seeds of regionalisation, which had 
been sown in connection with the decision to set them up. Large parts of the stakeholder 
community had by 2008 had positive experiences with the RACs and therefore searched 
for ways to build further upon these; the same could in part be said for the European 
institutions as well as the member states (Commission, 2008b). As a result, a pressure for 
more radical reform towards regionalisation, with a stronger emphasis on moving down, 
started to emerge in an environment in which institutional reform continued to be on the 
agenda due to poor economic performance of large parts of the sector as well as 
continued problems with sustainability of many stocks (Symes, Forthcoming 2012)—
something that continued to be at least in part blamed on the set-up of the CFP. However, 
compared to the situation before 2002, rather than emanating more or less exclusively 
from the UK, the concept of regionalisation, as one of the possible ways to fundamentally 
reform the CFP, was beginning to become more widely accepted for at least two reasons 
additional to the positive experiences with the RAC system.  
On one hand, an on-going global paradigmatic shift from sectorial management 
towards increasingly thinking and acting in terms of integrated and holistic eco-system 
based management approaches brought with it various pressures. The basic regulation 
adopted in 2002 (Council, 2002) already included a commitment to move towards to an 
eco-system based approach to fisheries management (EBAFM) but the implications of the 
paradigmatic shift in fisheries management was (and to some extent remains) unclear, 
although it appears unavoidable that the shift will result in further increase in the focus on 
eco-systems rather than individual elements of the ecosystem, such as individual fish 
stocks. Following the reform of 2002/03, two inter-linked EU funded research projects 
(European Fisheries Ecosystem Plan (EFEP) and the larger follow-up project MEFEPO, 
which contributes with papers to this thesis, see Appendix) came to the conclusion that 
the RAC areas / regional seas / LMEs would be an obvious unit to operate with—also in 
respect to the organisation of the governance system—when moving towards EBAFM. 
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From outside of the fisheries domain, the initiative of the Integrated Maritime Policy 
(Commission, 2007), which included a process towards marine spatial planning 
(Commission, 2008c), as well as the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (European 
Parliament and Council, 2008), with its objective to reach ‘good ecological status’ of 
Europe’s seas by 2020, both adopted an approach where regional seas were at the centre. 
Hence, pressures started to mount on the CFP to develop a compatible spatial framework 
to integrate with these initiatives.  
On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty (signed in December 2007, ratified in 
December 2009) was at the same time in the making and it was early on clear that this 
treaty would result in most fisheries management issues being subjected to the co-
decision procedure, where the Parliament acts as a true co-legislator, rather than, as 
before, subjected to the consultation procedure, where the Parliament plays a minor role. 
Although the involvement of the Parliament represented a step forward in terms of 
democratic participation, it was widely predicted that the sharing of responsibility would 
further reduce the efficiency of the system, or as Symes (Forthcoming 2012) later has put 
it, run “the risk of creating the worst of all possible worlds where centralised policy 
making is allied with lengthy and less efficient decision-making.” 
The positive experiences with the RACs, as well as the developments described 
above, led to a situation where the framework conditions halfway between the 2002/03 
and the 2012/13 reforms appeared considerably more favourable vis-à-vis regionalisation 
than prior to the 2002/03 reform. On top, an independent evaluation of the CFP from 
2007 (Sissenwine and Symes, 2007)—commissioned by the Commission itself—also 
pointed to regionalisation as one of the most effective reform options. As it was, the 
report by  Sissenwine and Symes, which was in principle for internal Commission use, 
was in reality widely circulated and soon became the first reference document in the 
discussion of where the CFP should be heading after 2012. In less than two pages, the 
report effectively placed regionalisation on the agenda for the coming reform, concluding 
that regionalisation had several benefits in relation to the CFP:  
 
…a more appropriate scale and focus for fisheries management; a more relevant 
framework in which to develop co-management and promote the functions of RACs; 
a suitable scale at which to progress EBAFM as an operational procedure; and the 
convergence of fisheries management with emerging strategies for the management 
of the marine domain (MSP: Maritime Green Paper). In short, it provides the ideal 
framework for a more imaginative implementation of the subsidiarity principle and 
for elaborating a new system of governance for marine areas. 
(Sissenwine and Symes, 2007, p. 70) 
 
Nevertheless, the report did also present some of the potential ‘costs’ of regionalisation:   
 
…it may appear to undermine the Commission’s ‘exclusive competence’ in 
formulating policy proposals and raise questions as to the legal authority to 
delegate powers to other trans-national organisations; that it relies on an untested 
assumption that neighbouring MS [member states] can work together in an 
effective, responsible and consensual way; that it may threaten the principle of 
relative stability and ideas of open access; that it may involve higher transaction 
costs; and that it could lead to the fragmentation of the CFP.  
(Sissenwine and Symes, 2007, p. 70f) 
 
 40 
In any case, for those looking towards regionalisation as one of the centrepieces of the 
2012 reform of the CFP, the report appeared as good news, insofar that it seemed 
unavoidable that the Commission could shy away from following up the topic. And 
indeed, in the fall of 2008 the first Commission document on the coming reform 
(Commission, 2008a) did take regionalisation on-board, however not with any particular 
determination.  
5.4.2 2008 to 2011: Specific Models and the Commission’s Proposal 
During 2008 DG MARE drafted a working document reflecting on the coming reform of 
the CFP. The document was informally discussed in the Council meeting in the fall of 
200834 and in this way marked the start of the policy-process towards CFP reform. The 
relatively brief Commission working document, which ended up being quite widely 
distributed thus becoming the reference document to follow after the report by Sissenwine 
and Symes, was primarily concerned with evaluating the CFP and presenting knowledge 
on how the policy had failed to reach its objectives and why. In addition, however, the 
document did also represent the Commission’s first attempt to mobilise an agenda for 
reform and outline important priorities. Finally, the document contained some indications 
of how the Commission could imagine the new CFP should be designed, and one of the 
elements that the Commission presented as possible was regionalisation, which would, it 
was suggested: 
 
…allow a drastic simplification of the regulation at EC level by recourse to specific 
regional management solutions implemented by Member States whenever 
appropriate, subject to Community standards and control. This will require strong 
powers by the Commission to act against irresponsible decisions and actions. The 
entry into force of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, which obliges 
Member States to ensure the good environmental status of the seas under their 
jurisdiction until 2020, provides an important orientation in terms of the long-term 
goal on which we need to align the reformed CFP in a coherent manner. 
(Commission, 2008a, p.8) 
 
The above quote represents what was mentioned in the document regarding 
regionalisation in the sense of moving authority down but, as noted by Symes 
(Forthcoming 2012), the document was substantially more lengthy on in particular the 
issue of how to make the industry accountable for sustainable use of a public resource. 
Although further involvement of stakeholders is often seen as integral to regionalisation 
the imbalance between how these two issues were threated was noticeable.  
The next fix-point in the process towards reform and hence also in the process that 
could potentially lead to the regionalisation of the CFP was the Commission’s full Green 
Paper, which the working document could be seen as an appetizer for. To some extent the 
Green Paper, which was made public on 22nd April 2009, confirmed the tendency from 
the working paper: it contained little clear guidance on how regionalisation could be 
achieved in practice. Whether this was due to the Commission being uncertain as to the 
legal possibilities or because they preferred allowing the stakeholders and other interested 
parties to set the agenda more on this issue is not possible to say. In any case, the Green 
Paper presented two ways of regionalising, one technocratic and centralistic way through 
                                                 
34 The discussion does not figure in the Council minutes from the meeting but I received the document from 
a person in a RAC secretariat with the information that it had been informally discussed at the September 
meeting. 
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‘comitology’35, and a way more in line with conventional regionalisation thinking and 
along the lines of what had been presented in the preceding working document: 
Another option to be carefully considered would be to rely wherever possible on 
specific regional management solutions implemented by Member States, subject to 
Community standards and control. The Treaty stipulates that the policy must be 
based on exclusive Community competence but this would not prevent 
implementation decisions from being delegated to Member States, provided they are 
bound by decisions on principles at Community level. For instance, decisions on 
certain principles and standards such as fishing within MSY, adapting fleet 
capacity to available resources or eliminating discards could remain at Community 
level, but it would then be left to Member States to regulate their fisheries within 
these Community standards. In most cases this delegation would need to be 
organised at the level of marine regions because shared fish stocks and shared 
ecosystems cover wide geographical areas and cannot be managed by individual 
Member States acting in isolation. Member States would therefore have to work 
together to develop the set ups required. This set-up requires effective checks and 
balances by the Community to ensure that common standards are safeguarded 
when policy in implemented. 
(Commission, 2009, p. 10f) 
 
Although definitely outlining a ‘space’ for regionalisation, the above hardly represents a 
clear vision. Nevertheless, the Green Paper does convey a few key messages, namely, on 
one hand, that it is indeed considered possible to decentralise authorities from the central 
level to the member states as long as these are exercised within principles decided at the 
central level, and, on the other hand, that many of such authorities decentralised to the 
member states would need to be exercised jointly at the level of marine regions. Anyhow, 
within this space it was left to those wishing to engage in the consultation process to flesh 
out the idea, a process that started immediately after the publication of the Green Paper, 
as comments to the Green Paper had to be in the hands of the Commission by the end of 
2009 to allow time for synthesising them and taking them into consideration in the 
development of the proposal. Although models of regionalisation had been floating 
around earlier, the Green Paper marked a shift in modus from discussing whether 
regionalisation was a good idea and whether the Commission would embrace it towards 
much more intensively discussing the details of how to do regionalisation. 
In particular the second half of 2009 became busy with conferences and meetings 
etc. where regionalisation was on the agenda as a larger or minor issue (see Supplement 2 
of the Appendix for examples). Of the activities that followed after the publication of the 
Green Paper and before the closure of the open consultation, one conference stands out. 
At the conference ‘Regionalization of the CFP’, arranged by the Nordic Council of 
Ministers on 13th October 2009, a paper was presented, which contained a comparison of 
four different ways of doing regionalisation in practice, from the more technocratic 
versions, such as ‘comitology’, to the most evolved both in terms of moving out and 
down. The paper, which was authored by David Symes who was also one of the authors 
of the evaluation of the CFP from 2007 and in general has written extensively on the issue 
of regionalisation over the years, outlined and discussed four alternative models of 
                                                 
35 Under the comitology procedure the Commission adopts implementing measures but does so assisted by 
committees consisting of member state representatives. The powers of the member states vis-à-vis the 
Commission differs according to different types of comitology committees. 
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regionalisation of which the following two—more ambitious models than the 
remaining—were found most worthy of attention:  
 
The administrative solution separates the functions of the Commission and member 
states by establishing regional standing conferences of member states' 
administrations meeting at regular intervals to interpret and implement Community 
policy without intervention from the Commission, Council of Ministers or 
Parliament. RACs continue to provide essential stakeholder advice. 
 
The reorganising solution requires the creation of dedicated Regional Management 
Organisations (RMOs) with permanent secretariats and fixed abodes within the 
regions to give them a clear identity. RMOs would supersede existing RACs; their 
membership would be broadened to include member state administrations and their 
terms of reference widened to confer responsibility for developing regional 
management strategies in line with Community policy and making binding 
recommendations to member states, subject to approval by Commission, Council 
and Parliament. 
(Symes, 2009a, p. 7) 
 
In the paper, the options are subjected to an analysis of their expected performance vis-à-
vis 14 different qualities, including various measures of ‘good governance’ and stated 
aims of the Green Paper, and the conclusion is that the model that scores the highest are 
‘the reorganising solution’. However, Symes recognises that of the two models ‘the 
administrative solution’ stood a better chance of being adopted than ‘the reorganising 
solution’. In the paper, Symes does not select a specific model, although he appears to 
have an affinity for the reorganising solution (Symes, 2009a). However, based on his 
attendance in multiple conferences and further consideration of the available options, 
Symes produces in November 2009 a letter to the Commission (Symes, 2009b), which 
makes clear that he supports a solution along the lines of the administrative solution, even 
though it falls short of the reorganising solution on some counts. Nevertheless, the 
administrative solution is, according to Symes (2009b), “likely to prove the more 
pragmatic, effective and timely”. He further stresses that the model should rest on newly 
decentralised authority to be exercised by the member states collectively as opened for in 
the Green Paper; thereby indicating that implementation of policy in the new system 
cannot be equated to the implementation that member states already now are responsible 
for under the CFP and that the proposal is for a ‘downstream’ model, rather than an 
‘upstream’ model where the regional structure would be relying on formal approval by 
the central level for its decisions to take effect. 
However, as the consultation came to an end, the next major event was the 
publication of the Commission’s synthesis of the open consultation in March 2010. Based 
on the synthesis, the Commission had clearly been given a mandate—if not an 
obligation—to move towards regionalisation, as it confirmed that most stakeholders were 
in favour of some sort of regionalisation. However, there were very different visions of 
how this in practice should look and to what extent stakeholders should be empowered in 
the process. The relatively lengthy quote beneath provides good insight in the many 
different issues in play at the same time: 
 
Support for a move to some form of increased regionalization is generalised. A mix 
of terminology is used – e.g. some refer to regionalization at the sea-basin level, 
others to regions within the MS. Some insist on subsidiarity where MS create 
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regional committees for management and a high level of self-regulation. Others 
propose simple co-operation between MS on issues of implementation and control, 
and some see room for delegated decision powers on e.g. access, resource or fleet 
management. 
A significant number identifies the need for a separate regional body, with varying 
degrees of powers and responsibilities. Most, including the EP, envisage a mainly 
advisory body to discuss and prepare proposals for policy and legislation adoption 
by the EU institutions. Associating the stakeholders and others involved, the 
regional body would then be used for dialogue and discussion. The Baltic region is 
sometimes mentioned as a possible pilot of a MS organization that develops and 
decides on applied regulations (e.g. discards, national quota management). Others 
envisage a regional body as the implementing entity for long-term plans with some 
room for operative regulating powers and implementation decisions. Some 
advocate devolution of powers (e.g. technical details and effort regulation). Some 
contributions suggest a combination of functions. 
On the composition most see the regional body as a MS-led entity, in a number of 
cases membership of industry and stakeholders is advocated, while in other 
contributions the stakeholders keep an advisory function through the RAC. The EC 
is envisaged as a member in some contributions while in others as an active 
observer/collaborator. Some propose a transformation of the RAC into a regional 
advisory body with both MS and stakeholders. 
On the RAC there are some clear messages: their success should be expanded 
through strengthening them, and (according to the RAC themselves) by giving more 
weight to their advice, particularly is cases of unanimity of the advice. The EP 
explicitly requests adequate funding. Some propose a change of composition to 
better balance the industry with the other interests and non-represented 
stakeholders.  
(Commission, 2010, p. 6) 
 
Although this clearly put pressure on the Commission to move forwards in relation to 
regionalisation, the message was not at all that clear in regards to the direction of 
regionalisation. And it was exactly based on the expectation of this outcome, which as 
2009 went by appeared increasingly likely based on the debates and drafts floating around 
prior to the closing of the consultation, that researchers working on the MEFEPO project, 
which contributes with 3 papers to Part 2 of this thesis, initiated a survey. The survey 
aspired to get stakeholders to select between different models, which varied according to 
chosen solutions in regard to the different problem dimensions introduced earlier: what, 
where and whom.  
The exercise was of course complicated by the fact that there are so many 
combinations of solutions, which is further discussed by Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær 
(Forthcoming 2012a, Part 2:4), and it was therefore decided to ask about five models plus 
the present system. For details on the considerations behind the survey, please consult the 
Appendix. It was decided to test models that for the most part represented substantial 
change from the current system, rather than variations of the current system; an approach 
that was by the way supported by Symes’ conclusion that the most promising of his 
models were the more ambitious (Symes, 2009a). The intention of the survey was to get a 
clearer picture of what stakeholders were looking for if they could choose freely, 
uninhibited of for instance legal considerations. The likelihood of adoption were 
consequently not of particular concern when the survey was drafted, although it was of 
course sought to present only models that were ‘within reason’, as defined by the 
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MEFEPO researchers. As a consequence, all the models ‘respected’ that authorities have 
to be de jure placed with the EU central level orwith the member states, as it was also the 
case with the models outlined by Symes (2009a; 2009b). In effect, the MEFEPO work 
developed Symes’ two best scoring models into four options and supplemented them with 
the option of re-nationalising fisheries management altogether, which was included to 
gauge how widespread this rather radical perspective was. The full descriptions and an 
extensive discussion of the models can be found in Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær 
(Forthcoming 2012a, Part 2:4).  
The five models of regionalisation plus the present system were tested through a 
survey, where we in various ways asked our respondents, which came from 4 different 
RACs, to rate the models (including the present system) against each other. The results of 
the survey, which were supplemented with qualitative interviews and a SWOT analysis, 
supported to a wide extent Symes’ conclusions. Solutions that were ambitious in terms of 
shifting authorities and involving stakeholders more in the process were more popular 
than the more low-key solutions but the more low key solution, in the MEFEPO project 
represented by a Cooperative Member State Councils model—an upstream version of 
Symes’ administrative solution, was attractive for more pragmatic reasons such as ease of 
implementation. The option of re-nationalising fisheries management received little 
support.  
In their conclusion, the MEFEPO researchers therefor propose that either the 
Cooperative Member State Councils model or a model based on the establishment of 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations—a more ambitious version of Symes’ 
reorganising solution—could be possible ways forwards for the CFP. For a more 
extensive discussion of these issues, please refer to Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær 
(Forthcoming 2012a, Part 2:4; Forthcoming 2012b, Part 2:5) and Raakjær et al. (2010). In 
this way, the conclusions of Symes and those of MEFEPO fell very close to each other. 
The results of the MEFEPO work were widely distributed in the stakeholder community 
as well as in the Commission. 
Anyway, in July 2011, the Commission unveiled its proposal for reform 
(Commission, 2011a), which presumably would, it was expected, provide a very 
significant indication of the extent of the coming reform. However, as thoroughly 
discussed by Symes (Forthcoming 2012), the proposal is far from clear or convincing on 
the issue of regionalisation. Although much emphasis is placed on regionalisation in the 
accompanying material, the proposal itself does little to clarify how regionalisation 
should be put into practice:  
 
Under the heading of 'conservation of biological resources', the proposed actions 
are divided into Union measures, regionalisation and national measures very much 
in line with the anticipated division of responsibility for decision making between 
central, regional and national levels of authority – and in that sense the draft 
regulation maintains the promise of greater delegation of powers. In practice, 
however, it appears that the intention is for the Commission to retain control over 
the content of multi-annual plans – the key instrument of conservation management 
– including setting the objectives, framing the technical measures to achieve MSY, 
mitigation of environmental impacts and reduction of discards, thus leaving very 
little scope for meaningful delegated responsibility. Under the heading of 
regionalisation it acknowledges that 'Member States may be authorised to adopt 
[additional] measures in accordance with multi-annual plans which specify the 
conservation measures for vessels flying their flag' (Article 17,1). Not only is the 
draft regulation stripped bare of all reference to substantive proposals for how the 
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so-called 'regionalisation' might be developed but even a simple reference to 
member states cooperating at fishery level to ensure compatibility of actions, 
appearing in an earlier draft, has been removed. 
(Symes, Forthcoming 2012). 
 
The most obvious conclusion is that, as also argued by Symes, the complete lack of 
thoughts as to how the member states should develop a regional structure to coordinate 
through does not promise well for the future of regionalisation. It appears that the 
proposal caters for a system, which is in a high risk of failing in terms of strengthening 
the regional aspect of fisheries management to any particular degree. At best, the proposal 
allows member states to adapt legislation to their own national needs, one is tempted to 
argue. 
However, a reading of the accompanying material and a second reading of the 
proposal may—if not clarify things—then at least indicate that there might be some more 
room for and dedication to regionalisation in the Commission’ thinking and thereby also 
some hope vis-à-vis regionalisation. Although not an official Commission document, the 
vagueness but also the underlying aspirations of the Commission’s proposal can be 
illuminated by this quote from an article on regionalisation in the ‘Fisheries and 
Aquaculture in Europe’ magazine, which is published by DG MARE: 
 
The fact that most large stocks in EU waters are exploited by fleets from several    
Member States nevertheless has to be taken into account. Ideally, the implementing 
measures decided by these different States should be compatible with one another 
within a shared fishery. In this case, the Member States will have to engage in 
coordination but will be free to choose the form of such coordination.  
There is no question of obliging all Member States to sign up automatically and 
straight away to this system, whether for decentralisation or coordination of 
individual fisheries. The Commission is aware that this will come about according 
to States’ determination, budgetary means and facility working together. In the 
Baltic, for instance, there is already a strong tradition of regional cooperation that 
will probably make coordination of individual fisheries easier. This is not always 
the case elsewhere. This decentralisation and cooperation  sea basin level will 
therefore be phased in on a flexible basis. 
(DG MARE, 2011, p. 7) 
 
Another, more official source of information, which might also help us interpret the 
proposal, is the official communication accompanying the proposal, in which the 
following statements can be found: 
 
The Commission proposes an agenda that is ambitious as regards regionalisation 
and simplification. EU fisheries legislation adopted centrally should focus on 
objectives, targets, minimum common standards and results, and delivery 
timeframes. While key decisions remain at EU level, Member States will have the 
flexibility to decide on other measures for fisheries management, under the 
supervision of the Commission, in full compliance with the provisions of EU law. 
To ensure effective management, Member States could adopt, for example, the 
desired mix of technical conservation measures and anti-discard measures. They 
would then individually implement these measures in their national legislation. 
Regionalisation is continued all the way down, and would include more self-
management for the fishing industry by increasing fishermen’s involvement in the 
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policies and acceptance of them, thus contributing to better compliance with the 
rules.  
(Commission, 2011b, p. 7) 
 
As a final example, in a press release in the form of a memo containing questions and 
answers on the reform also published together with the proposal, the following can be 
found: 
 
The Commission proposal is clarifying roles and obligations of each actor and will 
bring decisions closer to the fishing grounds. It will end micro-management from 
Brussels so that EU legislators will only define the general framework, the basic 
principles, the overall targets, the performance indicators and the timeframes. 
Member States will then decide the actual implementing measures, and will 
cooperate at regional level. The proposal includes provisions to ensure that the 
Member States concerned adopt measures which are compatible and effective. A 
fall-back mechanism is established for Commission action in cases where Member 
States cannot agree, or where the targets are not being reached. 
(Commission, 2011c) 
 
Consequently, although one could be either encouraged (“They seem so dedicated 
therefore it will work out!”), bewildered (“I must be overlooking or misunderstanding 
something!”) or provoked (“They are trying to talk their way out of not having delivered 
anything!”) by the emphasis that the Commission puts on regionalisation in the 
accompanying materials in contrast to in the proposal, which is not by far as clear and 
where regionalisation has to be found ‘between the lines’, the three lengthy quotes above 
does seem to indicate that the Commission might be reading more into the proposal than 
what is seen in a reading of it in isolation.  
5.4.3 Regionalisation and New Modes of Governance 
Regionalisation of the CFP can be discussed vis-à-vis new modes of governance in at 
least two ways. For one, the general approach that the Commission took to the reform, not 
least in relation to the issue of regionalisation, can be viewed as an example of an 
increasingly open and inclusive approach to developing policy. Secondly, the 
Commission’s vision of regionalisation more specifically could also in itself be seen as a 
new approach to governance in the CFP, which breaks with the traditional highly 
centralised, command-control approach, replacing it with more flexible and soft 
approach.  
The process that preceded the publication of the Commission’s proposal in July 
2011, illustrates the further institutionalisation of—at least on the surface—an open and 
inclusive approach to the development of CFP macro-policy, which the Commission 
already introduced in connection with the 2002/03 reform. As further described in 
Hegland (2004), the Commission did already in connection with the previous reform 
introduce an interactive approach to reform by embarking on wide-ranging efforts to get 
input from stakeholders in advance of the proposal. This approach has been continued in 
the case of the current reform process, which compared to the previous reform process 
has, however, been characterised comparatively more by the ever-present internet as a 
means of communication, which the Commission has made significant use of in 
connection with the open consultation as an example, as well as a means of exerting 
pressure, as exemplified by the ‘Fish Fight’ campaign, described in Section 5.3.2.  
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Arguably, however, the main new mode of governance in the present process compared 
to the previous is not really related to either the moving out or the moving down of CFP 
governance, which have been the elements under investigation in the Part 1. Rather, the 
main difference is likely to become evident in the process to follow after this thesis is 
submitted, namely the process of joint decision-making between the Council and the 
Parliament, which rather than an example of moving down or out could more 
appropriately be termed an instance of ‘moving around’ at the central level. Besides this, 
however, a very notable difference between the process last time and this time seems to 
lie in the role that the RACs has played in the reform deliberations in general—but of 
course specifically in relation to the question of regionalisation, which the RACs as 
institutions have a particular stake in.  
The presence of the RACs influenced the process in various ways. Obviously, the 
relative success of the RACs has to a significant extent contributed to putting 
regionalisation firmly on the agenda, although as discussed above other changes in the 
context of the CFP, such as the increasing focus on the eco-system as the appropriate unit 
for management interventions, also affected this. More concretely, the RACs have been in 
a position to organise joint inputs and inform individual inputs from groups of 
stakeholders. This has been done by having dedicated working groups within the RACs 
working on issues related to the reform, as well as organising conferences, of which a 
particular large one arranged in Edinburgh in November 2009 stand as the most 
prominent example (see Supplement 2 of the Appendix). In this way the RACs have 
taken on a role as purveyors of information and hubs for regional networks of 
stakeholders, both of which have contributed to making regionalisation one of the hot 
topics of the reform. In this way the reform process has been characterised by the 
presence of a new politico-administrative structure at a regional level, and it is noticeable 
that the politico-administrative structure there is clearly dominated by stakeholders, 
which has resulted in stakeholders being the core actors at this level.  
However, having briefly discussed the openness of the process, a few words on the 
opposite. Because, although the process has been very open, what we have been 
witnessing in the latest 3 years is also a process where hopes were (maybe too) high from 
the outset in light of what appeared to be favourable context. Then aspirations over time 
decreased following discussions of what is and is not legally feasible, as well as 
considerations of institution building as a slow process. This led to an increasing 
recognition of the fact that what mattered the most was to take determinate steps towards 
regionalisation—not necessarily to go for the ‘whole package’. As examples, this resulted 
in proposals from Symes and MEFEPO that were in fact very modest.  To some extent 
this is of course the nature of the game that the CFP is in itself embedded in a highly 
hierarchical legal setting and has to comply with the Treaties. However, in the long run it 
seems likely that the sort of procedure witnessed here might result in stakeholder fatigue, 
at least if, as there seems to be a certain risk of, the proposal does not really end up 
delivering regionalisation or significantly increased stakeholder participation. 
Finally, when discussing the process vis-à-vis new modes of governance, the 
discrepancy between the way that the Commission has emphasised regionalisation in the 
accompanying materials vis-à-vis what they have in reality have been able to deliver in 
the proposal is interesting. One interpretation of this could be the one I mentioned above 
that they are serious about this but unable to manifest it in the proposal due to legal 
difficulties. In this interpretation the Commission’s surrounding documents might be 
intended to sustain the pressure towards regionalisation by keeping it firmly on the 
agenda. Thereby, instead of relying on command-control and hierarchy (which is 
arguable also in the package, see beneath) to advance the creation of regional structures 
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for cooperation, then instead using a flexible approach were blaming and shaming can 
later be used to call out the regions or member states unwilling to embrace the new 
regime of ‘voluntary’ regional cooperation. 
Having now briefly discussed the process towards regionalisation, the 
Commission’s specific model (or vision) for regionalisation does also bear some 
hallmarks of new modes of governance—if we take the Commission’s accompanying 
material as an indication of what the proposal in reality entails. In section 3.1, I argued 
that new governance practices could only be seen as examples of new modes of 
governance if they represented something ‘genuinely novel’ within their context. If this is 
taken as point-of-departure for the discussion here, the Commission’s vision of 
regionalisation does indeed, with all its uncertainties taken into consideration, represent a 
new mode of governance under the CFP, which in several ways indicates a break with 
current practices. Two aspects of the Commission’s thinking appear particularly 
interesting in the context of new modes of governance: flexibility of governance 
structures and the wish to resort to ‘framework-decisions’ rather than micro-management 
from the central level. 
The most notable feature of the Commission’s vision vis-à-vis the current system is 
the potential flexibility it entails in relation to the set-up of the regional governance 
structure. The Commission’s proposal encourages the development of (but outlines no 
default) structures for regional cooperation between the member states, rather on the 
contrary. Not even from the accompanying material is it possible to get a clear picture of 
what the Commission is imagining. And this might exactly be a key message. The very 
loose guidelines leaves it, consequently, more or less entirely up to the member states on 
a voluntary basis to design governance structures for their own region, which is in reality 
quite in line with the philosophy of tailor-making rather than going for one-size-fits-all 
approaches. There is little doubt, as also predicted by the Commission, that this will lead 
to highly different paces towards and approaches vis-à-vis regionalisation in the different 
regions, which might, however, over time nonetheless result in the development of one or 
more best practices that can serve as inspiration for other regions.  
The EU member states around the Baltic Sea, for instance, have since the summer 
of 2010 been engaging in an informal cooperative structure, Baltfish, which has likely 
been of inspiration to the Commission. However, it has to be highlighted that Baltfish is 
currently under accusation for being very closed and unresponsive to stakeholders, 
something that might seem to suggest that the informal character of member state 
cooperative structures entails a risk of these not being to the same degree as formal 
structures grounded in principles of good governance. 
However, arguably, one of the problems involved in designing very concrete and 
tangible models of regionalisation, which can be designed as to accommodate for instance 
stakeholder involvement, as was done by both Symes and in the MEFEPO project, is that 
opting for and advancing a specific model to be rolled out over the entire European space 
is complicated by the fact that, although there seems to be a universal need for some sort 
of regional structure, it is equally clear the needs and capacities for this varies. To some 
extent this means that universal models of regionalisation risk being fit for only a few 
regions, thereby replicating the exact problem with conventional CFP decision-making. In 
this sense there is a clear trade-off in the fact that the more informal member state 
cooperation leaves room for adaptation to regional specificities but at the same time it 
also leaves room for the member states to operate outside a framework of good 
governance. However, by constructing a set-up, which requires the member states to 
cooperate without detailing how such cooperation shall materialise, the Commission’s 
proposal provides sufficient room for flexible approaches to develop. And, importantly, 
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due to the exclusive competence nature of the policy-area, the Commission retains the 
possibility to fall back to centralised decisions-making if they are not satisfied with the 
way the member states coordinate their implementation efforts, a possibility outlined in 
Article 20 of the proposal (Commission, 2011a).  
The need for Article 20, which basically allows the Commission to overrule 
member states if they fail to adopt necessary measures to implement LTMP, follows from 
what appears new to the CFP and might potentially change the way fisheries management 
is carried out, namely the promise of the central level to shy away from detailed decision-
making and instead focus on more general decisions, such as “the general framework, the 
basic principles, the overall targets, the performance indicators and the timeframes” 
(Commission, 2011c). Instead the member states, cooperating when necessary in a 
structure of own choice as discussed above, will be responsible for implementation 
measures. However, on this point the proposal seems unclear in the sense that general 
decisions, which will still lie at the central level, can be extremely restrictive in the sense 
of setting a very tight frame for implementation, which might potentially void the new 
powers of the member states of content. A central question is therefore to what extent the 
central level (the Commission) applies a minimum definition to LTMPs and follows a 
hands-off approach in relation to their implementation. This is difficult to say based on 
the proposal. For example, one of the big issues in fisheries management and the 
rebuilding of stocks is the issue of over what timeframe rebuilding should happen, and it 
is clear that setting very tight targets will in serious ways limit the possibility to develop 
regional approaches to management.  
Consequently, the Commission’s proposal can be interpreted as genuinely novel in 
its approach to governance and the implementation of measures. However, there are a 
number of uncertainties, which suggests that the extent to which this will in fact 
materialise will depend very much on how the Commission as well as the member states 
decide to use the new framework. In this sense the framework requires a considerable 
degree of political will  to make it workable. And it is moreover clear that the framework 
as it is outlined now to a significant extent fails to secure more decisive involvement of 
stakeholders in the process. This appears to be a possible problem of the proposal, which 
might provide for more efficiency by leaving more technical decisions to the member 
states but at the same time not maybe provide legitimacy; maybe on the contrary as 
important decisions regarding implementation are moved from the central level to 
informal networks of member states.  
 
6 Conclusion and Implications 
The intention of Part 1 of this thesis has been to explore whether—and if affirmative, then 
to what extent—two distinct but highly intertwined macro-developments within the CFP 
show convincing evidence of a shift in governance towards what is commonly referred to 
as ‘new modes of governance’ as opposed to the ‘traditional style of governance’. The 
style of governance under the CFP has traditionally been described as entailing central 
EU institutions outlining and applying very detailed regulations in relative isolation from 
those affected and without any particular success related to tailor-making measures to 
circumstances. This practice has led to well-described problems vis-à-vis basic objectives 
of the CFP related to legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness—and a track-record that 
impresses few.  
New modes of governance involves, as outlined and discussed more in detail in 
Section 3.1, increased use of such things as innovative modes of decisions-making 
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outside treaty provisions, increased use of soft law, stronger involvement of private 
partners in the governance process, informal governance procedures, mechanisms for 
adjustment to circumstances, restructuring of existing hierarchical patterns etc. Following 
Diedrichs, Reiners and Wessels (2011), the most important variables in the study of EU 
governance involves changes in the balance of authority between public and private 
actors, shifts in the balance between hard and soft instruments, and shifts in the pattern of 
decision-making between intergovernmental and supranational procedures. In the 
following, I will briefly recapitulate the evidence from the preceding analysis while 
associating this with new modes of governance. 
The macro-developments that the analysis has focused on are: 1) the widening and 
deepening of stakeholder involvement in CFP governance, and 2) regionalisation of CFP 
governance, which both potentially impinge on traditional, established structures of 
actors, institutions and interventions under the CFP. As mentioned, these two 
developments are in the case of the CFP highly intertwined, exemplified most clearly by 
the establishment of the RACs, which simultaneously stands out as the most tangible 
example of both developments by entailing the setting up of stakeholder bodies 
predominantly organised according to regional sea areas spanning multiple member 
states’ jurisdictions, thereby occupying a central role in the analysis.  
On a more general level these two developments are related to broader currents of 
thinking in relation to the CFP, namely the ‘moving out’ and the ‘moving down’ of 
governance. Both currents have over the years gained in strength and relevance, not least 
due to the—partly enlargement-driven—increase in the diversity of waters, stocks, 
fisheries, fleets, interests and cultures dealt with under the CFP.  
Where the idea of ‘moving down’ in the CFP basically refers to efforts to move 
selected authorities currently held at the central EU level to lower politico-administrative 
levels, such as smaller groups of member states working in cooperation, individual 
member states, or subnational regional or local authorities, the idea of ‘moving out’ refers 
to efforts related to shifting authorities from the ‘original’ institutional actors (most 
prominently the Commission, Parliament, Council, and the member states’ authorities) 
involved in classic style EU governance (or government) to increasingly taking advantage 
of alternative set-ups, such as semi-independent, central-level agencies, structures of 
public-private cooperation, or private self-governance. Both currents of thinking appear 
related to new modes of governance. As already illustrated by the example of the RACs, 
the two currents of thinking can and will often merge when applied in practice. 
As regards the development of stakeholder involvement in the CFP, Part 1 identifies 
and focuses on three elements of what appears to be a general process towards a widening 
and deepening of stakeholder involvement: 1) role of fishers’ representatives, 2) role of 
non-industry stakeholders (primarily environmental NGOs), and 3) involvement of 
representatives from other sectors as a consequence of the move from fisheries specific 
management to marine management. 
The first element to the macro-development related to stakeholder involvement that 
Part 1 highlights is the increase of the involvement of fishers / fishers’ representatives in 
EU central level governance. From a situation where fishers’ representatives were 
primarily active and heard at the level of the member states, particularly the establishment 
of the RACs but also shifts in the way fishers’ representatives and other actors approach 
the governance process has resulted in notable changes. To take the latter first, the 
community of fishers’ representatives seem, as an example, to be increasingly taking a 
more constructive role to science, which involves not necessarily less confrontation but at 
least more cooperation or challenging of science by its own rules. In the thesis, the 
development of the horse-mackerel LTMP provides an example of this. This process was 
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facilitated by the existence of an appropriate RAC for the efforts, which exemplifies the 
more general point that the RACs have provided fishers’ representatives with an arena on 
which to explore new approaches to involvement in governance and, in particular, get a 
closer relationship with the Commission. Strengthening this relationship for advice 
purposes was the main reason for setting up the RACs and, although notoriously difficult 
to measure, the horse mackerel LTMP, results from an industry dominated survey 
presented, as well as other material seem to indicate that participants in the RACs are able 
to exert a certain measure of influence in the governance process qua their capacity as 
sources of advice for (primarily) the Commission. The extent of the influence appears, 
however, uncertain, variable and in any case not overwhelming.  
The second element of the macro-process consists of an increased level of 
involvement of fisheries stakeholders in a broader sense than those related to the fisheries 
sector, most notable (but not exclusively) environmental NGOs. Although fishers and the 
fisheries sector are privileged by preferential treatment and the fisheries sector as a whole 
occupies two-thirds of the seats in the RACs, there seems to be a strong case for arguing 
that in particular the establishment of the  RACs—but also changes to ACFA, the general 
‘greening of policies’, and the increase in the use of the internet both to apply bottom-up 
pressure on public bodies and solicit opinions from stakeholders top-down—has resulted 
in a diversification of the stakeholders able to voice their opinions and be heard in the 
governance process, indicating a development towards some degree of crowding in the 
stakeholder community around the CFP. Like in the case of the fishers’ representatives, 
there are indications that these interest groups are also in a position to exercise influence. 
Even though disadvantaged by a limited number of seats, this seems to be not least due to 
their presence in the RACs. 
As the final element of the first macro-process, Part 1 highlights an emerging shift 
from the CFP being the all dominating mechanism for fisheries management towards a 
situation where important decisions vi -à-vis fisheries management tend to be taken in or 
shaped by encompassing initiatives, where traditional stakeholders under the CFP will be 
increasingly confronted with powerful interest such as oil and gas, shipping, and 
renewable energy, something which, it is argued, might be particularly problematic for 
the representatives of the fisheries sector.  
Turning to the macro-development towards regionalisation, the situation is 
compared to that of stakeholder involvement even more ambiguous. And, as it was the 
case for the stakeholder involvement process, the establishment of the RACs is also in 
relation to this process a fix-point. The establishment of the RACs represented the first 
formal recognition of the level of the regional seas as being of particular importance in 
and centrality to EU fisheries management. 
Although regionalisation had been on the agenda before the establishment of the 
RACs, the institutionalisation of RACs in the CFP has created an entirely new basis to 
discuss regionalisation from, as there is now experience with a regional structure, 
which—although still being in a phase of start-up and institutional learning—has already 
outperformed its initial sceptics. Moreover, the establishment of the RACs has to some 
extent created—or at least facilitated the creation of—‘regional’ stakeholder communities 
or networks. In addition, the discussion of a more decisive shift towards regionalisation 
has been facilitated by changes in the context of fisheries management, such as the rise of 
the paradigm of integrated, holistic management based on eco-system considerations, as 
well as the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which is expected to make the traditional 
micro-management approach increasingly inoperable due to the increased role played by 
the Parliament at central level.  
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At the time of writing, the above factors seem possibly to have steered the Commission 
(and other EU actors) on to a road cautiously leading towards what appears to be more 
regionalisation or at least decentralisation. However, true regionalisation (or 
decentralisation) requires that authorities are de facto reshuffled between actors and 
politico-administrative levels, which will always be contentious. Moreover, 
regionalisation challenges EU law in at least two ways: 1) It is argued to be unclear how 
much power the central level can in fact surrender to lower politico-administrative levels 
in an area of exclusive competence of the EU. 2) It remains a challenge to figure out how 
to commit the member states to cooperation at regional level. According to EU law, it has 
been argued, it is only possible to place authorities either at the central EU level or at the 
level of the member states—and not with in-between entities like a group of member 
states cooperating to manage fisheries issues in a regional sea area. At the time of writing 
no clear answers to these legal queries have been found.  
In the synthesis, the macro-development towards regionalisation is discussed vis-à-
vis new modes of governance in two ways: 1) as an example of a policy-process, and 2) 
as a specific governance structure / element.  
Firstly, recent years’ policy process towards regionalisation, and in particular the 
way the Commission has approached it, shows evidence of an approach to the 
development of policy, which in several ways draws on governance practices associated 
with new modes of governance. One example of this is the extent to which the 
Commission has relied on proposals for regionalisation being in practice developed 
outside the remit of the Commission in networks of researchers and stakeholders working 
in highly flexible networks and contexts. And, notably, in this process the RACs have 
been at the core, taking on a role as both purveyors of information and hubs for regional 
networks of stakeholders, both of which have contributed to making regionalisation one 
of the hot topics of the reform, although in fierce competition with other topics. In this 
way the Commission appears to have let the stakeholder community, assisted by 
researchers, drive the discussion of regionalisation as well as advancing the point that 
regionalisation has a role to play in the future CFP.  
Secondly, when discussed vis-à-vis new modes of governance, the model for 
regionalisation contained in the Commission’s proposal for reform can also be viewed as 
evidence of the—in this case potential—spread of practices of new modes of governance 
in the CFP. For one thing, the proposal seems to outline a model for regionalisation where 
the central level, rather than prescribing a specific governance structure for regional 
cooperation, creates the necessary space to allow the member states to develop the 
structure that they see most fit and appropriate. This is very much in accordance with 
characteristics of new modes of governance, such as making governance more flexible 
and informal, as well as relying on voluntary cooperation rather than hierarchical power-
relationships. Nevertheless, the Commission maintains in its proposal a fall-back clause, 
which allows it to take back the new powers vested with the member states, if these fail to 
develop the necessary structures for cooperation.  
Nonetheless, the Commission’s proposal seems to outline a distinctly different 
approach to the CFP than the detailed command-control structure of formal hierarchies, 
which has been characteristic of the traditional mode of governance in the CFP. Similarly, 
also when it comes to interventions decided under the CFP, the proposal from the 
Commission shows evidence of a shift towards a situation where the member states will 
be allowed increasingly to adjust implementation to circumstances, as the Commission 
proposes that the central level should restrict itself to such things as defining the general 
framework, basic principles, targets, indicators and timeframes. In other words, the 
central level should define the goals and the time it should take to get there. In contrast, 
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besides defining some general principles, the central level should be less concerned with 
how the member states arrive at the goals. 
Where, then, does this leave us vi -à-vis the intention to explore whether the above 
two intertwined macro-processes show evidence of a—possibly incremental—shift 
towards what can broadly be captured under the heading of new modes of governance? 
Well, I would argue that the evidence of the Part 1, which is briefly summarised above, 
mandates an affirmative but cautious ‘yes’. A certain caution is appropriate since, 
although there are definitely evidence that points in the direction of new modes of 
governance, the strength of what this evidence shows, in the sense of evidencing ‘real 
substantial’ rather than ‘superficial’ change, is debatable. Moreover, to some extent the 
evidence presented relates to the content of the Commission’s proposal and 
accompanying material, which, although being to some extent an ‘indicator’ of the 
content of the coming reform by no means can be taken as the ‘end of story’. So where 
the answer to question of whether the two macro-processes contain evidence of a shift 
towards new modes of governance is ‘yes’, the answer to the questions of the extent of 
the shift remains somewhat more uncertain. 
In many ways the coming reform of the CFP can be viewed as a litmus test of 
whether the CFP is ready to truly embrace new modes of governance. The RACs, which 
were set up following the previous reform, are in many ways excellent examples of new 
modes of governance. However, importantly, the setting up of the RACs has, due to their 
advisory status, not really contributed to fundamental change in the core decision-making 
hierarchy of the CFP. So—in a way—new modes of governance has been flourishing 
around the core processes of the CFP but only to a limited extent within them, one could 
argue. The question remains whether the changing circumstances of the CFP, including 
not least the increased involvement of the Parliament and the institutionalisation of the 
RACs, will push the core decision-makers in the direction of substantial change towards 
new modes of governance and new governance structures—simply because continuing as 
if nothing has happened is not sensible—or if the CFP will continue muddling-through 
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The PhD thesis, ‘Fishing for Change in EU Governance - Excursions into the Evolution 
of the Common Fisheries Policy’ by Troels J. Hegland, Innovative Fisheries 
Management, Aalborg University, consists of seven papers and a synthesis, all concerned 
with aspects of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU). 
Whereas the synthesis, which constitutes Part 1, is single-authored by Troels J. Hegland, 
the accompanying papers, which constitute Part 2, are co-authored by Troels J. Hegland 
and various colleagues. 
The point of departure for the thesis is an understanding of the CFP as having failed 
to deliver optimal results since being set up in 1983. Not only has the policy, which is 
intended to facilitate sustainable fishing, been unable to prevent a number of fish stocks 
in European waters from decreasing to precarious levels, it has also, it is argued, 
contributed to the development and maintenance of a much too large combined European 
fishing fleet, which is for a significant part struggling with low profitability.  
In several of the papers root causes of the problems of the CFP are identified. These 
include an inbuilt incentive at member state level to drift during implementation, thus 
undermining their own good intensions at EU level; an inability to decide measures for 
specific seas or fisheries without those decisions being linked to decisions regarding other 
seas or fisheries, thereby reducing the ability to tailor-make management in a fisheries 
system characterised more by diversity than commonality; a lack of convincing 
involvement of stakeholders in EU level decision-making, which has undermined the 
legitimacy of the CFP; as well as a failure to clarify and acknowledge the distribution of 
roles and authorities in the system, which has resulted in a failure to focus on long-term 
sustainability and in the Commission being blamed for fisheries management failures 
where in fact the Council and the member states have been more to blame. Although 
recognised that these are not the only, the above problems are identified as core.  
In several papers the option of regionalising the governance system of the CFP in 
order to put it on the right track is investigated. Although regionalisation based on the 
regional seas (North Sea, Baltic sea, etc.) is only one reform possibility among several, it 
is argued that it is an option that would potentially efficiently and fundamentally deal 
with the problems, while at the same time facilitate the move towards more integrated 
marine management in accordance with other EU initiatives such as the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive and the Integrated Maritime Policy, which both focus on regional 
cooperation. It is also documented that regionalisation has considerable support in the 
stakeholder community. Many rounds of enlargements of the EU have left the centralised 
mode of governance, which might have been appropriate in 1983 when the CFP was 
basically concerned with managing the fisheries of the North Sea, unable to respond to 
the needs of very diverse areas and fisheries. However, as fish remains a shared resource 
it is not an attractive solution to resort to national management unless this being 
conditioned on regional cooperation. It is also suggested that part of regionalisation has to 
be increased stakeholder involvement to follow up on the success of the stakeholder-led 
Regional Advisory Councils set up from 2004. 
In the synthesis Troels J. Hegland analyses the political process towards 
regionalisation. His diagnosis is that the CFP is on the edge of taking a wrong turn–or at 
least a detour—but that there might still be possibilities to develop regionalisation by 
means of so-called new modes of governance. However, this will, it is argued, require 
much stronger political will than what has been characteristic of the CFP over the years. 
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Resumé (Danish Summary) 
 
PhD afhandlingen, ‘Fishing for Change in EU Governance - Excursions into the 
Evolution of the Common Fisheries Policy’ af Troels J. Hegland, Innovative Fisheries 
Management, Aalborg Universitet, består af syv papers og en syntese, alle omhandlende 
aspekter af den Europæiske Unions (EU) Fælles Fiskeripolitik. Hvor syntesen, Del 1 af 
afhandlingen, er forfattet af Troels J. Hegland alene, så er de medfølgende papers, Del 2 
af afhandlingen, forfattet af Troels J. Hegland i samarbejde med forskellige kolleger. 
Udgangspunktet for afhandlingen er en forståelse af den Fælles Fiskeripolitik som 
have været ude af stand til at levere optimale resultater siden etableringen i 1983. Ikke 
alene har politikken, som skal tilvejebringe bæredygtigt fiskeri, været ude af stand til at 
forhindre, at et antal europæiske fiskebestande er reduceret til faretruende lave niveauer, 
den har også, argumenteres der, bidraget til udviklingen og opretholdelsen af en alt for 
stor europæisk fiskeriflåde, der for en dels vedkommende kæmper med lav profitabilitet.  
I flere papers identificeres den Fælles Fiskeripolitiks grundlæggende problemer. 
Disse inkluderer et indbygget incitament på medlemsstats niveau til at fravige 
målsætningerne i implementeringsfasen, hvorved egne gode intentioner på EU niveau 
undermineres; en manglende evne til at skræddersy forvaltningsinitiativer til bestemte 
områder eller fiskerier uden at disse beslutninger knyttes til beslutninger i for andre 
områder eller fiskerier, hvorigennem evnen til at skræddersy forvaltningsinitiativer 
reduceres i et fiskerisystem, der er mere præget af forskellighed end fællestræk; en 
mangel på overbevisende inddragelse af interessentgrupper i beslutningsprocessen på EU 
niveau, hvilket har undermineret den Fælles Fiskeripolitiks legitimitet; såvel som en 
manglende klarhed over fordelingen af roller og autoritet i systemet, hvilket har resulteret 
i manglende fokus på langsigtet bæredygtighed og i at Kommissionen ofte bebrejdes for 
forvaltningsproblemer, der retteligen burde bebrejdes Rådet og medlemsstaterne. Uanset 
at det er andre problemer, identificeres overstående som grundlæggende.  
Over flere papers undersøges mulighederne for at regionalisere den Fælles 
Fiskeripolitiks politiko-administrative strukturer for at få politikken tilbage på sporet. 
Desuagtet at regionalisering baseret på regionale havområder (Nordsøen, Østersøen, etc.) 
er en blandt flere reform muligheder, så argumenteres der for, at denne mulighed 
potentielt set effektivt og fundamentalt kan imødekomme problemerne, og på samme tid 
muliggøre integreret marin forvaltning, som allerede gennem andre EU-initiativer, så som 
Havstrategidirektivet og den Integrerede Maritime Politik, forudsættes baseret på 
regionalt samarbejde. Det dokumenteres også, at regionalisering har betydelig opbakning 
blandt interessenter. Adskillige udvidelser af EU har efterladt den stærkt centraliserede 
Fælles Fiskeripolitik—som måske var et passende svar på udfordringerne i 1983, hvor det 
basalt set drejede sig om forvaltningen af fiskeriet i Nordsøen—i en situation, hvor den 
ikke kan respondere på behovene i forskelligartede regioner og fiskerier. Ikke desto 
mindre, eftersom fisk forbliver en fælles ressource, er det ikke et attraktivt alternativ at 
lade medlemsstaterne stå for forvaltningen med mindre disse bindes op på at samarbejde 
på regionalt plan. Det fremføres endvidere, at en komponent af regionalisering 
nødvendigvis må være yderligere inddragelse af interessenter i forlængelse af de positive 
erfaringer med de Regional Rådgivende Råd, der er blevet etableret fra 2004. 
I syntesen analyses den politiske proces mod regionalisering. Diagnosen er, at den 
Fælles Fiskeripolitik synes tæt på at tage en uheldig retning, men at der fortsat er 
mulighed for at udvikle regionalisering via ’new modes of governance’. Dette vil 
imidlertid kræve en dedikeret politisk vilje, som man hidtil har været uvant med.
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Appendix: Projects, Papers and Research Techniques 
 
 
Projects and Papers 
 
Over the years where I have been employed at the Institute for Fisheries Management and 
Coastal Community Development (IFM; 2004-2007) and Innovative Fisheries 
Management – an Aalborg University Research Centre (IFM-AAU; 2007 to date) I have 
worked on approximately 10 different research projects relating to various aspects of the 
CFP—most of these in collaboration with other research institutions spread across all of 
Europe and wider. Of these projects three deserve a brief introduction as work within 
these projects has contributed with one or more papers to the collection in Part 2 of the 
thesis. Consequently, in the following I will briefly introduce the objective of each of 
these projects as well as a very rough overview of the research design.  
Besides the publications and papers mentioned in the following sections, a few 
other publications and documents of mine deserve mentioning as parts of the fundament 
for Part 1 of the thesis. These are: Hegland (2004)—my Master thesis; Hegland (2006)—
a book chapter developed in relation to the EFIMAS project (Operational Evaluation 
Tools for Fisheries Management Options; 2004-2008)i; and Hegland (2009)—a working 
paper developed as a PhD course assignment.  
 
The ITAC Project 
Within the Research Council of Norway funded ITAC project (Implementation of TACs 
in the Atlantic Fisheries; 2006-2008) we studied—not least in a historical perspective—
the administrative processes of implementing fisheries conservation policies in the North 
Atlantic. We did this by looking into and comparing the practices of three countries 
carrying out significant fisheries activities in this area: the Faroe Islands (a self-governing 
territory within the Kingdom of Denmark but outside the EU), Norway (outside the EU), 
and, finally, Denmark (as member of the EU and hence subjected to the CFP). The 
responsibility of IFM / IFM-AAU (represented by myself and my colleague Professor 
Jesper Raakjær) included in particular looking at the practices in Denmark and the EU. 
In terms of research design, the ITAC project combined literature reviews, 
document studies and key informant interviews. The branch of ITAC that related to the 
EU was basically carried out as a desk study due to the significant amount of publications 
(and thereby secondary data) available. In relation to the description of the Danish system 
and its developments a more explorative approach was needed due to the very limited 
number of previous publications on the topic. Hence, for that part of ITAC, we resorted to 
the use of archival documents as well as open, explorative key informant interviews with 
researchers, fisheries sector representatives and managers; over time we moved towards 
more semi-structured interviews, as we got better grasp of the issues at stake. Details on 
the use of different techniques will be supplied further beneath in this appendix. ITAC 
contributes with the following papers to Part 2 of this thesis: 
 
Paper 1: T.J. Hegland and J. Raakjær (2008): RECOVERY PLANS AND THE 
BALANCING OF FISHING CAPACITY AND FISHING 
POSSIBILITIES: PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE COMMON FISHERIES 
                                                 
i Project website: www.efimas.org/.  
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POLICY. Chapter 5 in S.S. Gezelius and J. Raakjær (Eds.): Making 
Fisheries Management Work. Implementation of Policies for Sustainable 
Fishing. Dordrecht: Springer.  
Abstract: The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU) has for 
long been accused of being unable to provide sustainable fisheries or 
actually in itself being an obstacle to this. Not least the inability of the CFP 
to achieve a sustainable balance between available resources and fishing 
capacity has been an issue of debate. By looking at the historical 
development of the implementation of the structural and conservation 
policies, this chapter sets out to provide an understanding of why the EU 
has for long been unable to choose another course in its fisheries policy. A 
key aspect in relation to this is the path dependence of the system, which has 
to a great extent made any real reform attempts unsuccessful. Nevertheless, 
based on recent changes in relation to the political cleavages between 
member states and the outcome of the CFP reform of 2002, the chapter 
describes how the evermore present resource crisis has opened a window-
of-opportunity which makes a change in course possible. This is to some 
extent evidenced by the adoption of a series of recovery plans. Whether this 
will be enough to provide for a bright future of the CFP is, however, 
questionable. 
 
Paper 2: T.J. Hegland and J. Raakjær (2008): IMPLEMENTATION POLITICS: 
THE CASE OF DENMARK UNDER THE COMMON FISHERIES 
POLICY. Chapter 6 in S.S. Gezelius and J. Raakjær (Eds.): Making 
Fisheries Management Work. Implementation of Policies for Sustainable 
Fishing. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Abstract:  Denmark is among the more loyal European Union (EU) member states 
when it comes to national implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP). However, even in Denmark several mechanisms contribute to sub-
optimal implementation of the CFP. Looking at implementation problems 
for a relatively loyal member state, this chapter sheds critical light on 
national implementation of the CFP in the EU as a whole. The chapter 
initially provides a description of the institutional set-up for fisheries policy-
making and implementation in Denmark, including a short historical 
account of the development of the Danish fisheries and their management 
since 1983. Subsequently, the chapter provides an understanding and of the 
mechanisms and processes behind the Danish implementation of fisheries 
policy, arguing that these mechanisms and processes have led to a situation 
where the goals agreed at the EU level are supplemented or even replaced 
by national priorities. The chapter concludes that in order to capture the 
domestic politics associated with CFP implementation in Denmark, it is 
important to understand the policy process as a synergistic interaction 
between dominant interests, policy alliances/networks and prevailing 
discourses. The inability of the EU to ensure that the conservation goals 
agreed at the EU level are loyally pursued during national implementation 
is one of the reasons why the EU has been struggling to keep fishing 
mortality rates at a sustainable level. 
 
Paper 3: S.S. Gezelius, T.J. Hegland, H. Palevsky and J. Raakjær (2008): THE 
POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION IN RESOURCE CONSERVATION: 
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COMPARING THE EU/DENMARK AND NORWAY. Chapter 7 in S.S. 
Gezelius and J. Raakjær (Eds.): Making Fisheries Management Work. 
Implementation of Policies for Sustainable Fishing. Dordrecht: Springer.  
Abstract: This chapter discusses implementation as a policy instrument in terms of 
fisheries resource conservation. Implementation is primarily a means of 
pursuing established political goals. However, it is also a potential means 
of deliberate subversion or change of political goals. The chapter describes 
the development of multiple goals in fisheries management and addresses 
mechanisms through which conservation goals are subverted or changed at 
the implementation stage. Through comparison between the EU/Denmark 
and Norway, this chapter identifies factors that promote and prevent 
subversion of conservation goals during implementation. 
 
In addition, though not included in Part 2, Gezelius, Raakjær and Hegland (2010) also 
forms part of the fundament for Part 1 of this thesis. 
 
The MEFEPO Project 
During most of the time of this PhD project, I and IFM-AAU colleagues, primarily my 
supervisor, Professor Jesper Raakjær, and a Research Assistant, Kristen Ounanian, have 
been working on the EU 7th Research Framework Programme project MEFEPOii (Making 
the European Fisheries Ecosystem Plan Operational; 2008-2011). The MEFEPO project 
was coordinated by the University of Liverpool and involved 10 research institutions 
from eight European countries from Spain in south to Norway in north.  
This project aimed among other things to show how an ecosystem approach to 
fisheries could be made operational within selected European maritime regions (namely 
the regions covered by respectively the North Sea RAC, the North Western Waters RAC, 
and the South Western Waters RAC) and evaluate different modes of fisheries 
governance. Responding to increased interest in the topic during 2008, it was early in the 
MEFEPO project agreed that IFM-AAU (and to a limited extent other partners working 
on MEFEPO) should specifically use the project to explore the role of the regional level 
(being the level between the member states and the central EU institutions) in the EU 
fisheries management system, i.e. regionalisation.  
A multitude of research techniques were employed to investigate regionalisation. 
The first step of our research process involved a literature review to familiarise ourselves 
with and develop an understanding of the concept of regionalisation. Subsequently, we 
moved to a more explorative phase where we combined observations of meetings and 
conferences with key-informants interviews with researchers, managers, policy-makers 
and stakeholder representatives to get a better idea of the main themes specifically in the 
context of the EU. To the material obtained through the observations and the interviews, 
we added a document study of (for the most part) position documents submitted to DG 
MARE in connection with the coming reform of the CFP. Simultaneously, we carried out 
a web-based survey of those who participate in meetings of Regional Advisory 
Councils.iii  Details on the use of different techniques will be supplied in the following 
sections. MEFEPO contributes with the following papers to Part 2 of this thesis: 
 
                                                 
ii Project website: www.liv.ac.uk/mefepo.  
iii  The survey was predominantly carried out by my colleague, Kristen Ounanian. 
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Paper 4: T.J. Hegland, K. Ounanian and J. Raakjær (Forthcoming 2012): WHY AND 
HOW TO REGIONALISE THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY: A 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. Submitted to Maritime Studies. 
Abstract: The concept of regionalisation, as it has been employed in connection with 
the Common Fisheries Policy, is both ambiguous and multidimensional in 
the sense that it can have different meanings to different people and 
subsumes several discussions under one heading. This fact further 
complicates an already delicate discussion. Similarly, the perceived benefits 
of regionalisation can vary. In this article we are concerned with 
developing a theoretical and conceptual framework, which allows 
structuring of different perceived benefits of regionalisation, as well as 
disentangles the different sub-discussions that the discussion of 
regionalisation subsumes. Eventually, we present a suite of five different 
models of regionalisation—‘archetypes’—that we believe are relevant 
representations of important perspectives on what regionalisation means in 
practice and might facilitate further discussion of where the European 
Union should be heading in relation to fisheries governance. 
 
Paper 5: T.J. Hegland, K. Ounanian and J. Raakjær (Forthcoming 2012):WHAT 
DOES ‘REGIONALISATION’ MEAN? AN EXPLORATORY MAPPING 
OF OPINIONS ON REFORM OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY. 
Submitted to Maritime Studies. 
Abstract: Regionalisation has in recent years been intensely discussed as a possible 
future path for the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union. The 
motivations for wanting to move in this direction are, however, as varied as 
the perceptions of what regionalisation as a mode governance would entail 
in practice. To draw implications for policy, we explore these perceptions 
and seek, by means of material from primarily interviews and a survey of 
participants in the Regional Advisory Councils who have hands-on 
experience with regional cooperation in European fisheries management, to 
put flesh on both the question of whether and why regionalisation is seen as 
potentially a good idea, as well as how people perceive different models of 
regionalisation when confronted with them. The article documents and 
substantiates the widespread interest in regionalisation but it also 
highlights the need to develop common understandings of what options for 
regionalisation are available and what they offer in terms of future benefits 
and challenges. 
  
Paper 6: K. Ounanian and T.J. Hegland (Forthcoming 2012): THE REGIONAL 
ADVISORY COUNCILS’ CURRENT CAPACITIES AND 
UNFORESEEN BENEFITS. Submitted to Maritime Studies. 
Abstract: The 2002 Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reform introduced the Regional 
Advisory Councils (RACs) to enhance stakeholder involvement and correct 
one of the policy’s primary deficiencies, its lack of legitimacy arising from 
stakeholder involvement. While some criticize the 2002 reform as not going 
far enough to alleviate problems of lacking process and content legitimacy, 
in certain ways the RACs may be thought of as representing an interim 
institutional stage, facilitating better information sharing and cultivating 
stakeholder relationships. Based on a survey of RAC participants, this 
paper illuminates the current capacities and functions of the RACs. The 
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paper reveals that the RACs possess additional—often not sufficiently 
recognised—roles and values to the advice they produce as they facilitate 
understanding across and within sectors and interest groups and act as key 
purveyors of information. Additionally, the data also shows mixed feelings 
of impact among those participating in the RACs. 
 
In addition, though not included in Part 2, own work in Nolan et al. (2010) and own work 
in Raakjær et al. (2010), which are grey documents associated with MEFEPO, also form 
part of the fundament for Part 1 of this thesis. 
 
The SAFMAMS Project 
The SAFMAMS projectiv (Scientific Advice for Fisheries Management on Multiple 
Scales; 2005-2008), which was coordinated by IFM / IFM-AAU and funded by the EU 6th 
Research Framework Programme, sought to collate insights from existing research 
projects and management processes on the most useful forms of scientific advice for 
marine environmental management and communicate those insights to scientists and 
decision-makers.v   
The SAFMAMS project investigated various ways of producing scientific advice at 
various geographical/politico-administrative levels. Under this project my responsibilities 
included in particular looking into processes going on at the level of the RACs. I did this 
by studying the Pelagic RAC as it in late 2006 embarked on a process of developing a 
long-term management plan for the western stock unit of Atlantic horse mackerel. 
I studied the development process of the management plan for western horse 
mackerel by means of several research techniques (see Supplement 1 attached to this 
appendix for a detailed overview of the SAFMAMS research process). In short, a number 
of meetings were observed and I gained access to minutes, presentations and papers from 
all RAC meetings, as well as to significant amounts of e-mail correspondence between 
the involved horse mackerel scientists. Finally, after the development process ended, I 
administered a small e-mail survey among key participants in the process.vi Details on the 
use of different techniques will be supplied further beneath in this appendix. SAFMAMS 
contributes with the following paper to Part 2 of this thesis: 
 
Paper 7: T.J. Hegland and D.C. Wilson (2009): PARTICIPATORY MODELLING 
IN EU FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: WESTERN HORSE MACKEREL 
AND THE PELAGIC RAC. In Maritime Studies. Vol. 8(1).  
Abstract: In 2006 the stakeholders of the Pelagic Regional Advisory Council (Pelagic 
RAC) contacted scientists with expertise on western horse mackerel and 
asked them to assist the RAC in developing a long-term management plan. 
This article reports on that process and contributes to the knowledge of best 
practices for interactive processes between scientists and stakeholders. 
Overall, the participants considered the process, which led to the first step 
of the implementation of the management plan from 2008, as a considerable 
                                                 
iv Project website: www.ifm.aau.dk/safmams. 
v The description of the SAFMAMS research process builds on Hegland and Wilson (2008). 
vi The SAFMAMS work contained elements of ‘action research’, where the researcher assumes a position of 
participant, as opposed to only an observer, in a change process - and at the same time observes and 
researches the process to gain new knowledge of the social mechanisms of the process (Hegland, Jørgensen 
and Hastrup, 1994). This was related 1) our ability to help facilitate a Pelagic RAC meeting on the horse 
mackerel management plan in early 2007; and 2) the involvement of us in discussions on how to handle the 
limited response to a questionnaire presented by the group of horse mackerel scientists to the stakeholders. 
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success. As such, the process could serve as an inspiration for stakeholders, 
researchers and policy-makers wishing to do similar exercises. 
 
In addition, though not included in Part 2, Hegland and Wilson (2008), which is a grey 






As described, this PhD thesis draws on work carried out in three different research 
projects: SAFMAMS, ITAC and MEFEPO. Having above briefly described the objective 
and research design of each project, I will in the following go more in detail with the 
research techniques employed; both in terms of introducing their qualities in general and 
describing in detail how the techniques were put to use in the projects. The three projects 
share features in terms of research techniques chosen and these techniques thus figures as 
particularly important for the PhD thesis as a whole. The following sections draw on the 
papers constituting Part 2 of this thesis, as well as in addition Hegland and Wilson (2008) 
for the SAFMAMS project, and Raakjær et al. (2010) for the MEFEPO project. 
Reflecting the fact that MEFEPO is the project that has filled the most in the period of my 
PhD work, the account for the use of different techniques in this project will be more 
detailed compared to the other two projects. 
 
Literature Review 
A literature review is a traditional first step of a research process, at what point the 
researcher reviews the current scientific knowledge base and thereby outlines the basis for 
the future research—and this has also been the case in relation to my research endeavours 
in the three projects contributing to the thesis.  
In SAFMAMS the theme of the (brief) literature review was participatory 
modelling between stakeholders and scientists.vii In the ITAC project the literature review 
evolved around the development of the CFP since its inception, as well as administrative 
practices relating to the implementation of the CFP in Danish fisheries management. 
Finally, in MEFEPO the themes of the literature review were decentralisation, 
regionalisation, and co-management, primarily in a fisheries context.viii  
In practical terms, the literature reviews in general involved structured searches 
with specific keywords in journal databases to identify relevant articles, usage of lists of 
references in relevant articles, discussions with other scientists able to point to other 
articles or ‘grey’ literature, creative Google-searches, as well as any other means of 
getting information on relevant literature. 
 
Document Study 
All three projects involved the study of primary documents (such as meeting minutes, 
position documents, legal texts etc.) as a research technique.  
In ITAC the documents studied included archival material from the relevant Danish 
ministry, in particular minutes from meetings of the advisory Board of Commercial 
Fishing from the beginning of the 1980’s to date, as well as EU and Danish legislative 
acts and official reports and communications etc. In SAFMAMS the documents included 
                                                 
vii The literature review for SAFMAMS was carried out by my colleague Douglas C. Wilson. 
viii  A colleague, Kristen Ounanian, was heavily involved in the literature review for MEFEPO. 
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a limited pool of RAC meeting PowerPoint presentations and personal e-mail 
communication between horse mackerel scientists.  
In MEFEPO the documents studied included various EU legislative acts, reports 
and communications, as well as the pool of position documents submitted in connection 
with the public consultation on the Commission’s Green Paper, all of which we were able 
to access due to the timing of our research. The documents received were by default 
public and accessible on a dedicated website.ix  
The Commission received 382 contributions (Commission, 2010). Consequently, 
we initially went through the list to identify the documents that were of interest to us 
ensuring that we captured a good variety and that we at least looked at the documents 
from key actors, e.g. the RACs.x Having narrowed down the number of documents 
substantially, we skimmed through them and discarded those which did not directly deal 
with issues of interest to us. Of the documents left we chose to focus on the ones that 
elaborated most on regionalisation, though still attempting to have a decent variety in 
these documents. Position documents from key actors not submitted as part of the public 
consultation process were also taken into account, as well as other texts that we found 
useful in attempting to outline the main issues, challenges and perspectives.  
 
Observation 
Observing meetings can be regarded as a simple version of the method of participant 
observation. Traditionally participant observation requires developing a relationship and 
adopting some sort of role within the group observed, a task that requires that significant 
time are spent on participating and observing. However, in general, the way we used 
observations was somewhat more basic, as we in SAFMAMS and MEFEPO were able to 
sit in on and observe relevant meetings (without really adopting the role as participant) 
with the dual objective of learning about the factual content of the discussion, as well as 
observing interactions between stakeholders and scientists (SAFMAMS) and interactions 
between different groups of stakeholders (MEFEPO).  
In SAFMAMS I or a colleague of mine observed five of the seven meetings of the 
Pelagic RAC where the development of the horse mackerel management plan appeared as 
an item on the agenda. For the two meetings we could not attend, I benefited from 
information from a stakeholder representative that was associated with the project (see 
Supplement 1 attached to this appendix). 
Specifically in MEFEPO, the observation of meetings served multiple purposes. 
First and foremost, the objective of observing the participants deliberating in meetings 
was to give us a preliminary understanding of the issues and discussions surrounding the 
issue of regionalisation. This, in turn, would facilitate developing the guide for the key 
informant interviews (see beneath). Secondly, attending the meetings presented an 
opportunity to meet some of the people who we had already planned to interview. We 
thought—that whenever possible—making initial contact face-to-face as opposed to the 
usual e-mail would increase our chance of getting that person to agree to be a key 
informant. Finally, we also felt that our presence at the meeting would help raise the 
awareness of MEFEPO; an exposure that we believe (but have no way of knowing) 
proved particularly useful when sending out a survey on regionalisation to RAC 
participants (see relevant section beneath).  
                                                 
ix See http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/consultation/received/index_en.htm, accessed 23 July 2010.  
x At this point of our research process it was—in general—also not feasible to consider documents 
submitted in other languages than English. 
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In practice in MEFEPO, the researcher(s) present at the meeting listened to the discussion 
and took notes during the meeting. Subsequently, the researcher(s) communicated the 
main insights from the meeting to the core team of researchers and distributed notes and 
in some cases presentations from the meeting. A list of meetings and conferences 
observed is included as Supplement 2 attached to this appendix. 
 
Interview 
Interviews have been one of the most important sources of empirical material behind this 
thesis. Generally, the interviews have been key informant interviews, an interview type 
that is particularly useful whenever there is limited access to written material on the topic 
of investigation, which was in particular the case in relation to the work carried out on the 
MEFEPO project, but also to some extent on the ITAC project in particular in regards to 
information on the Danish administrative practices. At the same time we also found the 
key informant interview attractive because we believed that the topics on both projects 
were of such interest that it would in fact be possible to get interviews with the real key 
persons, even though they are generally often rather busy and therefore selective. 
Key informant interviews are semi-structured interviews with persons who are 
expected to possess key information about a topic of interest to the researcher. A vital 
aspect of key informant interviews is selecting the right informants. At the level of the 
individual informant it is of course important to pick a person who has useful insights, but 
equally as important is that the person is able and willing to communicate these insights 
openly in an interview situation. In addition to carefully selecting the individual 
interviewee, it is important that the group of interviewees as a whole is somewhat 
representative of the different groups of people you wish to learn from. In both ITAC and 
MEFEPO significant efforts were made in order to live up to these aspirations.  
In ITAC eight key informant interviews (three of those with two informants 
present) were conducted, covering informants representing administration, the fisheries 
sector and research. The aim was to strike a reasonable balance and also to ensure that the 
informants had been involved with fisheries management for a substantial period in order 
for them to be able to reflect on the changing dynamics over time. In total six informants 
were from administration/research and five from the sector; all informants had a 
minimum of 15 years of experience with fisheries management in one way or the other—
and most had actually even longer experience. All interviews were transcribed to 
facilitate analysis and all 11 respondents were granted anonymity.  
The ITAC interviews were carried out in three distinctive rounds. The first three 
interviews (four informants) were very open and exploratory, structured only by the pre-
understanding and a few handwritten notes of the researchers. This strategy was chosen 
mainly for two reasons: 1) we had only a vague idea of what would be the main issues 
based on our pre-knowledge, and 2) we wanted the informants themselves to assist in 
identifying critical themes and issues. For the following two rounds of interviews (with 
respectively three and four informants), a more structured interview approach (but still 
with customised guides for each interview) was employed utilising the insights from the 
previous round(s) of interviews. However, all interviews remained relatively open and the 
informants were always encouraged to focus on what they found important 
During MEFEPO we carried out 19 semi-structured key informant interviews with 
various academics, stakeholders, managers, and policy-makers on the issue of 
regionalisation to get a better idea of the discussion, the policy-process, the political 
positions, the options, the challenges, and the perceived advantages etc. A list of the 
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interviewees as well as some information about each interview can be found in 
Supplement 3 attached to this appendix.xi 
Prior to the interviews an interview guide was developed based primarily on the 
insights from the literature review and the observation of meetings. The researchers 
carrying out the interviews were encouraged to report possible problems with the 
practical use of the interview guide in the interview situation back to the core team so that 
it could be determined if the problem demanded attention in relation to the remaining 
interviews. The final version of the interview guide can be found as Supplement 4 
attached to this appendix. It should be noted, however, that the interviews were semi-
structured and the interview guide was, as indicated by the name, only meant to act as a 
guide.  
As for persons to interview, these were chosen according to a variety of criteria. 
Our most important concern relating to the individual interviewee was of course whether 
we were convinced that the potential interviewee held useful information (opinions, ideas, 
insights, etc.) on the issue of regionalisation. Of course another concern was whether the 
person was available and willing to openly debate the issues during an interview. For the 
entire group of interviewees we aimed to make sure that 1) we got a reasonable 
geographical spread across the three RAC regions dealt with in MEFEPO and 2) we got a 
reasonable mix of researchers, managers, policy-makers, and stakeholder representatives 
(including the fisheries sector as well as other interests). The interviews were generally 
carried out in the mother tongue of the interviewee, recorded and subsequently 
transcribed into text-files (during the transcription the interviews not carried out in 
English were translated). Most interviews were transcribed in full; however, a few of the 
interviews were—based on cost-benefit thinking—only transcribed partially, or the 
relevant points of the interview were condensed and turned into text. Finally, to facilitate 
analysis of the data from the interviews selected key interview transcripts were imported 
into qualitative text analysis software, where the relevant text units were coded according 
to their topics in order to be able to create structure in the material. It was decided to 
make the list of interviewees public, but statements from the interviews were not 
associated to specific persons when reporting. 
 
Focus Group 
Only one focus group interview has been carried out in relation to this thesis, so this 
method will not be discussed at length. Generally, however, focus group interviews are 
considered to be particularly useful because the format reduces the role of the interviewer, 
who will often only set the agenda for discussion between the focus group participants. 
Ideally this reduces the bias that can be introduced by the interviewer leading the 
discussion often by means of a guide or a questionnaire. 
The focus group interview was carried out in MEFEPO. Focus group interviews 
were not originally among the planned research techniques in that project. However, 
when we contacted a key official in DG MARE to ask for a key informant interview, this 
person decided that the topic was of interest to a wider group of his colleagues and invited 
these to participate. The focus group interview was carried out in Brussels in November 
2009.  
Rather than using the interview guide, which had been developed for the key 
informant interviews, we decided to open focus group interview with a short PowerPoint 
presentation to get the talk started. The format of the focus group interview turned out to 
work well for the information we were after. However, the dynamic between the 
                                                 
xi The interviews were divided on seven interviewers, primarily due to the language skills required.  
 70 
participants was not as prolific as we would have liked. One explanation might be that 
there was a clear hierarchy between the participants from the same organisation. This was 
probably not be the best composition of focus group participants but in light of the way 
the focus group interview came into being this could not have been prevented. 
Particularly due to the timing of the focus group (during the open consultation on the 
Commission’s Green Paper) the participants asked to be kept anonymous, which was 
accepted.  
The focus group interview was conducted in English, recorded and subsequently 
transcribed into plain text close to ad verbatim. Finally, to facilitate analysis of the data, 
the transcript was imported into qualitative text analysis software in order to be able to 
create structure in the material.  
 
Survey 
By developing a questionnaire, which—with relative ease—can be administered to a large 
number of respondents, the researcher is able to get hold of data from a much larger 
population than if he or she had to talk to people personally. Moreover, the researcher 
will often make sure that the options for answering are fixed—as opposed to open-
ended—so that the answers can be associated with numerical values and treated 
statistically. This way of doing research provides a high level of reliability in the sense of 
the research being replicable. However, respondents are unable to add new aspects as 
they would have been able to in an interview situation; likewise the respondents have to 
answer according to the predetermined options—no matter if they would like to answer in 
another way or qualify their answer.xii Moreover, it can be difficult to ensure that the 
questions are interpreted similarly by all respondents as the one asking the question is not 
available for consultation. Surveying was an important research technique in MEFEPO 
and played a smaller role in SAFMAMS. 
In SAFMAMS I sent out an e-mail to the key participants in the process that was 
studied with a number of questions on how they experienced the process after it had 
ended (Supplement 5 attached to this appendix contains the questions distributed). I 
distributed to six scientists and five stakeholder representatives and, after a round of 
reminders, I received six and three answers respectively. The respondents were granted 
anonymity. It should be noted, however, that this was not a classical quantitative survey. 
The questions were kept open ended and the answers were not threated statistically. 
Rather, the aim of the survey was to gather qualitative data but do so in a cost-efficient 
manner; fully recognising that interviews would probably have provided richer accounts. 
In MEFEPO the objective of—among other things--uncovering relations between 
preferences for reform towards regionalisation and particular attributes (such as 
geographical affiliation, stakeholder type etc.) of respondents with an interests in 
European fisheries management lend itself well to the development of a quantitative 
survey.  
The development of the survey presented a number of methodological challenges, 
the first one being how to define the population for our survey. The first choice was to 
focus attention on the RACs and the regional structure they represent. Although the 
European Union’s fisheries management system includes seven RACs, only four came 
under investigation in this survey, namely those covered by the MEFEPO project: North 
Sea RAC, North Western Waters RAC and South Western Waters RAC, and additionally 
it was decided that it was appropriate to include the Pelagic RAC as this species specific 
                                                 
xii Often the respondents are given the possibility to qualify their answers in a comments box but these 
qualifications will not affect the numerical values of the provided answers. 
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RAC spans the waters covered by the other RACs. Within the four defined RACs, there 
were some concerns of how to define the exact population. We decided to define this as 
those who attended a General Assembly or an Executive Committee meeting in 2009 plus 
the participants from the first meeting within the 2009 calendar year of all working 
groups. That brought the survey population to 329 total potential participants.  
Through the process of finding e-mail addresses (through the RAC secretariat and 
Internet searches), it became apparent that for various reasons e-mail would not reach the 
full population. Consequently, we adopted a mixed-mode survey utilising both a list-
based web survey with e-mail invitations and a postal survey to follow-up with those who 
did not complete the web format. Since the survey population was tightly defined and the 
total number of participants was reachable via the outlined methods, we were able to send 
questionnaires to the entire population. The frame population therefore completely covers 
the target population and there was no sampling done randomly or otherwise. This meant 
that there were no replacements for participants who opted out or were unavailable 
through our methods of contact.  
Before reaching its final form, the questionnaire underwent a rigorous draft process. 
The internal IFM-AAU team reviewed and revised multiple drafts of the text after which 
IFM-AAU solicited comments from external MEFEPO partners. Upon receiving 
comments from our external partners, some of our contacts and colleagues from outside 
the MEFEPO team were asked to review the survey. Finally, the survey went through a 
pilot test. The pilot group comprised seven individuals representative of the survey 
population but not in fact included in it. The questionnaire (in English) is included in in 
Supplement 6 attached to this appendix. A separate challenge in relation to the 
questionnaire was the issue of language translations. Due to the wide range of countries 
represented in the four RACs, three MEFEPO colleagues translated the final English 
version into French, Spanish, and Portuguese. With the intention to keep the survey 
questions and response options as close to the original English as possible, all translations 
were translated back into English and checked by other colleagues competent in the three 
languages.  
In practice, the survey went out first through an e-mail, which provided a link to the 
online questionnaire. The cover letter e-mail was sent in the language of correspondence 
(English, French, Portuguese, or Spanish) as determined through name, organisation, e-
mail address, or any combination thereof. After roughly one week, the participants 
received a second e-mail with the identical cover letter and information as provided in the 
initial distribution e-mail. Since the survey went out close to the Easter holiday, we 
waited until after the holiday to send a second e-mail reminder, this time with shorter text 
and more direct request to fill out the survey. The final e-mail reminder did inform 
potential participants that mailed surveys would go out if they did not complete the online 
version. The paper questionnaire was then mailed through the post a little more than a 
month after the first contact through e-mail.  
The survey totalled 138 observations, of which 100 participants completed the 
online questionnaire, 30 completed the paper version and 8 partially responded online 
providing enough answers to merit inclusion. The response rate for the survey was 41.9 % 
(138/329). 
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Supplement 1: SAFMAMS Research Process 
 
 
Date Event Action Research undertaken* 





Invitation by PRAC to 
scientists. Consortium of 
scientists formed. 
SAFMAMS team 
becomes notified of 





Group meeting  
Presentation of 3 possible 
HCR scenarios. Presentation 
of questions to industry. The 
Commission expresses its 
support. Presentation of 
SAFMAMS. 
Meeting observed, 








E-mail questionnaire on 
priorities sent to industry 
stakeholder representatives 
(questions presented at PRAC 











Limited response on 
questionnaires. Exploration of 





team involved in 
discussion of 










Update on industry priorities. 
Presentations of simulations 
on two different principles for 
HCR. / Decision to set up 
focus group with scientists 
and stakeholders in April to 
get more input from industry. 
Meeting observed, 







Focused discussions between 









Group meeting  
Combined presentation of 2 
possible HCRs. Stakeholder 
representatives asked to 
consider the two options. 
Focus group members (incl. 
an NGO representative) to 
continue discussions. 
Meeting observed, 





Group meeting  
Combined presentation of 2 
possible HCRs. Decision by 
PRAC minutes and 
presentations studied. 
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working group on 
management plan to fully 







Draft management plan 
presented. Formal decision to 
ask the Commission to have 
the plan evaluated and 
possibly implemented by 
ICES. Management plan 



















ICES confirms having 
evaluated the management 
plan and found it consistent 
with the precautionary 
approach for the coming 3 
years. (ICES recommends 
TAC of 180,000 tonnes for 
2008, 2009 and 2010 based 
on plan). In the longer term 
several technical issues need 
to be addressed. 








PRAC recommends that the 
Commission implements 
management plan. A focus 
group should work on 
aligning assessment areas and 
management areas. 






on TACs for 
2008 
Commission proposes 
rollover of TAC from 2007 








TACs for 2008 
Council adopts TAC for 2008 
according to the management 




* After the process had ended an e-mail survey was carried out among key 











Working Group Meetings / Pelagic RAC, 16. Sept. 2009, Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands (Observer: Jesper Raakjær) 
 
Demersal Working Group / North Sea RAC, 14 Oct. 2009, Haarlem, the 
Netherlands (Observer: Troels Hegland) 
 
Meeting of the ad hoc group on the green paper on the reform of the Common 
Fisheries Policy / SWW RAC, 23 Oct. 2009, Madrid, Spain (Observer: Paulina 
Ramirez)  
 
Working Group on Horizontal Issues (i.e. CFP Reform) / NWW RAC, 28 Oct. 





Annual Science Conference 2009 / ICES, 21-25 Sept. 2009, Berlin, Germany 
(Observers: Jesper Raakjær and Troels Hegland) 
 
Regional Fisheries Management - Making It Work for Fisheries and the 
Environment / WWF and Ocean 2012, 29 Sept. 2009, Brussels, Belgium 
(Observers: Troels Hegland and Staffan Zetterholm) 
 
A new fisheries policy for fishers to take over stewardship of the fishery / 
DanFish, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries and the Danish Export 
Association, 8 Oct. 2009, Aalborg, Denmark (Observer: Kristen Ounanian) 
 
Regionalization of the CFP / Nordic Council of Ministers, 13 Oct. 2009, 
Copenhagen Airport, Denmark (Observers: Troels Hegland, Kristen Ounanian and 
Staffan Zetterholm) 
 
Decision-making within a reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) / Inter-RAC 




Supplement 3: List of Key Informants for MEFEPO 
 
 
Name Country Position 
Details about the 
interview * 
Mr John Scott UK 
(Scotland) 
Member of the Scottish 









Chief Executive of the Scottish 
Pelagic Fishermen’s 







Portuguese Mútua dos Pescadores; Rede 
Portugesa das Mulheres da 





Mr Jan Birger 
Jørgensen 








Irish Chief Executive of Killybegs 
Fishermen's Organisation / 







Norwegian Head of Department at the 
Norwegian Ministry of 






Norwegian Former Director of the 





Mr Alain Cadec French Member of the European 
Parliament (Group: European 
People’s Party), 2nd vice-chair 
of the Fisheries Committee 




translated to English by 





President of the Federation of 





translated to Spanish 
by colleague of PR 
Mr Harm 
Dotinga 
Dutch Lawyer at Netherlands Institute 




Mr Ole Poulsen Danish Head of the Fisheries Policy 
Section in the Danish Ministry 
of Food, Agriculture and 
Fisheries  





Portuguese Secretary General of ADAPI 
Associação dos Armadores das 
Pescas Industriais (Portuguese 








Dutch Director at Wageningen UR 
Centre for Marine Policy, 
former (Vice-) Chair of 





Mr Hans van 
Nieuwenhuisen 
Dutch Project manager for Natura2000 







Swedish Member of the European 
Parliament (Group: The Greens 
/ European Free Alliance), 
member of the Fisheries 
Committee 




Mr Javier Garat 
Perez 
Spanish President of Europêche, the 
Association of National 
Organisations of Fishery 







Spanish Representative of the EU Fish 
Processors and Traders 
Association (AIPCE-CEP) 





Swedish Director of a Swedish NGO, the 
Fisheries Secretariat, one of the 
main persons behind Ocean 
2012 







Chairman of the Scottish White 
Fish Producer's Association / 





* The following researchers carried out interviews: Paulina Ramirez (PR), Troels Jacob 
Hegland (TJH), Jesper Raakjær (JR), Kristen Ounanian (KO), Christine Röckmann (CR), 
Claire Armstrong (CA) and Helena Abreu (HA). 
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Supplement 5: SAFMAMS E-mail Questionnaire  
  
 
Questionnaire to stakeholders, January / February 2008: 
 
1.  Did the group of scientists surprise you in any way by the how they acted 
and operated? If yes, how so? 
 
2.  What were the best elements of the process and why?  
 
3.  What were the worst elements of the process and why? 
 
4.  Were you satisfied with the way that the scientists presented and 
communicated their material? Why? / Why not? 
 
5.  What were (if any) your major concerns in relation to working with a group 
of scientists on developing a management plan? 
 
6.  How would you do the process differently if you were to repeat it? 
 
 
Questionnaire to scientists, January / February 2008: 
 
1.  Did the group of stakeholders surprise you in any way by the how they 
acted and operated? If yes, how so? 
 
2.  What were the best elements of the process and why?  
 
3.  What were the worst elements of the process and why? 
 
4.  Where you satisfied with the level and usefulness of input provided by the 
stakeholders? Why? / Why not? 
 
5.  What were (if any) your major concerns in relation to working with a group 
of stakeholders on developing a management plan? 
 
6.  How would you do the process differently if you were to repeat it? 
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5 Recovery Plans and the Balancing of Fishing 
Capacity and Fishing Possibilities: Path 
Dependence in the Common Fisheries Policy 
Troels Jacob Hegland
 
and Jesper Raakjær 
Abstract   The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU) has 
for long been accused of being unable to provide sustainable fisheries or actually 
in itself being an obstacle to this. Not least the inability of the CFP to achieve a 
sustainable balance between available resources and fishing capacity has been an 
issue of debate. By looking at the historical development of the implementation of 
the structural and conservation policies, this chapter sets out to provide an under-
standing of why the EU has for long been unable to choose another course in its 
fisheries policy. A key aspect in relation to this is the path dependence of the sys-
tem, which has to a great extent made any real reform attempts unsuccessful. Nev-
ertheless, based on recent changes in relation to the political cleavages between 
member states and the outcome of the CFP reform of 2002, the chapter describes 
how the evermore present resource crisis has opened a window-of-opportunity 
which makes a change in course possible. This is to some extent evidenced by the 
adoption of a series of recovery plans.  Whether this will be enough to provide for 
a bright future of the CFP is, however, questionable. 
5.1 Introduction 
The adoption of multi-annual recovery plans for a number of fish stocks is the lat-
est attempt to promote sustainable fisheries management in the European Union 
(EU; Union)1 and has become an integrated component of the Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP). In this chapter we examine how administrative procedures around 
the CFP and its implementation and resulting unforeseen problems have led to the 
need for the adoption of this specific management tool.  
We describe how historical events have to a considerable extent shaped the fu-
ture course of the CFP, a process commonly referred to as path dependence. That 
the political process is path dependent – a key concept of the social theory of 
                                                          
1 We have chosen generally to use the term European Union, although in a historical and legal 
context the term European Community would technically be more correct in some cases. 
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(historical) new institutionalism – means that choices made at an earlier stage 
have decisive impact on the choices which are perceived as possible or plausible 
at a later stage. In other words, “once actors have ventured far down a particular 
path, they are likely to find it very difficult to reverse course […] The ‘path not 
taken’ or the political alternatives that were once quite plausible may become 
irretrievably lost” (Skocpol and Pearson 2002, p. 665).  
The present chapter provides, consequently, an account of how prior decisions 
and developments of the CFP in previous years have influenced subsequent deci-
sions and developments. It is, however, too narrow a perspective to focus on im-
plementation choices in isolation; they need to be seen in a broader political con-
text. This chapter therefore examines the different political positions surrounding 
the proposal and decision to adopt the recovery plans in their current shape.  
The CFP was adopted January 25th 1983 by introducing a fisheries conserva-
tion policy to complement the already adopted structural, market and external 
policies. This marked the completion of a comprehensive package of fisheries pol-
icy regulations, which had been in the making for more than 15 years. Although 
the CFP has been reformed twice since 1983 one can reasonably argue that the pe-
riod up to 1983 was the period where the main political decisions were taken, and 
the period from 1983 and onwards the period of implementation and adaptation of 
existing policies. Although the basic legal provisions of the CFP were revised in 
1992 and 2002 they are today basically based on the same fundamental principles 
as when the CFP was adopted in 1983.  
To set the scene for our further analysis, we initially provide a brief introduc-
tion of the main actors and decision-making procedures relating to the CFP. This 
is followed by a description of the process leading up to the adoption of the con-
servation policy in 1983. Then we investigate problematic implementa-
tion/administration of the CFP from 1983 to 2002, which made it necessary to in-
tegrate recovery plan schemes, and we look at their content and innovative 
components. Finally, we discuss our results and the implications in terms of future 
fisheries management in the EU. Overall the chapter provides the necessary back-
ground for a case of CFP implementation at national level (Denmark in Chapter 6) 
in the multi-level governance system of the EU. 
5.2 The Common Fisheries Policy 
The CFP is a European Union policy framework consisting of four pillars: conser-
vation policy, structural policy, market policy and external issues. The focus of 
this chapter will be the conservation policy (including control and enforcement) 
and the structural policy.2 These two policy areas impact most directly on the core 
issue of targeting fishing mortality rates in the North Atlantic. Target fishing mor-
                                                          
2 For those interested in a general introduction to the CFP, we refer to Lequesne (2000). 
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tality rates is an explicit focus of the conservation policy, but also the structural 
policy has de facto had direct implications on resource conservation, not least be-
cause of flawed implementation of total allowable catches (TACs) under the con-
servation policy, which has made the CFP particularly vulnerable to the problem 
of fleet overcapacity. The problems in the way that the EU has implemented the 
TAC system are to a large extent related to the setting of TACs above scientific 
advice, institutionalised discarding, and a control and enforcement failure. 
The conservation policy aims to ensure that stocks remain at healthy levels, and 
the main instruments used are fixed TACs for the most important species and 
technical conservation measures. The TACs are divided into national quotas ac-
cording to the principle of relative stability, which means that the member states 
are allocated the same fixed percentages of the different TACs every year. The 
question of dividing the TACs between the member states was the most sensitive 
part of the political negotiations leading to the agreement on the CFP. The mem-
ber states are responsible for the domestic allocation of their share of the quota.  
The TAC system is supported by a number of technical measures, which are di-
rected mainly at preventing (by-) catch of juvenile fish or non-target species. Con-
nected to the conservation policy is a policy for control and enforcement, which 
seeks to ensure that CFP regulations are respected. It should be emphasised that 
efficient control/enforcement structures are a precondition for effective implemen-
tation and administration of the CFP, irrespective of the approach adopted within 
the conservation policy. 
The aims of the structural policy are to ensure that the industry can face inter-
national competition, increase productivity, provide a fair standard of living for 
those who depend on fishing for their livelihood and guarantee regular supplies at 
reasonable prices for consumers by adapting and managing the structural devel-
opment of the fishing industry as well as processing and marketing of fish and fish 
products. These aims are pursued by means of a range of structural policy meas-
ures.3 In relation to fleet structure, the most important element has traditionally 
been Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGP) which have been implemented 
with financial support from the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). 
                                                          
3 It is important to keep in mind that structural policies have de facto been resource conservation 
tools as well. As an example, capacity reduction targets under the structural policy have been set 
with reference to high fishing mortality rates (Gulland 1990; Lassen 1995), something that indi-
cates a recognition of structural policies as supplements to the TAC system and as a means of 
counteracting the flawed implementation of it; particularly its inability to handle the problems 
associated to incidental catch, discards and illegal landings. Under the CFP it can in principle be 
rational for vessels to continue fishing as long as there is anything they can land legally, even 
though this leads to massive discarding of other species. The fact that there is no ban on discards 
– rather the opposite – indirectly encourages high-grading as well. This makes TAC implementa-
tion under the CFP very vulnerable to overcapacity. However, it should be mentioned that in 
Denmark, as an example, it is illegal to discard fish that can be landed legally, and hereby Danish 
regulations prohibit high-grading (see chapter 6). Nevertheless, this provision is extremely diffi-
cult to enforce. 
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The two main institutional actors in the decision-making system regarding the 
CFP are: (1) the Council of the European Union (Council), which consists of the 
relevant ministers from the EU member states and serves as the main legislator in 
the area of fisheries, and (2) the Commission of the European Communities 
(Commission) / Directorate General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (DG Fish), 
which serves as the EU bureaucracy seeing to the day-to-day management. The 
Commission has significantly more authority and political power than a traditional 
national bureaucracy. It is, for instance, the sole institution authorised to initiate, 
draft and propose legislative acts in the area of the CFP. The Commission also 
takes active part in the negotiations in the Council, although without the right to 
vote. This effectively means that it is not possible to draw a clear line between the 
political system and the bureaucracy / administration in the context of the CFP. 
This also means that inter-institutional struggles are common between the Council 
and the Commission over where the line should be drawn between the two institu-
tions’ responsibilities and powers. 
In most cases, the CFP legislative adoption process begins with initial propos-
als drafted by DG Fish, incorporating to a varying extent advice received from 
scientists or other stakeholders.4 The Commission’s proposal is then submitted to 
the European Parliament (EP), which has the right to be heard on most acts relat-
ing to the CFP. In light of the response of the EP, the Commission can – but is un-
der no obligation to – amend the proposal before the negotiations within the 
Council, the final step of the legislative procedure. In the Council all member 
states discuss the proposal from the Commission and all member states are entitled 
to vote – also in the cases where they do not have a direct stake in the question at 
hand. Legislative acts relating to the CFP are adopted by a qualified majority vot-
ing, which means that no single member state can block proposals. In case of dis-
putes, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) rules on the inter-
pretation of CFP legislation.5 
5.3 Towards a Common Fisheries Policy  
To understand the evolution of the CFP and the adoption of the scheme for recov-
ery plans, it is necessary to investigate the fundamental principles that have guided 
the adoption and evolution of the CFP even before the first legal acts relating to 
the CFP were established in 1970. These decisions set the path for the direction of 
fisheries policy and management in the EU. In this respect, the international fish-
ery commissions have had significant influence on the direction of the CFP.  
                                                          
4 For an account of how scientific advice and other types of knowledge feeds into the decision-
making process, see Hegland (2006). 
5 For a detailed description of the decision-making procedures of the EU, we refer to the numer-
ous accounts elsewhere, e.g. Hix (1999). 
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Gezelius (Chapter 2) describes how discussions in the second half of the 1960s 
within the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) and its twin com-
mission, the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
(ICNAF), in response to growing concern about overfishing, led to the decision to 
favour the use of catch limitations in the form of catch quotas rather than effort 
regulation.  
NEAFC is the framework for international cooperation on the conservation of 
fish resources in the North East Atlantic waters outside the national fishing zones, 
which were still rather narrow in the end of the 1960s, extending only 12 nautical 
miles (nm) off shore. The fact that the national zones were so narrow meant that 
conservation was essentially an international issue. According to Gezelius (chapter 
2) NEAFC and ICNAF consequently “became the arenas for the development of 
modern resource management,” which in the longer perspective made it all the 
more important when the commissions in the late 1960s opted to restrict fishing 
activities through catch control (outputs limitation) rather than introducing restric-
tions on input. Until that point in time conservation instruments had primarily 
been technical measures, primarily in the shape of mesh size restrictions. 
Among the arguments that tipped the decision in favour of catch quotas was the 
focus on controlling fishing mortality. It is difficult directly to relate fishing mor-
tality and fishing effort, whereas TACs were regarded the more feasible option in 
terms of finding a standardised measure of fishing mortality that states could agree 
on. In addition, developments within marine science at the time resulted in refined 
tools and models (i.e. the so-called cohort analysis) to estimate TACs, which fa-
voured output control in terms of catch quotas. Consequently, from the end of the 
1960s until the first half of the 1970s, the commissions successfully worked on 
implementing a TAC-based approach for the North Atlantic. As mentioned above, 
an important element of implementation of fisheries regulations, independent of 
the specific tool chosen, is to ensure compliance and put effective enforcement 
mechanisms in place. In this respect it is generally acknowledged that the com-
missions were less successful in enforcing the measures and ensuring compliance 
with the introduced regulations.  
Since the late 1960s, fisheries management in the North Atlantic has in practice 
become about TACs. The choice of the North Atlantic fisheries commissions to 
opt for TAC-based management established a precedent that had major influence 
on policy negotiations and decisions in the following decades, not least in the 
process leading to the adding of a conservation policy to the CFP in 1983. How-
ever, let us first return to the implications of the first CFP measures adopted in 
1970. 
In response to the requirements of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission in 
1966 drafted proposals for common regulations concerning structures and markets 
relating to fisheries resources. The two regulations were not adopted by the Coun-
cil until 1970, however, and then only after long and hard negotiations. The two 
regulations did not directly touch upon how the issue of conservation should be 
solved. Nevertheless, a provision for “equal access” contained in the structural 
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policy regulation turned out to have immense importance in relation to the devel-
opment of a conservation policy of the CFP. Equal access means that, as a general 
rule, vessels from one member state have the right to fish inside the territorial wa-
ters of any of the other member states – in principle this means “fishing up to the 
beaches”. According to Leigh (1983, p. 31) the adoption of the principle of equal 
access was not a requirement of the Treaty of Rome and the decision was there-
fore “a political one and not a legal obligation”. The obvious alternative to equal 
access would according to Leigh (1983) and Churchill (1977) have been the prin-
ciple of “freedom of establishment”, which would have left the concerned member 
states in more control of their territorial waters, something that would have set a 
different path for the conservation policy discussion taking place a decade later. 
Anyway, due to the upcoming accession negotiations with the United Kingdom 
(UK), Norway, Denmark and Ireland, the original six EU member states were fi-
nally able to arrive at a political agreement on the two CFP regulations including 
equal access on 30 June 1970. This agreement should be in place until 31 Decem-
ber 1982. The explanation for the sudden momentum was that the six original 
member states were well aware that it was in their own interest to reach an agree-
ment before the enlargement came into place. The agreement would then be part 
of the acquis communautaire6, which the applicants had to accept when joining 
the EU. If the six member states waited, the acceding countries would be able to 
join the negotiations and the six original member states would not be able to get 
the same agreement. 
It was agreed to deviate from the principle of equal access by allowing member 
states to restrict access within the six nm zone. In areas heavily dependent on fish-
ing, the limit was extended to 12 nm (Leigh 1983).7 The provision for equal access 
still remains one of the fundamental principles underlying EU fisheries manage-
ment and strongly contributes – together with the presence of many shared stocks 
and fisheries – to the prisoner’s dilemma8 nature of EU fisheries management, as 
no single member state can be certain to reap the benefits of applying a strict focus 
on long-term resource conservation. The fact that even this fundamental principle 
of the CFP was adopted as part of a manoeuvre to achieve a favourable position 
prior to an enlargement illustrates the importance of the EU’s unique position as a 
collective of states rather than an ordinary, unitary state. Deliberations and deci-
sion-making related to fisheries management are, consequently, subjected to a set 
of processes and incentives that do not apply to fisheries management in a unitary 
state. It might be argued that, in the EU, national autonomy is lost at the basic pol-
icy formation level, but regained at national implementation level (see Chapter 6). 
                                                          
6 The body of EU laws. 
7 Certain historical rights enjoyed by other member states remained applicable even within the 
special 12 nm zones. For a thorough account of the geographical areas affected by the 12 miles 
derogation and the discussions over this issue, we refer to Wise (1984). 
8 See Chapter 1 for an introduction to the prisoner’s dilemma logic in relation to fisheries. 
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Moreover, the structural policy regulation instituted the principle that the Euro-
pean Union should be responsible for conservation in territorial waters. The full 
implications of this provision were hardly recognised at the time of adoption, as 
the national fishing zones were rather narrow and conservation therefore essen-
tially an international issue, as mentioned earlier. This was, however, going to 
change dramatically during the 1970s (Leigh 1983).  
The fact that agreement between the six original member states came on the 
very same day as the enlargement negotiations were initiated did not go unnoticed. 
Norway, Denmark, the UK and Ireland all have significant fisheries interests. Es-
pecially Norway and Ireland had rich fishing grounds within their national fishing 
waters and were upset about the provision for equal access. The UK was critical 
too, but its negotiating position was affected by a well-organised distant water 
fishing industry, which saw the provision as a protection of UK fishing interests 
off the Norwegian coast in the event of a future extension of the national fishing 
zones. As it turned out, the issue of fisheries attracted little popular interest in Ire-
land, which joined the EU after a comfortable yes-vote in a referendum. In con-
trast, the Norwegians voted no in a referendum where the issue of fisheries proved 
important. This left the UK, which entered the Union without a referendum, de-
prived of the expected benefits of equal access in Norwegian waters. This affected 
the UK position and willingness to compromise in later CFP negotiations (Leigh 
1983). 
In the middle of the 1970s the international setting for fisheries management 
changed dramatically over a relatively limited number of years when coastal 
states, mainly in light of the increasing awareness of the risk of overfishing, began 
claiming larger exclusive fishing zones (EFZ). Iceland was the first major fishing 
nation to enlarge its EFZ,9 but the trend spread quickly and by the mid-1970s, it 
was relatively clear that the final outcome of the international negotiations on the 
issue would be the general institution of 200 nm exclusive economic zones (EEZ).  
As a result of the changing international environment, the EU member states – 
in a concerted action agreed upon by the Council in The Hague on 30 October 
1976 – extended their EFZs to 200 nm beginning 1 January 1977. This meant that 
the EU and its member states were effectively responsible for areas that were large 
enough to make resource conservation a significant “domestic” issue. While the 
                                                          
9 Iceland was the forerunner in enforcing its exclusive rights to fish on its continental shelf, but 
not the first to declare its right to do so. The move towards nationalization of the coastal seas was 
initiated by the United States’ Truman Declaration of 1945, which claimed rights to extract min-
eral resources from the seabed of the entire continental shelf of the United States. Other nations 
followed soon suit, most notably all the nations of South America, which claimed their territorial 
waters out to 200 nm in the Santiago Declaration of 1952, extending their claims not just to the 
seabed minerals covered by the Truman Declaration, but also to the continental shelf fisheries. 
Iceland gained most notoriety for its fisheries claims, however, because rather than simply mak-
ing a nationalist statement, it enforced its claims by excluding British trawlers from Icelandic 
waters, first to a zone of 12 nm around the coast in 1958, then to 50 nm in 1972 and to 200 nm in 
1975, resulting in a series of conflicts with the UK known as the “Cod Wars”. We are thankful to 
Hilary Palevsky for pointing our attention to this excellent example of path dependence. 
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so-called Hague Resolutions, the outcome of the Council meeting, contained an 
agreement among the member states to extend their EFZs and create a centralised 
EU external fisheries policy, it was not at that time possible to reach consensus on 
the arrangements for a conservation policy. The Commission had proposed a sys-
tem of TACs divided into national quotas in continuation of what was known from 
for instance NEAFC and other international organisations (Leigh 1983; Wise 
1984). The Commission did not propose any limitation of fishing effort besides a 
licensing system for fishermen. The decision not to emphasize fishing effort limi-
tations does not seem to have caused much debate, but critical comments were 
nonetheless expressed towards the perceived failure to sufficiently address the ef-
fort issue:  
Previous experience with the quota schemes of international fishery commissions has 
shown that licensing and checks on landings, although helpful, are easily evaded. What is 
needed is a limitation on effort. (Churchill 1977, p. 34)  
As a consequence of the failure to reach agreement on a conservation policy, 
the Hague Resolutions contained provisions that authorised the member states – in 
consultation with the Commission – to adopt non-discriminatory conservation 
measures to protect resources in the fishery zones off their coastlines. These pro-
visions were to provide the main mode of instituting EU conservation measures in 
the period from 1976 to 1983. One last noticeable element of the agreements was 
the “Hague preferences”, which stipulated that when implementing the CFP the 
Union should take into account the needs of local communities most heavily de-
pendent on fishing. These areas included Ireland, parts of northern UK and, fi-
nally, Greenland10 (Leigh 1983; Wise 1984). 
In the negotiations in The Hague and the subsequent discussions leading up to 
the eventual adoption of a conservation policy in 1983, Ireland and the UK were 
pitted against the other member states with a demand for exclusive national zones 
extending up to 50 nm. The Commission had initially proposed a system of exclu-
sive national zones of 12 nm in 1976. This was, on one hand, not acceptable to 
UK and Ireland, which favoured larger zones. On the other hand, other member 
states – most notably France – argued that the national zones adopted in connec-
tion with the accessions of 1973 were derogations valid only until 1983 and that 
equal access ultimately ruled out the possibility of having exclusive national 
zones. In the end, a compromise was found which determined that equal access as 
decided in 1970 should continue to apply in the waters of the EU member states. 
However, the member states would be allowed to reserve the waters within 6 nm 
off the coast for their own nationals and the waters between 6 and 12 nm would 
also primarily be reserved for the member states’ fishermen, although member 
states with historic rights could continue a limited fishery. The derogations to 
equal access within the 12 nm zone would apply for ten years and be renewable 
for another ten, i.e. to the end of 2002 (Leigh 1983).  
                                                          
10 Greenland left the EU in 1985. 
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The discussion over access was obviously strongly interlinked with the second 
major issue relating to the conservation policy, namely the adoption of TACs and 
the subsequent allocation of national quota shares, which was seen as necessary 
for the TAC system to work without creating an unsustainable “race for fish”.11 As 
mentioned earlier, the TAC system was from an early stage favoured over some 
sort of effort regulation system mainly due to the managers’ familiarity with TACs 
from the Atlantic commissions. However, it proved difficult to reach an agree-
ment: 
The reason for the long delay in reaching agreement is not hard to discover. For the 
apparently technical rubric ‘TACs and quotas’ disguises a political problem of resource 
distribution between member states. The sum of member states’ demands added up to 
more than the total amount of fish available. In the bad old days when this situation arose 
in the fishery commissions it led to the inflating of TACs, followed by overfishing. In the 
Community the excess of demand over supply led to a prolonged debate about the criteria 
for distributing quotas among member states and about the sharing out of specific stocks. 
(Leigh 1983, p. 90)  
In retrospect it is easy to see that it was not only in the “bad old days” that the 
excess of demand over supply led to inflated TACs; the Council inherited this 
practice.  
The conservation policy of the CFP, which was finally adopted on 25 January 
1983, included the above-mentioned compromise in relation to the access provi-
sions. In relation to TACs and quotas, allocation keys for the different stocks were 
found. These keys built on the consideration of three elements: historic catches of 
the different stocks by different member states; the Hague preferences, which fa-
voured Ireland, the UK and Greenland; and compensation for jurisdictional losses, 
which referred to the losses incurred by some member states, particularly Ger-
many and the UK, when non-member states extended their EFZs (Leigh 1983). 
The agreed system of allocation keys – referred to as “the relative stability” – re-
mains today virtually unaltered12 and stands as one of the most fundamental ele-
ments of the CFP. 
Finally, in connection with the conservation policy, a control regulation, which 
provided the Commission with certain powers in terms of overseeing the control 
efforts of the member states, was adopted in 1982. However, the powers of the 
Commission were relatively limited. When looking at contemporary accounts of 
the CFP negotiations, it is striking how little attention for instance the control is-
sue attracted in the beginning of the 1980s. The difficulties of agreeing on the ba-
sic principles seem to have overshadowed the discussions of how to properly im-
plement the system. That the question of proper enforcement and implementation 
                                                          
11 The discussion over allocation of quotas took more than six years and is to some extent rather 
technical. We will not in this chapter go into a detailed description of it, but rather refer the inter-
ested reader to Wise (1984). 
12 The only amendments made to the relative stability have been made i relation with the acces-
sion of new EU members and these amendments have not changed the relative stability between 
the member states originally agreeing on the CFP. 
140      T.J. Hegland and J. Raakjær 
is pivotal had nevertheless been confirmed by the experiences in the Atlantic 
commissions.  
Despite these difficulties, the EU managed to adopt a relatively coherent CFP, 
which was primarily designed to be able to control fishing mortality by the adop-
tion and enforcement of TACs for a large number of stocks. Moreover, a structural 
policy was in place, including provisions to enable the EU to move towards a bal-
ance between resources and capacity. However, we know today that there was no 
reason for any particular optimism. The main political hurdles might have been 
passed by 1983, but the CFP was not going to prove easy to implement and ad-
minister. 
5.4 1983 to 1992 – Muddling Through Without Change13 
In the years following 1983, neither the conservation policy (including control and 
enforcement) nor the structural policy were implemented and administered in a 
coherent manner, nor did they ensure sustainable and efficient utilisation of the 
fish stocks in EU waters. The consequence hereof was that the problems of over-
capacity and overfishing escalated further after 1983. 
The structural policy was to a large extent based on the idea of “auto-
sufficiency”, which was also a major driver in the creation of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy. The idea of auto-sufficiency developed after World War II and its 
basic objective was to increase Europe’s internal capacity to provide food in order 
to ensure that the people of mainland Europe would never again starve as they did 
during the war. This led to an emphasis on catching more fish, i.e. by providing 
grants to expand and increase the fleet, without any particular consideration to the 
impact on the long-term sustainability of the fish stocks. This policy, based on the 
outdated notion that the sea was too vast for its resources to ever be exhausted, 
caused a massive increase in the fishing capacity of the EU fleet. The increase 
from 1970 to 1983 was more than 60 percent in terms of gross registered tonnage 
(GRT) and considerably more in terms of kilowatt (kW) engine power (Holden 
1994; Commission of the European Communities 1997; Lindebo 2003).  
That it was possible to expand fishing capacity without significant negative 
economic consequences for the individual fishermen might to some extent be due 
to the fact that a number of fish stocks upheld abnormally high recruitment rates 
from the mid-1960s and until the beginning of the 1980s. This camouflaged the 
magnitude of the problems of overcapacity in the fleet and made continuous in-
crease in catches beyond “normal” or sustainable level possible (Holden 1994). 
                                                          
13 The use of the phrase ’Muddling through’ is inspired by Lindblom (1959). Lindblom used this 
phrase mainly to describe the way that bureaucracies find ways through a trial and error process. 
We use the term less positively and refer to a situation where the trial and error process does not 
really lead to improvement, but merely a continued trial and error process because of the path 
dependence of the system. 
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However, there were also significant exemptions to this trend, e.g. the North Sea 
herring stock, which was severely fished down despite reasonable recruitment, 
leading to a ban on herring fishing in the North Sea from 1977. Holden (1994) of-
fers two explanations as to why nobody within the system was able to foresee the 
problems that the increase in capacity subsequently caused, even though the risk 
of overfishing was well documented at the time. Firstly, until 1978 there was ef-
fectively no expertise on fisheries issues in the Commission to warn against this 
situation. Secondly, nearly all member states benefited from the funds and had no 
immediate interest in altering the arrangement. However, contrary to what might 
have been expected, the development with increasing capacity continued even in 
the years after the adoption of the conservation policy.  
By the early 1980s (some) awareness of the need to control fishing capacity 
had penetrated into the system. This led to the adoption of a series of programmes, 
the MAGPs, aimed towards balancing the fishing capacity of the different member 
states’ fleets to the size of the fish stocks. All MAGPs have primarily been setting 
targets for the future size of the fleets in terms of GRT and kW for each member 
state. MAGP I, in place from 1983 to 1986, set targets that were modest and basi-
cally aimed at keeping capacity constant. Nonetheless, all but two member states 
failed to reach their targets and overall fleet capacity continued to increase (for a 
description of this development in Denmark, see Chapter 6). The EU had no ex-
perience with implementing such programmes, and fleet registers and methods to 
measure the capacity of the member states were incomplete and inconsistent 
across member states. Although MAGP I was a rather limited success, it does 
stand as the first concrete expression of the wish to restrict the increase in fishing 
capacity and as such it was an indication of a fundamental, although insufficient, 
reorientation (Holden 1994; Lindebo 2003).  
Paradoxically, the financial funds allocated under the structural policy’s FIFG 
continued to be awarded mainly for the construction or modernisation of vessels 
while the amounts spent on reducing capacity through scrapping programmes 
were comparatively negligible. This situation lasted at least until 1987, after which 
the Commission according to Holden14 (1994) took a more rigorous approach and 
only approved grants for construction of vessels to the member states which had 
met their MAGP targets. However, this is a good example of how one of the two 
fundamental parts of the CFP can be counterproductive to the other.  
For various reasons, the conservation policy, like the structural policy, was not 
implemented in a way that really approached the problems in the first years after 
1983, though the problems were increasingly recognised. As described above, the 
negotiations on the conservation policy had been lengthy and extremely compli-
cated. This caused the Commission to choose a cautious road when suggesting 
TACs in order to give the fragile compromise time to settle. Furthermore, in the 
first years the TAC agreements were well behind schedule. The TACs adopted at 
the meeting on 25 January 1983 were those of 1982; those for 1983 were not 
                                                          
14 Mike Holden held various, prominent positions in DG Fish in the period from 1979 to 1990. 
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adopted before late in the year. The TACs for 1984 were adopted on 31 January 
1984 and, finally, those for 1985 were adopted before the beginning of the year, as 
has been the case since. In these first years the TACs proposed by the Commission 
basically reflected the actual fishing mortality at the time, a level of fishing mor-
tality that was not biologically sustainable. In 1985, the negotiations of the TACs 
for 1986 were affected by the accession of Spain and Portugal on 1 January 1986. 
An agreement on quota allocations to the two new member states was concluded, 
but at the cost of setting TACs well above historic catches. In terms of using 
TACs to restrict fishing mortality, these first years were to a large extent wasted 
and consequently served as nothing more than an opportunity to get the TAC-
instrument accepted and institutionalised (Holden 1994). Moreover, the TACs and 
quotas were hardly enforced in the early years. This meant that the recorded land-
ings did not in any way reflect the actual landings, which were much larger than 
those reported. This meant that fishing mortality was effectively underestimated, 
which also served to disguise the problems created by the mismatch between fish-
ing capacity and the resources available in the longer term. 
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that even though a relatively coherent 
policy was adopted in 1983, the first years hereafter were lost in terms of sustain-
able fisheries management because of ineffective and inconsistent implementa-
tion/administration. Rather, the period served basically – although the importance 
of this should not be underestimated – to get the newly adopted CFP package in-
stitutionalised. It is noteworthy that most of the deficiencies in the implementation 
practice of this period can be traced back to the problems of getting a large num-
ber of different countries to cooperate. The reluctance to propose reasonably re-
strictive TACs was mainly based on the fear of destroying a fragile compromise, 
which it had taken several years of negotiation between the member states to agree 
on. Moreover, the failure to halt the increase in fishing capacity was to a large ex-
tent the result of the administrative difficulties of implementing programmes aim-
ing at capacity reduction in many different member states with a number of differ-
ent recording and reporting practices.  
MAGP II, in place from 1987 to 1991, reflected the experience of the first 
MAGP where only a few of the member states had reached their targets. The 
Commission outlined a programme where the reductions to be achieved over the 
period was as modest as 3 percent in tonnage and 2 percent in power. When the 
increased efficiencies coming from technological development are taken into con-
sideration, this corresponded de facto to an increase in fishing capacity. According 
to Holden (1994) the Commission stuck to modest targets – even though problems 
with fish stocks were now obvious – in order to at least accustom the member 
states to the idea of decreasing capacity, something which might facilitate compli-
ance with more ambitious targets in later programmes. However, only five mem-
ber states managed to reach even these modest targets and the Community contin-
ued in the period to provide funds for construction of vessels which by far 
outweighed the funds deployed for scrapping. This meant that overall capacity 
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continued to increase (Holden 1994; Lindebo 2003). According to the Commis-
sion the main limitations of the two first MAGPs included the following: 
- Insufficient classification of the fleet into categories related to the species caught, fishery 
zones and methods of fishing; 
- monitoring of the fleet based on a limited number of physical capacity parameters only, 
without any consideration of the remaining parameters and fleet activity (fishing effort); 
- absence of short- and long-term objectives based on the actual situation of particular 
stocks; 
- lack of statistical data and inadequate measures to control fishing capacity and fishing 
effort; 
- non-obligatory status of the programmes. (Commission of the European Communities 
1991, p. 28) 
Holden (1994) points moreover to a specific problem in implementing the pro-
grammes, namely the fact that the member states weeded out from the registers 
mainly the vessels, which fished very little or not at all (see also chapter 6). For 
whatever reasons, the consequence was that fishing capacity – and fishing mortal-
ity – did not decrease as a consequence of MAGP I and II. 
The setting of TACs in accordance with the scientific advice continued to be 
problematic as well. A number of specific issues15 demanded the attention of the 
Council in the end of the 1980s and resulted in less attention to the question of the 
sustainable size of TACs. Furthermore, some of these specific issues were “best” 
solved by setting the TACs above the scientific advice. The failure to stop the in-
crease in capacity was clearly not the best background upon which to agree on 
cuts in TACs either. Holden describes the basic mechanism of TAC-setting in this 
way: 
It is not surprising that the level of TACs is mainly determined by political decisions 
because politicians regard it as their responsibility to respond to the pressures from their 
fishing industries as they consider fit. That is democracy in action. Account is taken of the 
scientific advice but more often than not it has been disregarded for socio-economic 
reasons, which is little more than coded language for saying ‘avoiding political 
unpopularity’. Only when the consequence of disregarding the scientific advice would 
appear to be calamitous has it been acted upon, but often then not rigorously. (Holden 
1994, p. 70) 
Holden might as well have been writing today. Nevertheless and in all fairness, 
the Commission has since 1991 adopted a new strategy for proposing TACs, 
which are now more in line with the scientific advice provided. However, this did 
in general not immediately change the actual size of TACs, as the Council contin-
ued its policy of adopting larger TACs than suggested by the Commission. More-
over, enforcement of TACs and quotas remained a problem. The changing attitude 
within the Commission, which can mainly be attributed to personnel changes, co-
incided with the publications of two reports, the Gulland report in 1990 and Re-
                                                          
15 These issues related to Svalbard cod, western mackerel, and North Sea cod and haddock, see 
Holden (1994) for specifics. 
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port 91 in 1991, which in very specific terms recognised and outlined the prob-
lems of the CFP. 
The Gulland report (Gulland 1990) was the outcome of an expert committee set 
up by the Commission to give advice in relation to the preparation of MAGP III, 
which systematically documented and, for the first time, set figures for the over-
capacity of the EU fleet. The report concluded that fishing mortality needed to be 
reduced by 40 percent. As a consequence, the report recommended that fishing for 
demersal stocks be reduced by 30 percent and fishing for benthic stocks by 20 
percent. Fishing for pelagic stocks was not affected by the recommendations from 
the Gulland report (Gulland 1990 in Lindebo 2003).  
The Commission used the Gulland report to back its proposals and the Council 
agreed on significant capacity reduction targets for MAGP III, which was in place 
from 1993 to 1996,16 reducing fishing effort by 20 percent for demersal stocks and 
15 percent for benthic stocks; fishing effort for pelagic stocks was kept un-
changed. This was less of a reduction than recommended by the scientists, but still 
substantial. In contrast to previous programmes, the reductions were not expressed 
in capacity, but in fishing effort – a product of capacity (GRT), engine power 
(kW) and number of days at sea. The member states could thereby choose to 
achieve part of their reduction by reducing the number of days-at-sea for vessels. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the previous programmes, MAGP III aimed at the larg-
est reductions for the fleets targeting the most threatened stocks (Lindebo 2003). 
In 1991 the Commission published Report 91 (Commission of the European 
Communities 1991) containing a review of the CFP based on the experiences from 
1983 to 1990. Report 91 was meant to stimulate and provide guidance for a debate 
in the various Community institutions and other bodies in order for them to pro-
vide the input necessary for the Commission to propose during 1992 new rules for 
the period 1993–2002 (Commission of the European Communities 1991). Report 
91 outlined a number of problems with the performance of the CFP from 1983 to 
1990, and stated that in general terms the stocks were in danger because of exces-
sive fishing mortality, which also negatively affected fishermen’s income.  
Furthermore, the Commission concluded that there was large overcapacity in 
the EU fleet and that most fleets had to reduce their level of activity. This was de-
scribed as a latent sectoral crisis. As a consequence the Commission concluded 
that “[p]resent mechanisms are inadequate” (Commission of the European Com-
munities 1991, p. III).  
The Commission identified a number of problems which had contributed to the 
situation. These problems included: the exclusive reliance on TACs and quotas 
without any real control over fishing capacity, which led to a race for fish and dis-
carding at sea; the lack of political will to ensure that the regulations were com-
plied with; the lack of coordination and coherence between the different parts of 
                                                          
16 A one-year transitional programme was adopted for 1992 to provide time for negotiations in 
the Council after which MAGP III was amended for the period from 1993 to 1996 (Lindebo 
2003). 
5 Recovery Plans and the Balancing of Fishing Capacity and Fishing Possibilities      145 
the CFP, etc. Finally, the Commission warned about the consequences of not tak-
ing action: 
“If no mandatory decisions are taken to restructure the industry and significantly reduce 
fishing effort, with emphasis on the ‘at risk’ fisheries, the fishing sector and connected 
activities risk causing a real and irreparable tear in the socio-economic fabric of the 
coastal and island regions heavily dependent on fishing.” (Commission of the European 
Communities 1991, p. 60) 
The Commission furthermore identified seven main areas where the CFP could 
be improved. Most of the identified areas related to the setting of TACs, getting 
capacity under control or control and enforcement: 
- distribution of responsibility at all levels, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, conferring responsibility on the parties concerned, in particular the 
fishermen's organizations which could be given the task of implementing the management 
measures at the appropriate level; 
- more stringent regulation of access to resources by a system of licenses in order to 
rationalize fishing effort (by zone, species, fisheries, etc.), cutting back excess capacity 
and improving the planning of fishing so as to reduce over-investment and economic 
inefficiency; 
- a new classification of fishing activities (multiannual, multispecies, and analytical 
TACs, as appropriate), definitions being based on existing rights and the economic and 
social characteristics of each fishery; 
- more stringent control mechanisms, using modern technologies for vessel location and 
communication of information, in order to monitor the movements of certain vessels and 
inform the authorities concerned, while coordinating the information obtained; 
- enforcing compliance with rules which are in the common interest, ideally through 
economic incentives encouraging good behaviour by fishermen (use of selective gear, 
compliance with landing standards), and deterrent sanctions at Community level (penalty 
quotas, withdrawal of licenses, withholding of aid, fines); 
- stronger structural management, by segmentation of the fleet, on the basis of new 
parameters, providing a basis for the assessment and control of fishing effort, and 
inclusion of structural measures under the umbrella of the reform of the structural Funds; 
- greater synergy between management of internal and external resources, other sources of 
supply and market management. (Commission of the European Communities 1991, p. V) 
According to Raakjær Nielsen (1993), Report 91 clearly stated that the main 
problem for the CFP was that it did not ensure rational utilization of the fish re-
sources. The instruments used in the past had created a severe overcapacity in the 
fleet. Thus Report 91 primarily focused on conditions that contribute to a more 
appropriate utilization of the fish resources in EU waters. Report 91 strongly em-
phasised the need to ensure a coherent balance between fishing capacity and activ-
ity and the size of the stocks, focusing on capacity reduction. Instruments that 
would facilitate this development were suggested. These included, for instance, 
multi-annual and/or multi-species TACs. Economic incentives to ensure a more 
appropriate utilization of the fish resources were proposed, but the Commission 
did not provide any guidelines on how to implement economic incentives in the 
management regulations.  
Approaching the mid-term revision in 1992, nobody could be unaware of the 
severity of the situation and of the steps to be taken to approach the situation. The 
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goals set under MAGP III were also considerably more ambitious than in previous 
programmes. However, the mid-term revision of the CFP and especially the way it 
was subsequently implemented turned out differently than would be expected 
from this lead-up. 
5.5 1993 to 2002 – Turning the Blind Eye to an Emerging Crisis 
As described above, it was not a shortage of challenges that plagued EU fisheries 
managers in the run-up to the revision of 1992. The Commission had identified a 
number of problems in Report 91 and as a result, the Commission proposed a 
wider reform than what was required by the 1983 basic regulation, which merely 
stated that the rules of access were to be revisited. A number of new elements 
were added to the basic regulation of the CFP in connection with the mid-term re-
vision. The revised basic regulation entered into force on 1 January 1993. Some of 
the most important new features included: the prolonging of the exceptions to 
equal access until 31 December 2002, which was the only issue that the Council 
had to decide on; the introduction of the possibility to adopt multi-annual TACs; 
the introduction of the possibility of using days-at-sea to limit fishing effort; and 
the adoption of a scheme for developing an EU licensing system (Council of the 
European Communities 1992). 
In reality, the EU decision-makers did not utilise the possibilities of adopting 
days-at-sea restrictions or multi-annual TACs, which were mandated by the modi-
fied basic regulation adopted in 1992. The implementation of management based 
on days-at-sea failed mainly because of opposition to the idea of having both 
TACs and effort restrictions at the same time and because of the limited scientific 
ability to calculate the needed effort reductions. As for the question of multi-
annual TACs the Commission actually came forward with a proposal in 1993. 
However, the Council failed to make a decision on multi-annual TACs mainly due 
to limitations in the scientific advice, which had been approved by authorised bod-
ies, as well as opposition from the fishing industry (Commission of the European 
Communities 2001b).  
As it turned out, the most important new addition of the 1992 basic regulation 
became the licensing system, which was subsequently amended and expanded 
several times and improved the ability to monitor and guide the development of 
the EU fleet. However, without failing to appreciate the importance of the licens-
ing system, it seems fair to argue that the progress achieved by the 1992 revision 
in the most pivotal areas was only modest considering the rather obvious severity 
of the situation.  
Following the revision of the CFP a new regulation on control measures was 
adopted in 1993 (Council of the European Communities 1993). Monitoring and 
control measures had for a long time been insufficient and the Commission stated 
in Report 91 that as a result of the lacking political will in this respect, 
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“[c]ompliance with TACs and quotas had been very limited” (Commission of the 
European Communities 1991, p. 22). The 1993 control regulation provided for a 
more integrated approach covering the different aspects of the CFP. The Commis-
sion powers to oversee the national monitoring authorities were strengthened and 
a requirement to impose dissuasive penalties was instituted. Moreover, the 1993 
regulation opened the possibility of using modern satellite based surveillance 
methods (Commission of the European Communities 2001b). The control regula-
tion has been significantly amended over the years, most significantly in 1998. 
The satellite-based vessel monitoring system, as an example, has over time be-
come a key element of the EU member states’ monitoring efforts, incrementally 
being applied to more and more vessels. However, neither the 1993 regulation nor 
later amendments changed the balance between the member states and the Com-
mission fundamentally in this area. The member states remain more or less in con-
trol of monitoring and enforcement efforts,17 although the 2002 reform did in-
crease the Commission’s powers in the area. Moreover, as a result of the 2002 
reform, a Community Fisheries Control Agency is being set up in Vigo in Spain. 
This institution will by means of operationally coordinating the member states’ 
control and inspection activities most probably strengthen the uniformity and ef-
fectiveness of enforcement without actually taking over the national control agen-
cies.18 
Overcapacity is arguably a major driver for the enforcement problems within 
the EU fisheries sector. Thus getting the capacity in balance with fishing opportu-
nities must be seen as pivotal, since it is an impossible task to monitor the fleets of 
the member states at all times, even with the newest available technologies. The 
capacity reduction programmes must therefore also be understood as an important 
effort to reduce the incentives for breaking the rules. However, in consideration of 
the stark conclusions of the Gulland report, progress on this issue remained mod-
est in the first half of the 1990s, which meant that the control authorities did not 
get the necessary helping hand in terms of a capacity-reduction. MAGP III led, 
nevertheless, to some reduction of the overcapacity of the EU fleet. According to 
the Commission’s Green Paper from 2001, the overall cut in the fleet was around 
15 percent in terms of GRT and 9.5 percent in terms of kW (Commission of the 
European Communities 2001b, details are provided in Table 5.1).  
                                                          
17 It should in this respect be noted that the Commission has the possibility to refer cases of non-
compliance to the ECJ, whose judgements are binding on the member states. The penalties can in 
extreme cases be significant as this excerpt shows: “The European Commission has welcomed 
this morning’s decision by the European Court of Justice to request France to pay a lump sum of 
€ 20 million and a periodic 6-month penalty of € 57,761,250 running from today, for failing to 
comply with a 1991 Court ruling on serious shortcomings in its enforcement of fisheries rules.” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2005). 
18 The fact that this is a coordinating rather than operating institution is underlined by its annual 
budget of around € 5 million, which is little more than half of what Denmark alone spends on 
control activities (Fødevareministeriet and Fiskeridirektoratet 2006; Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities 2006). 
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Table 5.1. Development of the EU Fleet 1991 – 2002 (excl. Finland and Sweden). Figures for 
1991 from Commission (1997) cited in Lindebo (2003), other figures from Eurostat (2006a, b) 
Year 1991 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Tonnage of Fleet (1000 GRT) 2,010 1,964 1,945 1,951 1,900
Power of Fleet (1000 kW) 8,347 7,468 7,524 7,190 6,880
 
By the end of 1996 and MAGP III, the EU fleet had as a whole reached its tar-
gets, but this masked the fact that some member states, notably the Netherlands 
and the UK, had failed to reach their individual targets. Furthermore, even though 
most member states had reached their overall targets, this did not necessarily mean 
that the reductions had taken place to the required extent in the targeted fisheries 
(Lindebo 2003); as described earlier, MAGP III targeted the fleets fishing on the 
most threatened stocks. Thus although MAGP III did go part of the way towards 
approaching the problem of overcapacity, the problem continued to be massive. 
Moreover, the member states, which reached their targets, could benefit from EU 
grants for vessel renewal and modernisation under the FIFG, adding to the prob-
lem of increasing efficiency due to technological development. 
In preparation of MAGP IV, the Commission commissioned an expert report to 
follow-up on the Gulland report. This expert report, known as the “Lassen report” 
(Lassen 1995), documented once again that fishing pressure on a number of stocks 
was still much too high (Commission of the European Communities 1998). Never-
theless, the Council continued to fail to sufficiently reduce capacity, just as the 
Lassen report documented in previous programmes, and MAGP IV turned out yet 
again not to ensure an appropriate reduction of the capacity of the EU fleet. Ac-
cording to the Commission (2001b), the targets set were not even able to counter 
the increases in efficiency due to technological development. That the targets were 
in fact modest was also evidenced by the fact that the member states’ overall tar-
gets were in general reached long before the end of the programme. 
Two main issues were identified as reducing the effectiveness of the pro-
gramme. One issue was the method used to calculate reductions in fishing effort: 
For MAGP IV, the Commission had proposed to cut fishing effort by 30% for stocks at 
risk of depletion and 20% for those overfished. The Council decided that, instead of 
applying the proposed reduction rates to the various sections of the fleet on the basis of 
the stocks targeted, these rates should be weighted according to the composition of the 
vessel catches. This system has the perverse effect that the more a stock is depleted, the 
lower the proportion of the catch is likely to represent, and the lower protection that stock 
receives under MAGP IV. (Commission of the European Communities 2000) 
A second issue was that part of the effort reduction on behalf of a member state 
could be achieved by means of days-at-sea schemes limiting fishing activity. 
These schemes were, according to the Commission, comparably difficult to con-
trol (Commission of the European Communities 2000).  
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The disappointing experiences with MAGPs led the EU to abandon these after 
MAGP IV and instead, as a result of the 2002 reform, apply a strict but relatively 
simple entry-exit regime from 1 January 2003.19 
As the EU approached the reform of 2002, the situation had not been improved 
from the situation before the revision of 1992. The problems were obvious and a 
wider reform was required. The reason why decision-makers had failed to tackle 
the increasingly obvious resource base crisis was probably related to the fact that 
in the last half of the 1990s and in the beginning of the new millennium the fishing 
sector experienced favourable economic conditions, e.g. decreasing interest rates 
and increasing fish prices; had this not been the case, the fleet would most likely 
have been operating on the brink of bankruptcy (something that was also the case 
in Denmark, see Chapter 6). The favourable economic climate created a situation 
As part of the preparation for the reform of the CFP in 2002 the Commission 
published the “Green Paper on the future of the Common Fisheries Policy” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2001a) equivalent to Report 91. The 
Green Paper, evaluating the CFP at the turn of the century, painted a dark picture 
as it identified the sources of the problems:  
As far as conservation is concerned, many stocks are at present outside safe biological 
limits. They are too heavily exploited or have low quantities of mature fish or both. The 
situation is particularly serious for demersal fish stocks such as cod, hake and whiting. If 
current trends continue, many stocks will collapse. At the same time the available fishing 
capacity of the Community fleets far exceeds that required to harvest fish in a sustainable 
manner. 
The current situation of resource depletion results, to a good extent, from setting annual 
catch limits in excess of those proposed by the Commission on the basis of scientific 
advice, and from fleet management plans short of those required. Poor enforcement of 
decisions actually taken has also contributed to over-fishing. (Commission of the 
European Communities 2001a, p. 4) 
The reform that the Commission proposed in the aftermath of the discussion on 
the Green Paper was much more wide-ranging than the revision in 1992. Virtually 
no aspect of the CFP remained untouched. On several points, the Commission 
                                                          
19 We will not go in detail with the entry-exit regime here. However, it deserves to be mentioned 
that the abandonment of the MAGPs in favour of a new approach is an indication of the increas-
ing awareness of the implications of the EU fleet overcapacity. 
similar to the abnormally high recruitment of the stocks in the late 1970s, covering 
up the crisis in the sector. Thus, the fishing sector has twice been helped by exter-
nal factors and thus avoided facing the consequences of too high fishing mortality. 
Although policymakers are not unaffected by evidence of problems of biological 
sustainability, they tend to be more strongly affected by socio-economic concerns, 
which have to some extent been masked by external factors. Furthermore, many 
years of justified warnings about the looming crisis had created an end-result simi-
lar to that in the story of the boy who cried wolf. The severity of the situation was 
consequently not really acknowledged until the cod stocks were virtually on the 
verge of collapse. 
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proposed more extensive changes than were actually adopted by the Council in the 
end. In this chapter we will, however, not go into the specifics of the entire reform 
but only the dynamics surrounding the decision to adopt multi-annual recovery 
plans.  
5.6 Adoption of Recovery Plans – Hope for the Future? 
One of the key outcomes and innovative changes in the reform of 2002 was the 
decision to adopt the scheme for recovery plans.20 On 19 December 2003 the 
European Union adopted a long-term recovery plan covering four cod stocks, in-
cluding the most important in the North Sea (Council of the European Union 
2004). This plan represented the first application of an instrument which had been 
added to the “toolbox” of the Common Fisheries Policy almost precisely one year 
before. The provisions for recovery plans were motivated by the alarming state of 
a number of stocks in the waters of the EU. The Gulland report and the Lassen re-
port had both indicated that fishing mortality was much too high and needed to be 
reduced for most stocks in EU waters. The necessary decreases were typically es-
timated to be some 40 percent for many stocks. In the “Green Paper” the Commis-
sion reflected on the causes of the failure to successfully implement the TAC-
system and thereby control fishing mortality:  
To control exploitation rates of fish stocks, the CFP has almost exclusively used upper 
limits on the quantities of fish which may be caught in a year (Total Allowable Catches or 
TACs and associated national quotas) and establishment of measures such as mesh sizes, 
closed areas, closed seasons (technical measures). […] Difficulties with TACs are due to 
the Council's systematic fixing, in some cases, at levels higher than indicated in the 
scientific advice, over-fishing, discards and illegal or black landings and to the over-
capacity of the fleet. Moreover TACs can only play a limited role in the management of 
fisheries in which many species of fish are taken simultaneously by each operation of the 
fishing gear (the mixed or multi-species fisheries). (Commission of the European 
Communities 2001c, p. 8) 
The objective of recovery plans is to ensure the recovery of stocks to safe bio-
logical limits, with a requirement to specify target conservation reference points. 
Targets are expressed in terms of: (a) population size and/or (b) long-term yields 
and/or (c) fishing mortality rate and/or (d) stability of catches. Recovery plans are 
to be drawn up on the basis of the precautionary approach to fisheries manage-
                                                          
20 As mentioned, the 2002 reform contained several other important elements besides the provi-
sions for recovery plans, e.g. the adoption of a strict entry-exit regime in relation to the fleet, the 
control agency and increased stakeholder involvement. However, here we choose to focus on the 
instrument of recovery plans, which is the instrument that most directly approaches the issue of 
fishing mortality rates. 
ment and taking account of limit reference points recommended by the relevant 
scientific bodies. They must ensure the sustainable exploitation of stocks and that 
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Several novel elements are noteworthy in relation to the scheme for recovery 
plans. Firstly, the basic regulation requires that the recovery plans should be multi-
annual in scope. This must be considered a key issue. A main problem of the con-
servation policy has allegedly been its failure to provide plans covering more than 
Introducing the scheme for recovery plans did not become the controversial 
element of the reform, although the Commission’s proposal gave rise to a debate 
which to a certain extent reflected general cleavages within the Council in connec-
tion with the 2002 reform. The debate regarding the recovery plans related mainly 
to who should be in control of setting TACs and fishing effort limitations, as well 
as to the role of fishing effort limitations.  
The most heavily disputed part of the proposal was the Commission’s sugges-
tion that once a multi-annual plan had been adopted by the Council and the catch 
and effort limits for the first year decided, the Commission itself should in the fol-
lowing years (under the Management Committee procedure21) decide on catch and 
fishing effort limitations in accordance with the harvest rules set out in the plan 
(Commission of the European Communities 2002). This proposal was unaccept-
able to most member states “as decisions on catch and fishing effort limits [can] 
not be reduced to an arithmetic automatism” (Council of the European Union 
                                                          
21 A Management Committee consists of member states’ representatives. If the Commission’s 
decision is not supported by a qualified majority in the committee then the proposal will be dealt 
with by the Council (European Union 2004). 
the impact of fishing activities on marine eco-systems is kept at sustainable levels. 
They may cover either fisheries for single stocks or fisheries exploiting a mixture 
of stocks, and must take due account of interactions between stocks and fisheries. 
The recovery plans must be multi-annual and indicate the expected time frame for 
reaching the targets established (Council of the European Union 2002d). 
just a single year; something which has been criticised by both industry and con-
servation organisations. Secondly, the article outlining the provisions for recovery 
plans includes a reference to the possibility of employing “harvesting rules which 
consist of a predetermined set of biological parameters to govern catch limits” 
(Council of the European Union 2002d, art. 5(4)). If adopted in accordance with 
scientific advice (and respected in the following years), harvest rules effectively 
eliminate the Council’s possibility of agreeing on TACs exceeding the biological 
advice, which the Council has gained a reputation for doing (Commission of the 
European Communities 2001a). Thirdly, the regulation states that the “[r]ecovery 
plans shall include limitations on fishing effort unless this is not necessary to 
achieve the objective of the plan” (Council of the European Union 2002d, art. 
5(4)). Considering the prevailing problems of over-capacity of the fleet, discards 
and illegal landings this means de facto that fishing effort limitations must be ap-
plied in most recovery plans. Direct limitation on fishing effort (input-regulations) 
in combination with the overall restrictions of TACs (output-regulations) has gen-
erally been ill-received by the industry, which has argued strongly against being 
subjected to both measures at the same time.  
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2002b, p. 13). Only Sweden and the UK among the member states with fisheries 
interests were willing to consider the proposal (Council of the European Union 
2002a, c). The proposal was consequently not accepted. It is possible that the 
Commission genuinely considered that the setting of TACs according to a harvest 
rule was a management decision, which the Council would be willing to turn over 
to the Commission. However, it is probably equally likely that this specific pro-
posal should partially be seen as a bargaining chip in the larger context of reform. 
According to a high-ranking representative of DG Fish (Interview, November 
2003) “any Commission proposal is a sort of mixture of what we honestly believe 
should be the final outcome and what we need to propose in order to get the final 
outcome that we want.” This conflict, however, was probably just as much rooted 
in the inter-institutional struggles as in fisheries. Any suggestion by one EU insti-
tution that it unilaterally expand its powers at the expense of another institution 
will almost always be ill-received by the institution that stands to loose power.  
Another debated issue, which in part emerged from the negotiations in the 
Council rather than from the Commission’s original proposal, was a suggested ob-
ligation to use fishing effort limitations in recovery plans in addition to the tradi-
tional TACs. This idea found considerable support in the Council. In general Bel-
gium, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK supported the 
Commission’s idea, and argued that fishing effort limitations could be used in par-
allel with TACs which in isolation had not been effective. In contrast, Spain, 
France, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Finland were sceptical about the 
Commission’s approach to fishing effort limitations (Council of the European Un-
ion 2002c). These member states were either sceptical about the value of effort 
limitations in general or, at least, sceptical about the usefulness of combining 
TACs and effort limitations. The compromise became the following provision: 
“Recovery plans shall include limitations on fishing effort unless this is not neces-
sary to achieve the objective of the plan” (Council of the European Union 2002d, 
art. 5(4)). In reality, this postponed the debate on this issue until the negotiations 
on individual recovery plans began. Considering the situation, fishing effort limi-
tations will probably have to be part of most recovery plans.  
5.7 Political Cleavages in EU Fisheries Policy-Making 
The general political cleavages within the Council, which were also to some ex-
lysed and understood within a general framework proposed by Charles (1992), 
who argues that “conflict can often best be understood as rising from natural ten-
sions between three differing fishery paradigms (or ‘world views’), each based on 
a different set of policy objectives” (Charles 1992, p. 379). Charles (1992) identi-
fies the three paradigms to be: conservation, which focuses on the policy objective 
of resource conservation; rationalization, which focuses on economic performance 
tent visible in the discussion regarding the recovery plans (see above), can be ana-
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in the sense of productivity; and social / community, which focuses on community 
welfare in the sense of equity. The paradigms can be organised in a triangular 
model where each corner is occupied by a “pure” paradigm. In between the pure 
positions all kinds of mixtures can in theory be found. 
Three different political positions22 could generally be observed in the Council 
in connection with the reform:23 The Commission, which does not have the right 
to vote, but nevertheless plays an important role in Council negotiations and the 
general decision-making process, proposed a radical reform marked by a conser-
vationist world view. A somewhat similar position was assumed by a network of 
member states, which informally referred to themselves as the “Friends of Fish” 
(FoF), composed of Germany, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium 
(and to a lesser extent Finland which views on structural aid especially diverged 
from those of the rest of the network). FoF favoured a comprehensive reform, but 
were less radical than the Commission in terms of conservationist focus. The net-
work’s nickname was chosen in response to the opposing group of member states 
who referred to themselves as “Amis de la Pêche” (AdlP), or in English “Friends 
of Fishing”. AdlP was composed of France, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and 
Greece and had been formed around December 2001 in response to the Green Pa-
per and what they saw as an overly conservationist approach from the Commis-
sion. These member states, which to a large extent argued from a social / commu-
nity perspective, engaged in an unprecedented level of coordination of strategies, 
meetings at high levels, publication of joint conclusions and counterproposals, etc.  
In Fig. 5.1 we plot the positions within the Council using the triangular model 
of fishery paradigms developed by Charles (1992). The specific positioning of the 
different political groupings is merely indicative, as it is hardly possible to place 
the players in the triangle in a way that cannot be contested, especially in such a 
complicated process as the 2002 reform where other factors not necessarily related 
to fisheries also influenced the political position of the member states (e.g. juris-
diction of national authorities and balance of power between EU institutions). 
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that individual member states have their own 
hobbyhorses, which affiliation with either group does not change. 
All players in the reform debate placed themselves relatively far from the ra-
tionalization corner, which is explained by the fact that the fundamental principle 
of relative stability, which was not seriously contested during the reform, compli-
cates any real attempts to reform the CFP towards the perspectives of the ration-
alization paradigm. At national level, however, several member states have 
                                                          
22 Outside the main groupings in the Council, the Danes, who chaired the Council meetings in 
the second half of 2002 in their role of President (a position that rotates among the member 
states), took the relatively neutral approach, which is traditionally required from the Presidency 
to facilitate compromises. Landlocked Luxembourg and Austria played negligible roles in the 
discussions. 
23 The section about the configuration of the Council in connection with the 2002 reform draws 
on Hegland (2004). 
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adopted part of the rationalization paradigm and are increasingly using economic 




Fig. 5.1. Council configuration during the 2002 Reform. Inspired by Charles (1992) 
The Commission clearly positions itself closer to the conservation paradigm 
with its emphasis on recovery of stocks as a dominating concern. The AdlP group 
largely keeps to the social / community paradigm, as they have done for two dec-
ades, prioritising socio-economic concerns over conservation. This group also has 
a predisposition towards various kinds of public aid to the sector, a view that 
places this group further from the rationalization corner than the other parties. Fi-
nally, in many of the debates, the FoF positioned themselves somewhere between 
the Commission and the AdlP, on most issues arguably slightly closer to the 
Commission.  
In-depth analysis of why the different member states assumed these positions 
and ended up in these coalitions is a study beyond the scope of this chapter, but a 
few significant factors ought to be mentioned. The fisheries sector is more impor-
tant for AdlP member states than for FoF member states, where conservation in-
terests are progressively gaining weight compared to fisheries interests. Further-
more, the FoF member states are in general net financial contributors to the EU, 
whereas the AdlP member states are net beneficiaries, making them more suppor-
tive of subsidies in general. Moreover, the fleets of the AdlP member states are 
generally more in need of modernisation than those of the FoF member states. Fi-
nally, the FoF member states had more immediate experience with the crisis of re-
sources, which has so far been most severe in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.  
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An interesting fact of the 2002 reform was that it was actually possible to agree 
on a number of substantial changes to the CFP without significant debate. For ex-
ample, this was the case in relation to multi-annual plans and to some extent the 
use of harvest control rules. Nevertheless, we would like to emphasise that the 
1992 revision of the CFP actually provided the instruments required to introduce 
recovery plans. This underlines the fact that the successfulness of the measures 
under the CFP is primarily determined by the political will among member states 
to reduce fishing effort and confront and alter the present path of the CFP, rather 
than by the availability or absence of specific instruments. 
As the account provided in this chapter substantiates, the story of the CFP is to 
a large extent a story of failed administration and implementation. This failure can 
to a large extent be explained by path dependence in the decision-making process, 
which has resulted in insufficient action from decisions-makers towards altering 
the course of the CFP and, most importantly, approaching the problem of overca-
pacity.  
It is our understanding that the balance between the paradigms presented above 
has shifted in the Council in recent years. The reform in 2002 may have been the 
first step towards a break with the unsuccessful path of the CFP. Path breakage is 
usually precipitated by the occurrence of an extraordinary event/process, creating 
a window–of–opportunity for “path-change”. These events, which cause signifi-
cant institutional changes and breaks in the path, are referred to by Hall and Tay-
lor (1996) as critical junctures. Although the critical development in relation to the 
fishery resources managed under the CFP has been gradual, it is reasonable to ar-
gue that the present situation, where a number of commercially important fish 
stocks are on the verge of collapse, constitutes a critical juncture that may open a 
window for reorientation. 
The CFP implementation failure of past years has recently been demonstrated 
by the near collapse of several fish stocks. Decision-makers are now questioning 
the present path and becoming motivated / forced to make changes, more actively 
reducing fishing capacity and activity in order to allow the stocks to rebuild. Al-
ready in 1992, the Commission expressed this opinion, and in Report 91 it pro-
posed a number of potentially effective ways to improve the situation. The Com-
mission thereby demonstrated its move from the social/community corner towards 
the conservation corner of Charles’ triangle. A decade later, however, decision-
makers in the Council mostly refrained from applying new instruments and re-
mained strongly biased towards the easy, short-term political solution of pleasing 
the industry and the dependent communities, a behaviour which has now in reality 
turned into a tragic disservice to the same industry and communities. 
The FoF member states have in recent years followed the example of the 
Commission and increasingly realised the need to change the implementation of 
the CFP to allow the stocks to recover and maintain fishing communities for the 
future. In contrast, protection of fishing and fishing communities has to a larger 
extent remained the priority of AdlP member states; although an increasing under-
standing of the need for change can also be observed within this group. We can 
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thus observe a crisis-driven change in the centre of gravity for decision-making 
related to the CFP, especially in recent years.  
 
 
Fig. 5.2. Changes in the relative strengths of paradigms. Inspired by Charles (1992) 
As illustrated in Fig. 5.2, the CFP’s centre of gravity has moved, and is increas-
ingly moving, from being firmly associated with the social/community corner to-
wards the conservation corner. Based on domestic developments in the member 
states, as well as developments in other parts of the world,24 it is likely that this 
development will eventually be supplemented by a move towards the rationaliza-
tion corner. 
Although we foresee that the centre of gravity will continue to move from the 
social/community corner towards the conservation corner, (potentially the ration-
alization corner) we are by no means certain of how far and at what pace, some-
thing only the coming years will show. As we have demonstrated in this chapter, 
two decades of implementation of the CFP have not lead to an effective admini-
stration. Even though the need for change is becoming increasingly evident and 
many respects kept the system in a deadlock. The relative stability can probably be 
considered one of the most resilient elements creating path dependence. It is diffi-
cult to see how the CFP can be truly reorganised in an economically efficient 
manner without at least redefining the concept of relative stability. Whether the 
shock that the system has incurred will be enough to promote this development 
remains an open question. The way the centre of gravity has moved within the 
                                                          
24 This is illustrated by the increasing spread of management systems building on some sort of 
privatised harvesting rights (see also Chapter 6). 
recognised, the principle of relative stability and other elements have until to now in 
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Council nonetheless gives reasons for some optimism, at least with regard to the 
EU actually employing more of its available instruments in the future. 
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6 Implementation Politics: The Case of 
Denmark Under the Common Fisheries Policy 
Troels Jacob Hegland and Jesper Raakjær  
Abstract   Denmark is among the more loyal European Union (EU) member sta-
tes when it comes to national implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP). However, even in Denmark several mechanisms contribute to sub-optimal 
implementation of the CFP. Looking at implementation problems for a relatively 
loyal member state, this chapter sheds critical light on national implementation of 
the CFP in the EU as a whole. The chapter initially provides a description of the 
institutional set-up for fisheries policy-making and implementation in Denmark, 
including a short historical account of the development of the Danish fisheries and 
of the mechanisms and processes behind the Danish implementation of fisheries 
policy, arguing that these mechanisms and processes have led to a situation where 
the goals agreed at the EU level are supplemented or even replaced by national 
priorities. The chapter concludes that in order to capture the domestic politics as-
sociated with CFP implementation in Denmark, it is important to understand the 
policy process as a synergistic interaction between dominant interests, policy alli-
ances/networks and prevailing discourses. The inability of the EU to ensure that 
the conservation goals agreed at the EU level are loyally pursued during national 
implementation is one of the reasons why the EU has been struggling to keep fish-
ing mortality rates at a sustainable level. 
6.1 Introduction 
Controlling the fishing mortality rates is an underlying key concern in any modern 
fisheries management approach. In the member states of the European Union 
(EU), fisheries regulations that are aimed at or have implications for controlling 
fishing mortality rates are to a large extent centrally imposed through the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP).1 However, in some policy areas the member states are free 
to decide on the specific way of implementing the rules. Furthermore, there are 
differences between the member states with regard to the procedure for how to 
                                                          
1 An account of the development of the CFP from its adoption in 1983 can be found in Chapter 5. 
their management since 1983. Subsequently, the chapter provides an understanding 
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A prominent feature of the Danish decision-making system is the extent to 
which the fisheries sector2 itself, and particularly the catch industry, has managed 
to influence the way in which CFP regulations have been implemented. This has 
to a significant extent (but not only) been possible through the Board for Com-
mercial Fishing (BCF). The BCF is an advisory institution of central importance 
because the responsible minister will, in line with a Danish tradition in public ad-
ministration of involving stakeholders in decision-making, go a long way to fol-
low its advice when implementing fisheries legislation (Raakjær Nielsen 1994; 
Raakjær Nielsen and Christensen 2006). However, at a more basic level, it is our 
hypothesis that there must be more fundamental, underlying drivers that determine 
why decisions are made in the way they are. These drivers are surely influenced 
by the Danish decision-making model, which focuses on stakeholder input, but it 
seems likely that as drivers behind fisheries management decisions they are also 
rooted in fundamental features of the Danish fisheries system.3 Consequently, our 
research will explore the implications of having the catch industry heavily in-
volved in the decision-making process and, more importantly, try to uncover fun-
damental drivers in order to understand the behaviour of the fisheries decision-
making system and administration over time. Using the Danish experience as an 
example, the chapter also looks into the implications of the fact that decisions 
made at the supranational level of the EU are implemented at the national level by 
actors with different preferences and objectives than those of the EU bureaucracy. 
Despite national autonomy in the implementation of EU rules, however, it is ulti-
mately often the EU bureaucracy and not the national governments that is held ac-
countable for the ramifications of decisions taken at a national level.  
Although this chapter casts a critical light on the implementation of CFP regu-
lations in Denmark, this does not indicate that Denmark is worse than other mem-
ber states in this respect. On the contrary, Denmark is in our opinion among the 
most loyal member states when it comes to implementation of the CFP. This is 
also indicated in the evaluation of the control, inspection and sanction system that 
the European Court of Auditors (2007) carried out in the six member states with 
the largest value of catch. A simple count in the report shows that Denmark and 
the Netherlands each received three critical remarks, placing them as the most 
loyal states in terms of these aspects of CFP implementation. In comparison, 
Spain, Italy and the UK each received more than 10 critical remarks. France re-
ceived almost 20. 
                                                          
2 By sector we refer to the catch industry, consisting of the fleet, as well as the processing industry. 
3 This is composed by natural, social and governance systems, following Charles (2001) and 
Raakjær (forthcoming). 
arrive at decisions on implementation. This chapter’s point of departure is that the 
specific choices in relation to implementation influence the ability of the EU to ef-
fectively control fishing mortality rates through the CFP. This chapter will conse-
quently look into how Denmark has implemented the CFP regulations and the 
driving forces for implementation choices.  
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This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first covers the legal and 
institutional setting for Danish implementation, beginning with the CFP (see also 
Chapter 5) and subsequently presenting a short introduction to the Danish system 
in terms of laws, institutions and legislative processes. The second describes the 
general evolution of the Danish fisheries system and its management from 1983 
(when the full CFP was adopted) to 2007. The third section presents and outlines 
the main domestic drivers of Danish implementation and administrative practices, 
which we have uncovered during our research, as well as examples of how these 
drivers function and have influenced the development of policy and implementa-
tion practices. The final section synthesises the main lessons learned and provides 
a discussion of their possible implications. 
In order to understand the evolution of the administrative practices and the 
Danish implementation of fisheries regulations, 11 key informant interviews were 
conducted, covering informants representing administration, industry and re-
search.4 Only fishermen (or fishermen’s representatives) who have held a high-
level position within Danish fishermen’s organisations were selected. The aim was 
to strike a reasonable balance between respondents from administration, research 
and industry and also to ensure that the informants had been involved with fisher-
ies management for a substantial period of time so that they could reflect on 
changes over time.5 Furthermore, an effort was made to select informants that 
would supplement one another and thus contribute different views and perspec-
tives. 
The interviews were conducted from the fall of 2006 to the fall of 2007 and all 
were transcribed before the analysis. All 11 respondents were granted anonymity, 
                                                          
4 In total 6 informants were from administration/research and 5 from industry. Furthermore, one 
of the authors has in his capacity first as a fisherman and later as a researcher and chairman for a 
larger processing plant closely followed the evolution of the Danish system since the CFP was 
adopted.  
5 All informants had a minimum of 15 years of experience during the period we analyse and 
most have actually been involved for the entire period. 
and are thus referred to by their interviewee number (1–11, see list with experi-
ence background at the end of the chapter) rather than by name. All interviews 
were conducted in Danish and direct quotations are in our translation. The inter-
views were carried out in three rounds. The first four interviews were very open 
and exploratory, structured only by a very rough interview guide. This strategy 
was chosen mainly for two reasons: (1) we had only a vague idea of what would 
be the main issues based on our pre-knowledge, and (2) we wanted the informants 
themselves to assist in identifying critical themes and issues. For the following two 
rounds of interviews (four and three interviews respectively), a more structured in-
terview guide was elaborated utilising the insights from the previous interviews. 
However, all interviews remained relatively open and the informants were always 
encouraged to focus on what they found important. In addition to key-informant 
interviews, a large body of legal documents, statistics and archive material from 
the Directorate of Fisheries was investigated. 
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To the best of our knowledge, no research has previously been conducted fo-
cussing specifically on Danish administrative practices and the Danish implemen-
tation of CFP regulations. The relatively few works that touch upon the issues 
have other primary focuses (e.g. Raakjær Nielsen 1992a, b; Vedsmand 1998; Ra-
akjær Nielsen and Vedsmand 1999; Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003; Sand-
beck 2003; Byskov 2005; Raakjær Nielsen and Christensen 2006; Hegland and 
Sverdrup-Jensen 2007). Consequently, the research providing the information for 
this chapter has been highly exploratory. This chapter thus does not claim to rep-
resent a conclusive and complete picture of the Danish administrative practice and 
its driving forces in the period in question. Rather, it represents a first attempt6 to 
outline some of the key-issues influencing Danish implementation and relate them 
to target fishing mortality. 
6.2 The Legal and Institutional Set-Up 
Conservation of living marine resources (the crucial conservation policy compo-
nent of the CFP) is one of only a few areas where the EU has exclusive compe-
tence vis-à-vis the member states. This means that the member states cannot adopt 
their own legislation within the area of living marine resource conservation unless 
that power has explicitly been given back to them, and the member state cannot 
under any circumstances legally adopt legislation which works counter to the ob-
jectives of the EU.  
The cornerstone of the conservation policy is an output-based system (see 
Chapter 1) setting total allowable catches (TACs) for individual (or in some cases 
multiple) fish stocks on an annual basis. Member states are allocated the same 
fixed percentages of the TACs every year, a principle known as the relative stabil-
ity. TACs are applied in combination with technical measures that primarily aim 
to reduce catches of non-target species or juveniles. Regulation of fleet capacity 
has traditionally also been high on the agenda under the structural policy compo-
nent of the CFP (see Chapter 5). In recent years, the CFP has been developed to 
include additional input-based elements (see Chapter 1) such as days-at-sea regu-
lations.  
The EU definition of “fishing mortality rate” is “the catches of a stock over a 
given period as a proportion of the average stock available to the fishery in that 
period” (Council of the European Union 2002b, Art. 3(f)). It is important to note 
that this definition is supplemented by the definition of “catch limit”, which is “a 
quantitative limit on landings of a stock or group of stocks over a given period 
                                                          
6 Within the constraints of the project we were not able to go further, but the analysis and argu-
ments presented in this chapter would benefit from further research, particularly by looking into 
the Directorate of Fisheries’ archives as well as those of the fishermen’s representative organisa-
tions. 
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unless otherwise provided for in Community law” (Council of the European Union 
2002b, Art. 3(m)). This creates a situation where the EU does not actually monitor 
catches, but rather the landings. Consequently, it becomes difficult to assure that 
the agreed TAC actually results in the preferred fishing mortality rate, since fish-
ing practices such as discarding, high-grading and unreported landings undermine 
this approach to control fishing mortality. This has created a muddy situation 
where, although scientists try to take these issues into account when they advise 
on TACs, the inability to directly measure their impact on the fish stocks neverthe-
less creates uncertainty. Furthermore, it is not uncommon that the Council of the 
European Union (Council) adopts TACs well above scientific recommendations. 
This has, it has been argued (Commission of the European Communities 2001), 
contributed to the development of a situation where a number of stocks in EU wa-
ters have fishing mortality rates that are far above advisable levels (Gulland 1990; 
Lassen 1995; Commission of the European Communities 2001).  
Implementation of EU decisions is a significant part of Danish fisheries policy 
and management. However, this does not mean that member states have no free-
dom in how they choose to implement EU decisions. The member states have sub-
stantial decision-making powers in some areas, and national choices regarding 
implementation can significantly influence the actual fishing mortality rates. Be-
low, we give four examples of areas in which national implementation and deci-
sions can impact the CFPs ability to actually match TACs with target fishing mor-
tality rates.  
1. Allocation of fishing opportunities. Although overall TACs are adopted by the 
Council, it is up to the member state to decide on the method of allocating the 
TAC between the vessels flying its flag (Council of the European Union 
2002b). Some groups of vessels are notoriously known to have higher discard-
ing rate than others and this will affect the fishing mortality rates.  
2. Adjustment of fishing capacity. A major cause of the EU’s struggle with much 
too high fishing mortality rates is the overcapacity of the member states’ fleets. 
Paradoxically, the EU’s Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) 
facilitated an immense capacity build-up (see Chapter 5 for details). It is a well-
established fact that the overcapacity has been transferred into excessive fish-
ing mortality rates, particularly because control measures have been inadequate 
and because allocations have not reflected fishing practices. It was not until 
December 2002 that an amendment to the basic structural policy regulation was 
adopted that specifically stated that measures under the structural policy “shall 
not increase fishing effort” (Council of the European Union 2002a, Art. 1(1)).  
3. Control and enforcement. The member states are responsible for control and 
enforcement within their own waters. The basic regulation states that: “[u]nless 
otherwise provided for in Community law, Member States shall ensure effective 
control, inspection and enforcement of the rules of the Common Fisheries Pol-
icy” (Council of the European Union 2002b, Art. 23(1)). The basic regulation 
also outlines guidelines as to how the inspection should take place and what 
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elements it should contain. However, it is well-known that control and en-
forcement have been an Achilles heel of the CFP from the beginning (e.g. 
Commission of the European Communities 2001; Commission of the European 
Communities 2006). 
4. Measures applying only to the state’s own vessels. The member states have the 
right to adopt more restrictive legislation relating to the conservation and man-
agement of stocks in their own waters, but these can only be applied to the 
state’s own vessels (Council of the European Union 2002b). In principle, more 
restrictive legislation should lead to lower fishing mortality rates, but this is not 
always the case, as it might instead be converted into higher discard rates and 
thereby contributing to the discrepancy between catches and landings. Den-
mark has for several species introduced minimum landing sizes that are higher 
than required by EU regulations.  
The legal and institutional set-up for Danish fisheries policy and management 
has significantly influenced how Denmark has employed its implementation pow-
ers in relation to the CFP. The Fisheries Law of 19997 can be considered the Dan-
ish equivalent to the basic regulation of the CFP. However, in contrast to the regu-
lar and significant (although not particularly successful) reform endeavours (see 
Chapter 5), that have contributed to regulatory development in the EU, the Danish 
Fisheries Law was not the result of a policy reform-process. In fact, the period 
from 1983 to 1999 was poor on policy developments in Denmark. Nevertheless, 
since the new Fisheries Law came into place, there have been wide-ranging re-
forms of the Danish fisheries policy (see section on allocation of fishing rights be-
neath). However, these reforms are still in their infancy and partly outside the re-
mit of this chapter. They were prompted not by the Fisheries Law of 1999 itself, 
but rather by changes in the political environment (see section on strong individual 
actors beneath). 
The overall legal framework and guiding principles of the fisheries policy is 
usually modified yearly in the Regulation Announcement, which announces the 
rules governing the different fisheries for the following year. This announcement 
is the national equivalent to the annual TAC and quota regulation of the EU, and 
sets out the principles regarding how to implement the Fisheries Law as well as 
the outcome of the EU negotiations in terms of limitations on catches and effort 
etc. However, following the Regulation Announcement, more specific manage-
ment regulations are determined throughout the year and announced in so-called 
Supplement 6 communications.  
                                                          
7 From 1983 to 1999 the national Danish marine fishery policy was outlined in three main laws 
supported by a number of laws of relatively minor importance. In 1999, the previous laws on the 
subject were merged into one general Fisheries Law (Folketinget 1999) covering almost every 
aspect of Danish fisheries policy. However, this merge did not constitute a reform but can more 
correctly be termed as a legal clean up.  
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MFAF constitutes the political level with two sections within the Department 
specifically dedicated to fisheries issues. Their main tasks in relation to fisheries 
policy and management include servicing the minister and developing policy. The 
objectives include sustainable exploitation of the fisheries resources, making sure 
that Denmark lives up to its international obligations, the protection of Danish in-
terests in the EU and other international negotiations, and safeguarding the best 
possible conditions to develop and ensure structural adjustment within the Danish 
fisheries sector. 
The Directorate of Fisheries (DoF), which was extracted from (but remains re-
sponsible to and financially dependent on8) the Ministry of Fisheries in 1995 after 
the merge with the Ministry of Agriculture in 1994, consists of a central unit, three 
inspectorates and four control vessels. The DoF is responsible for the day-to-day 
implementation and administration of fisheries management in Denmark, includ-
ing enforcement and data collection. 
In conducting its tasks the administration is supported and informed by a num-
ber of boards. Two of these boards are particularly important: the Board for 
Commercial Fishing9 (BCF), mandated to advise on the “planning and develop-
ment of rules on how to practice commercial fishing, as well as on the catch ca-
pacity, use of gear etc. and on the development of rules regarding the firsthand 
sale of fish” (Folketinget 1999, §6, our translation), and the Board for EU-fishing 
(BEUF), mandated to advise on the “position regarding the Common Fisheries 
Policy of the European Community and on developing the rules in the area of 
fisheries necessary to implement the EC legal acts mentioned under §10” (Folke-
tinget 1999, §5, our translation). In this chapter we focus on the BCF,10 which is 
                                                          
8 The DoF has been operating on the basis of a so-called Performance Contract signed with 
MFAF, which outlines its budget and the tasks to be undertaken within that budget (Fødevare-
ministeriet and Fiskeridirektoratet 2005).  
9 Formerly known as the Regulation Advisory Board. 
10 We have gained access to the minutes of BCF meetings. In contrast, minutes and recommen-
dations of the BEUF are confidential as they to some extent relate to the Danish position vis-à-
vis EU legislation, which is still under negotiation. 
The day-to-day implementation of the rules is the responsibility of the minister in 
charge of fisheries policy. Consequently, the system is relatively centralised, as there 
are in principle no management decisions taken at regional level. Until 1994, the 
fisheries sector had its own ministry, subsequently agriculture and fisheries consti-
tuted a dual ministry from 1994 to 1996, and fisheries issues have been dealt with 
under the Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (MFAF) after 1996. As the 
ministry has evolved to include within its purview an increasing number of topics in 
addition to fisheries, fisheries-specific issues have become less central to the overall 
ministry objectives. Rather than considering only the business aspect of fisheries 
management, as was common under the original pre-1994 ministry, the ministry 
now increasingly has to consider fisheries within the context of the overall food sup-
ply system in Denmark with significant focus on the consumer perspective. 
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the most important board for implementing policy rules and regulating how the 
fisheries are actually carried out.  
The BCF has traditionally played an important role in the day-to-day imple-
mentation of the national fisheries policy as laid out in the Fisheries Law and the 
Regulation Announcement, as well as in amending the overall Fisheries Law and 
developing the next year’s Regulation Announcement. The BCF is the central 
stakeholder institution in the implementation of fisheries policy in Denmark and 
has been so for the entire period since 1983 when the CFP was adopted at the EU 
level. The Board consists of a number of permanent members who are listed in the 
Fisheries Law and can be joined by members appointed by the responsible minis-
ter either on an ad hoc or semi-permanent basis.  
The membership of the BCF has generally been quite stable since 1983. The 
board has consisted of representatives of the central administration, various repre-
sentatives of the fishermen (fishermen’s associations and producer organisations), 
representatives of the processing industry, and representatives from workers’ and 
employers’ organisations. It should be emphasised that until 1994, two fisher-
men’s associations were represented in the BCF: the Sea Fishermen’s Association, 
which represented the larger vessels primarily situated on the west coast of Jutland 
and had its main office in Esbjerg, and the Danish Fishing Association, which rep-
resented the fishermen in the rest of Denmark and had a larger proportion of 
small-scale fishermen. In 1994, the two organisations merged and created the 
Danish Fishermen’s Association (DFA). In addition to the members specifically 
mentioned in the law, the minister has recently invited the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF) to become a member of the BCF. The BCF reflects a relatively 
traditional and to some extent narrow conception of legitimate stakeholders (for a 
discussion of the changing perception of legitimate stakeholders see Mikalsen and 
Jentoft 2001).  
The minister often appoints members from the BCF to serve on other commit-
tees as well. This was for instance the case with the working group that was set up 
in May 2005 to advice on the future regulation model for the Danish demersal 
fisheries. It was partly based on the recommendations from this working group 
(Udvalget vedrørende Ny Regulering i Fiskeriet 2005) that the regulation of the 
demersal fisheries underwent reform in 2006/07 (see section on allocation of fish-
ing rights below). Although this did not formally take place within the BCF (be-
cause it would be outside its remit) it seems reasonable to understand groups like 
this one as BCF offspring.  
The institutional set-up for policy-making and implementation within the fish-
eries domain in Denmark can be captured by the notion of corporatism as it is 
commonly employed today. Whereas corporatism as a theory was traditionally as-
sociated with macro-level issues involving the state and the national organisations 
of employees and employers, the concept of corporatism is today used in a broader 
sense covering a range of policy-making models involving a significant degree of 
formalised stakeholder involvement (Blom-Hansen and Daugbjerg 1999). Today, 
corporatism is often found to be a relevant term for describing the set-up on the 
6 Implementation Politics      169 
meso-level in more specific policy areas. This is especially true in Denmark where 
there is a strong tradition of corporatism/stakeholder involvement on the meso-
level without there actually being any formal macro-level corporatist arrange-
ments (Blom-Hansen 2001).  
Another concept relevant to this discussion is co-management. Co-management 
has been a prolific research agenda within fisheries for the last couple of decades. 
Co-management schemes can be captured by corporatism in its broadest sense but 
generally co-management schemes distinguish themselves from sectoral or meso-
level corporatist arrangements by the extent of involvement of the stakeholders. In 
co-management schemes the stakeholders will not only be involved in making and 
shaping the decisions regarding the rules and their implementation, but also be ac-
tively involved in the implementation hereof. In essence, corporatism and co-
management place themselves differently (but nonetheless close to each other) on 
a continuum ranging from, at one end, complete state-control with interest groups 
functioning only as outside pressure groups to, at the other end, complete self-
control where all decision-making and management tasks are handed over to the 
fishermen themselves (see Sen and Raakjær Nielsen (1996) for more details).  
A classical question in the study of user-group and stakeholder involvement in 
policy-making is whether these arrangements serve to further or to work against 
the interests of society at large. Stakeholder involvement may increase the accep-
tance of policies that serve the common good by providing some sort of buy-in 
from the members of the involved interest groups. On the other hand, stakeholder 
involvement may also lead to regulatory capture, where interest groups hijack the 
policy process and exploit the system to shape or develop policies that serve their 
own interests, but may not be in the best interest of the society at large. This can 
also be regarded an underlying theoretical question for this chapter, which we will 
return to in the concluding sections. 
Traditionally Scandinavia has been viewed as a special case where the presence 
of powerful, encompassing interest organisations has had a particularly positive 
influence on the overall development of the societies in the post-war period. It has 
been argued that the key reason for the positive role, which has been played by in-
terest organisations exerting their influence in corporatist arrangements with the 
state, has been the fact that the interests of the organisations have been the same as 
those of the societies at large – primarily overall economic growth (Blom-Hansen 
2000). However in recent decades, both actors within the corporatist system as 
well as scholars have, according to Blom-Hansen (2000), argued that the system 
does not always work as it should, but rather in some instances serves to maintain 
structures that are in need of change. Moreover, in some areas the traditional cor-
poratist structures have been weakened as new interests and priorities have forced 
their way onto the arena. This has for instance been the case in the area of agricul-
ture where the agricultural interest organisations have been forced to accept envi-
ronmental legislation (Blom-Hansen 2000; Blom-Hansen 2001).  
In sum, Denmark is not without powers within the fisheries policy-area. Al-
though the CFP outlines the overall system and provides some basic rules and 
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conditions, there are areas where the member states have considerable decision-
making power, and it is up to the member states’ administrations to implement 
CFP rules. This in itself provides powers, which can influence the CFP’s ability to 
monitor and match target fishing mortality rates.  
The Danish system is, as described, highly centralised, with almost all deci-
sions taken at the national level. However, the way that the Danish political sys-
tem has arrived at decisions on how to implement fisheries regulations in Den-
mark has, nonetheless, been heavily influenced by a national tradition of involving 
user-groups and stakeholders in policy-making through corporative structures. 
Within these structures, boards of an advisory character have at times been 
awarded almost de facto decision-making capabilities within the overall guidelines 
set down in the legal framework. Thus, even though we are dealing with a highly 
centralised system at national level, it has not exclusively been functioning in a 
top-down manner. 
6.3 Danish Fisheries and Their Management 
6.3.1 The Geographical Setting 
It is a challenge to provide a short introduction to the development of the Danish 
fisheries and their management from 1983 to today. Although we attempt to pro-
vide a simple and informative picture, the reality is muddy and complex, and a 
recognition of the extreme complexity both in the natural and social components 
of the Danish fisheries system is a basic precondition for understanding the way 
Danish fisheries policy has developed and been implemented. 
Fishing ports are scattered over most of Denmark, although the most important 
fishing ports are primarily located in Jutland. This concentration is not surprising 
insofar as the west coast of Jutland faces towards the North Sea, which is tradi-
tionally the most important fishing area for the Danish vessels. In 2006, a little 
more than half of the value of the Danish fishermen’s total catch was taken in the 
North Sea; Skagerrak and Kattegat together accounted for around 20%; and the 
Belt Sea and the Baltic Sea accounted for a little less than 15% (Fiskeridirektoratet 
2007). The balance was slightly different throughout the previous two decades, 
when the fisheries outside the North Sea, particularly in the Baltic Sea, were in 
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6.3.2 The Fisheries and the Fish 
The Danish fishing fleet, which in 2005 consisted of 1,167 vessels, each with a 
yearly turnover of more than 216,731 Danish Kroner (DKK)11 (Fødevareøkono-
misk Institut 2006) and employed some 2,000–2,200 full-time fishermen (Inter-
viewees 1 and 2), is extremely diversified both in terms of vessel sizes and fishing 
methods. Danish vessels use mussel scrapers, Danish seines, purse seines, nets, 
hooks, traps, bottom trawls and pelagic trawls. This diversification also reflects in 
the types of vessels represented in the Danish fleet, which ranges from wooden, 
one-man operated vessels under 6 m to large, highly modern combined trawl-
ers/purse seiners over 40 m costing up to several hundred million DKK (including 
tradable fishing rights). In terms of tonnage, however, trawlers dominate the in-
dustry, accounting for around 2/3 of the total tonnage (Fiskeridirektoratet 2007). It 
goes without saying that these vessel types have very little in common besides the 
fact that they catch fish. This has also been a source of constant tension within the 
industry and the DFA in particular (see section on cleavages and dilemmas be-
neath). 
                                                          
11 The figure 216,731 DKK is a calculated lower limit for commercial fishing vessels from the 
Danish fisheries statistics. Vessels landing less than the lower limit are considered as being oper-
ated on a part-time basis. The vessels in the group above the lower limit account for 97% of the 
turnover (Fødevareøkonomisk Institut 2006). 
12 These fisheries targeting species to be reduced into fishmeal and oil are often referred to as 
“industrial fisheries”, which is, however, a slightly ambiguous term. We will therefore refer to 
non-human consumption fisheries instead.  
At a very general level, the Danish fleet can be divided into three main seg-
ments: (1) the vessels engaged in pelagic fishing primarily for mackerel and her-
ring for human consumption, (2) the vessels engaged in non-human consumption 
fisheries,12 and (3) the vessels primarily fishing for demersal consumption species 
of which cod has traditionally been the most important. The two first segments are 
relatively homogenous while the third one is not. The vessels fishing for herring 
and mackerel for human consumption and the vessels fishing for non-human con-
sumption species are generally large trawlers and purse seiners, and there is some 
overlap lap between these two segments. The third segment consisting of vessels 
mainly targeting demersal species for human consumption is the largest and most 
difficult to characterise, as it includes vessels of all sizes employing different 
types of fishing gear. One useful division is between smaller so-called “coastal” 
vessels with crews of 1–3 usually making short fishing trips (1–2 days) employing 
different types of gear, and larger vessels primarily trawlers usually having an op-
erational crew of four (including the skipper). The larger vessels often employ a 
total of six people, as the crew rotates according to a system where each fisherman 
works for two fishing trips and then takes time off during one trip. These vessels 
are highly geographically mobile and can easily change gear at sea and thus target 
one species during the day and another during the night. (Christensen and Raakjær 





















































Other consumption species (primarily plaice, sole, deepw ater praw ns, Norw ay lobster and blue mussels)
Herring and mackerel for consumption
Non-human consumption landings
 
Fig. 6.1.  Value of landings (domestic and abroad) by Danish vessels 1983 – 2006 in 2006 
prices. Basic data from Fiskeridirektoratet (1992, 1999, 2007). Own calculation into 2006 prices 
based on inflation rates of the period 
Figure 6.1 shows the importance based on the value of landings of the three 
segments, with cod depicted in a separate colour. Most notable is perhaps the fact 
that when calculated in 2006 prices,13 the value of landings has been halved since 
1983. This is not primarily because fish has become a cheaper commodity, al-
though globalisation and aquaculture etc. are changing the market and prices for 
some species have gone down (Raakjær forthcoming), but rather because landings 
in Denmark have dropped because a number of stocks have been depleted and 
                                                          
13 It should be emphasised that recalculating into “2006 prices” means that inflation has been 
taken into consideration. It has consequently nothing to do with the prices of the different species 
in 2006.  
2006). For more information on the interaction between the different segments, 
see section on cleavages and dilemmas below. 
have not been able to recreate former years’ harvestable surplus. Figure 6.2 below 
illustrates fishing trends for the cod stocks. Several other species have developed 
similarly, although not as dramatically. As a result of these stock declines, the im-
portance of the catch industry in Denmark has been severely shrinking over the 
last 20 years. Figure 6.1 shows that the value of landed cod in 1983 was equal to 
the value of all other demersal consumption species. Furthermore, throughout the 
period shown, demersal consumption species have accounted for some 60–75% of 
the total value of landings, but with the share of cod decreasing continuously ex-
cept for a period at the end of the 1990s. The industry segment has accounted for 











































Baltic Sea, Belt Sea and the Sound
Skagerrak and Kattegat (incl. the Isefiord) 
North Sea
 
Fig. 6.2. Volume of cod caught by Danish vessels from 1983 to 2006 divided on main sea 
areas.14 Data from Fiskeridirektoratet (1992, 2000, 2007)  
Figure 6.2 further illustrates some of the points made above and gives a con-
crete example of the situation that fisheries management faces today. Cod is cho-
sen as the example because it has traditionally been the most important species for 
the Danish fleet. Although stock decline has reduced the importance of cod, it re-
                                                          
14 Figure 6.2 does not include all Danish cod catches as some cod are caught outside the chosen 
areas. This has, however, been insignificant amounts in most years. 
15–30% of the value of landings. There are two primary explanations for the fluc-
tuations in non-human consumption fisheries: (1) non-human consumption fisher-
ies are often conducted for short-lived species that can be plentiful one year and 
gone the next, and (2) in some years, vessels from the other segments have sup-
plemented their income with non-human consumption fisheries and vice versa. Fi-
nally, the mackerel and herring segment has managed to increase its economic 
value since 1983: herring and mackerel for consumption accounted for between 8 
and 9% of the value of landings in 1983 and almost 20% in 2006. There are two 
reasons for this: (1) the most important species, herring, has been in relatively 
good shape during most of the period, although recruitment has been very low 
since 2003, and 2) there has been political focus on utilizing herring for human 
consumption (historically much herring has been used to produce fish meal and 
oil). 
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mains of central importance and is still, together with plaice, the species that many 
Danes associate with white fish. 
Figure 6.2 shows that although decline has been the general trend for cod land-
ings, there have been occasional regional upswings and downswings, particularly 
in the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea has traditionally attracted fishermen from all over 
Denmark in the winter season because this fishery was particularly profitable. 
Changing fishing areas like this was made possible by the flexibility offered by 
the traditional Danish management system with free access to quotas (see section 
on allocation of fishing rights below). This, however, also led to conflicts with lo-
cal fishermen, a dilemma that the management authorities had to deal with and 
which we will explore in the following section on cleavages and dilemmas. The 
drastic downswing in cod in the beginning of the 1990s coincided with a severe 
crisis of the Danish catch industry where many vessels operated on the brink of 
bankruptcy. In contrast, the Danish fleet was in the beginning of the second half of 
the 1990s favoured by generally increasing fishing possibilities, improved fish 
prices and lower interest rates, which together made the fisheries quite profitable 
(Statens Jordbrugs- og Fiskeriøkonomiske Institut 2001; Raakjær Nielsen and 
Mathiesen 2003). 
6.3.3 Allocation of Fishing Rights 
As mentioned earlier, the Danish system for allocating fishing rights in the demer-
sal fisheries recently underwent a wide-ranging reform, referred to as New Regula-
tion or the FKA-system 15.  As a result of the adoption of this system most Danish 
fisheries are now managed primarily through some form of transferable quotas. 
The full range of long-term effects of the reform and the new situation for Danish 
fisheries are difficult to outline this soon, although some effects, which will cer-
tainly have long-term implications, are already identifiable. This is especially the 
case for the reallocation of capacity and fishing rights across regions and fishing 
ports and between different fleet segments (see also section on structural policy 
beneath). In the following, we will initially look at the catch quota-system, which 
basically dominated the management of Danish fisheries from 1983 to 2007. After 
this, we will briefly describe the system of individual transferable quotas (ITQ) 
that was implemented for herring from the beginning of 2003 and served to a large 
extent as an inspiration for the reform of the demersal fisheries regulation, which 
was established from the beginning of 2007. At the end of the section, we will dis-
cuss New Regulation.  
It will be impossible within this section to provide a full account of the devel-
opment of the Danish fisheries management system, but we will provide a brief 
                                                          
15 “FKA” refers to “fartøjs kvote andele”, which means vessel quota shares. 
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From the time quotas were introduced in Danish fisheries management until 
2007, the fishing rights in demersal fisheries were primarily distributed as catch 
quotas, allocated to individual fishing vessels and varying in size depending on 
the length of the vessel. These quotas were to be caught within a specified, often 
relatively short time period and in a specified fishing area. The overall national 
quotas were often divided into 3 to 4 periods over the year to ensure that the quota 
was not fished up too fast as well as to meet other concerns, such as the interests 
of different regions, vessels using specific gear or the catch-ability of the species 
in the particular period. As an example, in 2005 the cod quota in the Kattegat was 
divided in the following periods: 50% to be caught from 1 January to 31 March; 
10% to be caught form 1 April to 30 June; 20% to be caught from 1 July to 30 
September; and, finally, 20% to be caught from 1 October to 31 December. This 
reflects that the fishing waters of Kattegat and the Baltic Sea have a peak season 
in the first quarter and thus attract fishermen from outside these areas due to par-
ticularly high catch per unit effort (CPUE). The cod quota in the North Sea, where 
fishing intensity is more equally spread over the year, was evenly distributed over 
three periods of four months (Fødevareministeriet 2004). The periodic share of 
the quota was subsequently divided into the catch quotas that should be fished 
within a week, a fortnight, 1 month or even two months. A catch quota was as 
such equivalent to an individual vessel quota, however, usually to be fished within 
a short period. The catch quotas were set according to vessel sizes and announced 
in Supplement 6 communications. When determining the sizes of the catch quotas, 
the amount to be taken within the period (e.g. 50% of the national quota, referred 
to as the “fix point”17) as well as the expected number of participants in the fishery 
were taken into account.18 In fisheries where the quotas were not too restrictive, 
the fishery was regulated as free competitive fishing within the total quota until a 
certain percentage of the quota had been taken (also referred to as the fix point) af-
                                                          
16 It should be kept in mind that in a brief description like this, some details are deliberately left 
out, which a person with in-depth knowledge about the system might find important. Moreover, 
we have chosen not to discuss the implications of the days-at-sea regulations, which were intro-
duced at EU level in connection with the cod recovery plan. The days-at-sea system is, of course, 
important and has significant implications for the management of Danish fisheries. Nonetheless, 
it is a centrally imposed management measure, which leaves little room for manoeuvre on behalf 
of the member states, and it is thus outside the remits of this chapter. 
17 As an example, if the overall national quota for a species in a specific area was 1000 tonnes 
and the quota was equally distributed over the year in four periods; then the fix point for the first 
period would be 250 tonnes caught, for the second period 500 tonnes caught, for the third period 
750 tonnes caught, and for the final period 1000 tonnes caught.  
18 E.g. in the first half of June 2005 vessels below 6 meters were allowed to land 50 kg of cod 
from Kattegat; vessels 6–12 m 125 kg, vessels 12–16 m 250 kg; and vessels above 16 m 300 kg 
(Fiskeridirektoratet 2005). 
description16 of the general development and changes in general principles over 
time. In order to be specific, we will to some extent use the cod fisheries as an  
example. 
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ter which a stricter quota regime was implemented along the lines described above 
(Vedsmand 1998).  
The system has been characterised by a high degree of openness and flexibility, 
in the sense that almost all vessels have in principle been allowed to participate in 
any fishery in any area,19 although there have been some restrictions relating to 
gear and size of vessels in some areas. However, the flexibility of the system was 
to some extent the result of the short period of the catch quotas (most often two 
weeks or a month), which came at the expense of possibilities for long-term plan-
ning in order to lower costs (e.g. by not fishing in bad weather) or maximise in-
come (e.g. by adjusting catches to the market situation to obtain the highest price 
or fish when CPUE is high). Since catch quotas could not be “saved for later”, but 
had to be taken within a specific period, the vessels were forced to fish no matter 
the weather and land the fish no matter the price in order to obtain an income from 
the catch quota. The pronounced flexibility was also difficult to manage from a 
control perspective. 
Specifically in relation to cod, the wish for more security and a longer planning 
horizon as opposed to flexibility to fish in different areas led, among other things, 
to the introduction of the possibility to obtain an annual individual catch quota in 
the Baltic Sea from 1995 (Fiskeriministeriet 1994). The annual catch quota, which 
specified an amount of cod depending on vessel size, required a license, which 
contained the conditions regarding how the quota should be fished. Vessels were 
not allowed to fish outside the Baltic Sea as long as they operated under the sys-
tem of annual cod quotas, and those vessels thus gave up the flexibility of being 
able to switch fishing areas, gaining the security of knowing that nothing was nec-
essarily lost if you had to stay in port for a limited time (although there were pro-
visions outlining how a vessel could leave the system of annual quotas during the 
year). Alongside the annual catch quota-system a traditional catch quota-system 
with shorter quota periods continued to operate to uphold the flexibility of the sys-
tem to the benefit of vessels only operating in the Baltic Sea on a seasonal basis. 
In the North Sea, Skagerrak and the Kattegat similar systems of annual catch quo-
tas for cod (and other important demersal species) were introduced as of 2002 for 
the smallest (and least flexible) vessels under 15 m  (Fødevareministeriet 2001).  
Whereas a TAC system based on annual quotas by definition complicates plan-
ning beyond one year ahead, the traditional, short-period quota system sometimes 
made it difficult to plan further ahead than one week. Although the short-period 
system often aimed to keep the size of the catch quotas stable, this was in many 
cases not possible because of the uncertainty as to how many vessels would take 
part in the fishery. The fisherman was thus highly dependent on the strategies of 
other fishermen. Moreover, the traditional, short-period quota-system benefited 
the most flexible vessels to some extent, as they could cream off the different 
                                                          
19 A few fisheries have demanded a restricted entry license, most notably the fishery for blue 
mussels, primarily in the Liim Fiord, and the fishery for common shrimps in the Wadden Sea.  
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fishing possibilities, whereas the smaller, less flexible vessels had to stay behind 
and carry the expense of the lack of security and short planning horizon. The small 
vessels were also generally more sensitive to weather conditions and had to stay in 
port while larger vessels were fishing. However, it has been argued (Raakjær Niel-
sen 1992a) that the value of flexibility might have been overestimated because, at 
least early in the period, fishermen tended to focus on turnover rather than the 
contribution margin, and in many cases fishermen would probably have been bet-
ter off continuing in the same fishery rather than changing to another, due to the 
costs associated with the change. 
Finally, the traditional, short-period quota-system created an inexpedient situa-
tion where the most threatened species (e.g. cod) had to be managed with very 
small catch quotas to be caught over short periods to ensure that the quotas were 
not overfished before the next catch quota could be set – or at least to avoid hav-
ing to close the fishery altogether. This was both administratively cumbersome 
and also a problem for the fishermen in terms of planning. In some periods the 
situation has been so extreme that weekly quotas of for instance down to 25 or 50 
kg have been set in order to be able to keep fisheries open without risking offi-
cially breaking the quota.20 However, as we will discuss in the section on strong 
persons, this also allowed fishermen to be at sea legally and catch fish that could 
then be landed illegally. Moreover, short periods, which are necessary when catch 
quotas are low, also increase the risk of vessels failing to catch their quota because 
of bad weather or other reasons, another explanation of why the periodic catch 
quota-system was increasingly challenged over time. 
The BCF played a key-role in the implementation of the catch quota-system, as 
the minister normally listened very carefully to arguments regarding quota sizes 
and periods put forward by the industry. The industry’s preference for keeping the 
fisheries open even if catch quotas were low was guided by the principle of not 
excluding vessels, which became a very important principle for the administration 
of the catch quota-system.  
weekly or monthly basis. From 1990 to 2003, the BCF, complemented by a BCF 
sub-group dealing with herring, was an important body in the process of determin-
ing regulations. Denmark decided in 2002 to adopt an ITQ-system for the herring 
                                                          
20 High-grading is illegal under Danish legislation, which since 2002 (for the main commercial 
species) states that all catch that can be landed legally (meaning that a quota for it is available 
and that the fish is above minimum landing size) shall be landed. This provision is, however, no-
toriously difficult to enforce. Moreover, vessels are still obliged to discard catches of fish for 
which they do not have a quota (Interviewees 5 and 11; Andersen et al. 2003; Fødevareminis-
teriet 2001). 
21 The change of the management system was made at very short notice and benefited trawlers 
primarily based in Esbjerg at the expense of purse seine vessels based in Northern Jutland 
(Dansk Institut for Fiskeriteknologi og Akvakultur et al. 1991). 
From 1983 to 1990, the herring fisheries were managed by individual quotas 
for licensed purse seine vessels. From 1990, they were managed by licenses allow-
ing trawlers fully into the fisheries,21 accompanied by catch rations decided on a 
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fisheries. The main new feature of this system was not so much that individual 
quotas were given for a year at a time, which had also been done previously, but 
rather that the quota rights were given for a number of years and could be traded. 
This system introduced private ownership to fishing rights.22 The ITQ-system was 
implemented in 2003 for a 5-year trial period with the possibility of a 3-year ex-
tension. However, the arrangement became permanent half way through the trial 
period.23 It is worth noting that even though the ITQ-system was implemented as a 
trial, it lead to rapid structural adjustment, as the number of vessels was reduced 
by 50% within the first two years (Fiskeridirektoratet and Fødevareøkonomisk In-
stitut 2005). 
The latest step in the adaptation of the principles for allocating fishing rights in 
Denmark was taken in the fall of 2005 when a small majority in the Danish par-
liament agreed to develop a new regulatory system, known as New Regulation or 
the FKA-system, for the most important demersal species. At the same time the 
ITQ-system for herring was made permanent, and the parliament decided to de-
velop similar ITQ-systems for mackerel and non-human consumption species 
(Regeringen og Dansk Folkeparti 2005). The new management scheme, which 
was implemented beginning 1 January 2007, is based on the distribution24 of ves-
sel quota shares for specific species in specific areas. Although the FKA-system 
imposes restrictions on the sale of fishing rights, the adoption of the system none-
theless means that almost all Danish fishing activities are now managed by means 
of some form of transferable quotas.  
The FKA-system is relatively complex and includes a number of special ele-
ments established mainly to accommodate the different interests within the sector, 
in addition to ensuring that the capacity follows the quota shares. A special bonus 
system reserved an amount of cod and sole for vessels under 17 m making short 
fishing trips. In return for this extra allocation, these vessels are only allowed to 
transfer their rights to other coastal fishermen. This alternative system was intro-
duced to protect the smaller vessels, as there was a fear that they would lose out in 
a market-based system. It has been made possible for groups of fishermen to pool 
their quotas, which also benefits smaller vessels because it means that they do not 
need to have shares for all species in all fishing areas themselves.  
The political agreement on the FKA-system was to a large extent based on the 
input from a working group set up earlier in 2005, composed of the stakeholders 
and user-groups represented in the BCF. However, the working group had to work 
within a relatively fixed mandate since the government had already determined 
                                                          
22 For more information on the background of the decision, see section on strong individual 
actors beneath or Hegland and Sverdrup-Jensen (2007) and Christensen et al. (2007). 
23 For a detailed account of the system, see Hegland and Sverdrup-Jensen (2007) or Fiske-
ridirektoratet and Fødevareøkonomisk Institut (2005). 
24 The quota shares were distributed to the fishermen based on their fishing pattern from 2003 – 
2005. New Regulation provides the fishermen with de facto ownership over their quota shares, 
although the system can in theory be terminated at eight years notice. However, the shares can-
not be sold freely, but have to follow the capacity of the vessel. 
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that the reform should increase the possibility of the individual fisherman to ac-
quire and pool together quotas (Udvalget vedrørende Ny Regulering i Fiskeriet 
2005), based on the experiences from the herring fishery described above.  
The FKA-system was expected to contribute to structural adjustment in the 
fleet, working towards a better balance between fishing capacity and fishing pos-
sibilities. As of late 2007, the first indications of the new system show an immense 
concentration of fishing quotas, as the number of vessels has been reduced signifi-
cantly, which has resulted in a regional reallocation of the fleet, among other 
things. In the FKA-system, the role of the BCF has also been significantly re-
duced, resulting in shorter BCF meetings (Interviewee 2), as the decisions on how 
to fish have been individualised. The influence of the sector will, consequently, 
have to manifest itself in different ways in the future. 
The development described above changed the system from a catch quota-
system managed as a common pool resource open to any vessel to the present 
ITQ- and the FKA-system, where vessels’ activities are locked by their quota allo-
cation. This is a significant change from an open and flexible system to a system 
focussing on security and segmentation in order to ensure long-term planning. 
Under the previous catch quota-system it was always uncertain what the vessel’s 
fishing opportunities would be, as this depended not only on the national quota, 
but also on other vessels’ strategies.  
6.3.4 Structural Policy and the Fleet 
In terms of structural policy, Denmark has traditionally employed scrapping pro-
grammes25 in order to cut capacity. This has to some extent been done in response 
to the (mostly modest) requirements set out in the EU capacity reduction pro-
grammes, but it has also to some extent been implemented on Denmark’s own ini-
tiative to improve the economic performance of the fleet (Interviewee 1 and 3). 
Even though some of our respondents mention capacity reduction as a national 
Danish management strategy, the results have over the period been unconvincing, 
as we will discuss below. The development of the Danish capacity in terms of 
tonnage is depicted in Fig. 6.3 below. 
In order to make sense of the tonnage development in terms of fishing capacity, 
it is necessary to take increases in efficiency caused by technological development 
into consideration.26 The implication of this is that the capacity of the Danish fleet 
                                                          
25 In scrapping programmes, fishermen are offered a premium for scrapping their vessel. Scrap-
ping a vessel has always required that the vessel left the fishing fleet, and later on it also became 
a requirement that it was physically removed. 
26 There is a common understanding that efficiency over time increases by at least 2% per annum 
due to technological improvements. Although it is here called capacity creep, it should be em-
phasized, that sometimes innovations lead to larger jumps, e.g. improvements of fishing gear or 
pulling power. 
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should annually be reduced by at least 2% in tonnage just to maintain status quo 
other words, there has most likely been a de facto increase in fishing capacity, 
which adds to the problem of securing sustainable utilization of fish stocks. 
Fig. 6.3. Development of fleet capacity in Denmark from 1982 to 2006 (vessels over 5 
GRT/GT).27 Raakjær (forthcoming) 
In relation to Fig. 6.3 it is also worth noting that the dotted line indicating how 
the Danish capacity should have developed to compensate for efficiency creep 
does not imply a balance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities in 
Denmark. There are at least three reasons for this. Firstly, if the compensation for 
capacity creep should maintain a balance, we would have to be convinced that 
there actually was such a balance in 1982. This may likely be true (Vedsmand 
1998), but it is not given, and if there was any lack of balance, it was probably to-
wards overcapacity and not undercapacity. Secondly, when scrapping, there is 
generally a tendency towards choosing to scrap the least efficient vessels. This 
was also confirmed by our interviews in relation to the situation in Denmark (par-
ticularly Interviewees 1 and 7). Thirdly and most importantly, for the 1982 bal-
                                                          
27 Gross Register Tonnage (GRT) represents the total measured cubic content of the permanently 
enclosed spaces of a vessel with some allowances or deductions for exempt spaces, such as liv-
ing quarters. Gross Tonnage (GT) refers to the volume of a vessel from keel to funnel measured 
to the outside of the hull framing and is always higher than GRT. Since 1994 GT has replaced 
GRT as the measurement of capacity and from 1982 to 1994 the two measurements were used in 
parallel. There has been a break in data for the period 1993–1995, which explains the drop and 
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and avoid an increase in fishing capacity. Figure 6.3 shows that many years of 
scrapping programmes in the Danish fleet have not even compensated for the ex-
pected creep in fishing capacity, even though the tonnage has been reduced from 
approximately 118,000 tonnes in 1982 to approximately 83,000 tonnes in 2006. In 
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ance to have been maintained merely by compensating for efficiency creep, the 
general fishing opportunities based on the available fish stocks would have to have 
stayed at the 1982 level. This has definitely not been the case. A large number of 
stocks relied upon by the Danish catch industry have declined since 1982, and it 
has been argued that several stocks were at an abnormally high level until the be-
ginning of the 1980s and thus produced fishing opportunities that could not be 
maintained long-term (see Chapter 5; Holden 1994). Cod, as discussed above, is 
the prime example of fish stock decline in this period (see Fig. 6.2). To keep a rea-
sonable balance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities, the decrease 
in tonnage should have been even more rapid than indicated by the dotted line in 
Fig. 6.3. The continued failure to reach that balance has in itself contributed to the 
deteriorating state of the stocks, creating a self-perpetuating vicious cycle.28 
The significant build-up of capacity in the years 1983–1987 is noteworthy in 
relation to the situation that developed in Denmark. Over that short period the ca-
pacity increased by approximately 15%, laying the foundation for the continuing 
capacity problems in Denmark. Two interesting questions are why this was al-
lowed to happen while the EU was implementing programmes aimed at restricting 
capacity (see Chapter 5) and whether anybody noticed the implications of this in-
crease in capacity.  
According to Raakjær Nielsen (1992b), the situation was caused by a combina-
tion of (1) good fishing possibilities, primarily in the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea, 
(2) easy access to subsidies, and (3) an aversion among fishermen to pay tax (the 
fishermen could avoid tax by making investments, often financed by loans). How-
ever, according to Raakjær Nielsen, the fishermen soon realised that the combina-
tion of reduced quotas for several stocks and a heavy debt burden was making 
fishing an unprofitable business. This generated support for refocusing the struc-
tural policy towards scrapping, and scrapping programmes consequently became 
central in Denmark over the following 20 years.  
Raakjær Nielsen’s analysis can be supplemented by information from one of 
our interviews. This respondent (Interviewee 6) outlined a number of additional 
reasons for the build-up of overcapacity. Firstly, in the beginning of the capacity 
build-up period there were no restrictions on entering vessels into the fleet. Al-
though the central administration began to demand that applications were submit-
ted containing the GT of the vessel and a budget, standard practice until the end of 
1984 was that most applications were accommodated. From around 1985 it be-
came, however, very difficult to get a license to introduce a new vessel unless 
                                                          
28 This discussion is necessarily based on a simplified description of events, and a number of po-
tential factors could influence the extent to which clear conclusions can be drawn. One example 
could be that tonnage is not necessarily a good indicator of fishing capacity. Another problem is 
that overcapacity does not automatically turn into overfishing, as it is possible to keep capacity in 
the harbour by use of for instance days-at-sea restrictions. In general, however, it seems that 
overcapacity is often associated with a failure to keep fishing mortality rates at the required level. 
All this taken into consideration, we are convinced that our conclusions are correct at a general 
level, even though the picture might be more nuanced than described.  
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capacity was removed from the fleet at the same time. This was something that 
few or no fishermen could afford in a situation where the catches (particularly in 
the Baltic Sea) were declining. However, the licenses for building new vessels that 
had already been granted on the basis of applications sent in before 1985 were still 
valid and ran for two years, and on top of that came the building period (this delay 
in the impact of licenses was actually noted with concern in the BCF during 1985 
(Fiskeriministeriet 1985b)). As a result, new vessels continued to be built with 
subsidies (see Chapter 5) on old licenses until around 1987.29 There was, conse-
quently, considerable inertia in the system, which prevented speedy adaptation 
even though the brakes were to some extent already activated in 1984/1985. From 
the minutes of the meetings in the BCF during 1984 and 1985, it can be observed 
that the administrative practice for granting licenses to increase fleet capacity and 
introduce new vessels changed significantly over a relatively short period (Fisk-
eriministeriet 1984a). In the beginning of 1984 licenses for new vessels were gen-
erally granted as a routine matter. During April 1984, the procedures for granting 
licenses to new capacity were tightened30 and introduction of new capacity from 
then on required that capacity had to be withdrawn (Fiskeriministeriet 1984b). Ini-
tially vessels under 14 m were exempted from this and larger vessels were allowed 
to exceed the withdrawn capacity by 15%. However, the rules were progressively 
tightened over time 31 (Fiskeriministeriet 1985b).  
Secondly, the respondent mentioned that even though there was an increasing 
awareness of the problematic situation of the resource base, this information did 
not penetrate down through the system as it does today. As an example of the lack 
of information behind decisions, the respondent described how budgets were 
based on participation in the open access fisheries in the White Zone32 between 
Sweden and the Soviet Union in the Baltic Sea at a time where the open access 
fishery was about to end. 
Finally, the respondent mentioned that “local patriotism” and a tendency to ig-
nore what was going on outside one's own local community also contributed to the 
build-up of capacity beyond what was sustainable at a national level. The respon-
dent indicated that many local banks gave loans for investments in vessels without 
taking into consideration that banks from other local communities were doing the 
same. The reasons for this were (1) a competition for market shares among local 
                                                          
29 In the period from approximately 1985 to 1987, there was actually an “undersupply” of li-
censes to build new vessels. This meant that some vessels were actually sold immediately after 
having been built (Interviewee 6). 
30 The ministry had at this point of time received applications for new capacity amounting to 
6000 GRT (Fiskeriministeriet 1984b).  
31 The increased focus on the capacity issue led in 1985 to the setting up of a board consisting 
primarily of the fisheries organisations to deal with this question (Fiskeriministeriet 1985a). 
32 This is known among fishermen as the Grey Zone. The conflict over jurisdiction in the White 
Zone/ Grey Zone between Russia and Sweden (north-east of Bornholm) lasted from 1978 to 
1988 and resulted in massive overfishing of cod in the area since there was open access for all 
vessels.  
6 Implementation Politics      183 
banks, and (2) a wish to support local fishermen to the benefit of the harbour or 
the local community as such. On a national level, these loans turned out to be a 
bad strategy, especially in a period where the fishing opportunities were about to 
decline. On the island of Bornholm, a number of banks lost a substantial amount 
of money and at least one local bank actually went bankrupt because of fishermen 
being unable to pay back their loans. 
As shown above, there are several explanations as to why capacity was allowed 
to build up beyond a sustainable level. This overcapacity not only steered the Dan-
ish structural policy onto a path of scrapping programmes, but also created serious 
problems in terms of the economy of the Danish fleet and the conservation of re-
sources. These problems were, nevertheless, not sufficient to provoke the neces-
sary capacity reductions, as illustrated in Fig. 6.3. 
6.3.5 Control and Enforcement 
In the light of the overcapacity within the Danish fleet, control and enforcement 
becomes a crucial element to ensure compliance with regulations. As mentioned 
earlier, the responsibility for control and enforcement, both on land and at sea, is 
within the Directorate of Fisheries (DoF). Although the DoF has also other re-
sponsibilities, control and enforcement is by far the most important; approxi-
mately 75% of its budgeted resources in 2007 were allocated for this task 
(Fødevareministeriet and Fiskeridirektoratet 2006).  
The fact that the Danish control and enforcement responsibilities are central-
ised in one institution, as compared to the more common systems where several 
actors are involved in control and enforcement, was considered a strength by our 
informants (Interviewee 5 and 11). According to the informants, the strength of 
centralising responsibilities in the DoF is that this provides short chains-of-
command, enabling fast reactions in case of control problems. Thus, this way of 
organising the control and enforcement activities creates a relatively short distance 
between those actually carrying out the inspection and those making the regula-
tions. The DoF maintains a close relation to the political system and is therefore 
able to provide inputs if control problems need to be addressed on a political level. 
However, the fact that they are not an integrated part of the ministry, but operate 
on the basis of a contractual arrangement, provides a necessary distance to the po-
litical system, meaning that the minister is less able to interfere with how control 
should be carried out. At least in one period in the past, a minister has sent signals 
to the enforcement agents, which have resulted in less stringent control and mas-
sive cheating among fishermen (see section on strong individual actors). The re-
spondents considered something like this less likely to happen under the present 
institutional set-up, which has been in place since 1995 (Interviewees 5 and 11).  
The respondents also mentioned that even though they considered the control 
authorities to be relatively well equipped in terms of access to administrative and 
184      T.J. Hegland and J. Raakjær 
sanctions, equipment and qualified people,33 successive cutbacks in the DoF’s 
budget34 (Interviewees 5 and 11) create a real challenge in terms of effective en-
forcement, forcing the DoF to continuously think in resource saving measures, of-
ten IT-solutions. This raises doubts about the extent to which it is possible to keep 
the efficiency of the control at the present level. Moreover the amount of “red 
tape” in the DoF has had a tendency to increase, partly due to the contractual ar-
6.4 Danish Implementation Strategy – Domestic Driving Forces 
6.4.1 National Room for Manoeuvre 
Although the CFP has predominantly influenced fisheries management in the EU 
by laying down the overall framework (primarily the TAC system and the under-
lying relative stability, see Chapter 5), member states and the national actors have 
room to manoeuvre, particularly in relation to the four areas mentioned above in 
Section 6.2. In these areas, national decisions and implementation practices can in-
fluence the ability of the CFP to ensure that preferred fishing mortality rates are 
met. Looking across the EU, it can also be observed that member states have pur-
sued different approaches in their implementation practices. This section will ad-
dress and examine the domestic driving forces that have had a major influence on 
the development of fisheries management in Denmark – and also to some extent 
have hindered formulation of a clear strategy for the future of the Danish fishing 
industry, including management models and desired structural development within 
the fishing fleet. This will be done by investigating following issues:35 (a) cleavages 
                                                          
33 In 1988, a formal education of fisheries inspectors was put in place, replacing a system where 
the inspectors were often retired fishermen. On the positive side, the respondents mentioned that 
this had led to more uniform control and that inspectors are now more professional than they 
were before. However, on the other hand, the respondents also recognised that in-depth knowl-
edge about how fishing is carried out is maybe not as great as before (Interviewees 5 and 11). 
34 Delivering “efficiency gains” has been a constant demand in the public sector in Denmark in 
recent years, and it seems plausible that there is even more pressure for this on an organisation 
that is dealing with an economically shrinking industry (see Fig. 6.1). To indicate the magnitude 
of these budget cuts, the DoF needs to cut its costs for control by more than 15% from 2007 to 2010 
(Fødevareministeriet and Fiskeridirektoratet 2006). 
35 These issues have also been mentioned in interviews as important domestic drivers. 
rangement with the ministry, which requires a substantial amount of documentation 
of the work undertaken. In spite of the above, the overall perception is that the con-
trol and enforcement system in Denmark is generally of a reasonable standard given 
the framework provided by the CFP and that overcapacity and small quotas create 
incentives for non-compliant behaviour (Interviewees 2, 4, 5, 6 and 11; Kommis-
sionen for de Europæiske Fællesskaber 2001; European Court of Auditors 2007).  
6 Implementation Politics      185 
and dilemmas within fisheries and management; (b) strong individual actors and 
the existence of windows-of-opportunity; and (c) differences in perspectives – in-
dividual versus collective.  
6.4.2 Cleavages and Dilemmas Within Fisheries 
 and Within Management  
The complexity within the Danish fishing industry is significant, with fleet com-
position ranging from small-scale, subsistence fisheries at one end of the spectrum 
to company-owned, large-scale vessels at the other end. In terms of ownership 
structure, the Danish fishing fleet consists primarily of owner-operated vessels, 
but the number of capital-intensive vessels, mostly trawlers, owned by fishing 
firms have increased their share in recent years, a trend which has intensified since 
the agreement on the FKA-system in the Danish parliament in November 2005.  
Although Denmark is a small country, it is not without regional differences. 
This has indirectly influenced the allocation of catch quotas, as geographical con-
cerns have often been an underlying factor in the allocations. In particular, the 
way catch quotas are differentiated according to vessel size or distributed over the 
year have been employed as indirect ways of favouring certain geographical inter-
ests. The Baltic cod fishery is a good example illustrating these geographical dif-
ferences (Raakjær Nielsen 1997), which can be boiled down to a question about 
access rights. For decades, a large number of North Sea fishermen, as well as fish-
ermen from other parts of Denmark, have fished cod in the Baltic Sea during the 
winter season (more than 1200 vessels participated in the Baltic Sea cod fisheries 
in 1986 (Sandbeck 2003)). Fishermen from Bornholm, an island in the Baltic Sea, 
have likewise fished outside the Baltic Sea in the summer period. However, fish-
ermen from Bornholm have often argued that they should have privileged access 
to the cod stocks in the waters around Bornholm. In practical terms, the conflict 
has mainly concerned the proportion of the annual quota to be caught in the first 
quarter, which is dealt with by the Danish administration. Fishermen from Born-
holm had an interest in spreading out the fisheries over the year to ensure a stable 
supply to the processing industry and obtain the largest share of the Baltic Sea cod 
quota. Vessels from outside the Baltic Sea region had an interest in obtaining large 
catch quotas in the first quarter, as the CPUE is usually at its highest in this period 
and because these vessels had other attractive fishing alternatives outside the Bal-
tic Sea later in the year. In this situation, the management authorities have sought 
to solve the dilemma by balancing the interests of the two groups in order to ob-
tain some form of stability in the Baltic Sea cod fishery and ensure an “equitable” 
allocation which would please both sides and avoid conflicts.  
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The fishermen have similar interests regarding other issues. This was for in-
stance the case in relation to the decision on closed days in the cod fisheries in the 
Baltic Sea determined by the EU to be implemented in 2006. Some closed periods 
were pre-decided by the EU, but the member states were given the right to decide 
on where to place a fixed number of additional closed days. Here the fishermen 
from Bornholm36 stood united with the fishermen in the DFA in arguing for plac-
ing these days in the periods where very little fishing was going on, particularly 
during Easter, Christmas and the autumn school holidays (Fiskeridirektoratet 
2006). The administration followed the advice of the fisheries associations to a 
significant extent, and imposed most of the closed days as recommended. Conse-
quently, the closures had little effect in terms of reducing fishing mortality. Al-
though this is not a surprising observation, it is a good illustration of the fact that 
national implementation does not necessarily support the intentions of EU legisla-
tion and may operate without conservation as the dominant objective. It should be 
noted that the EU is aware of this response from the member states, and adapts the 
Until 2003/2004, the policy of the DFA was that no Danish fisherman should 
be administratively excluded from any fishery. The DFA has thus applied the slo-
gan: “Danish fishing waters for Danish fishermen” (our translation) arguing for 
maximum flexibility within Danish fisheries management. This position has been 
challenged for a long time, however, and since the turn of the century with in-
creasing strength from particularly pelagic fishermen employing large-scale capi-
tal-intensive vessels. This group has made the counterargument that there is a need 
for segmentation (in terms of management) of the Danish fleet by giving fisher-
men in the pelagic fleet exclusive rights to a large proportion of the herring and 
mackerel quotas. In return, these vessels would then accept exclusion from other 
fisheries.37 The pelagic fishermen are represented within the DFA, but they have 
used the Danish Pelagic Producers Organisation (DPPO) as their political plat-
form. Through the DPPO they have argued in favour of ITQs since the 1980s, 
hoping to gain a longer planning horizon, which they considered necessary in or-
der to obtain capital for modernisation of the Danish pelagic fleet, which during 
the late 1980s was becoming technologically outdated compared to particularly 
Norwegian and Scottish vessels (see Christensen et al. 2007 for details).  
Flexibility, of course, has its advantages, particularly if some stocks are in de-
cline, as flexibility allows fishermen switch fisheries without problems. However, 
                                                          
36 The fishermen’s association from Bornholm and Christiansø, as well as the one from Grenå, 
left the DFA in 2005 for a variety of reasons, but particularly due to dissatisfaction with the posi-
tion of the DFA regarding the principles for the new regulation of the demersal fisheries. The 
two associations formed the Union of Danish Fisheries Associations, which is now in the BCF 
alongside the DFA. The withdrawal from the DFA of these two associations is yet another indi-
cator of the cleavages within the Danish catch industry. 
37 However, in reality this group had difficulties accepting exclusion from other fisheries, as it 
wanted to maintain its rights to participate in non-human consumption fisheries. 
principle so that in the longer perspective there will be no “free” days. The regula-
tion may thus eventually have the desired impact.  
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the flexibility has also created a domino effect at times, where a problem in one 
part of the fishing industry spread to other parts; e.g. in the years around 1986 (see 
Fig. 6.1) when the non-human consumption fishing had problems. Vessels tradi-
tionally employed in this fishery moved into other fisheries, pressuring vessels al-
ready operating there. As a result, these newly-crowded fisheries became eco-
nomically unprofitable38 for the vessels originally employed there. These vessels 
were then forced to move to yet another fishery, repeating the story there. This 
creates a vicious cycle where the lack of segmentation makes all fishermen worse 
off instead of isolating the problem within the fishery where the problems oc-
curred. To indicate the magnitude of the problem, the operating profit of the Dan-
ish fleet could have been increased by about 10% – equivalent to DKK 350 mil-
lion in 1988 (520 million in 2006 prices) – if the fishing fleet had been fishing 
differently and been able to avoid a situation with high shadow costs (externalities 
in terms of costs imposed by one fleet segment on another) (Løkkegaard 1990).39 
Christensen and Raakjær (2006) demonstrate the wide variations in fishermen’s 
perceptions of their occupation, which to a large degree coincide with vessel size, 
The lifestyle- versus business-oriented approach to fishing came out clearly in 
the interviews as cleavages in Danish fishing; one respondent (Interviewee 10) ar-
ticulated it this way:  
When Bent Rulle and his predecessor were chairmen of the DFA it was all about fishing 
as a lifestyle. This is all right…but it belongs in a sportfishing association.  
In contrast, another key-informant (Interviewee 4) presented the following 
view of owners of large capital-intensive vessels and the way they conduct their 
business:  
Those Kings will in bad years modernise in order to obtain a loan that can be used for 
private consumption as well – and in good years they will modernise in order to avoid 
paying taxes. 
This quotation clearly illustrates how lifestyle-oriented fishermen are critical of 
the approach taken by the business-oriented fishermen. 
                                                          
38 When larger vessels are entering these fisheries, they take a large share of the quota, imposing 
shadow costs. In addition, smaller vessels cannot maintain their CPUE because larger vessels 
with more powerful gear and engines stress the fish, which thus become more difficult to catch. 
39 The authors are not aware that such calculations have been made since 1988, but the large 
prices paid for quotas under the new regulations indicate that shadow costs are still high in Dan-
ish fisheries, and that the fishermen expect these shadow costs to disappear as the quotas under 
the FKA-system are increasingly allocated in an optimal way. 
and present two extremes. On the one hand are the small-scale fishermen who 
combine combining fishing with a family life keep costs at a low level and do not 
expect a large turnover or profit, but rather consider fishing a lifestyle. On the 
other hand, the group of fishermen who own large vessels with a very high geo-
graphical mobility can be characterised as dynamic investors and typical front-
runners who consider fishing a business like any other. 
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An unarticulated objective of Danish fisheries management has always been to 
strike a fair balance between the different views and interests, mainly in order to 
avoid conflicts. This policy has created dilemmas for the national administration 
when implementing the CFP. It is not easy to strike the right balance between 
flexibility and segmentation, which is linked to the lifestyle- versus business-
oriented approach to fishing, and again to a large extent represent a conflict of in-
terest between small and large vessels. Furthermore, implementation becomes 
even more complicated as regional and local political concerns also need to be 
taken into consideration.  
6.4.3 Strong Individual Actors and the Existence  
of Windows-of-Opportunity  
In order to fully understand the dynamics of the Danish management system’s 
evolution, it is important to recognise the importance of strong individual actors 
and windows-of-opportunity40 for changing both implementation practises and the 
system in general. According to most interviewees fisheries policy generally at-
tracts very little attention from the politicians. This enables strong individual ac-
tors to influence the fisheries management significantly in Denmark.41 Some of the 
interviewees (Interviewee 1 and 4) actually suggested that fisheries policy in 
Denmark might be considered an extreme case in this respect. 
How can this be so? The Danish fisheries administration is highly centralised 
and decisions concerning major or radical changes are taken by the national par-
liament (Folketinget). Therefore, only the politicians in the parliament have a di-
rect say. Fisheries policy and fisheries issues, however, rarely42 attract the interest 
of the 179 parliamentarians. This often results in a situation where politicians ac-
tually taking an interest in the subject find themselves in a strong position. As one 
interviewee put it (Interviewee 1):  
                                                          
40 For a short introduction to windows-of-opportunity, see Chapter 5. 
41 It is important to remember that these strong individual actors still have to operate within the 
frames set at the EU level. 
42 It should, however, be noted that in a few cases fisheries issues have prompted broad interest 
and discussions in the parliament. An example of this is the discussions leading to the recently 
adopted ITQ-like vessel quota system, the FKA-system. The reason for the broader interest in this 
case seems related to the fact that the discussion over transferability and ownership of fishing 
rights fits well with the ideological differences between the left and right. The issue was there-
fore “lifted” from a discussion only relevant to fisheries to a discussion illustrating the difference 
between left and right. Unfortunately, according to one of our respondents (Interviewee 3), the 
general impression is that whenever the politicians engage more broadly the quality of the dis-
cussion is not improved. Rather, the discussions then suffer from the lack of in-depth knowledge, 
e.g. about the Danish competences vis-à-vis the EU competences in the area. 
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It is characteristic of the fisheries area that if there are one, two or three active persons 
then they can control the rest of the parliament.  
Similar statements were made by several of the other respondents and the op-
posite view was not presented at all.  
The primary explanation for the general lack of interest from the politicians in 
fisheries policy and implementation practices is, according to several of the inter-
viewees, the insignificance of capture fisheries in Denmark as compared to other 
policy-areas. This is relatively unsurprising but has nonetheless severe implica-
tions for the implementation of fisheries policy over time in Denmark. The impor-
tance of capture fisheries in economic terms is marginal and fisheries is constantly 
losing out relative to other sectors of the economy. As explained previously, the 
catch value is in 2006 only half of what it was in 1983 if inflation is included (see 
Fig. 6.1 above). Furthermore, the number of fishermen has never been high 
enough to constitute a critical mass able to really influence anything with the votes 
they could mobilise. As a consequence, most politicians choose to focus on alter-
native, high-profile issues that affect more people and therefore potentially can de-
liver more votes. 
The relative lack of general political interest in fisheries policy has not only 
strengthened the power of the few politicians that have actually taken an interest 
in fisheries issues, but has also paved the way for industry representatives who 
have often been in a strong position to influence policy (Interviewee 1, 4 and 6). 
However, it is important to note that until 1994 the fishing industry itself was 
divided in two associations, and after 2000 when the two associations merged 
there were strong tensions within the resulting industry-wide representative body – 
the DFA – in terms of policy priorities, particularly over the issue of flexibility 
versus segmentation. The consequence has been that fishing industry 
representatives have not been able to fully benefit from their favourable position 
and have largely resorted to aiming towards maintaining status quo.  
Within the political system, and particularly due to the situation explained 
above, the minister is in a strong position to influence the Danish fisheries policy 
and implementation practices if he or she has a wish to do so. However, it should 
be acknowledged that there might also be good reasons for not changing the 
system and practices. The need for major or radical changes are usually caused by 
a critical situation whereby strong individuals or networks of individuals are 
provided with a window-of-opportunity for changing the present system or 
practises – or even reforming the system, which has also been the case. In the fol-
lowing we will take a closer look at some of the ministers – names marked in bold 
in Box 6.1 – in office since 1983.43  
                                                          
43 We have chosen to deal with the ministers that our respondents have referred to as strong in-
fluential individual actors, which is fully in line with our understanding from following the Dan-
ish fisheries policy process for a quarter of a century. Although it is not something that we will 
go into here, it is an interesting observation that the ministers responsible for fisheries throughout 
the period have been from the same party as the prime minister, even though there have been 
coalition governments in the entire period. 
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Kent Kirk was seen by most informants as a strong individual actor who man-
aged to implement an agenda for fisheries policy that was very much to the benefit 
of the fishing port he came from, both before and during his time in office as Min-
ister of Fisheries. Kent Kirk is a former fishing skipper from Esbjerg, where he 
was chairman of the local fishermen’s association from 1975 and until he became 
minister in 1989.44 He was a member of the European Parliament (EP) from 1979 
to 198445 and elected to the Danish parliament in 1984–1998. 
Box 6.1. Ministers responsible for fisheries in the period from 1983 to 2007 
 
Kent Kirk’s interest in fisheries was self-evident. His personal commitment to 
the area is illustrated by the fact that he stands out as the only minister who par-
ticipated in meetings of the BCF46 himself (Interviewee 1 and various BCF min-
utes). However, according to several interviewees (Interviewees 4, 5 and 6) and 
Dansk Institut for Fiskeriteknologi og Akvakultur et al. (1991) Kent Kirk did not 
use his position and fisheries knowledge to forward the interests of the industry as 
a whole; he rather pursued the interests of the Esbjerg fleet at the expense of other 
regions. In the parliament, Kent Kirk formed a strong alliance with another par-
liamentarian, Laurits Tørnæs,47 who also happened to be an influential former 
                                                          
44 He was also member of the board of the Sea Fishermen’s Association during the same period 
and in the latter part of the period also vice-chairman. The Sea Fishermen’s Association had its 
main office in Esbjerg.  
45 In 1983, during his term in the EP, he claimed his place in history by carrying out one of the 
most publicised media stunts ever in the history of Danish and EU fisheries policy. During the 
final negotiations of the EU CFP in January 1983 (Chapter 5), he steered his fishing vessel into 
the UK 12 nm zone and began fishing. He argued that since the agreement on the new CFP had 
not been signed before the start of 1983, when the derogations providing for 12 nm zones ended, 
he was entitled to do so. He was stopped by a UK inspection vessel and severely fined; however, 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities later acquitted him. 
46 All of his predecessors and successors have been represented by their civil servants. 
47 Laurits Tørnæs was also long-time chairman of the Sea Fishermen’s Association (1974–1987). 
From 1971 to 1974 he was chairman of the Fishermen’s Association of Esbjerg. He was a mem-
ber of Denmark’s Liberal Party, the other strong party in the government coalition, and Minister 
of Agriculture from 1987 to 1993 (Member of Parliament from 1981). He was after this for a 
long-time mayor of the County of Ribe where Esbjerg is situated. 
• Henning Grove, 1982–1986, The Conservative People’s Party  
• Lars P. Gammelgaard, 1986–1989, The Conservative People’s Party  
• Kent Kirk, 1989–1993, The Conservative People’s Party  
• Bjørn Westh, 1993–1994, The Danish Social Democrats  
• Henrik Dam Kristensen, 1994–2000, The Danish Social Democrats  
• Ritt Bjerregaard, 2000–2001, The Danish Social Democrats  
• Mariann Fischer Boel, 2001–2004, Denmark's Liberal Party  
• Hans Christian Schmidt, 2004–2007, Denmark's Liberal Party  
• Eva Kjær Hansen, 2007- , Denmark's Liberal Party  
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fishing skipper from Esbjerg and who supported the focus on helping the Esbjerg 
fishing fleet.  
The Kirk-Tørnæs alliance, both members having vested interests in fisheries 
and strong positions in their respective parties in government, was able to obtain a 
strong influence on the Danish fisheries policy for around a decade (1983–1993). 
Their influence is exemplified by the introduction of a new generation of large 
trawlers in 1984/85. These trawler were introduced at a time when the overall pol-
icy was increasingly focused on reducing capacity and not issuing licenses for new 
vessels without the withdrawal of equivalent capacity, as described above. In 1984 
permits were given to a number of Esbjerg fishermen to build new, larger trawl-
ers.48 The licenses were granted on the background of indicative vessel budgets 
that showed that the vessels would be economically viable based on fishing for 
species for non-human consumption outside the TAC-system in the North Atlan-
tic. However, this fishery was not economically viable (an argument which several 
people had made in advance), and as a result, the new vessels made very few fish-
ing trips to their intended fishing grounds in the North Atlantic before they were 
granted access to the North Sea (Interviewee 4 and 6). These vessels were first al-
lowed in the non-human consumption fishery. However, they progressively ex-
panded into the herring and mackerel fishery until 1990 when the management 
system was changed at short notice, and the vessels got equal rights to participate 
in the Danish North Sea herring fishery alongside the purse seiners that had until 
then dominated that fishery. This resulted in a de facto movement of fishing rights  
from Northern Jutland to Esbjerg, the homeport of the new trawlers. The decisions 
to issue licenses to build the vessels, although the budgets were not realistic, and 
later to grant them access to the North Sea were facilitated by Kent Kirk and 
Laurits Tørnæs, who “twisted the arm of Grove [the minister at the time]” (Inter-
viewee 4, supported by Interviewee 6).49 As it turned out, the way that Kent Kirk 
and Laurits Tørnæs advanced the interests of the Esbjerg fleet and region by al-
lowing special treatment not only resulted in regional redistribution but also, 
equally importantly, increased the overall structural problem of overcapacity in 
the Danish fleet fishing in the North Sea and contributed to the domino effect de-
scribed above.  
Another aspect of Kent Kirk’s time in office was that he did not make the nec-
essary effort to ensure an appropriate balance between fishing possibilities and 
fishing capacity and thus maintained too high levels of fishing mortality, as well 
as overcapacity in the fleet. At the time, there was a window-of-opportunity for 
change accompanying the cod crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. Kent Kirk’s 
predecessor, Lars P. Gammelgaard, had introduced a large analytical project aim-
                                                          
48 Popularly referred to as super-trawlers. 
49 It has to be mentioned that in our interviews, it was opponents of these decisions who argued 
that it was the Esbjerg lobby that stood behind them. In this context the interviewees were to 
some extent biased. However, that the Esbjerg lobby had a decisive impact on these decisions 
fits well with the general perception of this lobby as being very powerful at the time. 
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ing towards introducing ITQs in Danish fisheries, but this was disrupted during 
Kent Kirk’s time in office. Apparently, Kent Kirk wanted to maintain status quo 
in terms of fleet capacity and designed regulations in such a way that fishermen 
always had a right to be at sea (e.g. weekly catch quotas of 50 kg). This left com-
pliance with catch regulations to the conscience of the fishermen, since, at the 
same time, the Danish fisheries inspection was far from aggressive. It has also 
been argued that the minister indirectly encouraged fishermen to non-compliant 
behaviour50 e.g. by obstructing civil servants from pursuing cases of non-
compliant behaviour (Sandbeck 2003) and by downplaying the importance of 
sticking 100% to the regulations when he met with fishermen (Interviewee 4). 
Bjørn Westh, Kent Kirk’s successor, initiated a strong law enforcement practice in 
order to avoid repercussions from the EU, and a large number of fishermen was 
caught in retrospective paper controls and penalised for behaviours they had at the 
time – understandably – thought were acceptable based on signals from Kent 
Kirk’s ministry (Interviewee 4; Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003; Sandbeck 
2003). 
The second minister, whose role we would like to emphasise, is Henrik Dam 
Kristensen, not due to his personal role in particular, but more due to his collabo-
ration with Bent Rulle,51 who was mentioned by most interviewees as the most 
powerful individual actor outside the circle of national politicians. Bent Rulle 
managed to become extremely influential in determining how the Danish fisheries 
policy was administered and implemented in the period from 1994 to 2002, which 
to a large extent coincided with the period that Henrik Dam Kristensen was in of-
fice. It is worth mentioning that Bent Rulle on several occasions announced that 
the Danish minister (Henrik Dam Kristensen) was the best person to protect the 
fishermen’s interests during negotiations concerning the CFP in Brussels. We also 
believe that Henrik Dam Kristensen in particular took Bent Rulle seriously be-
cause Bent Rulle in 1994 became chairman of the newly established unified fish-
ermen’s association, which for the first time gave the industry a unified voice in 
general and in the BCF in particular. Henrik Dam Kristensen was also likely to 
take Bent Rulle seriously because he as a social democrat sympathised with many 
of the views that Bent Rulle presented. Bent Rulle focussed on the importance of 
the fisheries sector in fisheries-dependent communities and on fishing as a special 
lifestyle worth protecting in its own right (Interviewees 4 and 6) and argued that 
the fisheries industry was something more than an ordinary economic sector. He 
                                                          
50 Among other things, renaming of fish became a common practise. At the time Denmark had a 
large quota for plaice, which was rarely utilised, and it became relatively common to rename cod 
into plaice when landing, or renaming quota species into non-quota species. It should be men-
tioned that taxes were paid on the income from illegal fishing as it was sold through the normal 
channels and for that reason labelled grey fish. 
51 Rulle is a fishing skipper from Læsø, a small, relatively fisheries-dependent island in Kattegat. 
In the 1980s chairman of the Fishermen’s Association of Østerby. He became chairman of the 
Danish Fishing Association in 1991 and the first chairman of the DFA in 1994, a position he held 
until 2003. 
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was seen as a representative of the smaller and medium-sized vessels, but in the 
eyes of many, particularly among the larger vessels and outside the industry, also 
as an obstacle to progress and development in the industry. He was a very strong 
opponent of introducing ITQ or ITQ-like systems in Denmark, which he feared 
would lead to speculation and unhealthy regional displacements of capacity, 
among other things, and in general destroy the special, independent lifestyle of 
Danish fishermen.52 Henrik Dam Kristensen teamed-up with Bent Rulle in arguing 
against ITQs (Fiskeritidende 1997).  
In many respects, Henrik Dam Kristensen agreed with the views put forward by 
Bent Rulle, although he also tended towards agreement because he did not want to 
go against a unified fishing industry and hereby create a conflict. Neither Henrik 
Dam Kristensen and his administration nor the political establishment had an in-
terest in opposing the DFA. This conflict aversion was not only because of the 
corporatist traditions of decision-making in Denmark, but likely also due to the 
more pragmatic issue that the Ministry of Fisheries was at the time busy being 
merged with the Ministry of Agriculture, which to some extent created an admin-
istrative vacuum. Furthermore, Kent Kirk had recently resigned and a scandal was 
unfolding arguing that his efforts to ensure compliance during his time in office 
had been less than dedicated (Sandbeck 2003), providing further incentive for the 
ministry to comply with industry demands and avoid further conflict. Finally, Bent 
Rulle was on a personal level a very charismatic person who to a large extent 
managed to control the board of the DFA (Interviewees 4, 6 and 10), placing him 
in a strong negotiation position when dealing with the minister. After Henrik Dam 
Kristensen resigned as minister, Bent Rulle faced a stronger opposition from the 
larger vessels in the DFA, and because of his opposition to ITQs, he withdrew as 
chairman in 2003 to make room for a compromise candidate (Interviewees 4, 6, 8 
and 9). However, that did not occur until after the ITQ-system for herring had 
been introduced and the direction for the future of Danish fisheries policy to a sig-
nificant degree had been set (see section on allocation of resources above). 
Bent Rulle’s fingerprint on Danish fisheries policy is that he for a decade man-
aged to make Danish fishermen speak with largely one voice. This, however, also 
explains why he did not manage to fully capitalise on his position, as he was strug-
gling to keep the new association together and was forced to maintain some sort of 
balance. Maybe this partly explains why his legacy among several interviewees 
was that of the chairman that said “no” to everything and wanted to maintain 
status quo (Interviewees 6, 8 and 9). Most likely he would not as a chairman of the 
organisation have survived saying “yes” (Interviewee 4), as there was not a win-
dow-of-opportunity at the time for reforming Danish fisheries policies, and no one 
was really interested in solving the fundamental issue of overcapacity that in the 
end led to the ITQ-like FKA-system.  
                                                          
52 The first year of the FKA system has indeed resulted in large regional displacements of fishing 
capacity. 
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The third minister who particularly influenced the path of the Danish fisheries 
policy and its administration and implementation was Ritt Bjerregaard, also a so-
cial democrat like her predecessor, Henrik Dam Kristensen. It was during Ritt 
Bjerregaard’s term in office that ITQs were decided on in the herring fishery for a 
5-year trial period. This decision was a radical change of previous Danish practice, 
as it introduced direct ownership of fishing rights for the first time. It was directly 
in opposition to the views expressed by the former minister, Henrik Dam Kris-
tensen, and DFA chairman, Bent Rulle. Several interviewees (particularly Inter-
viewee 4) argued that this decision kick-started the development that culminated 
with the adoption of the FKA-system introduced in 2007 for the demersal fisheries.
Ritt Bjerregaard had a strong ally in the parliament in Lene Espersen,53 who 
was elected in Northern Jutland. Lene Espersen, who had a family background in 
the pelagic fisheries, took a strong interest in the management of these fisheries 
(Interviewees 1 and 4). Interestingly enough, Lene Espersen represented a political 
party from the opposition, and this may have served to strengthen the alliance, as 
Danish governments, this one included, are almost always minority governments. 
The alliance between Ritt Bjerregaard and Lene Espersen was so strong that they 
were able to convince the parliament to introduce ITQs even though this was 
against the wishes of the majority of the Danish fishermen organised in the DFA 
(particularly those fishing for demersal species) even while strongly supported be 
the DPPO, the processing industry and the banks. What made it possible to force 
the decision through was probably a combination of: (1) the alliance of the two 
politicians from each side of the parliament, (2) the fact that the number of li-
censes issued for herring fisheries was high and increasingly recognised as an 
obstacle to modernisation and competitiveness of the Danish pelagic sector, and 
(3) the presence of a relatively active, powerful and homogenous group of vessel 
owners in the pelagic fisheries who were in favour of ITQs (Interviewees 1, 4 and 
8; Christensen et al. 2007; Hegland and Sverdrup-Jensen 2007). In other words, 
the time was right, but it is likely that the decision could have been postponed by 
the opposition from the industry had it not been for the presence of the two politi-
cians with a wish to make this change at the specific time.54  
                                                          
53 Lene Espersen, the present Minister of Justice, is the daughter of an owner of pelagic fishing 
vessels in the fishing port of Hirtshals in Northern Jutland. Functioning as a representative of the 
fishermen that lost out during the Kirk/Tørnæs period, Lene Espersen had a significant influence 
on the fisheries policy together with Ritt Bjerregaard.  
54 On a theoretical level, the garbage can model (first outlined by Cohen et al. 1972) seems to be 
an appropriate model for at least in part understanding the decision processes and the decision-
making system behind the evolution of Danish fisheries management and implementation prac-
tices over time. A fundamental message of the garbage can model is that the different elements 
of a decision process – problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities – cannot al-
ways be put into a neat chain of events leading to a well thought-through decision, as a simple, 
conventional model of decision-making would have us think. Rather, these four elements of a 
decision function as independent streams (Cohen et al. 1976). An implication of this is that “[a] 
major feature of the garbage can process is the partial decoupling of problems and choices. Al-
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Hans Chr. Schmidt of Denmark's Liberal Party was the minister in office when 
the most radical reform of the Danish fisheries management system since the in-
troduction of the CFP was adopted by the Danish parliament in 2005. Hans Chr. 
Schmidt took particular interest in the fisheries issues, and in his resignation 
speech September 2007, he specifically mentioned that dealing with fisheries is-
sues was what he had enjoyed the most during his term in office. Denmark's Lib-
eral Party is a strong supporter of market solutions and pursuing ITQs and ITQ-
like solutions was thus straightforward for Hans Chr. Schmidt. The first important 
step to introduce market-based approaches was taken already in 2002 with the 
adoption of ITQs in the herring fishery. Even though this was for a 5-year trial pe-
riod, this first implementation of ITQs became a landmark decision in the evolu-
tion of fisheries management in Denmark and in reality set the direction for the fu-
ture. This direction was reinforced first by the new pro-ITQ DFA chairman from 
2005. Later it was also reinforced by the broad industry support gained by the 
minister. Thus the window-of-opportunity for change was there during his time in 
office, in contrast to what had been the case for his predecessors. He merely fol-
lowed his political vision with strong support from the top of the DFA and carried 
through the reform,55 changing Danish fishing rights from being common property 
by introducing private property rights to the Danish share of the TAC for most 
species, including all economically important ones.  
What is the lesson learned? When fisheries issues are not considered important 
at the relevant political level, as is the case in Denmark, such issues will only at-
tract sporadic political interest. This places people who have an interest in and 
knowledge about the issues in a favourable position. This goes for politicians as 
well as industry representatives. Although we have not investigated this directly, it 
seems plausible to conclude that individual actors would not have been able to ex-
ert the same degree of influence in more important sectors of the Danish economy 
                                                                                                                                    
though we normally think of decision making as a process for solving problems, that is often not 
what happens. Problems are worked upon in the context of some choice, but choices are made 
only when the shifting combinations of problems, solutions and decision makers happen to make 
action possible” (Cohen et al. 1976, p. 36). We are grateful to Interviewee 8 for making us think 
in terms of the garbage can model when looking for good decision-making models to describe 
the Danish situation. 
55 It should be mentioned that the reform was adopted by a small majority within the parliament 
only supported by the government coalition and its supporting party, the Danish People’s Party. 
It is interesting to observe that the Danish Social Democrats had changed positions towards ITQs 
since Ritt Bjerregaard’s term in office, even if they had been instrumental in introducing ITQ in 
the herring fishery. There was also a strong opposition within the DFA, primarily from fishermen 
having small and medium sized vessels, recreating the traditional cleavages in Danish fisheries. 
It should also be mention that de jure property rights have not been granted, as the the Parliament 
introduced an eight-year termination clause, but it is very unlikely that this clause ever will be 
used as this will require at least two consecutive parliamentary elections to change the system – 
and the clause is more a type of window dressing from the Government to demonstrate that the 
Danish fish resources have not been privatised, which they de facto have been by adopting the 
new regulation in 2005.  
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or on issues that attract public debate or in other countries where the fisheries sec-
tor plays a more important role in the economy or public debate. 
It is difficult to determine whether this feature of the system is necessarily good 
or bad. Any assessment of how these individuals have influenced the development 
of fisheries management and implementation practises will likely depend on who 
is looking at the development. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
this feature makes the system more vulnerable and prone to ad hoc developments 
due to personal preferences than systems less dependent on individuals. Further-
more, there is also a risk that necessary compromises are not made, since indi-
viduals in some cases can get their ideas through without compromise and also are 
likely to make it extremely difficult to develop a commonly accepted strategy or 
vision for the development of the fisheries sector. 
6.4.4 Differences in Perspectives – Individual versus Collective  
It came across in all interviews that there are different perspectives in the fishing 
industry towards management, and these are often driven by individual concerns 
rather than a wish to find collective long lasting solutions. Several of the inter-
viewees mentioned that in Danish fisheries it is extremely difficult to agree on 
measures that will put some fishermen in a better position without harming other 
fishermen.56 This concept was articulated by several of the interviewees as envi-
ousness, explaining that a decision which put all fishermen worse off would actu-
ally stand a better chance of being accepted. These interviewees in general argued 
that it was a relatively simple expression of envious fishermen as one interviewee 
(Interviewee 6) put it:  
Enviousness has controlled a lot. A lot of effort has been put into figuring out how to 
prevent others from gaining anything. 
What might be understood as enviousness is actually, we will argue, an ex-
treme focus on individual interests, forgetting about finding collectively correct 
solutions that benefit the industry at large.  
Several interviewees argued that this line of reasoning was definitely not some-
thing going on only among the average fishermen, but also in leadership circles. 
The interviewees argued that it was standard practice to argue exclusively from 
                                                          
56 This sort of decision would be along the lines of what in economic theory is known as a 
Pareto improvement. Pareto optimality is reached when no more Pareto improvements can be 
made. Examples mentioned by the interviewees included situations where some vessels were in 
various ways prevented from catching fish in foreign waters even though no other Danish vessels 
could go there to fish them (Interviewee 6), as well as fishermen arguing that other fishermen 
should not be allowed to catch the cod when it was at its best – if they were themselves prevented 
from doing so; then it was preferred that nobody caught it when it was best (Interviewee 2). 
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the point of view of one’s own vessel in representative boards within the fisheries 
association (Interviewees 6 and 10). One interviewee (Interviewee 10) described it 
in this way:  
If you are discussing whether something in the regulation should be changed it always 
ends up in: What does this mean to me? Will I benefit or not.  
Interviewee 4 provided a more nuanced description of what goes on in the head 
of the fishermen:  
Fishermen have always been individualists. The fishing vessel was a small society with a 
crew of 3, and that was the unit that the fisherman was trying to develop and do the best 
for. […] So whenever a proposal was presented, the fisherman first and foremost 
considered: ‘Hey, how will this affect my vessel, my world, my society’. And if there was 
anything whatsoever that could in any thinkable way conflict with his ideas, he would say 
‘No’. 
This indicates that the driving factor is not so much about enviousness, but 
more likely a question of being insecure about the outcome of new measures or 
regulations. The philosophy seems to be along the lines of “You know what you 
have, but not what you will get”. Many fishermen tend to evaluate a proposal on 
the background of their own vessel only. As most fishermen have been struggling 
to keep their business economically viable, it is only natural that fishermen take an 
individual perspective even if it would have been better in the long run, even for 
the individual, to take a more collective perspective. This tendency has been an 
important force in preventing implementation and administration practices from 
developing in a rational way (Interviewees 2, 6, 8 and 10). One interviewee did, 
however, mention that this attitude went hand in hand with the changes in society 
overall, which are generally moving in a liberal, market-oriented, individualistic 
direction (Interviewee 6).  
Furthermore, several interviewees also mentioned that sector representatives 
(and to some extent also politicians) had a tendency to make decisions to accom-
modate very small groups of vessels or in extreme cases individual vessels (Inter-
viewees 2, 8, 9 and 10). The interviewees explained this with the abovementioned 
preference for discussing things based on examples rather than in terms of general 
principles. This might also relate to the fact that in the fisheries sector the repre-
sentatives are not “professional representatives” but often people active in the 
business. One can easily imagine that it is hard to support measures that might on 
a general level be the best way forward but will be difficult to explain to your fel-
low fisherman back home, who will immediately ask why you did not take his 
special situation into consideration. It is not unlikely that this could lead to a not-
so-organized “proliferation of rules and administrative practices” (Interviewee 
5), as one interviewee put it, rather than facilitate a well founded development 
strategy. 
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6.5 Evaluation and Implications 
The issue of balancing fishing mortality rates with the carrying capacity of the fish 
stocks is important when analysing fisheries management performance. By identi-
fying the main domestic drivers in the development of fisheries policy and imple-
mentation practices in Denmark, this chapter fits another piece into the puzzle of 
why the CFP has been struggling in vain to achieve preferred fishing mortality 
rates. 
In the EU, the conservation policy component of the CFP deals with fishing 
mortality, with annual TACs as its major instrument. The conservation policy is 
supplemented by structural policy measures that aim to control the capacity and 
activities of the fishing fleet. As described above, there is no clear link between 
fishing mortality rates and the TACs because fishing mortality is never directly 
monitored. Only fish landings, rather than catches, are directly measured, and dis-
cards are thus not taken fully into account. Furthermore, enforcement practices in 
the EU have not been sufficiently restrictive to avoid illegal fishing, which has at 
least to some extent been provoked by massive overcapacity. Last but not least, 
the EU member states’ ministers in the Council have for various reasons repeat-
edly set TACs higher than the levels advised by the scientists (see Chapter 5), 
These basic observations lead us to the conclusion that the CFP framework in 
which Danish administration and implementation operates cannot in itself ensure 
sustainable utilisation of fish resources in EU waters.  
Furthermore, the CFP framework provides Denmark with substantial freedom 
to make decisions on how to allocate fishing rights and how to adjust fleet capac-
ity. This obviously has an impact on the effectiveness of the CFP by influencing 
the degree to which the measures under the CFP will work as intended and will be 
useful to control fishing mortality. In this respect, rule compliance and enforce-
ment practices57 become equally important.  
In order to understand the Danish policy process, it is important to recognise 
that fishing mortality rates and conservation measures per se have never been real 
                                                          
57 It should be mentioned that enforcement largely remains with the member states. Raakjær 
Nielsen (1992a) argues that this creates a tragedy of the commons situation, as no member state 
wants to strictly enforce the regulations in relation to its own fishermen if there is no mechanism 
to ensure that other member states do so, too. 
issues in the Danish implementation. Across all stakeholders (apart from conser-
vation NGOs), conservation concerns have been considered – at least in principle 
and theory – as having already been dealt with by the CFP and the TAC system. 
However, no stakeholder could have been unaware that such an assumption was not 
based on realities. Thus Danish fisheries management and implementation practices 
have focussed on allocating the Danish quotas and ensuring accepted management 
approaches. In this process, it has been considered legitimate to find ways to cir-
cumvent conservation measures when designing implementation strategies e.g. by 
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In this chapter, we have examined the policy process by undertaking an analy-
sis combining an institutional perspective with an actor-oriented approach and 
have clearly found that the policy process has been driven by case-specific, inter-
twined interests, networks/alliances and discourses, which all affect each other and 
influence policy-making. 
Fig. 6.4. Actor-level drivers influencing the policy process (Raakjær forthcoming) 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the various actor-level drivers (working within a specific 
institutional setting) that influence the policy process and its logic. We will refer 
to the figure as we synthesize why and how the implementation of fisheries poli-
cies in Denmark has changed over time the way it has. Policy changes occur as a 
result of a combination of multiple interrelated elements that are shaping the process 
and its outcome. In this chapter, we have clearly found that the Danish fisheries 
policy process has been driven by interests – or more specifically, that different 
actors/groups have been pursuing different interests and there have been clashes of 
interests among user-groups, stakeholders, interest groups and the administration 
or some combination hereof. The policy process has also been driven by net-
works/alliances, by which we mean clusters of different kinds of actors with simi-
lar or compatible interests that join forces to collectively influence the outcome of 
the policy process. Networks/alliances can vary from tight alliances to loosely 
                                                          
58 This is not unique for Denmark, and is probably the rule rather than the exception among all 
the EU member states. 
placing closed days when nobody is fishing or by setting unreasonably low catch 
quotas instead of closing fisheries.58
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affiliated networks mobilised for specific issues and are by nature very dynamic 
and change over time. The last element we include is discourses, which define 
dominant lines of reasoning. As discussed by Hajer (2002), one needs to under-
stand the overall position as much as the actual wording of arguments to fully un-
derstand the meaning of a discourse, as arguments are used to pursue a specific 
purpose. When these three elements: interests, network/alliances, and discourses 
work together, major policy changes are possible. 
Based on our analysis, we can conclude that domestic factors and concerns, 
rather than concern about the state of the fish stocks, have been driving the evolu-
tion and changes in Danish fisheries management and sector development. It has 
been particularly important to balance the various interests within a sector domi-
nated by internal differences, including a fundamental disagreement within the 
fishing industry on what fishing is all about: business or lifestyle. The discourses 
articulated in the debates on various issues have to a large extent been embedded 
in these two different perceptions of fisheries, which themselves can be under-
stood as fundamental underlying discourses.  
The different interests articulated can also clearly be linked to two fundamen-
tally different perceptions of fishing. One side aims to maintain status quo and 
flexibility and is generally reluctant to make major changes. In contrast, the other 
side aims for market-based solutions that will lead to a radical structural adjust-
ment of the Danish catch industry probably with strong and uneven negative 
socio-economic impacts at the local level.  
Particularly networks and alliances have shifted over time. As Fig. 6.4 sug-
gests, the dynamics of the process are sensitive to changes relating to any of the 
drivers, which we in our analysis also observed to be the case, and furthermore we 
found that these drivers affected each other. However, the situation has been rela-
tively stable when looking at the interests and discourses – of course with incre-
mental changes over time. This suggests that the major driver in terms of creating 
the change is the changing networks and alliances. This can be explained by the 
significant power held by a few persons (primarily) in the parliament. The power 
of these few people is brought about by the relatively low importance of the sector 
in the national economy. Consequently, various discourses and interests have 
competed against each other, but what has really changed the balance and the sys-
tem has been changes in powerful networks and alliances. However, it should be 
kept in mind that although conservation and the state of fish stocks have never 
been of specific concern in the Danish context, they have nonetheless been under-
lying issues that have occasionally opened a window-of-opportunity in the wake 
of conservation failures – and it is not unlikely that the increasing force of the en-
vironmental discourse might add to this picture in the future. 
An underlying theme of the analysis has been the institutionalised involvement 
of the sector itself, particularly the fishing industry, in decision-making. As de-
scribed in the section on legal and institutional set-up, the fisheries decision-
making process is embedded in an overall corporative governance system with a 
long – but increasingly questioned – tradition of consulting relatively narrow 
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groups of stakeholders or users. What seems clear from our analysis is that the 
corporatist structures have worked best under weak, or perhaps more correctly, 
less determined ministers, and to a minor degree – compared to the ideal model of 
corporative governance – under strong/determined ministers who have to some ex-
tent been able to bypass the corporatist structures by utilising networks and alli-
ances. However, even when the corporatist set-up has worked on a technical level, 
it is questionable whether it has worked as intended in the sense of delivering 
stakeholder buy-in for decisions in the best interest of society. There are several 
examples where the corporatist structures have delivered decisions that have been 
at least questionable from the point of view of the society at large, as the sector 
has managed to get policies adopted that have been beneficial for itself (e.g. pub-
licly funded scrapping programmes, allocation of fishing rights in the shape of 
free vessel quota shares) without these policies efficiently solving the problems 
they were supposed to address. Therefore, it seems fair to question whether corpo-
ratist structures in the area of fisheries policy, where a relatively narrow group of 
stakeholders enjoy a privileged position, continue to serve the common good or 
rather serves to maintain structures that might prioritise a small group of stake-
holders at the costs of the society as a whole, especially as societal priorities 
change over time and to some extent move away from those of the narrow group 
of stakeholders. In the context of the Danish fisheries policy-making system, the 
represented interests and occasionally a subset of those have – either by using the 
corporatist system in the traditional way or by means of strong alliances and net-
works able to bypass the corporatist process – managed to shape the implementa-
tion policies in ways that in several instances can be characterised as questionable 
from the point-of-view of society at large. This is an interesting observation in a 
corporatist system, where policy decisions ideally should be shaped by thorough 
consultations among those affected by the measures and a subsequent balancing of 
the various represented interests, taking into consideration the interests of society 
at large. 
That the system has in several instances served special interests rather than so-
ciety at large is to some extent related to the narrow conception of legitimate 
stakeholders, which we have dealt with indirectly in our analysis. The interests 
formally represented in the Danish fisheries policy-making system are mainly the 
traditional stakeholders: fishermen, fish processors / traders, and employers’ and 
employees’ organisations. The system has not to any significant extent responded 
to the fact that other types of interests have increasingly legitimate claims to rep-
resentation in the system.59 As the resource crisis has over time become accepted 
as a fact, the set of legitimate interest groups in fisheries has moved beyond that of 
the traditional actors to a situation where the interests of consumers, environ-
mental interests, local communities and future generations, as notable examples, 
are increasingly relevant (Mikaelsen and Jentoft 2001). These interests are in gen-
                                                          
59 The recent inclusion of WWF in the BCF on a semi-permanent basis, however, gives evidence 
that the system is not completely static. 
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eral only sporadically included in the decision-making system for commercial 
fisheries in Denmark, and to a large extent they do not have the power to force 
their way into it. Nevertheless, these are, as Mikaelsen and Jentoft (2001, p. 284) 
Finally, our analysis of the policy process points to the importance of under-
standing the dynamics that enable change, emphasizing the necessity of synergis-
tic interaction between the three elements illustrated in Fig. 6.4. Over time there 
will be windows-of-opportunity for implementing larger reforms, but whether 
these opportunities are taken advantage of depends on the situation – particularly 
in terms of the dominant interests and alliances/networks at the time, the scale of 
the problems and to what degree solutions exist that can guide a reform process. 
Although strong individual actors have influenced the implementation process on 
and off during the whole period, we argue that it was not until the problems facing 
the fishing industry became evident to most people involved in the decision-
making process that the window-of-opportunity for fundamental change was cre-
ated. The solution eventually chosen – the market-based approach – had actually 
been floating around for almost two decades with continuous minority support, but 
until 2004/5 this solution was rejected by the majority of the Danish fishermen. In 
2005, however, the reform became political reality because a dominant interest in 
market-based solutions and a strong political alliance in favour of an ITQ-system 
coincided with the on-going discourse on the need for changes and thus created 
the window-of-opportunity to introduce the largest reform in Danish fisheries 
since the introduction of the CFP in 1983.  
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7 The Politics of Implementation in Resource 
Conservation: Comparing the EU/Denmark  
and Norway 
Stig S. Gezelius, Troels Jacob Hegland, Hilary Palevsky, and Jesper Raakjær 
Abstract   This chapter discusses implementation as a policy instrument in terms 
of fishery resource conservation. Implementation is primarily a means of pursuing 
established political goals. However, it is also a potential means of deliberate sub-
version or change of political goals. The chapter describes the development of 
multiple goals in fisheries management and addresses mechanisms through which 
conservation goals are subverted or changed at the implementation stage. Through 
comparison between The EU/Denmark and Norway, the chapter identifies factors 
that promote and prevent subversion of conservation goals during implementation. 
7.1 Introduction 
In the introduction to this volume, we illustrated the idealized model that presents 
fisheries management as a simple causal chain of independent processes. Accord-
ing to this model, political decisions are based on scientific knowledge; state ad-
ministrative agencies design their tangible management strategies to directly im-
plement political objectives; and the fishing industry is expected to comply by 
following the rules implemented. In the introduction, we outlined some of the po-
tential flaws in each of these steps that have been identified in the academic litera-
ture of recent years: science does not always produce accurate estimates of fish 
stocks; political decisions sometimes prioritize short-term gains over long-term 
sustainable harvesting; and the fishing industry does not automatically comply 
with all regulations. Based on the causal chain model, each of these flaws can 
propagate itself throughout the management process as each link in the chain de-
pends on the previous processes, ultimately undermining management goals and 
producing a poorly-managed resource. 
Even this critique, however, often implies the perspective that fisheries manage-
ment operates as a series of independent processes. An alternative, and often more 
fruitful approach, is to regard the components in the model as interactive, constitut-
ing a web of interdependences rather than a simple causal chain. Consequently, 
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recent literature has begun to question the independence of some of these 
processes. Here are a few examples: 
• The political independence of scientific stock estimates cannot always be taken 
for granted (Rozwadowski 2002: 188, 193). 
• Administrative implementation strategies and the level of industry compliance 
can affect the accuracy of data collected about the fisheries and thus affect the 
accuracy of scientific knowledge, as many of the standard scientific models 
rely on implementation procedures to enable data collection, and it is difficult 
to account for illegal/unreported fishing in these models. Political decisions can 
also affect data collection. For example, the EU’s system of only measuring 
fish landings and requiring mandatory discards makes it difficult to monitor 
fishing mortality. 
• Industry compliance can be much more complex than suggested by the wide-
spread idea that industry action is a non-political response to utilitarian incen-
• Describing implementation as the administration’s loyal pursuit of predefined 
political goals may sometimes be appropriate on a national level (Christensen 
et al. 2007). However, some of the cases outlined in this volume show that it is 
difficult to draw a clear line between policy-making and implementation. This 
is particularly notable in relation to the implementation of EU policies where 
supranational political goals are renegotiated in the process of national imple-
mentation. 
Fig. 7.1. Delimitation of the subject of this chapter 
The shaded box in Fig. 7.1 marks the chapter’s topic. This chapter focuses on a 
specific type of relationship between processes in the fisheries management chain: 
mechanisms through which competition between conflicting political agendas may 
redefine political goals in the implementation process. Our focus is on implemen-
tation of resource conservation policies. We are consequently concerned with the 
ability of non-conservation agendas to subvert conservation when politics enters 













tives, a view which has been thoroughly questioned (Gezelius 2003; Hauck 
2008). The industry’s compliance with regulations may be influenced by its 
role in the political decision-making process and in the design of implementa-
tion strategies. 
7 The Politics of Implementation in Resource Conservation      209 
only by not meeting the intended targets but also by attempting to realize other 
targets than conservation. 
The cases presented in this volume illustrate that the separation of implementa-
tion from politics cannot be taken for granted, but the cases also represent signifi-
cant variety regarding the extent and mechanism of politicised implementation. 
The cases represent various forms of corporatist arrangements, all of which give 
industry organisations a significant say in matters of resource conservation and 
implementation. However, the presence of heterogeneous interests has apparently 
had quite different consequences in terms of watering down conservation goals in 
the process of implementing conservation policies. The analysis in this chapter 
suggests explanations for this observed difference, emphasising the roles of na-
tional autonomy in political decision-making, the framing of national implementa-
tion discourses, and the (in)ability of supranational entities to ensure national 
compliance.  
Before considering the differences in politicized implementation between the 
cases, however, it is necessary to consider how politics found its way into imple-
mentation practices. The departure from politically-determined conservation aims 
in the implementation process is ultimately rooted in the multiplicity of agendas in 
fisheries management. The historical move towards multiple fisheries manage-
7.2 The Development of Multiple Agendas in Fisheries 
Management 
The effectiveness of conservation policy implementation depends on the extent to 
which conservation remains the primary goal pursued at the implementation stage. 
Several chapters in this volume illustrate that conservation does not always remain 
the dominant goal, especially when supranational policies are subject to national 
implementation. 
The concepts of “political goal” and “political agenda” are crucial but am-
biguous in terms of fisheries management. The cases in this volume describe the 
pursuit of different important goals such as industry modernisation and resource 
conservation. While they can justly be described as different and potentially com-
peting goals, they do not represent conflicting basic values as states ultimately 
protect fish stocks because they are concerned about people. The state’s primary 
task in relation to fishing has always been to regulate and develop the industry for 
the purpose of securing and increasing people’s welfare. However, over the years 
the attempt to realize this general goal has developed into a pursuit of an increas-
ing number of potentially conflicting sub-goals.  
ment agendas is common to the cases studied, but has had different effects on the 
implementation of conservation policies. Before we proceed to the analysis of 
these different developments, it is useful to have a basic understanding of the 
shared process that led to multiple agendas in fisheries management. 
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In the early years of fisheries governance, the primary focus of the national 
policies were dominant in promoting efficiency. First, as described in Chapter 3, 
were the regulatory efforts to reduce inefficiency resulting from gear damage and 
conflicts between fishermen. These efforts mainly consisted of detailed regula-
tions regarding e.g. fishing space and fishing gear, and aimed to ensure orderly 
fishing. Second, as described in Chapters 2–5, were policies to promote moderni-
sation of the fishing fleets. Significant financial resources were spent developing 
the fishing sector across the North Atlantic. Technological advances, the utilisa-
tion of which was sponsored by the states, led to overcapacity within the fishing 
fleets. Consequently, the policies regarding effective fishing had an unintended 
by-effect which forced the states to address a new problem: overfishing. By the 
1960s, the goal of industry modernisation was accompanied by growing concerns 
about resource conservation. 
It was believed that the emergence of overfishing called for increased control 
of fishing activity, but national politics were not initially the main arena for this 
effort. The contemporary law of the sea made conservation of fish stocks mainly a 
matter of international politics. The international fisheries commissions were thus 
the main arena for the emergence and growth of a resource conservation agenda. 
However, the establishment of 200-nm EEZs in the late 1970s, which brought off-
shore fisheries under national jurisdiction, forced the coastal states to assume na-
tional responsibility for the conservation of fish stocks. Resource conservation 
thus became a second major task for the coastal states, alongside industry devel-
opment. As illustrated in Chapters 3 and 5, the dual task of industry development 
and resource conservation also became manifest in the administrative divisions of 
labour. 
The dual task of modernisation and conservation has resulted in policies that 
pursue somewhat conflicting long-term goals: efficient harvesting and resource 
conservation. This duality has represented an enduring tension in the governance 
of the fishing industry. In addition, the entry of resource conservation into politics 
also brought about a potential conflict between the goals of short-term benefits for 
the parties involved in fishing activities and long-term sustainable fishing. Striking 
a sensible balance between short-term benefits and long-term sustainability is es-
sential because long-term success for the industry requires, at the very least, that it 
survives in the short-term. The importance of short-term survival has often given 
industry actors who oppose conservation policies a legitimate voice in the political 
debate. The entry of resource conservation onto the political agenda has thus 
greatly increased the complexity of fishing industry governance. 
The increasing complexity did not end with the establishment of conservation 
institutions. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the concerns about problems of inefficiency 
that arise when fishermen compete to catch the greatest possible share of the Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC). These concerns have led fisheries managers to divide the 
TAC between fleet sectors and vessels in order to increase predictability for 
fishermen, allowing them to adjust their fishing effort more profitably. Resource 
states regarding fish harvesting was on promoting efficient fishing. Two types of 
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conservation policies consequently presented the state with a third task: distribu-
tion of fishing rights. This is arguably the most politically difficult task among the 
three because, unlike industry development and resource conservation, it is inex-
tricably linked with deep conflicts of interest among industry actors. While re-
source conservation benefits all, and industry development often can be similarly 
legitimised, distribution of fishing rights is inevitably a zero-sum game. Distribu-
tion consequently makes fisheries management a politically sensitive issue, and 
presents managers with constant problems of legitimation.  
Both national and international resource conservation regimes often rest on dis-
tributional compromises, meaning that biological sustainability sometimes has to 
be weighed against the need for political agreement. Increasing TACs beyond bio-
logically desirable levels has often been necessary in order to establish or maintain 
a conservation regime, the management of the blue whiting of the Northeast At-
lantic being perhaps the most conspicuous recent example (Gezelius 2007a), al-
though the history of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is also rich with 
examples (see Chapter 5 or Holden 1994). The significance of distributional con-
flicts of interest to conservation is not only related to the ability of political actors 
to construct conservation institutions but also to their political self-interest. Long-
term survival presupposing short-term survival is not only true of fishing enter-
prises but also of elected leadership. One fundamental conservation problem is 
that unsustainable management mainly generates a long-term political cost while 
distributional conflicts arising from strict conservation policies tend to create very 
noticeable short-term costs. Consequently, elected leaders may often feel tempted 
or forced to make long-term sacrifices in terms of conservation, in order to solve 
short-term distributional conflicts. 
Fisheries management offers several examples of how this problem can be ad-
dressed. For example, following the collapse of the Canadian East coast cod fish-
eries, critical TAC advice for these stocks has been provided by an agency that is 
strictly detached from the distribution processes (Gezelius 2002). Another solution 
has been applied in the management of the Northeast Arctic cod stock for which 
Norway and Russia since 2004 tied TACs to scientific advice (Government of 
Norway 2003). Such institutional arrangements are not always established, and 
when they are, they do not reduce the costs of distribution and are not always ro-
bust. Consequently, concerns about short-term political survival remain a potential 
challenge to conservation aims among political decision-makers and industry or-
ganisations involved in distribution. 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the dynamics of agenda expansion in fisheries manage-
ment. The boxes illustrate tasks undertaken by the state, and the arrows represent 
causal relationships. The figure only focuses on governmental factors. While the 
need to allocate fishing rights results entirely from the task of resource conserva-
tion, the need for resource conservation can only be partly ascribed to governmen-
tal factors. There is no doubt that state policies regarding industry modernisation 
and welfare contributed to overcapacity in the fishing fleets, but technological 
advances have been a major underlying factor. Similarly, developments within 
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fisheries science have been a necessary condition for the emergence of modern re-
source management. Nonetheless, Fig. 7.2 illustrates the tendency of political 
agendas to lead to new agendas, resulting in an increasingly complex set of poten-
tially conflicting goals. 
 
 
Fig. 7.2. The development of multiple agendas in fisheries management 
Successful conservation of fisheries resources not only requires that the con-
servation agenda dominates conservation policies, but also that it keeps its domi-
nant position in the implementation process. It can be argued that the multiplicity 
implementation, because this may lead to a vicious circle of declining dedication 
to conservation. The first step in this circle is the reduced effectiveness of conser-
vation policies that follows from the interference of other agendas in the imple-
mentation process. The second step is the subversion of faith in the effectiveness 
of conservation policies, reducing the willingness to even try to implement them 
according to their original purposes. In the following, we will outline the dynam-
ics of the policy process through which non-conservation agendas feed into the 
implementation of conservation policies. For that purpose, we will focus specifi-
cally on the Danish case, which has some similarities with the “garbage can” 
model introduced by Cohen et al. (1972) to describe the role of multiple agendas 
in processes of organisational choice. Comparing Denmark and Norway will serve 












Main goal Human welfare 
of agendas is especially significant in resource management when politics enter 
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7.3 Mechanisms Allowing Implementation Drift 
As mentioned previously in this chapter it is important to understand that often no 
clear division can be made between political decisions and administrative imple-
mentation. It was clear in some of the case studies that these two elements of the 
fisheries management process are intimately interlinked. The Danish study in par-
ticular (Chapter 6) demonstrated how political decisions are redefined and alterna-
tive political aims are pursued at the level of what should in principle be “neutral” 
administrative implementation.1 As argued in Chapter 6, the Danish case is re-
garded as a modest example of member states departing from EU goals in CFP 
implementation. It is thus reasonable to hypothesise that the findings regarding 
politicised implementation in Denmark can also be made in many other EU mem-
ber states, especially as the tendency of politics to penetrate implementation can 
largely be explained in terms of general EU structures. We may therefore use the 
findings in the Danish case as a basis for a more general analysis of the obstacles 
to effective CFP implementation in the EU.  
icy decisions will be reinterpreted or circumvented during their implementation 
and how this could be avoided. Inspired by the principal-agent approach which 
will be thoroughly discussed below, we apply the term “implementation drift” to 
describe the process of redefining political goals and pursuing alternative political 
goals during implementation. The difficulties in taking implementation drift into 
account are in some cases added to by elements of path-dependence, which limits 
the potential alternative strategies available to the policy-maker (see Chapter 5). 
Moreover, our analysis suggests that the scope for manoeuvring and pursuing 
alternative political aims during implementation is highly dependent on the 
overall institutional setup of the fisheries management system and in particular 
with regard to the national autonomy of the state. We found some indications 
that the higher the autonomy of the state in fisheries management, the less 
likely it is that policy decisions will be reinterpreted or circumvented during 
their implementation. 
The principal-agent approach is helpful in order to understand the mechanisms 
that allow implementation drift. This (arguably somewhat rationalist) approach 
deals with how a principal, who delegates tasks to other actors, can ensure that 
these agents remain loyal and perform the delegated tasks according to the wishes 
of the principal. Within this approach, disloyalty on behalf of the agent is termed 
“agency drift”, which refers to the process of agents drifting towards carrying out 
the delegated tasks in a way that pursues their own goals and priorities rather than 
those intended by the principal. In the context of this section “agency drift” refers 
to the same process as “implementation drift”. The principal-agent approach has 
                                                          
1 Zetterholm (1980) describes how implementation politics must be understood as a type of po-
litical participation. 
Our analyses suggest that it is highly complicated to foresee in detail how pol-
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been applied to the EU in various ways and, inspired by Blom-Hansen (2005),2 we 
will apply this perspective to the implementation of EU fisheries regulations based 
on Chapters 5 and 6. The principal-agent perspective provides us with tools to at 
least partly understand why Denmark differs from the Faeroe Islands and Norway 
in terms of implementation drift.  
Following Blom-Hansen (2005), two types of ex-ante mechanisms and two 
types of ex-post mechanisms3 can theoretically be used by a principal to control 
the agent to which it delegates a task. The first ex-ante control mechanism is to 
choose the agent with care so that the incentives for agency drift remain as limited 
as possible. The EU is the principal in relation to the CFP, while the member 
states are the agents that decide on the specific implementation of conservation 
and structural policies.4 The TAC system is the fundamental component of the 
conservation policy, but it is as much an allocation as a conservation instrument. 
The EU allocates TAC shares based on the firmly rooted principle of relative sta-
bility between member states, which may be the most path-dependence creating 
element of the CFP (see Chapter 5). Unfortunately, the EU member states, the 
units to which TACs are allocated, are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma situation in 
relation to conservation, control and enforcement, meaning that member states are 
inclined not to implement measures with conservation loyally in mind because 
they cannot be sure to reap the benefits of these implementation efforts them-
selves.5 Consequently, the EU is left with agents who have strong incentives for 
drifting toward domestic priorities at the expense of common conservation con-
cerns, and, as a result, the member states cannot a priori be expected to act as 
loyal agents. However, a few developments in the EU’s implementation strategy 
seek to limit the scope of this problem. For example, the increasing emphasis in 
EU fisheries management on regionalisation and involvement of cross-national 
stakeholder groups expressed in the creation of the Regional Advisory Councils 
(RACs) may reduce the prisoner’s dilemma in implementation by reducing the 
dominant role played by the member states. Likewise the attempt by the Commis-
sion of the European Communities (the Commission) to take over some of the 
control and enforcement tasks from the member states can be seen as an effort to 
get out of the prisoner’s dilemma situation. Nonetheless, it appears unlikely that 
the member states will lose their position as the central agent for implementation 
anytime in the near future. 
The second ex-ante control mechanism is the design of the framework and 
mandate that the agent works under. The likelihood of the agent drifting is reduced 
                                                          
2 Blom-Hansen applied it to the implementation of the EU Cohesion Policy. 
3 As indicated by their name, ex-ante control mechanisms are mechanisms that the principal can 
employ prior to or in the process of delegating the tasks. Ex-post control mechanisms can be em-
ployed after the agency relationship has been established. 
4 As outlined in Chapter 5 these are the two elements of the CFP that most directly impinge on 
the issue of target fishing mortality rates. 
5 See Chapter 1 for an introduction to the prisoner’s dilemma. 
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if the principal can create an incentive structure that makes it more profitable or 
opportune for the agent to remain loyal to the principal’s objectives than to ignore 
or subvert these objectives. Understanding the mechanisms at play in relation to 
the incentive structure in the CFP is crucial in order to understand why the EU has 
struggled to implement target fishing mortality rates. There are arguably several 
examples where the EU has provided incentives through benefits or costs to drive 
the member states in the direction of loyal implementation. One example men-
tioned in Chapter 5 is the Commission’s decision from 1987 to refuse EU grants 
for construction of new vessels to member states that fail to reach their targets in 
the EU fleet reduction programmes. This decision made non-conservationist be-
haviour costly under the structural policy. Another example is the design of the 
days-at-sea system adopted as part of the conservation policy to reduce fishing 
mortality rates by allowing each vessel only a limited number of days to spend at 
sea fishing. The system has been designed so that certain vessels can obtain extra 
days-at-sea if they use selective gear of a specified nature, which provides incen-
tives at the national level to promote the use of such gear. In these two examples, 
the EU provides an incentive structure that drives the member states towards con-
servationist behaviour. 
The problem, however, is that for the most fundamental measure influencing 
fishing mortality rates, the TACs, there are no strong incentives for fishing the 
quotas in a conservationist manner. As explained in Chapters 5 and 6, the quotas 
allocated to the EU member states are related to landings rather than catches. The 
fishing mortality associated with discards is thus not directly recorded or deducted 
from the fishermen’s quotas. The incentives for the individual member state to re-
duce discards are weak because the negative impact of the non-conservationist be-
haviour is shared among all the member states, who will receive lower quotas in 
the following year. This is a typical example of the “tragedy of the commons” dy-
namic (Hardin 1968). Although the EU acknowledges the problem, it has so far 
been unsuccessful at creating an incentive structure to eliminate the problem.  
There are many obstacles to eliminating the problem of discards in terms of 
                                                          
6 It should be remembered that the relative stability was the most sensitive part of the negotia-
tions leading to adoption of the conservation policy in 1983.  
legislation, administration and enforcement (Gezelius 2008). It can further be ar-
gued that the principle of relative stability represents a significant political obsta-
cle to solving this problem. Most member states are reluctant to open the debate 
on the long-negotiated relative stability,6 confirmed during the reform negotiations 
of 2002 (see Hegland 2004). This reluctance is an obstacle against replacing TAC-
based management with, as one option, an effort regulation scheme in response to 
the problem of discards. The problem is that TACs are as much allocation instru-
ments as conservation instruments, and recalculating TACs into national effort 
quotas would open many questions about the relative stability of quota allocation 
among member states. Another option would be to introduce a ban on discarding, 
which would change the incentive structure and make catches equal landings – at 
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least in theory. Such a change would nevertheless also impinge on the relative sta-
bility since discarding rates likely vary significantly across member states. There 
would moreover be a real risk that such a rule would only exist on paper, since a 
ban on discarding creates a number of implementation challenges, especially in re-
lation to administration and enforcement (see Chapters 1 and 3). It should, how-
ever, be mentioned that at the time of writing the EU is actively exploring how to 
ban discarding, partly based on positive experiences from Norway (see Chapter 3), 
as well as from Iceland, New Zealand and Canada (Commission of the European 
Communities 2007). Nevertheless, the conclusion on this ex-ante control mecha-
nism must be that the EU has so far been unable to create the right incentive struc-
ture when it comes to the issues that are most important in relation to fishing mor-
tality rates, and it is not obvious how this could be done in practice. The practical 
problems are not only related to administration, legislation and enforcement but 
also to politics because it only takes a few member states to block a proposal un-
der the current voting arrangement in the Council of the European Union (the 
Council). As will be addressed beneath, blocking minorities represent significant 
inertia in the CFP. 
Above, we have described how the EU has problems related to the ex-ante con-
trol mechanisms. The same is to some extent true of ex-post control mechanisms. 
We will go quickly over the first of these mechanisms, monitoring of the agent, as 
we believe that the second ex-post control mechanism, sanctioning of agency drift, 
is more interesting in terms of the CFP. The EU has various ways of monitoring 
agency drift. One brief example worth mentioning is the so-called CFP Compli-
ance Scoreboard, which has been presented annually since 2003. The Compliance 
Scoreboard claims to outline the extent to which the different member states have 
complied with their obligations under the CFP. It is, however, noteworthy that in-
formation on a crucial issue such as discarding is not systematically accessible. 
This practice is notoriously difficult to monitor and discarding is furthermore not 
illegal per se under the framework of the CFP and is therefore outside the scope of 
the Scoreboard. Moreover, the Compliance Scoreboard is to a large extent based 
on information provided by the member states themselves. This means that the in-
formation in the Scoreboard is only reliable insofar as the member states provide 
credible information, which is not always the case. For example, statistics on 
quota overruns are only reliable to the extent that the member states register all 
landings, meaning that there are no unrecorded landings, which is hardly true in 
all member states. 
As to the second ex-post control mechanism, sanctioning of agency drift, in-
formation on agency drift is only useful if sanctions can be imposed (or other ac-
tions taken) to ensure compliance with the requirements of the principal. Two 
kinds of drift – criminal agency drift and non-criminal agency drift – are thus 
relevant for further exploration. In our context, criminal drift can be defined as 
drift that is directly against the rules, while non-criminal drift can be defined as 
drift that is not directly against the rules but either conflicts with the intention of the 
rules or the overall political objectives. When criminal agency drift is identified, 
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e.g. based on the information in the Compliance Scoreboard or other sources, the 
Commission, as a representative of the EU, is able to bring the drifting member 
state in front of the Court of Justice of the European Communities or – as will 
more often be the case – threaten to do so. The court may punish the drifting 
member state e.g. by imposing fines, which is sometimes an effective and straight-
forward sanctioning mechanism. However, as explained above, the most important 
agency drift under the CFP is of a non-criminal kind, such as discards or the use of 
EU subsidies to expand fishing capacity. In contrast to criminal agency drift, the 
Commission cannot sanction non-criminal agency drift by itself because non-
criminal drift can usually only be “sanctioned” by amending the regulatory 
framework that the agents operate under (e.g. draw up more clearly defined objec-
tives) or by applying peer pressure from other member states. Consequently, the 
EU usually has to act through the Council to sanction non-criminal agency drift. 
However, the ability of the Council to sanction non-criminal drift is severely re-
stricted by the fact that the EU is a principal that consists of multiple actors whose 
powers vary depending on the context. The Council decision-making rules in rela-
tion to the CFP (see Chapter 5) enables blocking minorities of member states to 
prevent the EU from sanctioning non-criminal agency drift. This enforcement in-
efficiency arguably reinforces the prisoner’s dilemma dynamic at the national 
level because member states that in principle would like to sanction non-criminal 
drift will easily be swayed by their national interests, knowing that other states 
face few costs when drifting towards their national interests at the expense of con-
servation. The implementation of the structural policy’s Financial Instrument for 
Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) is an example of these dynamics, as subsidies for mod-
ernizing or building new vessels contribute to overcapacity in the EU fleet. How-
ever, a blocking minority was against removing this type of subsidy because of the 
In conclusion, it is hard to escape the fact that what seems to characterise the 
CFP from a principal-agent perspective seems to be strong incentives for the 
agents to drift away from conservation and weak powers on behalf of the principal 
to prevent this. The CFP is caught in path-dependence to a great extent, which has 
resulted in a deadlock. In practice this means that political goals set at the EU 
level are reinterpreted and circumvented at the national level, and domestic aims 
are pursued to the extent possible within the framework provided by the CFP.  
The focus of the principal-agent approach on incentive structures has proven 
useful in order to understand the institutional dynamics of fisheries policy imple-
mentation in the EU. The solutions that the principal-agent approach can prescribe 
largely assume that states act rationally to pursue national interests. This rational-
ist analysis has thus demonstrated that the implementation of conservation policies 
benefits it brought to the individual member states (until very recently, see Chap-
ter 5). While the subsidies remained in place, it was difficult for individual mem-
ber states who opposed the subsidy to decide not to use them, as they would lose 
out compared with drifting member states that continued to use them. Conse-
quently, member states that have worked in the Council to abolish this type of 
subsidy have also used it to a significant extent. 
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in the CFP has significant similarities with the prisoner’s dilemma game. In the 
EU and Denmark we have found that political goals have been redefined and al-
ternative political goals have been introduced making fisheries management de 
facto politics in implementation. However, the principal–agent approach provides 
little assistance in terms of understanding the networks and alliances that have 
caused the deadlock in CFP implementation through blocking minorities. It is 
therefore necessary to supplement the principal-agent approach with network 
analysis in order to fully understand the dynamics of implementation of fisheries 
policies. 
We find that the concept of a blocking minority is useful in order to understand 
the political dynamics of political decisions and implementation of the CFP. We 
have been inspired by Nedergaard (2007), who undertook a policy network analy-
sis of the opposition against the proposal for a directive on temporary work by the 
EU Council of Ministers. Applying this concept, we consider the political deci-
sion-making process in relation to the CFP to be driven by actors with divergent 
interests, therefore forming different networks and alliances to pursue their spe-
cific interests. At the EU level, three different political positions could be ob-
served in the Council in connection with the 2002 reform (see Chapter 5), but 
these networks are in fact relatively stable and have influenced CFP decision-
making also on other occasions. The question of stable political positions is not 
only relevant with regard to the various member states, but also the EU admini-
stration. Even though the Commission has no voting rights, it plays an important 
role in Council negotiations. According to Burns (2004), the Commission is a cen-
tral and influential actor in the Council’s decision-making process, and in terms of 
the CFP the Commission has generally focused on conservation. A network of 
member states, which informally referred to itself as the “Friends of Fish” (FoF),7 
composed of Germany, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium – and to a 
lesser extent Finland – generally favours a comprehensive reform and is suppor-
tive of conservation concerns, but is less radical than the Commission in terms of 
conservation focus. The opposing network, composed of member states that re-
ferred to itself as “Amis de la Pêche” (AdlP),8 France, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, It-
aly and Greece, opposes what it argues is an overly-conservationist approach by 
the Commission, and is a strong defender of the short-term livelihood of fisher-
men and fishing communities even at the expense of conservation concerns (see 
Hegland 2004 for details). Both networks represent a blocking minority and, con-
sequently, the Council finds itself in a position where it is the lowest common de-
nominator that determines what can be decided in the Council. This causes a dead-
lock at the policy-making level, leaving the Council unable to elaborate 
comprehensive strategies and rational changes. 
                                                          
7 Denmark generally belongs to this group, but in relation to the 2002 reform, Denmark chaired 
the Council meetings in the second half of 2002. In the role of President it took the relatively 
neutral approach, which is traditionally required from the Presidency to facilitate compromises 
(Hegland 2004).  
8 In English: Friends of Fishing. 
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It can be argued that the fragmented nature of both the business structure and 
the political focus (Raakjær forthcoming) in the member states directly under-
mines the ideal principal-agent setup. From the outset, most actors in the policy 
process have different goals than the principal, which makes it difficult to create 
incentives that will ensure rational implementation. The Danish case is a good, but 
in no way an extreme, example of how different actors and interests aim to influ-
ence the implementation process and in reality bypass the EU’s policy objectives. 
In Chapter 6, we showed that the Danish policy process was dynamic in the sense 
that changes were generated through synergistic interaction between interests, 
networks/alliances and discourses, where particularly strong individual actors 
have influenced the implementation process. The Danish corporatist system has 
generally contributed to implementation drift by pursuing short-term solutions, 
which has to some extent undermined conservation aims. It was concluded that in 
the area of Danish fisheries policy-making and implementation it is fair to ques-
tion whether corporatist structures have managed to promote the policies that 
serve society at large, as it appears that decisions have in several cases been pre-
dominantly beneficial to a relatively narrow group of stakeholders. 
We find that Sissenwine and Symes provide a very precise diagnosis of the 
situation and future challenges for the CFP, and their conclusions are largely sup-
ported by our observations. However, it can be argued that the problems do not re-
sult from a lack of adequate solutions but from a lack of political will to adopt 
adequate solutions. Nearly 25 years of experience with the CFP, as shown in 
Chapter 5, demonstrates that institutional and technological solutions to the prob-
lem of overfishing are only feasible to the extent that they are accepted by actors 
in the political arena. Consequently, it will often be too simplistic to only focus on 
institutional and technological solutions because such solutions can either be 
blocked politically at the EU level or circumvented through national implementa-
tion whenever they lack sufficient political support. Even when recognising the 
Recent contributions on CFP change (Sissenwine and Symes 2007 and Symes 
2005) at least indirectly argue for institutional reform to influence policy-making 
and implementation in the CFP so that some of the present problems of overfishing 
in EU waters can be overcome. Symes (2005: 265) argues that the dilemma of eco-
nomic versus social objectives must be resolved. One solution would be to adopt a 
market-based approach for allocation of fishing rights. However, the prospect of 
an EU transfer market is heavily debated among actors and would lead to a fun-
damental institutional change of the CFP, likely undermining the relative stability. 
Further, following Sissenwine and Symes (2007, part 2:70), it is important to de-
cide on an appropriate geographical scale and choose the most appropriate institu-
tional arrangement for management intervention and following implementation 
strategies. In this respect, regional seas and RACs are good examples of the intro-
duction of such institutional changes at the EU level, but the Danish experiences 
indicate that a large degree of stakeholder involvement, as is the case with the 
RACs, might create another set of problems and does not necessarily reduce im-
plementation drift.  
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administrative desire to ensure a rational setting for policy-making and implemen-
tation, it is important to understand the underlying political rationality of member 
states, because member states often act in a way that undermines the intentions of 
the CFP, as was indeed found by the European Court of Auditors in a recent 
It appears that the Commission at times has a tendency to make proposals that 
invite or largely force in particular the AdlP network into the blocking minority 
corner (see Chapter 5 for details). It is important in drafting proposals that the 
Commission acknowledges that no policy or management intervention is better 
than what can be agreed to in the Council and subsequently implemented by the 
member states. It is in other words important to consider how proposals can be 
made more robust in the face of shifting political agendas and more resilient to 
implementation drift. One possible way out of the present political deadlock could 
be that the Commission increasingly moves from the tactical level – improving the 
system within the present path – to act strategically and propose long-term aims 
and to work towards adoption of adequate conservation principles that in a longer 
perspective could be used to strengthen the management performance. This strat-
egy is likely to cause less tension in a short-term perspective and is consequently 
less likely to provoke blocking minority votes. It would allow politicians to sup-
port a more restrictive CFP as the consequences hereof would not be immediately 
felt by their constituencies. In all fairness, it appears that the Commission in recent 
years has chosen such a strategy to some extent (see for instance on the days-at-
sea system in the Baltic Sea in Chapter 6). 
7.4 Mechanisms Preventing Implementation Drift 
In Chapters 3 and 4 describing the management systems of Norway and the Faeroe 
Islands, we found little evidence to support the claim that the conservation agenda 
was challenged to any great extent at the implementation level. In the case of the 
Faeroe Islands, this finding is unsurprising given that Faeroese demersal fish 
stocks are exclusively national and, consequently, managed entirely by one gov-
ernment. The national exclusivity of fish stocks removes the state-level prisoner’s 
dilemma logic facing EU members. Consequently, the Faeroese Home Govern-
ment has no obvious incentives for subverting its own conservation policies. Nor-
way is a far more interesting case for comparison with Denmark, because it shares 
evaluation (2007). This problem has been described particularly in Chapters 5 and 
6, which illustrate that implementation of the CFP is an extreme example of politi-
cised implementation at the national level. Consequently, a prerequisite for im-
proving the performance of the CFP is that the political process is understood and 
taken into account. Consequently, we will argue that unless the power relations in-
fluencing policy-setting and policy-shaping (following Peterson’s classification 
(1995)) are taken into consideration, it seems questionable that conservation con-
cerns will be dominating under the CFP in the near future. 
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two significant characteristics with Denmark, despite not being a member of the 
EU. First is the fact that Norway, like Denmark, manages most major fish stocks 
jointly with other states, which entails potential prisoner’s dilemma situations in 
national implementation. Norway manages several fish stocks jointly with the EU, 
among others, and is highly aware of the insufficiencies of EU implementation of 
TACs. This could, in principle, lead to Norwegian disillusionment regarding the 
point in making a wholehearted implementation effort, although this potential 
problem is reduced by the fact that Norway has significant shares of the TACs that 
are most important to the Norwegian fishing industry. Second is the fact that Nor-
way, like Denmark, has a strong tradition of stakeholder influence in fisheries 
management. Norwegian industry organisations have played a significant role in 
the construction of the implementation system, and are also responsible for several 
specific implementation tasks. In theory, such corporatist management implies a 
potential risk of implementation drift, because stakeholders representing multiple 
political agendas are influential in matters of state administration. Given the simi-
larities between Norwegian and Danish fisheries management, the relative robust-
ness of conservation aims in Norwegian implementation9 calls for an explanation. 
As argued in Chapter 3, the multiplicity of agendas is clearly visible in the Nor-
wegian political decision-making processes. For example, concerns about the in-
dustry’s short-term survival and distributional problems have occasionally chal-
lenged resource conservation as the dominant political value in discussions on the 
size of TACs (Gezelius 2002; Jentoft 1991:11–16; Sagdahl 1992). However, the 
data presented in Chapter 3, as well as previous research (Christensen et al. 2007; 
Gezelius 2003) gives very little support to the hypothesis that conservation aims 
are frequently challenged during the implementation process once these aims have 
been set at the political level. Compared to the EU as represented by the moderate 
case of Denmark (see Chapter 6), the extent to which Norwegian implementation 
of TACs has been treated as a question of administrative realisation of predefined 
political aims is notable. This is especially striking with regard to the role of in-
dustry organisations, which appear to have displayed a relatively high level of ac-
ceptance of basic conservation goals in the implementation discourse. For exam-
ple, the loyalty of the sales organisations in fulfilling their implementation tasks is 
undisputed and the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association is generally perceived by 
the government as a “responsible” actor in the conservation discourse (Gezelius 
2003). 
                                                          
9 While our data does not indicate significant Norwegian implementation drift in relation to basic 
resource conservation aims, Chapter 3 describes Norwegian implementation drift in relation to 
another aspect of a fisheries agreement between Norway and the EU: the spatial separation be-
tween herring quotas in the North Sea and Skagerak, which has been adopted despite Norway’s 
wish to remove it. Norway has deliberately chosen not to enforce this spatial division, and non-
compliance is consequently widespread among Norwegian fishermen (Gezelius 2007b). The ex-
ample illustrates that also Norway occasionally resorts to implementation drift when faced with 
controversial supra-national decisions, and it shows the significance of national autonomy and 
consensus in relation to implementation drift. 
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In Chapter 3, it was argued that the continuity of the Norwegian management 
system was rooted, among other things, in persistent faith in the system’s ability to 
ensure sustainable fishing. This faith has resulted from an absence of enduring10 
fisheries crises in the post-EEZ period, which has been viewed as a sign of the 
functionality of the implementation system. The apparent robustness of the con-
servation agenda in the implementation of TACs is arguably an essential aspect of 
this functionality. 
Several factors contribute to the relative robustness of the conservation agenda 
in implementation, compared to Denmark. The fact that Norway has large shares 
of the TACs for its most important fish stocks,11 which gives Norwegian imple-
mentation a direct impact on the long-term welfare of Norway’s fishing industry, 
is probably a significant factor. However, this can arguably not provide a full ex-
planation because Denmark also has significant shares of several important TACs, 
although they are generally well below Norway’s shares for its major fish stocks.12 
It can be argued that an important factor explaining the relative robustness of the 
conservation agenda in Norwegian implementation is related to national autonomy 
in fisheries management. Despite the fact that both Norway and EU member states 
manage fish stocks jointly with other nations, their levels of national autonomy 
vary significantly. As described in Chapters 5 and 6, the CFP covers a wide range 
of policy areas and establishes strictly defined frames within which member states 
can act. Consequently, there is an extensive transfer of politics from the EU to the 
national level. Moreover, these politics are outcomes of various forms of majority 
decisions, implying that governments may find themselves tied by decisions they 
have opposed. This extensive transfer of majority-made politics tends to trigger 
extensive political debate not only prior to EU decision-making, but also when 
politics are transferred back to the member states. The CFP thus emerges as a two-
level political system: basic fisheries regulations are negotiated at the EU level 
                                                          
10 The Norwegian cod fisheries faced a crisis in 1989/90, but this crisis was short-lived and the 
situation returned to normal within a few years. 
11 Norway has 50% of the TAC for the Northeast Arctic cod and haddock stocks, approximately 
60% of the TAC for Norwegian spring-spawning herring (also commonly referred to as Atlanto-
Scandian herring), approximately 30% of the TAC for North Sea herring, almost 65% of the 
TAC for the North Sea mackerel, and full national control over the TAC for saithe (Government 
of Norway 2007). 
12 Looking at the main quotas for Denmark’s most economically-important species, Denmark has 
44% of the cod TAC (the EU has the entire TAC) for the western Baltic Sea, 23% of the EU’s 
cod quota for the eastern Baltic Sea, 25% of the cod TACs (29% of the EU quota) in the North 
Sea and Skagerak combined, 27% of the herring TACs (35% of the EU quotas) in the North Sea 
and Skagerak combined, 28% of the plaice TACs (the EU has 98% of the TACs) in the North 
Sea and Skagerak combined, and 95% of the EU sandeel quota in the North Sea. With regard to 
Norway lobster, which is second only to cod in terms of economic importance to Denmark, it 
holds 16,5% of the TACs in the North Sea (EU waters) and Skagerak combined, and 95% of the 
EU quota in the North Sea (Norwegian waters) (Government of Denmark 2007, quota figures for 
2007). These figures mainly concern the North Sea and Skagerak, as they contain Denmark’s 
most important fishing grounds, except for the Baltic Sea cod fisheries. 
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and are often subject to a second round of domestic political discourse when trans-
ferred back to the member states, before entering a phase of purely administrative 
implementation. This entails that there is no clear, institutionalised division be-
tween the politics and implementation stages. 
In Chapter 3, it was argued that Foucault’s (1999) concept of “discourse” could 
be fruitful in understanding the demarcation of agendas. Briefly repeated, the con-
cept of “discourse” refers to the often implicit normative boundaries of a given 
field of human interaction. These normative boundaries define legitimate partici-
pants, legitimate perspectives, legitimate values etc. in a given interactive setting. 
If we regard fisheries management as a discourse, the blurred distinction between 
the phases of politics and implementation can be regarded as a blurred distinction 
in terms of the legitimate agendas that can be expressed in the implementation 
phase. The implementation discourse is thus framed so that it opens up the “gar-
bage can” of political agendas (Cohen et al. 1972). The open garbage can poten-
tially threaten the pursuit of original conservation goals and leaves room for a 
prisoner’s dilemma logic in implementation. It thus becomes essential for the EU 
as principal to control its agents – the member states. The need for centralised 
control of EU members might have been less prominent if the national implemen-
tation discourses had been framed as matters of pure administration. It can be ar-
gued that a key difference between Norway and Denmark is related to the framing 
of the implementation discourse, and that this framing partly results from the level 
of political autonomy in fisheries management.  
As is the case for EU members, the TACs restricting Norwegian fisheries are 
set through international negotiations. However, the similarities regarding national 
autonomy largely end there. In contrast to EU regulations, the TACs regulating 
Norwegian fisheries are based on consensus, meaning that the Norwegian gov-
ernment has an effective veto. Moreover, and unlike EU members, Norway is 
generally free to establish its own regulations once a TAC has been set and allo-
cated between contracting parties.13 This means that although TACs are set at the 
international level, the transfer of politics from the international to the national 
level is minimal: it only consists of strictly-limited, routine, consensus-based deci-
sions. The Norwegian enabling legislation leaves the responsibility for setting and 
implementing TACs to the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs. As described 
in Chapter 3, the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs consults the main in-
dustry organisations when preparing the Norwegian position on the international 
quota negotiations. The major industry organisations are also included as active 
members in the Norwegian delegation in these negotiations. The consensus nature 
of conservation decisions and the crucial roles played by the Ministry of Fisheries 
and Coastal Affairs and major industry stakeholders entail that the main actors in 
implementation are also responsible for the conservation policy. This strongly dis-
                                                          
13 Like other Atlantic coastal states, Norway is party to several bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments regarding control and enforcement, among others, but they do not notably restrict Nor-
way’s autonomy to regulate its fisheries. 
224      S.S. Gezelius et al. 
courages reopening political discussions at the implementation stage, as that 
would imply that implementing agencies question the legitimacy of their own de-
cisions. This is a major difference from the EU, where national governments and 
industry stakeholders especially are often subject to conservation policies over 
which they have had little say and for which they carry little responsibility. The 
Norwegian management system thus has a mechanism that prevents implementa-
tion drift, with no equivalent in the CFP. 
As pointed out in Chapter 3, the Norwegian system of enabling legislation and 
consensus-based TAC decisions entails that implementation is by and large classi-
fied as an administrative issue. The perception of TAC implementation as an ad-
ministrative task is also partly a result of its routine, long-term, complex, and 
technical nature. TAC implementation has developed incrementally through shift-
ing political leaderships and its complexity tends to exceed the competence of 
politicians. The Foucauldian perspective implies that framing implementation as 
an administrative discourse means that it is shaped and restricted according to the 
norms of civil service. The administrative discursive frame limits the room for 
discussing which political aims to pursue in implementation. The focus on conser-
vation goals in the implementation of conservation policies has largely been tacit 
and taken for granted within this discursive frame. It is consequently typical of the 
development of the Norwegian implementation system that the implementation 
agenda has largely been shaped by the administration’s perceived need for im-
proved implementation tools rather than the shifting priorities of shifting political 
leaderships.14 The system has thus largely emerged as a long-term, incremental 
bottom-up process driven by experienced insufficiencies in the ability of present 
implementation to realise the original policy goals.  
It is likely that the co-responsibility of major industry organisations in conser-
vation decisions encourages a certain discipline in terms of accepting conservation 
goals at the implementation stage. However, this does not exclude stakeholder in-
fluence from also representing a latent challenge to these goals, especially when 
conservation has severe consequences in terms of distributional conflicts or the 
welfare of specific groups. In that regard, it is important to keep in mind the 
asymmetrical nature of Norwegian corporatism. As pointed out in Chapter 3, the 
interaction between the industry and the state administration is not an equal power 
relationship. The continued influence of the industry organisations rests on the ex-
tent to which they are included and taken seriously by the state administration. 
Consequently the industry organisations must keep to the state administration’s 
frame of discourse in order to remain influential. 
The institutionalisation of the strictly-framed implementation discourse has ar-
guably been facilitated by the absence of enduring resource crises in Norwegian 
fisheries since 1977. This absence has meant that conservation measures have not 
seriously threatened the short-term welfare of large groups and have not triggered 
destructive distributional conflicts, although distribution has often been extremely 
                                                          
14 Chapter 3 points to some deviations from this general pattern. 
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challenging. Consequently, the agendas of short-term welfare and political peace 
have by and large not been pressing enough to alter the frame of the discourse on 
implementation of conservation aims and cause implementation drift. The absence 
of enduring crises has arguably also increased the faith in the ability of the imple-
mentation system to prevent stock collapse, despite perceived insufficiencies in 
the implementation by other states exploiting the same fish stocks. Faith in the 
system has at least been strong enough to maintain the frames of the implementa-
tion discourse and thereby prevent frustration with the implementation of other 
states from triggering any extensive prisoner’s dilemma behaviour in Norwegian 
implementation. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Table 7.1 summarises the comparison between Denmark and Norway with regard 
to factors influencing the chances of implementation drift. In the Danish case, the 
combination of low national autonomy and extensive transfer of politics from the 
international to the national level invites political debate at the national level re-
garding the political goals to be implemented. This tendency is arguably rein-
forced by the limited responsibility carried by industry stakeholders for the politi-
cal decisions to be implemented. In Denmark’s case, these factors have defined 
implementation as a discourse that is partly political and partly administrative. The 
blurred distinction between politics and administration in the implementation dis-
course has opened up the “garbage can” of multiple, partly conflicting agendas in 
fisheries management and legitimised strategic adaptation by actors who disagree 
with the goals to be implemented or do not wish to carry the costs of goal 
achievement. Consequently, the implementation discourse has been framed in a 
manner that invites prisoner’s dilemma-like behaviour in national implementation, 
especially as each CFP member knows that the implementation discourse is likely 
to be similarly framed in other EU states. The prisoner’s dilemma dynamic in CFP 
implementation has triggered problems that are typical of principal-agent rela-
compliance. 
Denmark and Norway are interesting cases for comparison because they seem 
to differ in terms of implementation drift despite having significant characteristics 
in common. They are both states with strong fisheries sectors, a tradition of corpo-
ratist fisheries management, and are tasked with implementing conservation deci-
sions made at the international level. Both consequently face conditions that pro-
mote implementation drift. In explaining different levels of implementation drift, 
we have emphasised the importance of power structures in decision-making. 
While the Danish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries is to a great extent 
tasked with implementing various forms of international majority decisions, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs is always a consenting 
tionships: effective control and the provision of proper incentives for agent 
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partner to international conservation decisions. The main Norwegian industry 
stakeholders have also been included in the decision-making process to the extent 
that they emerge as co-responsible for conservation policies. In contrast to Denmark, 
the politics transferred from the international to the national level are strictly lim-
ited and routine-based. All of these factors discourage a highly-politicised imple-
mentation discourse in Norway. We have argued that, in Norway’s case, the com-
bination of large national shares of important TACs, national autonomy, enabling 
legislation and asymmetrical corporatism has shaped and restricted the implemen-
tation discourse in a manner that leaves little room for implementation drift. It can 
be hypothesised that the absence of enduring fisheries crises has enhanced basic 
trust in the system’s functionality, hence allowing these frames of the implementa-
tion discourse to become institutionalised and tacitly accepted. 















































The study upon which this volume is based chose a comparative case approach 
for its ability to sensitise us to issues that might have been taken for granted in a 
single-case study. A comparative approach also inevitably raises the question of 
which general lessons can be learned, if any. In Chapter 1, it was argued that the 
generalising ambition of a study dealing with a matter as complex and context-
dependent as fisheries management must necessarily be modest. That said, our 
comparison of implementation drift and its causes points to explanatory mecha-
nisms that may have significant relevance beyond our selection of cases (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967; Ragin 1994). These mechanisms mainly consist of interplay be-
tween a series of power forms and power relations in fisheries management. One 
such power relation concerns the autonomy of the state in fisheries management, 
i.e. the extent to which supranational actors are authorised to impose politics on 
the state. The actual effects of this authority depend, among other things, on con-
trol and sanctions executed by supranational principals. The necessity of control 
and sanctions by supranational principals partly depends on the tacit, implicit 
power of discourse frames in national implementation. These discursive structures 
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in turn depend on power relations between the state administration and political 
actors. The extent to which a given management regime entails a risk of imple-
mentation drift depends on the interplay between these power structures. For ex-
ample, a high degree of national autonomy and enabling legislation facilitate the 
framing of the implementation discourse as a matter of civil service. When the 
implementation discourse is so framed, a high level of stakeholder influence in 
implementation may not generate a high risk of implementation drift, provided 
that the state administration maintains the power to discipline, ignore or exclude 
stakeholders who attempt to challenge this discourse frame. The risk of implemen-
tation drift in a corporatist system further decreases if stakeholders share responsi-
bility for the political decisions to be implemented. 
 
 
Fig. 7.3. Factors influencing implementation drift 
We have argued that our comparative analysis of implementation drift and its 
causes focuses on a series of power relations and power forms. Figure 7.3 illus-
trates how these aspects of power work in a causal mechanism affecting imple-
mentation drift. We have emphasised two main factors influencing the risk of im-
plementation drift. First, the framing of the national implementation discourse is a 
crucial factor in producing risks of implementation drift. In cases where the na-
tional implementation discourse is open to deliberation over basic political goals, 
the second factor – power and control by the international principal – becomes 
important to prevent implementation drift. We have ascribed the high risk of im-
plementation drift in the Danish case to the combination of vague boundaries be-
tween political and implementation discourses and the EU’s limited capacity to 
ensure that its members adhere to the goals of EU policy.  
We have emphasised several factors that influence the shaping of the imple-
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which potentially brings multiple agendas into the discourse. Second and third are 
the degree of national autonomy and national shares of the managed resource, 
both of which influences the receptiveness of state agencies to reopening the po-
litical debate at the implementation level. We have argued that the potential of 
stakeholder influence to bring multiple agendas into the implementation discourse 
depends on the relative power relationship between industry organisations and the 
state administration, as well as the extent to which industry organisations emerge 
as responsible for the decisions to be implemented. 
It would be naive to assert that these mechanisms are bound to work in similar 
ways under all conceivable conditions. Our selection of cases only covers a lim-
ited range of all the relevant conditions for implementation that can be found. 
Consequently, the applicability of this knowledge has to be critically assessed on a 
case-to-case basis. That said, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the mechanisms 
for implementation drift explored here are relevant far beyond our limited selec-
tion of cases. Even in cases where the causal mechanisms may work differently, 
influenced by factors that we have not addressed here, the elements of the causal 
model outlined in Fig. 7.3 should be relevant for consideration. 
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WHY AND HOW TO REGIONALISE THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY  
A Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Troels Jacob Hegland 












Abstract The concept of regionalisation, as it has been employed in connection with 
the Common Fisheries Policy, is both ambiguous and multidimensional in the sense 
that it can have different meanings to different people and subsumes several 
discussions under one heading. This fact further complicates an already delicate 
discussion. Similarly, the perceived benefits of regionalisation can vary. In this article 
we are concerned with developing a theoretical and conceptual framework, which 
allows structuring of different perceived benefits of regionalisation, as well as 
disentangles the different sub-discussions that the discussion of regionalisation 
subsumes. Eventually, we present a suite of five different models of regionalisation—
‘archetypes’—that we believe are relevant representations of important perspectives 
on what regionalisation means in practice and might facilitate further discussion of 





The discussion of regionalisation, as it has in later years unfolded in relation to the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU), is both complex and 
politically sensitive, as are the decisions potentially to be taken. Nevertheless, having 
observed and to some extent taken part in the discussions of recent, we feel that the 
lack of a clear (and perhaps common) conceptual framework for discussing 
regionalisation further complicates the matter. Consequently, this article offers a 
framework of concepts and possible regionalisation models, which we believe 
resonate in the ongoing discussion of regionalisation as a way forward for the CFP.  
 To us regionalisation is, as it is also the case for Symes earlier in this issue 
(Symes 2012), strongly associated with decentralisation of CFP governance. A main 
point in this regard is that the discussion of regionalisation must—due to the present 
highly centralised structure of the CFP—basically evolve around the need to make the 
management regime less centralised, rather than, which regionalisation could in 
principle also refer to, about making a management regime more centralised by 
strengthening a regional structure above for instance the level of individual countries. 
Interestingly, it can be argued that the initial establishment of the CFP is an example of 
the latter version of regionalisation: centralisation of fisheries management 
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authorities. Thus, as pointed out by Symes (2012), the CFP was originally basically 
designed and set up with the North Sea in mind. However, with numerous 
enlargements of the EU the CFP expanded from a policy for one regional sea to the 
continental wide policy, which it was never designed to be. However, decentralisation 
and regionalisation is not the same. Regionalisation includes a territorial component 
that decentralisation does not necessarily and, in that sense, regionalisation is a very 
particular instance of decentralisation. For a more thorough discussion of 
decentralisation, regions, regionalism and regionalisation please refer to Symes 
(2012). 
This article consists of three parts before concluding in a brief discussion: 
Immediately following this introduction is a systematic overview of different 
theoretical reasons for why the CFP should be regionalised. The assertion is that 
regionalisation to be perceived as preferable must be seen as able to contribute to 
what can be perceived as basic objectives of CFP governance. The second part outlines 
and discusses the three main problem dimensions to address when designing a 
regionalised governance system for the CFP. In the third section, we outline a handful 
of what we refer to as ‘archetypes’ of regionalisation to flesh out possible ways that 
regionalisation of the CFP can be designed vis-à-vis the different problem dimensions. 
The article concludes in a brief, integrated discussion of the archetypes vis-à-vis the 
objectives of CFP governance. 
The current article is kept on a relatively abstract level. However, to draw 
more specific implications for policy, the following article of this issue (Hegland, 
Ounanian and Raakjær 2012) applies the framework from this article to the discussion 
of regionalisation and reform of the CFP as it has played out in recent years, as well as 
reports on how the archetypes were received by stakeholders confronted with them by 
means of a survey.  
 
 
Why Regionalise? Outlining the Objectives of CFP Governance 
 
Discussing regionalisation of the CFP is only relevant insofar that CFP governance 
could potentially in some way gain from being regionalised. Consequently, in this 
section, we develop and outline a relatively simple typology of theoretical objectives 
(or qualities) of CFP governance that regionalisation could in principle be perceived as 
contributing to. The specific benefits from regionalisation that people invoke can thus 
be expected to relate to one or more of the objectives in our typology and will, 
furthermore, affect how they imagine regionalisation should be put into practice, 
which is the topic of the subsequent sections. 
 
The Three Basic Objectives of CFP Governance 
Our starting point is an understanding of ‘governance’ as consisting of, on one hand, a 
‘governance system’—defined as the system or network of public and private bodies 
having an impact on the content, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation, et 
cetera, of policies and measures adopted—and, on the other hand, the ‘policies and 
measures’ themselves—defined as the actual rules and regulations, et cetera, that 
citizens are subjected to.  
Accordingly, in the context of the CFP, we argue that any perception of 
regionalisation as a favourable option will be motivated by a belief that either the 
governance system of the CFP or the policies and measures of the CFP—or both 
simultaneously—will benefit in one way or another from regionalisation.  
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Such distinction between the system itself and its products in the shape of policies and 
measures is related to Scharpf’s (1997:19) notion of democracy having to be 
‘understood as a two-dimensional concept, relating to the inputs and to the outputs of 
the political system at the same time.’ Scharpf’s distinction highlights that a well-
functioning democracy, which means one that is able to deliver ‘collective self-
determination’, is contingent on both the system’s ability to take up the preferences of 
citizens and balance the differences of interests through the decision-making system 
(which Scharpf refers to as ‘input-oriented authenticity’) along with the ability to 
transform preferences into actual outcomes that are effective in achieving stated goals 
(which Scharpf refers to as ‘output-oriented effectiveness’). In our typology, we 
operate with these qualities of a democracy as two of the basic objectives of CFP
governance and hence also major categories of reasons for wanting to move towards 
regionalisation.  
However, to these two we add a third objective that also relate to the 
governance system, namely efficiency. In other words: how efficient the system is in 
the process of taking up preferences and transforming those into effective policies and 
measures. Where effectiveness is about getting the actual product (in this case a 
policy or a measure) in the best possible shape vis-à-vis the needs, efficiency is about 
optimising the production process, so to speak.   
Consequently, our typology includes three basic theoretical objectives of CFP 
governance, which regionalisation can potentially contribute to: 1) ability to take up 
and balance preferences, 2) efficiency of the system, and 3) effectiveness of the 
policies and measures.1 
In the following sections we take a closer look at these basic objectives and 
sub-divide each in more specific objectives by drawing more directly from literature 
specifically on fisheries management. 
 
Subdividing Objective 1: Increasing the Ability to Take Up and Balance Preferences 
The objective of being able to take up and balance preferences relates broadly to the 
legitimacy of the governance system. Arguments for regionalisation that invoke this 
objective are consequently concerned with how regionalisation can assist in bringing 
about a system where the dispersal of authority, power, responsibility or related 
measures of influence2 across actors and institutions is (perceived as) more legitimate 
/ fair or just than an alternative distribution. Where Scharpf label this ‘input 
legitimacy’, the more common term in the fisheries management literature is ‘process 
(or procedural) legitimacy’, which has traditionally been employed to refer to the 
legitimacy that fisheries management derives from being the product of a process or 
system perceived as fair and just (Jentoft 1989, 1993, Jentoft and McCay 1995, 
Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003) 
Literature on fisheries management has argued that participation of user 
groups positively influences the perception of the legitimacy of fisheries management 
                                                 
1 It should be emphasised that the typology outlined here is relatively simple; particularly in terms of 
operating with only three basic objectives. The primary reason being that the first objective of our 
typology with its focus on take-up and balancing of preferences effectively collapses and includes a 
range of what could be seen as more detailed ‘good governance’ criteria, such as for instance of 
governance being transparent, inclusive, participatory, and so on.    
2 It should be acknowledged that authority, power, et cetera, can be both formal and informal. This 
distinction is of significant importance in the context of the EU, as recent years has evidenced an 
increase in the use of more informal ways of moving towards increasingly ambitious objectives—often 
referred to as soft law or new modes of governance—compared to the community method, which the 
traditional operating mode of the CFP is an example of. 
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and that this in turn will improve the level of compliance (Jentoft 1993), which is 
widely considered a sine qua non of successful fisheries management.3 In relation to 
this, however, Jentoft introduces an important distinction by emphasising the need: 
 
To distinguish between i ternal and external legitimacy, and to recognize that 
these two types of legitimacy may be in conflict. For those directly involved, 
user-participation in decision making may improve legitimacy, but for the 
general public and other groups that are outside the process, user-participation 
may well be seen as a step in the wrong direction (Jentoft 2000:145). 
 
On a general level Jentoft’s observation highlights that there is no universal yardstick 
on how good a system is at taking up and balancing preferences. For some one 
specific way of organising the system might be perceived as the most legitimate, to 
others that specific way may be viewed as illegitimate. At the same time Jentoft 
points us in the direction of what might be one of the defining cleavages on our 
particular issue, namely the different perspectives of users as opposed to a wider set 
of stakeholders or citizens.  
 Consequently, arguments for regionalisation that invoke the objective of 
improving the take-up and balancing of preferences, which in turn ‘produces’ process 
legitimacy, can be sub-divided on the basis of whether they are driven by a concern 
for internal or external legitimacy. And these two perspectives will likely often 
translate into different perceptions of how regionalisation should look in practice. 
 
Subdividing Objective 2: Making the System More Efficient 
As mentioned, this objective is concerned with whether the policy process can be 
organised more efficiently—preferably, of course, without reducing its ability to take 
up or balance preferences or the effectiveness of its outputs. Arguments invoking this 
objective will advocate that regionalisation contribute to creating a situation where the 
same (or higher) level of goal realisation can be achieved with the use of less 
resources by reorganising the system and putting the resources in play in a more 
efficient way.  
In our understanding this covers two interrelated but nonetheless distinct sub-
objectives: efficient use of financial resources and efficient use of human resources. 
The two are interrelated insofar as financial resources are to some extent a means by 
which human resources can be acquired.  
In relation to the efficient use of financial resources a main issue is the balance 
between the public costs of managing the fisheries sector vis-à-vis the public benefit 
of having a fisheries sector. It has been noted that in several member states the value 
of landings is now lower than the costs on the public budget related to carrying out 
fishing activities (Commission 2009). Although the public benefit of having a 
fisheries sector can be difficult to make up and that the value of landing is not a 
definitive measure for the public benefit4, this discrepancy clearly puts the issue of the 
efficient use of financial resources at the centre of attention for the reform of the CFP. 
In principle financial resources are a means by which human resources can be 
acquired. However, when we talk about the efficient use of human resources in the 
                                                 
3 However, it has also been argued that many other factors influence compliance and that the degree of 
user participation might not be the most important (Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003). 
4 As an example, in several member states fishing activities are considered part of a cultural heritage 
and something that attract tourists; likewise there might be regional concerns that are not easy to 
calculate. 
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context of the governance system of the CFP, we primarily think of human resources 
that cannot in a simple way be acquired merely by spending financial resources. It is 
more than ‘just’ a financial issue. Examples of this could be highly qualified scientific 
expertise or elected decision-makers. Consequently, when using scarce human 
resources, it is vital that these resources are put to work in the most efficient way.  
 
Subdividing Objective 3: Providing for More Effective Policies and Measures 
Whereas the first two objectives of our typology highlight respectively the legitimacy 
of the governance system and its efficiency, the third objective—more effective 
policies and measures—focuses attention on the outputs from the system. Scharpf 
uses the concept of ‘output-legitimacy’ to refer to the legitimacy that a policy or a 
measure can derive from being perceived as effective in reaching its goals. Output-
legitimacy is thus not the same as effective policies or measures but rather a result of 
them. 
Jentoft (1989), focussing on the legitimacy of management measures among 
fishermen, argues that there are primarily two elements at play in relation to this kind 
of legitimacy, which he labels ‘content legitimacy’: 1) that a measure—to be 
perceived as legitimate—has to ‘coincide with the way the fishermen themselves 
define their problems’ (Jentoft 1989:139) and 2) that the measure needs to be 
equitable. Content legitimacy is ‘in the eye of the beholder’, so to speak.  
So fishermen prefer policies and measures that coincide with how they 
perceive the problems, but so will other stakeholder groups; they will also have 
different perceptions of what the problems and thereby appropriate solutions are—and 
equity among fishermen may not necessarily be one of them.  
Currently, the stated objective of the CFP is to ‘Ensure exploitation of living 
aquatic resources that provides sustainable economic, environmental and social 
conditions’ (Council 2002:Article 2.1). Of course, the perception of whether CFP 
measures are appropriate to achieve the goals will to a significant degree depend on 
how the individual weighs these different, specific fisheries management objectives in 
relation to each other.  
The three objectives of the CFP reflect what Charles (1992) presents as the 
three conflicting fisheries management world views or paradigms: 1) the 
‘conservation paradigm’, focussing on conservation and resource maintenance; 2) the 
‘rationalisation paradigm’, focussing on economic performance and productivity; and 
3) the ‘social/community paradigm’, focussing on community welfare and equity. It 
should be noted, though, that the paradigms are theoretical constructs, which will 
usually not be found as pure orthodoxies in real life but rather as blended preferences.  
Anyhow, in relation to our conceptual framework the implication of the co-
existence of conflicting fisheries management worldviews has the implication that 
arguments for regionalisation that depart from the objective of more effective policies 
and measures might very well depart in conflicting ideas of what fisheries 
management is all about and therefore be fundamentally different in their implications 
for regionalisation in practice. 
 
Putting the Typology of CFP Governance Objectives Together 
Based on the above sections we can now ‘assemble’ our typology. As evident from 
Figure 1 beneath, the typology is based on the notion that there are three basic 
objectives of CFP governance and a range of more specific sub-objectives. Our 
assertion is that any specific argument for of how the CFP would benefit from moving 
towards regionalisation will relate to one or more of these objectives or sub-
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objectives, Thus, our typology of objectives is effectively also a typology of the 
different benefits that regionalisation can be perceived as having.  
 




Having now identified the different objectives that regionalization can in theory 




Problem Dimensions of Regionalisation  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, we believe that part of the complexity of the 
regionalisation discussion stems from the fact that the discussion subsumes three 
intertwined sub-discussions or problem dimensions. These discussions pertain to the 
questions of ‘what’, ‘where’ and ‘whom’—issues which can only be separated 
analytically. Consequently, this section disentangles the discussion into the three 
important problem dimensions of regionalisation of the CFP: 1) what kind of authority 
should be regionalised, 2) where on the politico-administrative scale should 
regionalisation take place, and 3) who should be the recipients of authority at any 
given level of the scale. 
 Anyway, before turning our attention to the problem dimensions, it seems 
appropriate briefly to introduce the current set-up of the CFP, which will be the point 
of departure of regionalisation, as well as introduce the different shortcomings that the 
current CFP is suffering from (see also Raakjær and Hegland, 2012, as well as Symes, 
2012, for more details). 
 
Current CFP Governance 
What Figure 2 beneath depicts appears to be a centralised, top-down policy-making 
and implementation system, which only to a relatively limited extent involves 
stakeholders. And indeed we would argue that this is in general terms a fair 
description of the CFP. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that Figure 2 is a crude simplification of 
what is in reality the situation, namely the existence of a considerably more complex 
multi-level governance setting, where networks of both formal and informal 
interactions transgress the different institutions at the different level of the system as 
well as across, where various stakeholder groups works to exert influence on the 
various EU institutions also outside the remit of the official advisory structure, where 
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national civil servants and politicians meet in formal and informal working groups 
organised under the Council or the Commission, et cetera.   
 




(Scientific bodies are depicted as triangles, judiciary bodies as hexagons, stakeholder bodies as elipses, 
and policy/management bodies as ‘soft’ rectangles. Abbreviations used: ICES (International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea); Commission (Commission of the European Communities), DG MARE 
(Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries), Parliament (European Parliament); Council 
(Council of the European Union); ECJ (Court of Justice of the European Communities), Control Agency 
(Community Fisheries Control Agency), STECF (Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for 
Fisheries), ACFA (Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture), RAC (Regional Advisory 
Council), and Adv. (advice))   
 
Anyway, though recognising that the picture is in reality much more complex than 
what is illustrated, the situation of the CFP remains one charachterised by a top-down, 
command-and-control approach to management, which—although being the process 
of increasingly complex formal and informal processes—is generally being shaped in 
a continous process of the Commission drafting, the Council and Parliament adopting 
together through the codecision procedure, and the member states implementing.  
Figure 2 indicates that the governance system of the CFP operates across three 
politico-administrative levels: the member state level, the (embryonic) intermediary 
level of regional EU seas (or the RAC areas), and the EU level. Due to the fact that the 
protection of living aquatic resources is recognised as one of only a handful of issues 
under the exclusive compentence of the EU, the central EU level is in a position to take 
a very wide range of decisions relating to fisheries manageement. Moreover, the 
policy system is embedded in the binding principle of non-discrimination, equating to 
a standard set of regulations or ‘harmonisation’ for its ‘common pond’—the 
combined waters of the member states (Symes 1997). Furthermore, the EU allocates 
fishing opportunities based on a firmly rooted principle of ‘relative stability’, which 
may be the most path dependent element of the CFP (Hegland and Raakjær 2008). The 
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implication hereof is that the CFP governance system is predisposed to exerting a high 
degree of micro-management from the central EU level.  
Thus, Council Regulation No 2371/2002, known as the basic regulation, 
provides the Council with the necessary authority to govern access to fishing zones 
and resources and the sustainable pursuit of fishing activities, including limiting 
catches; limiting fishing effort; adopting technical measures; adopting multiannual 
recovery plans; and adopting multiannual management plans. Unfortunately, as 
discussed in the introduction to this issue (Raakjær and Hegland 2012), the set-up 
may have provided a stable and strong institutional basis for EU-wide fisheries 
management but has not to the same extent provided sustainable fisheries.  
 In a recent analysis of the situation, Raakjær (2009:147-48) outlines the 
current state of affairs in terms of problems in the CFP and its surrounding 
environment: 
  
• For many years overfishing has been evident resulting in a critical 
resource situation.  
• A fragmented fishing industry, leading to a fragmented interest 
structure in the EU fishing industry.  
• Lack of commitment within the Council to ensure sustainable fishing. 
• Persistent lack of political will in the Council and the member states to 
reform the CFP. 
• Member states emphasise domestic interests. 
• A strong tendency to apply off-the-peg approaches (one size fits all). 
• Inconsistency between structural policy elements and conservation 
elements within the CFP. 
• The management regime building on total allowable catches (TAC) set 
for single species is not effective in multispecies demersal fisheries. 
• Problems of “implementation drift” and lack of enforcement exist in 
the member states. 
• A clash between the ways administrators and fishermen view the goals 
and means of the management regime. 
• Attempts to introduce elements of “New modes of governance” have 
not been successful in the fisheries domain. 
• The type of co-management introduced has not led to responsible 
behaviour.  
 
Within the area of fisheries management, there has been a growing recognition that 
effective fisheries management relies on allowing rules to differ between different 
fisheries, as pointed out by Symes (2007). However, the monolithic structure of the 
CFP complicates this in Europe, where even matters of details are decided at the 
central EU level. Following from its status as an exclusive competence area of the EU, 
the protection of living aquatic resources is excused from the principle of subsidiarity, 
which otherwise entails that decisions in the EU should be taken at the lowest level 
appropriate. However, that it is not mandatory to follow the principle does not mean 
that it is not allowed or preferable. 
Thus, understanding the present structural failures of the CFP closely relates to 
the mismatch in scale levels, particularly the lack of ability to find the ‘right fit’ of 
scales levels for governance intervention. As illustrated in Figure 1 above, the ‘levels’ 
of the natural system are not necessarily reflected by corresponding levels on the 
politico-administrative scale. 
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The problem of scale and governance has been addressed by several influential 
scholars. For example, Ostrom (1990) invokes the concept of ‘nested enterprises’, 
Kooiman et al. (2008) refer to ‘orders of governance’, and Symes (2007) uses the 
term ‘scales of governance’. They all introduce different levels of rules or orders of 
governance that can be thought of as different spheres of influence encased in one 
another. However, matching the political boundaries to manageable areas or 
ecologically appropriate scale levels poses particular challenges in relation to fisheries 
and other marine management concerns. Specifically vis-à-vis the CFP, the EU’s 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) and the Integrated Maritime Policy 
(IMP) both present new considerations in this regard (van Hoof, van Leeuwen and van 
Tatenhove 2012).  
 
Regionalising What? 
The first problem dimension of the discussion relates to the question of determining 
which authorities that should be placed at the various politico-administrative levels. 
Although all kinds of authority are in play in this regard, the power to take decisions 
is of special importance.  
Generally, developed fisheries management systems include a hierarchy of 
decisions ranging from the most general to the most specific. In the terminology of 
Ostrom (1990) ‘constitutional rules’ represent the outermost sphere, as they dictate 
the structure of governance and the overall political organisation of the system, 
‘collective-choice rules’ are nested within the constitutional rules and concern policy-
making and management decisions, and, lastly, ‘operational rules’ involve the daily 
decisions of managing fisheries, as they involve monitoring, enforcement, and other 
actions on the ground level. Operational rules are the innermost sphere and, thus, are 
nested in both collective-choice and constitutional rules. Other scholars employ 
different terminologies. However, a main message that we draw from this is that for 
each of the ‘nested enterprises’, ‘orders of governance’ or ‘scales of governance’ it is 
in principle possible to determine, which decisions are most appropriately taken there. 
However, in practice this is a highly complex and politicised discussion, not least in 
the context of an organisation such as the EU where there are marked differences 
between the member states when it comes to both the national fisheries systems as 
well as the culture of public administration.   
Without going into the actual discussion of what specific decisions under the 
CFP that are most appropriately taken at what politico-administrative level, it might be 
useful in brief to outline the current hierarchy of the regulatory framework of the CFP. 
Ignoring that the EU is part of a system of international agreements, the top level of 
the CFP regulatory hierarchy is the Lisbon Treaty, which outlines the basics of the 
mode of cooperation in the EU as such and the area of fisheries in specific 
(‘constitutional rules’). It is for instance the Lisbon Treaty that stipulates that the area 
of fisheries is a co-decision area, where the Parliament and the Council decides in 
cooperation. The second layer of the hierarchy is the so-called Basic Regulation, 
which generally deals with a mixture of ‘constitutional’ and ‘collective choice’ rules 
and is reviewed every ten years. It is for instance in the Basic Regulation that the 
system of total allowable catches is outlined as well as rules on access to waters and 
so on. Likewise, overall strategies for fisheries management such as ‘maximum 
sustainable yield’ (MSY) as a target for stock exploitation and the application of the 
ecosystem approach to fisheries as a management philosophy are contained in the 
Basic Regulation. The third regulatory layer consists of more specific regulations or 
decisions for different components of the CFP, in relation to conservation the most 
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important being the Technical Measures Regulation, which is negotiated yearly and 
outlines detailed provisions on how to fish in practice in the EU by stipulating days-at-
sea, mesh sizes, allowed gear types, and so on, for various fisheries and fleet segments 
(‘operational rules’). Finally, the member states have the authority to decide on for 
instance how to allocate fishing rights (‘collective choice’) as well as on how to in 
practice implement the decisions taken at EU level (‘operational rules’).  
So regionalisation is, we would argue, about allocating the right to take 
particular decisions (and other authorities) to the right levels. Recalling the notion of 
‘nested systems’, there is nothing that says that elements of for instance 
‘constitutional rules’ (e.g. how to include stakeholders) cannot be decided at lower 
levels, as long as they respect the ‘constitutional rules’ decided at higher levels (e.g. 
democracy and sustainable fishing). In fact, this may in the light of the principle of 
subsidiarity be preferable. 
Finally, it should be recalled that vis-à-vis the above discussion, there is a 
separate discussion to be taken in relation to the extent to which fisheries management 
decisions should be dealt with in separation from broader marine management or not. 
  
Regionalising to Where?  
As illustrated earlier by Figure 1, the governance system of the CFP operates over 
several politico-administrative levels, most prominently the member state level, the 
intermediary level of regional EU seas (or the RAC areas), and the EU level. Moreover, 
the EU is embedded in a global international level as signatory to a number of treaties, 
conventions, and declarations dealing with fisheries policy and management. 
Likewise, at the other end of the scale, a number of member states embed within them 
subnational politico-administrative levels with relevance for fisheries management.  
In any effort to regionalise it must be decided to which level or component of 
the organisation or system that a particular authority could most appropriately be 
allocated. In relation to the CFP, it is important to bear in mind that the politico-
administrative scale has its counterpart in a bio-geophysical scale reflecting the 
biological system of the sea, as also illustrated in Figure 1. One scale level of the 
natural system could be a fjord or a bay, and on the other end of the spectrum would 
be the oceans or ultimately the global marine ecosystem. In between we have the 
regional seas, of which the North Sea and the Baltic Sea are examples. The scale 
levels of the natural system are not, however, neatly reflected by corresponding levels 
of policy-making/management on the politico-administrative scale, which is one of 
the challenges of operating the current governance system of the CFP. Thus, creating a 
better match between scale levels of the governance system and the scale levels of the 
natural system may call for regionalisation.  
 A particular challenge in relation to this problem dimension relates to the fact 
that the EU legal framework does not allow politico-administrative structures with 
decision-making powers between the EU level and the member states—in effect these 
powers can be held be either by the EU or by the member states. Of course, however, 
this does not rule out regionalisation. In principle, we would argue, there are at least 
three ways to get around this problem. The least ambitious is the one already applied. 
Establishing the RACs did represent some sort of regionalisation of the CFP, and since 
the RACs are exclusively advisory bodies that did not constitute a problem in a legal 
sense. However, insofar that regionalisation presupposes more authority at the 
regional level than merely that of a right to be consulted, a possibility would be to 
create an informal structure that is in a legal sense not decision-making but might be 
so de facto. Finally, the most advanced solution but also legally most tricky is to 
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resort to indirect regionalisation, where authority is awarded to the EU member states 
on the condition that they exercise that authority jointly with the other relevant 
member states in the region. This resembles to a wide degree one of the visions 
presented in the Commission’s Green Paper:   
 
Another option to be carefully considered would be to rely wherever possible 
on specific regional management solutions implemented by Member States, 
subject to Community standards and control. […] In most cases this delegation 
would need to be organised at the level of marine regions […]. Member States 
would therefore have to work together to develop the setups required.  
(Commission 2009:10f) 
 
Regionalising to Whom?  
Even if a clear vision might exist as to what authorities are best placed at what 
politico-administrative level, as discussed in the sections above, the issue remains to 
decide to whom management authority should be awarded. A key issue in this regard 
is the question of how private interests—as opposed to public bodies that are 
traditionally in one way or the  other linked up to representative democracy—should 
be involved in the process at any given politico-administrative level.  
According to democratic theory, those affected by a decision should be given 
the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process related to it (Dahl 1989), 
and today most fisheries management systems worldwide include elements of 
involvement of users and stakeholders in the development of management measures 
(beyond the involvement coming from representative democracy in which users and 
stakeholders are of course also voters). Often these arrangements are of a sort that is 
generally known under the label ‘co-management’, which Jenfoft (2003:3) defines as 
‘a collaborative and participatory process of regulatory decision-making between 
representatives of user-groups, government agencies, research institutions, and other 
stakeholders’. 
Sen and Raakjær Nielsen (1996) have provided empirical evidence on a 
variety of different co-management arrangements based on user and stakeholder 
involvement in fisheries management. Not surprisingly, they observed a large degree 
of variation across fisheries and regions and even within specific countries. Their 
conclusion is that the proper design principles depend upon the context and conditions 
under which the co-management arrangement must operate. Sen and Raakjær Nielsen 
(1996) observed moreover that the development of co-management arrangements 
often evolves gradually through a process of muddling through, noting that the 
process is always dynamic; a finding also supported by Jentoft and McCay (1995). 
In order to facilitate the discussion of different options for user and 
stakeholder involvement in fisheries management in the EU, we have outlined a 
revised and modified version of the typology of fisheries co-management regimes 
originally presented by Sen and Raakjær Nielsen (1996). Inspired also by Raakjær 
(2009), we suggest the existence of five levels of stakeholder-involvement5, which 
form a continuum range from little or no involvement over various visions of co-
management to ultimately self-management: 
 
                                                 
5 We acknowledge that this typology is a simplification of a very complex situation. There is a 
multitude of tasks that can be managed under different types of institutional arrangements and at 
different stages in the management process. Moreover, we have decided to refer to the typology as one 
of ‘stakeholder involvement’, as the two outliers are hardly co-management variations. 
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1) ‘Top-down hierarchical management by the state’; where mechanisms for 
dialogue with users and stakeholders might exist, but only minimal 
exchange of information takes place and EU/national governments decide 
what information to share. 
2) ‘Co-management by consultation’; where extensive formal mechanisms 
for consultation (and feedback on use of recommendations) with users and 
stakeholders exist, but all decisions are taken by EU/national governments. 
3) ‘Co-management by partnership’; where EU/national governments, users, 
and stakeholders cooperate as decision-making partners in various aspects 
of management. 
4) ‘Co-management by delegation’; where EU/national governments have 
devolved de facto decision-making power to users and stakeholders in 
relation to various aspects of fisheries management. 
5) ‘Industry self-management with reversal of the burden of proof’; where the 
government has devolved wide-ranging management authority to users and 
stakeholders, who must demonstrate to EU/national governments that 
management decisions are in accordance with the given mandate.  
 
Traditionally, stakeholder involvement within the CFP has primarily been variations of 
the two top categories, in other words the least ambitious. Even the 2002 CFP reform, 
which introduced the Regional Advisory Councils (RAC), only consolidated the ‘co-
management by consultation’ approach in the CFP as the means to obtain inputs from 
the regional and local level into the CFP decision-making.  
However, the question of who are the specific stakeholders that should be 
involved is also contentious. In the EU it is commonly accepted that those dependent 
on fishing for their livelihood ought to be well-represented in the management 
process. Nevertheless, as part of a broader trend worldwide, the EU is encouraging 
broader stakeholder representation. Even though industry upholds a dominating 
position, conservationists and consumers are today represented in EU consultative 
bodies. There are many interests related to fisheries issues and this might, at least in 
principle, call for representation of a broad set of stakeholder organisations. However, 
in a system such as the EU where it is already a challenge to balance industry interests 
from different countries with each other this serves to further complicate matters and 
constitutes yet another choice to be made when designing regionalisation.   
 
 
Merging What, Where and Who: A Selection of Archetypes of Regionalised 
Governance of the Common Fisheries Policy 
 
The following section outlines five qualitatively different models of regionalisation of 
the CFP on the basis of our discussion so far. In other words, each of the following 
models reflects an integrated perception of how the questions of who, where, and 
what could be answered ‘in practice’ and they also contribute to the objectives of CFP 
governance in varying ways. By referring to these models as ‘archetypes’ we 
emphasise that they are—rather than detailed ready-to-apply systems—rough 
skeletons drafted primarily with the intention to create an illustrative suite of potential 
models, which could form a point-of-departure for discussions.  
We do not claim that this is a complete list of possible models—far from it. A 
full list of theoretical models based on our three problem dimensions including sub-
dimensions would be almost unimaginably long. Simply consider that the variation of 
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stakeholder involvement (five options) multiplied by the issue of whether 
regionalisation should be about fisheries management or marine management (two 
options) results in ten different models. 
Consequently, in deciding on our selection of archetypes we have not resorted 
to any such automatism but rather included five models that we based on our pre-
knowledge of the CFP believe capture important perceptions of ways to go forward. It 
should be mentioned, however, that we have prioritised presenting and discussing 
models that represent a significant and qualitative change from the current system as 
opposed to models that represent variations of the current system. 
 
Archetype 1: Nationalisation 
The first alternative to the current governance system in our selection of 
regionalisation archetypes is the Nationalisation model. The Nationalisation model 
represents a qualitatively different configuration to the current system and also stands 
in contrast to the subsequent models outlined, where an intermediary level of 
governance between the EU and the member states is actively sought strengthened. 
This is not the case under the Nationalisation model, which puts the member states at 
the centre. In that way it represents a perspective on regionalisation that responds to 
the question of ‘where’ in a fundamentally different way than any of the other models 
in the selection—and this is its trademark. 
 
Nationalisation 
The member states are awarded the responsibility for the conservation of resources in their own 
Exclusive Economic Zones. Issues relating to shared stocks would be sorted out through a system of 
bilateral agreements between member states or any other arrangements that the member states 
themselves deem necessary. The level of involvement of stakeholders would be an issue for the 
individual member state to decide. 
 
In its pure form the Nationalisation model entails arguably the most radical change 
from the current system among the presented selection of regionalisation models. In 
fact Long (2010) argues that nationalisation, in the sense that we outline it above, 
would require an amendment of the Lisbon Treaty. This model turns EU fisheries 
management upside down by awarding the authority for resource conservation 
measures to the member states within their own Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)—as 
opposed to the current system where this is one of only a few exclusive competences 
of the EU. Management of stocks shared by different states would then, likely, be a 
matter of setting up bilateral or multilateral agreements among the countries (EU a  
well as non-EU) in whose EEZs the stock in question inhabits, much like the 
agreements that are negotiated yearly between for instance Norway and the EU. 
The Nationalisation model would per definition eliminate the problem of 
excessive micromanagement or one-size-fits-all solutions from the EU l vel, as in 
principle the EU would not even be in a position to coordinate approaches. Because it 
will in general be up to the individual member states to decide their national 
approach, it is difficult to say much more about how such a system would operate in 
practice at the level of fisheries. For instance, at member state level 
micromanagement may continue under such a system depending on the national style 
of management. Nonetheless, stakeholders exclusively concerned with stocks present 
in the EEZ of only their own member state will likely feel that decisions are being 
made closer to them and they could, depending on the national style of management, 
have more direct say in the management of such stocks. In opposition, those 
concerned with stocks shared with other member states or stocks in other member 
Submitted for publication in Maritime Studies (MAST) 
 
 14 
states’ EEZs will have less say, and their interests will have to be defended by their 
government in negotiations with other states. This would be the situation in many 
fisheries, as the geopolitical characteristics of EU waters results in a high number of 
shared stocks.  
 
Archetype 2: Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
The heart and soul of the Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) model 
is the establishment of formalised structures with ‘institutional personalities’ at the 
regional level. The RFMOs are—via delegation of authority to the member states on 
condition that they exercise their power jointly—given authorities to be exercised 
without interference from the central EU level within a specified mandate.  
 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
Under this model the member states would be given wide authority for fisheries conservation on the 
condition that the member states with fishing interests in a regional sea area establish a regional 
fisheries management organisation (RFMO) to deal with fisheries management issues specific to that 
area. A general framework for regional approaches will be provided by the central EU institutions. 
The stakeholders’ input will continue to be channelled through the RAC. However, the RAC would in 
most cases advice the RFMO rather than the central EU institutions. The exact extent to which 
stakeholders’ input is given weight in the decision-making process of the RFMO is up to that 
organisation on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Generally, only member states with fishing interests in the specific sea area covered 
by the individual regional management organisation would participate in the RFMO—
or alternatively, in a stricter interpretation than the one reflected in our text above, 
only member states with coastlines to the region. The geographical coverage of the 
individual regional management organisation would be the ‘regional sea area’, which 
may have different meanings to different sets of interests. However, generally the 
term ‘regional sea area’ when discussed in the context of EU fisheries management 
would refer to areas such as the North Sea or the Baltic Sea, or marine regions such as 
those covered by the RACs or alternatively the regions and sub-regions outlined in the 
MSFD (European Parliament and Council 2008). 
The RFMO model presupposes considerable authority placed with the regional 
organisation—referred to as ‘wide authority’ above. Although not specifying how 
much authority this entails, the text above indicates that their authority should at least 
allow the different regional organisations to develop different approaches to 
management.  
Under this model the RACs would continue to provide stakeholder input to the 
decision-making process. Basically they would continue operating as they do under 
the current system with the modification that instead of the Commission being the 
primary recipient of advice, the RFMOs or the member states in their capacities as part 
of the RFMO would become the main recipients.  
This model potentially relieves the central level of the burden of micro-
managing; at the same time, the EU would, as opposed to under the Nationalisation 
model, maintain a coordinating role as well the ability to set the overarching goals and 
the frame for the regional approaches. This would potentially increase the system’s 
ability to tailor-make management as the EU would not have to apply off-the-peg, one-
size-fits-all management solutions to the same extent as today. Furthermore, the 
feeling of distance between the decision-making body and the place where impacts of 
management or mis-management are felt would be reduced. Delegation of some 
authorities to a lower level would potentially facilitate more timely management 
measures as only the most principal decisions would have to go through the lengthy 
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process of joint decision-making between the Council and Parliament. Ideally, 
therefore, this model offers a more efficient and legitimate governance system as well 
as policies and measuress more closely corresponding to the needs of the specific 
region. 
However, what this model offers in particular compared to most of the models 
in our selection of archetypes is first and foremost that the model builds to a relatively 
wide extent on the current structures. The RAC can, as an example, be allowed to 
continue operating in a relatively unchanged format as an advisory body. As a 
consequence, this model also offers a governance system where there is a clear 
differentiation between those governing and those being governed. Based on advisory 
input from stakeholders, the EU and the member states would decide on how to do 
management. Coordination with other policy areas would need to be taken care of 
through the general framework decided upon by the central EU institutions or possibly 
in cooperation with other regional management organisations charged with other 
elements of marine management. 
In terms of the level of stakeholder involvement, however, this model does not 
move beyond the weakest form of co-management, namely ‘co-management by 
consultation’. However, the feeling of being heard (and maybe also in reality being 
listened to) might be increased by getting a closer match between the RACs as 
advisory bodies and the RFMOs as decision-making bodies. Moreover, it should be 
noted that there is nothing in the model that hinders that a decision could be taken at 
regional level to involve stakeholders more in the decision-making process, which 
would then potentially move the regional system towards more evolved co-
management.  
However, these advantages are not guaranteed. In contrast, it could also be 
argued that the governance system will lose efficiency by including yet another 
decision-making level and that the system loses legitimacy because of even more 
complex procedures. Moreover, establishing mechanisms for ensuring delivery of the 
targets/the frame agreed at central level remains a challenge in this regional 
management organisation model as well as the next two variations, see beneath. 
 
Regional Fisheries Co-Management Organisations 
Our second variation on the regional management model theme in our selection of 
archetypes, the Regional Fisheries Co-Management Organisations (RFCOMO) model, 
distinguishes itself from the RFMO model described above by specifying stronger 
direct involvement of stakeholders in the regional decision-making process. 
 
Regional Fisheries Co-Management Organisations 
Under this model the member states would be given wide authority for fisheries conservation on the 
condition that the member states with fishing interests in a regional sea area establish a regional 
fisheries co-management organisation (RFCOMO) to deal with fisheries management issues specific 
for that area. A general framework for regional approaches will be provided by the central EU 
institutions. The RACs would cease to exist; instead stakeholders, scientists, and member states’ 
administrators would work together within the RFCOMO to determine the best strategies for their 
regional area. 
 
This model delivers stronger ownership of regulations by those subjected to them. 
Where the RFMO model allowed regional decisions to be made by the member states’ 
representatives alone acting on advice from stakeholders in the RAC, this model 
presupposes joint decision-making between member states’ representatives and 
stakeholders. Consequently, not only does this model decentralise authority to the 
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regional level with the potential benefits that this entails, it also moves the system 
from ‘co-management by consultation’ to ‘co-management by partnership’ in relation 
to the specific authorities given to the RFCOMO. 
Enlarged with government representatives and possibly scientists, in principle 
the RACs could be reorganised into RFCOMOs since the stakeholder expertise needed is 
already present there. In any case, the RAC, as the type of organisation it is presently, 
would likely cease to exist. As compared with the RFMO model, the RFCOMO model 
represents a more drastic change from the current system. Not only does the RFCOMO
require delegation of authority from the central level to the regional level—as in the 
case of the RFMO via delegation of authority to the member states on condition that 
they exercise their power jointly—it also blurs the line between those being governed 
and those elected to govern. A lack of distinction such as this could pose particular 
challenges in terms of traditional good governance criteria such as accountability and 
transparency, as it might become less apparent who is actually doing the governing 
and in relation to some of those involved it will be difficult to hold them 
democratically accountable. Moreover, there is also a discussion to be taken in 
relation to how different stakeholder groups should be balanced. This discussion 
becomes much more delicate in the RFCOMO than in relation to the other models, 
where stakeholders are not awarded direct decision-making capabilities. 
In terms of the geographical coverage and the interpretation of ‘wide 
authority’ the RFCOMO resembles the RFMO. Likewise, besides the potentially stronger 
buy-in of stakeholders to management measures than what can be expected by the 
RFMO, the RFCOMO potentially delivers the same benefits and suffers from the same 
weaknesses, as further expanded above.  
 
Regional Marine Management Organisations 
Compared to the RFMO and the RFCOMO, the distinctive feature of the Regional 
Marine Management Organisation (RMMO) model, which also suggests the setting up 
of a regional organisation, is that it broadens the perspective of the possible regional 
organisation from dealing exclusively with management of fisheries to managing 
several or all activities of a specific regional marine area. Establishing this kind of 
organisation attempts in particular to tackle one of the coming years’ major 
challenges, namely that of implementing a more holistic approach to environmental 
management. 
 
Regional Marine Management Organisations 
Under this model the member states would set up regional marine management organisations 
(RMMO) with responsibility for coordinating all matters relating to the regional sea areas. 
Stakeholders from all sectors would be involved in some form—either as advisors or in a more co-
management-like structure. The RACs could continue to operate, but would only be providing advice 
as one of the affected sectors of the RMMO. Alternatively, the current RACs could be opened for a 
wider group of stakeholders. A general framework for regional approaches will be provided by the 
central EU institutions. 
 
The advantage of this model is its holistic approach, which goes hand in hand with the 
ecosystem approach to management. Potentially, the RMMO would be a forum for 
coordination of all the interests that claim their right to the marine space in a 
particular region. Having an integrated organisation for this would be an advantage 
insofar that integration of policies would be much more manageable since it would 
only involve one organisation and not several organisations having to interact. 
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In terms of the actual authority of the RMMOs, the regional organisation would be 
tasked with ‘coordinating’ all matters relating to a particular marine region, which 
might be interpreted as somewhat weaker than the ‘wide authority’ of the previous 
two regional management organisation models. Moreover, when discussing the issue 
of stakeholder involvement this archetype leaves that an open question. 
 A particular challenge of this model is that it only to a very limited extent 
builds on the current system. As suggested by van Hoof, van Leeuwen and van 
Tatenhove (2012) elsewhere in this issue, a way forward could be to establish regional 
bodies by merging the RACs with the Regional Sea Conventions, e.g. HELCOM (the 
Helsinki convention for the Baltic Sea) and OSPAR (Convention for the North Sea). 
These organisations are presently not part of the EU system but play nonetheless and 
active role in relation to implementation of the MSFD.  
 
Cooperative Member State Councils 
The last model in our selection of regionalisation archetypes, the Cooperative 
Member State Council (CMSC) model, is the one that necessitates the least change to 
the current CFP governance structures. In fact the CMSC model can in principle be set 
up without having to formally reallocate authority in the governance system at all. 
 
Cooperative Member State Councils 
The institutional structure and formal distribution of powers remains largely unchanged. However, 
the member states with fishing interests in a regional sea area establish mini-councils to deal with 
fisheries management issues specific to that area. These mini-councils forward their 
recommendations for formal approval to the overall EU Fisheries Council. The RAC would in most 
cases advice the mini-council rather than the central EU institutions. The exact extent to which 
stakeholders’ input is given weight in the recommendations of the mini-council is up to that mini-
council on a case-by-case basis.  
 
As described, the formal distribution of authority and the institutional structure stays 
largely as it is in the current system. Consequently, the central EU institutions remain 
formally in charge of deciding on most fisheries management issues in EU waters. 
However, for each regional sea the member states with fishing interests there (or in a 
stricter interpretation: coastlines) set up on a more or less formalised basis mini-
councils to provide the central EU Fisheries Council with recommendations on 
fisheries management issues specific to that area. The RACs would provide the 
regional mini-councils with stakeholder input and thus the RACs would continue to 
operate more or less in the current form, now with the member states of the regional 
mini-council and the Commission as the primary recipients of advice.  
To provide significant advantages as compared to the current system, it is a 
precondition that the recommendations from the mini-councils are, as a general rule, 
not challenged by or renegotiated in the central EU Fisheries Council, but rather 
adopted as the position of the Council in the decision-making process. Consequently, 
this model is highly dependent on the presence of political will in the EU Fisheries 
Council and the Commission—as well as in the European Parliament—to allow for 
different approaches and accept that one region might favour a different path than 
another region.   
The primary advantage of this model is the relative ease with which it could be 
installed. Under this model the EU central level would still apply management from 
the centre, but the exact nature of that management would de facto (but notably not de 
jure) be decided at the regional level. This would in practice allow member states 
sharing an interest in a specific region to develop their own strategies without having 
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to worry about how the adopted approach will be received by all the other EU member 
states, which by default would opt out of having a say in management in the areas 
where they do not have a direct interest.  
Although empowerment of stakeholders is not a specific aim of this model, it 
is nevertheless likely that a relationship could develop between the mini-council and 
the relevant RAC. Potentially this could reduce the feeling of distance between those 
making the decisions and those subjected to them, perhaps enabling stakeholders to 
propose measures that better fit the actual situation of the region in question.  
In contrast to the various regional management organisation models, as an 
example, this model does not have the same potential in terms of delivering more 






In the present article we have outlined a theoretical and conceptual framework for 
aspects that need to be taken into consideration when discussing regionalisation of the 
CFP. The article unfolded in three parts, respectively concerned with: 1) developing a 
typology of CFP governance objectives, which regionalisation can be seen as 
contributing to; 2) outlining and discussing the three main problem dimensions to 
address when designing a regionalised governance system; and 3)  the presentation of 
a representative suite of archetypes of regionalisation.  
Our article takes outset in an understanding of three basic objectives of CFP
governance, namely 1) the ability to take up and balance preferences in a way that is 
perceived as legitimate, 2) the ability to do this in an efficient way, and 3) the ability 
to deliver policies and measures that are effective. We subsequently divided each of 
these objectives into more—in some cases partly conflicting—sub-objectives. 
Further, we argued that overall challenge in relation to designing 
regionalisation of the CFP can be related to three problem dimensions: the kind of 
authority that should be decentralised; the politico-administrative scale to where 
decentralisation should take place; and who should be the recipients of authority at 
any given scale and these dimensions have been unfolded in details in the framework.  
In particular, in relation to the problem of who should be the recipients of 
authority at any given scale, the article offers a typology of how stakeholders can be 
involved in CFP governance, ranging from little to no involvement, over what is 
referred to as variations of co-management, to self-management. The CFP has 
traditionally been heavily top-down driven, as illustrated in Figure 2, and even the 
latest CFP reform, which introduced RACs, did not move governance beyond a weak 
version of co-management—what we refer to as ‘co-management by consultation’ in 
our typology. A major opportunity related to future regionalisation is, consequently, 
to let regionalisation be not only about moving authorities between different politico-
administrative levels but also moving authority outwards, towards users and 
stakeholders.  
As an example, one could argue for a package solution with an inbuilt 
hierarchy—a funnel approach to representation, in which the EU level sets clear 
principles and long-term objectives, standards and frameworks, but where extensive 
formal mechanisms for consultation (and feedback on use of recommendations) with 
users and stakeholders exist, although all decisions are taken by EU/member states. 
The regional level could then develop implementation plans and guidelines tailored to 
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regional conditions, and here stakeholder involvement could be through consultation 
as for the EU level or through the more ambitious ‘co-management by partnership’, 
where regional member states, stakeholders and users cooperate in developing the 
implementation plans.  
In the last part of the article, we explored more way of going about 
regionalisation in practice and presented a suite of so-called archetypes of 
regionalisation: five models that we based on our knowledge of the CFP believe 
capture important perceptions of ways to go forward towards regionalisation of the 
CFP’s governance system. The five archetypes provide different ways of 
decentralising management authorities and vary in terms of stakeholder involvement 
or the type of co-management to become in place. In other words, each of the 
archetypes reflects integrated perceptions of how the questions of who, where, and 
what could be answered ‘in practice’. As in many other situations, it is fair to say that 
the devil lies in the detail when it comes to designing regionalisation in practice. 
Consequently, it is very difficult with any degree of certainty to say how the different 
archetypes would contribute to the objectives of CFP governance. 
On a general level, however, each of the models represents qualitatively different 
ways forward. The Nationalisation model represents an end to the attempt to 
coordinate fisheries management in the EU in an integrated way. The CMSC model, on 
its side, may represent a quick, pragmatic fix to the current system but does not 
constitute any great overhaul of the current system. The RFMO model is more 
ambitious in the sense of actually providing significant change of the current 
structures, but this approach also presents significant challenges in terms of how to set 
it up. The same can be said about the RFCOMO, which takes a step further in moving 
management closer to those affected. Finally, the RMMO may prove to be the most 
forward looking of our models as it as the only model puts the integrated marine 
management at the centre of the reform towards regionalisation. But, as discussed, the 
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WHAT DOES ‘REGIONALISATION ’  MEAN? 
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Abstract Regionalisation has in recent years been intensely discussed as a possible 
future path for the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union. The motivations 
for wanting to move in this direction are, however, as varied as the perceptions of 
what regionalisation as a mode governance would entail in practice. To draw 
implications for policy, we explore these perceptions and seek, by means of material 
from primarily interviews and a survey of participants in the Regional Advisory 
Councils who have hands-on experience with regional cooperation in European 
fisheries management, to put flesh on both the question of whether and why 
regionalisation is seen as potentially a good idea, as well as how people perceive 
different models of regionalisation when confronted with them. The article documents 
and substantiates the widespread interest in regionalisation but it also highlights the 
need to develop common understandings of what options for regionalisation are 





The release of the Commission of the European Communities’ (Commission) Green 
Paper in April 2009 (Commission, 2009) placed regionalisation firmly on the agenda 
for the coming reform of the European Union’s (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), 
intended to be ready for progressive implementation from the beginning of 2013. By 
examining with a critical eye the current style of governance, where almost all 
decisions are taken at the highest political level in Brussels, the Green Paper 
illustrated significant problems facing the CFP in this regard. Although the 
Commission did suggest that the regional dimension of the CFP governance system 
could be enhanced by relying ‘wherever possible on specific regional management 
solutions implemented by member states’ through means of delegation that ‘would 
need to be organised at the level of marine regions’ (Commission, 2009:10), the 
document remained weak in terms of giving specific directions or suggestions on how 
in practice regionalisation could be achieved.  
 The present article reports on an exploratory investigation of opinions 
and arguments about regionalisation as a policy element in the coming CFP reform 




process. The key informants were participants or potential participants in debates on 
regionalisation, representing different interests in the CFP: managers, policy-makers, 
fisheries sector or representatives of environmental interests, and so on. In particular 
we carried out a survey of individuals who due to their participation in the Regional 
Advisory Councils (RAC) have obtained hands-on experience of doing regional 
cooperation in EU fisheries management. This experience places them in a unique 
position in terms of proving insights on how regionalisation could most appropriately 
be further developed.  
The aim of our research has been to look for different patterns of ideas 
and opinions to get an impression of where they converge and diverge, and thus point 
in the direction of potential political agreement or conflict.  
  
 
Background and Analytical Framework  
 
As described in detail by Symes (2012) earlier in this issue, the debate over 
regionalisation of the CFP is not new. Rather, the issue has been more or less on the 
agenda since the beginning of the 1990s. However, in terms of reorganising the 
governance system of the CFP towards regionalisation, interest and activity in this 
regard peaked in connection with the previous reform of the CFP, which was 
implemented from the beginning of 2003. At that time, the simultaneous concern of 
the CFP not being sufficiently responsive to stakeholders’ perspectives nor to regional 
particularities led to the setting up of a structure of regional advisory bodies; the RACs, 
consisting of stakeholders, predominantly from the catch industry and the wider 
fisheries sector but also including other interests such as recreational fishing and 
environmental groups, et cetera.  
While focus in the years immediately following 2003 seems to have 
been most on institutionalising the RAC system, which is primarily intended to provide 
a regional stakeholder perspective to the Commission’s deliberations rather than 
providing stakeholders with real decision-making authorities, interest in further 
regionalisation seems to be on the rise, in the most recent years with the publication of 
the Commission’s Green Paper as a milestone in this regard. For more information on 
the background of CFP regionalisation, please consult the article by Symes earlier in 
this issue.  
The current article applies an analytical framework developed and 
described earlier in this issue (Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær, 2012). As we argue 
there, practical motivations for wanting to move towards regionalisation can basically 
be structured by reference to three basic objectives of CFP governance: 1) the ability 
of the governance system to take up and balance preferences (process legitimacy), 2) 
the efficient use of resources in system, and 3) the effectiveness of policies and 
measures coming out of the system (content legitimacy). These objectives can then 
again be divided into more detailed sub-objectives that take into account the 
dominating cleavages in discussions on fisheries management. The second part of the 
framework breaks down the complex discussion of how to move forward towards 
regionalisation into three interrelated problem dimensions: the question of where 
(being the discussion of actual politico-administrative level that regionalisation should 
be about), the question of who (being the discussion of roles of different public 
authorities and/or the involvement of private actors), and the question of what (being 
the discussion of various types of decisions and which of those should be considered 




apt for decentralisation). In the final part of our previous article, we outlined 
furthermore a number of archetypes of regionalisation.  
The present article is divided in three main parts and concludes with a 
brief discussion of the results of our research and the way forward in relation to 
regionalisation in the context of the coming reform of the CFP. The first main section 
reports on the dominant perspectives on why regionalisation might be an interesting 
way to go within the governance system of the CFP. Then, the second part presents 
selected perceptions of how regionalisation could or should in general materialise in 
practice. Subsequently, the third part presents data on how people perceive the 
different archetypes of regionalisation of the CFP, when presented with those. 
 
 
Research Methods  
 
In the last half of 2009 and first half of 2010, we employed several research 
techniques in order to collect and solicit opinions on regionalisation from stakeholders 
and others with an interest in European fisheries management.  
The techniques ranged from observation of meetings of RACs (four in 
total) and various conferences (five in total), over key informant interviews (nineteen 
in total) and a focus group interview (six participants from the Commission)1, t  study 
of selected documents (predominantly some of the position documents submitted to 
the Commission in relation with the Green Paper consultation process) and a survey 
of participants in meetings of different RACs. The survey drew its participants from 
general assemblies and selected meetings of executive committees and working 
groups of the North Sea, the North Western Waters (NWW), the South Western Waters 
(SWW) and the Pelagic RACs in 2009. The survey employed both an online 
questionnaire with e-mail invitations, as well as a traditional, mailed questionnaire to 
those not completing the online version. The response rate for the survey was 41.9 per 
cent: 138 responses out of 329 invitations to participate in the survey. The breakdown 
of participants in the survey reflects the individuals who participate in meetings of the 
four RACs. Roughly half of the participants in the survey are fisheries sector 
representatives, a quarter are representatives of various other interest groups and 
constellations, and the last quarter are made up of scientists, managers and others.2 
Whereas the interviews and other qualitative sources of material 
provided us with rich, in-depth information on the various perspectives on 
regionalisation, our survey was designed to provide quantitative measures of 
perceptions of regionalisation as well as to uncover relations between preferences vis-
à-vis regionalisation and particular participant attributes such as primary RAC 
affiliation, geographical affiliation, and stakeholder type. In particular, the survey was 
employed to solicit opinions about the different archetypes of regionalisation. 
Although this article draws on all the above sources of material, most 
prominently figures data obtained through interviews and the survey. In relation to all 
                                                 
1 The interviews (incl. the focus group interview) involved two researchers, ten managers, three policy-
makers, eight fisheries sector representatives and two representatives from non-governmental 
organisations. 
2 In terms of geographical affiliation, the participants come from 10 EU member states; in addition a 
few comes from states outside the EU or categorise themselves as ‘European’ or ‘International’. Not 
surprisingly, in terms of numbers, the four largest fishing nations of the EU, namely Denmark, United 
Kingdom, France, and Spain, dominate the group of participants with 84 responses in total.   




the techniques, standard scientific practice was employed. For details on the 
methodology of the different techniques, please consult Raakjær et al. (2010).    
 
 
Why should the CFP Move towards Regionalisation?  
 
As expected, our research presented us with a rich variety of perspectives on why 
regionalisation of the CFP is an option worth considering and the following sections 
present some of the main perceptions based upon the values or dimensions invoked in 
the reasoning.  
 
Regionalisation Makes the Governance System more Legitimate 
The first category of motivations for regionalisation that we direct our attention to is 
the value of a governance system that is perceived as legitimate due to its ability to 
take up and balance preferences of different actors in a fair and just way. Process 
legitimacy, as this kind of legitimacy is termed, has two sides to it: internal 
legitimacy, relating to the legitimacy of the process among the user groups subjected 
to the policy (most importantly fishermen and vessel owners), and external 
legitimacy, related to the legitimacy of the process among other interests groups, who 
to some extent reflect the broader societal interest (Jentoft 2000).  
When investigating the empirical material, the concern for internal 
process legitimacy figures as a very important motivation for regionalisation. It is 
widely perceived that fishermen themselves need to be more involved in the 
management process to avoid non-compliance, and that one way of accomplishing 
this is through regionalisation. Several of our interviewees indicate that the current 
system of RACs has not sufficiently solved the issue of providing a feeling of 
ownership over the adopted fisheries management measures. 
The value of regionalisation in relation to process legitimacy is also 
emphasised in a broader, more general sense, however. Here the focus is less on 
internal legitimacy and the compliance issue and more on the fact that decentralising 
authority to a regional level could, in general, increase the feeling of legitimacy by 
reducing the perceived distance between those taking decisions (at EU level) and those 
implementing them (at member state level) and being subjected to them—be it 
fishermen or other stakeholder groups who also have to live with the results of 
fisheries management. In relation to this, some argue that a regionalised CFP 
governance system would better facilitate holding those responsible for decisions 
accountable—which might in fact in itself also impact the nature of the decisions 
taken. An example of the contrary in the current system is that decisions with direct 
relevance for only a particular regional sea, such as the Baltic Sea or the North Sea, 
can be modified or blocked by EU member states without any stake in that sea area. 
The member states can be tempted to do so because of the perception that the 
decision(s) in question can in time create a precedent that might be contrary to the 
blocking member states’ interests in the seas where they do have a stake. A 
regionalised CFP governance system is perceived able to tackle this problem by 
reducing or altogether removing the need to take decisions pertaining only to specific 
regional seas at the most central level. 
The link between process legitimacy and regionalisation was something 
we briefly touched upon in our survey of RAC meeting participants, as well. In a series 
of questions on possible outcomes of regionalisation, survey participants were asked 
to indicate the importance of different outcomes by for each suggested outcome 




marking ‘Not important at all’ (score 1) to ‘Very important’ (score 5). In the series, 
one potential outcome related directly to process legitimacy, as the participants were 
asked to indicate the importance of the outcome of ‘Increasing compliance by giving 
stakeholders a larger say in fisheries management’. Notably, this measure scored 
second-highest mean (4.15) within the full set of six sub-questions3 ndicating that 
this is indeed a very important concern—at least when asking a group made up of to a 
large extent of fisheries sector representatives. 
 
Regionalisation makes the Governance System more Efficient 
The second category of motivations for regionalisation relates to the objective of 
efficient use of resources in the governance system. In relation to this a distinction can 
be made between financial concerns and concerns about limited human resources.  
In relation to the use of human resources and general efficiency of the 
system, several of our interviewees considered it inefficient that the central EU 
institutions engage in and spend time on discussions of miniscule issues applicable 
only to specific regions or fisheries, described to us by a manager as ‘such things as 
twine thickness and ridiculously small things like that’, instead of spending the effort 
on deciding and developing the overall principles and taking specific decisions that 
due to their nature must be taken at a central level. This way of operating is widely 
perceived as a misuse of resources and a distraction from what should really be in 
focus at the central level, namely the long-term perspective and overall strategic 
decisions. Several interviewees pointed to the fact that this type of inefficiency was 
only going to be even more prominent after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
(European Union, 2007) in December 2009, which requires more involvement of the 
European Parliament and thereby also a lengthier decision-making process at central 
level. The Lisbon Treaty was also raised as a turning point by a fisheries sector 
representative explaining why previously highly hesitant—predominantly Southern 
European—member states’ fishing sector interests were beginning to support 
regionalisation, ‘the truth is that now with the entry of the Lisbon Treaty and the […] 
long period of time that it supposedly will take to make decisions, the concept of 
regionalisation starts to soak through in the different countries’. 
 Although the above interviewee argues that interests from Southern 
European member states have not been left unaffected by the discussion of decreasing 
efficiency following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, there appears still to be 
a cleavage on this issue. In our survey—in the series of questions on possible 
outcomes of regionalisation previously introduced—we asked our participants to 
indicate to us the importance of ‘Relieving the EU central level of tasks (Council, 
Commission, Parliament)’. Upon examination, the results divided by participants 
from respectively Northern and Southern Europe4 indicate a significant discrepancy 
on the importance placed on this particular outcome. Participants from Northern 
Europe rank the measure as 3.53 while participants from Southern Europe score a 
statistically lower average at 2.61.5 Notably, the difference between the two groups on 
the outcome measure of relieving the central EU level of tasks produces the greatest 
difference of all six potential outcomes measured. Roughly 48 per cent from Southern 
Europe believe this outcome is not important (score 1 or 2), while about 18 per cent 
from Northern Europe feel that way. Oppositely, about half of the participants from 
                                                 
3 For the series of six outcome questions the total number of responses ranged from 125 to 126. 
4 Southern Europe comprises in this context France, Portugal, and Spain. Northern Europe comprises 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
5 T-test reveals statistical difference between means of 3.53 and 2.61 (t=4.15, p-value of 0.001). 




Northern Europe feel that this is an important outcome (score 4 or 5) in comparison to 
only roughly a quarter of those from Southern Europe. The low emphasis by 
participants from Southern Europe contributes to this outcome scoring the lowest 
average for all participants (3.10) of all measured potential outcomes. Consequently, 
it seems that there is a notable geographical divide on what RAC participants are 
looking for in regionalisation in relation to the efficiency dimension. 
Another kind of system efficiency value of regionalisation emphasised is 
efficient integration of policies; a main point being that the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive6 (MSFD) (European Parliament and Council, 2008), an important 
environmental policy initiative, presupposes member states working together at 
regional level and it would therefore be beneficial that the CFP employed a compatible 
strategy as fisheries is a major anthropogenic pressure on the marine environment. 
This perception of the potential value of regionalisation is clearly also closely linked 
to the value of being able to deliver better (integrated) management outputs (see 
section on effectiveness beneath). Emphasising a preference for more integrated 
structures to create efficiency (in a broad sense), a manager gave us this description of 
his perception of the current state-of-affairs when trying to unite an environmental 
policy initiative (though in this case not the MSFD but Natura 20007) with the CFP: 
 
The experience from my current main occupation, which is the 
protection of the Natura 2000 sites, is that it is very difficult and 
cumbersome and takes very long time to try to unite the frameworks of 
Natura 2000 and the CFP. I use this metaphor that I want to put up this 
poster on the wall. I know what I need. I need a drill and I need a 
screwdriver. So I go to the toolbox of the CFP to take a drill and a 
screwdriver. But then the CFP says: no no no, not that easy. You can 
open my toolbox, but I want you to put in order everything in my 
toolbox, from big to small, including a hammer and all sorts of 
instruments that I know I will not use. You have to somehow structure 
them in line, from big to small, colour by colour, and have everybody 
who also wants to maybe use that toolbox to have a look at it. Is it ok 
that I take just these two? And then, after a process of a couple of years, 
I can finally take my screwdriver and my drill.  
  
Another distinct perspective associates regionalisation closely to a shift towards a 
management approach where the fisheries sector itself carries a larger share of the 
costs of management by introducing ‘results-based management’ and ‘reversal of the 
burden of proof’. In general this approach entails that the fisheries sector, rather than 
being managed in detail, would be subjected to certain targets or limits to comply 
with, and—as long as respecting those limits, which the sector itself would cover the 
costs of documenting—it may decide for itself on how to stay within the limits. This 
way of perceiving regionalisation links it closely to the issue of financial efficiency 
but it is likewise closely linked to the general issue of legitimacy by suggesting that 
both the system and its outputs will be perceived as more legitimate, at least among 
                                                 
6 The MSFD requires the member states to achieve ‘good environmental status’ (GES) of their seas by 
2020. 
7 Natura 2000 is a network of protected areas designated as a requirement of the Habitats Directive 
(Council, 1992), ‘special areas of conservation’, and the Birds Directive (European Parliament and 
Council, 2009), ‘special protection areas’.  




fisheries sector interests, if they have themselves been involved in developing the 
measures.  
The importance of this variation of a financial efficiency outcome of 
regionalisation was to some extent also measured in our survey in the series of 
questions on possible outcomes. In this case the survey gauged the importance of 
‘Making fisheries management less costly by giving the industry more responsibility’. 
Although the question related to relieving the EU of tasks (see above) scored the 
lowest average for all participants (3.10), as explained before this is due to the low 
importance from Southern Europe pulling down the overall average; for the financial 
efficiency measure, the overall average is universally low. The overall importance 
placed on reducing costs is significantly lower than the other regionalisation outcomes 
sub-questions. Apart from the measure regarding the importance of relieving the 
central EU level of tasks, averages of other measures dwarf this measure’s 3.34 overall 
mean. Currently, EU fisheries stakeholders are not accountable for the costs of 
oversight, scientific assessments, and other operational expenses, which may explain 
the relatively lower priority ascribed on reducing costs by the survey participants.  
 
Making the Policies and Measures more Effective and thereby Legitimate 
The third category of motivations is those related to the objective of effectiveness 
(and subsequently directly associated content legitimacy) of measures and policies. 
This category of motivations centres on the extent to which a regionalised CFP 
governance system would better enable the delivery of policies and management 
measures that realise the policy goals, which are perceived as important—be it 
conservation, rationalisation, or social/community benefits (Charles 1992). 
On a very general level, the main issue in relation to this objective is the 
perception that the centralised nature of the current system makes the CFP incapable of 
responding sufficiently to the diversity of needs in different regions—be it the needs 
of the regional fishing sectors or the regional ecosystems. Responding in the most 
suitable way to the needs and interests of, in particular, different segments of the 
European fishing fleet would, the perception is, be more possible in a system where 
detailed knowledge of the specifics of the local or regional setting could be put more 
directly to use in decisions on management. Notably it is not only fisheries sector 
representatives arguing this, as evidenced by this quote from an NGO representative, 
who suggets experimenting with taking decisions at ‘a more regional or local level 
where fishermen basically can be more involved in coming up with the solutions that 
would result in the objectives that have been agreed—because most often you have a 
number of different choices, different ways to do things’.  
The need to make better use of local knowledge was another of the 
possible regionalisation outcomes that we measured the importance of in the survey. 
The participants were asked to indicate the importance of ‘Providing better 
management by taking into consideration local/fishermen’s knowledge of the system’ 
on the earlier described five-point scale and the mean of this proposed outcome 
proves to be the highest of all outcome means, namely X; indicating the perceived 
high importance of this outcome.  
A slightly different aspect of the quality of fisheries legislation and 
management relates to the increased time it will take to reach decisions in the area of 
fisheries at the EU level after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Several 
interviewees argued that this in itself requires regionalisation to make sure that the 
decision-making framework can still respond to emerging needs in a timely manner. 
This value is strongly associated with the point made during the previous discussion 




of the efficiency of the system; however, in the present context the concern is about 
the actual ability to apply timely—and thereby effective—management measures 
rather than the efficient use of resources but arguably the two are intimately linked.  
Another perspective, which is also closely linked to the discussion of 
efficiency, is the challenge of integrating policies, the perception being that 
regionalisation can facilitate not only efficient but also better and more correct 
integration of policies because both environmental policy (represented by the MSFD) 
and fisheries policy (represented by the CFP) would then have regional set-ups. This 
perspective was also something we investigated in our question on potential outcomes 
of regionalisation in the survey. We measured the importance of ‘Integrating fisheries 
into general maritime policy’ and the importance of ‘Paving the way for ecosystem-
based fisheries management’. Both relate to the priority of well-functioning policy 
integration. Overall, these two measures of integration average close to one another in 
terms of importance with the maritime question averaging slightly lower than the 
ecosystem-based management question, 3.74 versus 3.89 respectively. Stakeholder 
type reveals the most interesting comparisons on these measures. Comparing the 
overall group of fisheries sector representatives to other stakeholder interests reveals a 
marked difference in the level of importance placed on these potential outcomes. In 
the case of representatives of environmental interests, they exclusively selected 
somewhat (score 4) to ‘very important’ (score 5) for the ecosystem-based 
management measure, whereas fisheries sector responses distributed more evenly 
throughout the answer options with 31 per cent choosing below neutral, 24 per cent 
selecting neutral, and 45 per cent choosing above neutral. The difference in 
importance on this outcome represents one of the major cleavages between the EU 
fisheries stakeholder groups. Perhaps not so surprising that those working for 
organisations promoting the environment value ecosystem-based management highly 
as an outcome; nevertheless, the neutrality of the sector uncovers a discrepancy in the 
motivations for regionalisation as it does not equate to ecosystem-oriented planning to 
the same extent for all stakeholder groups. 
  
 
Towards a Vision of a Regionalised CFP  
 
The following sections contain perspectives on selected issues, which seem to be 
among the most important in the discussion when trying to settle on how to put 
regionalisation into practice. These perspectives are organised under three headings, 
each referring to a particular problem dimension; the dimensions of ‘where’, ‘who’, 
and ‘what’ (Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær, 2012). Clearly, to some extent the 
question of how to regionalise is linked to the perceptions of what regionalisation is 
intended to deliver, which we discussed in the previous section. Likewise, in practice 
perceptions related to one problem dimension was often closely attached to particular 
perceptions of the appropriate ‘solutions’ in relation to the other problem dimensions.   
 
Putting the Regional Seas at the Centre of the CFP 
The CFP governance system stretches over three, core politico-administrative levels: 
the central EU level, the intermediary level of regional EU seas (where the embryonic 
institutional structure is basically represented by the RACs), and the member state 
level. These politico-administrative levels poorly match the biogeophysical scale 
levels of the marine ecosystem or the way that the fisheries fleets of the member states 




operates—often across the waters of several member states and fishing on stocks 
shared by multiple member states.   
Consequently, a problem dimension to address when trying to carve out 
how regionalisation could be put into practice is the ‘where’ dimension, in the sense 
of addressing what scale level(s) that regionalisation should be concerned with and 
how to organise the politico-administrative level(s), for instance in terms of dividing it 
up in regional units. Although we found diverging perceptions on these questions, this 
proved to be the problem dimension where there was most agreement on what 
regionalisation ought to entail.  
Most of our interviewees were of the perception that regionalisation 
should be about strengthening the intermediary regional seas level, the same was 
reflected as a general tendency in our other empirical material. Nevertheless, several 
of our interviewees also pointed to the need for getting management even closer to 
those affected, meaning regionalisation as a subnational process or by collaboration of 
fewer member states than those associated with a regional sea area, which would be 
relevant in cases where only a few member states have interests in a certain sea area. 
However, it does not seem that there is any great tension between these perceptions; 
rather, those arguing for a more ‘local’ regionalisation also generally saw the need for 
strengthening the intermediary regional seas level and even to some extent were of the 
opinion that this in itself could facilitate the move towards more ‘local’ 
regionalisation by fostering a transition from a centralised management system to a 
management system built more solidly on the principle of subsidiarity.  
The most significant cleavage, within the general agreement that the 
intermediary regional seas level is what regionalisation should be about, is found 
between those basically favouring regionalisation as something related to the current 
RAC regions (determined by fisheries policy) and those of the opinion that the 
geographical units of regionalisation should basically come out of other policy areas 
(generally environmental policy and the MSFD). From a narrow fisheries perspective 
building as much as possible on the current system appears preferable and the RACs 
have been set up to best reflect functional regions within fisheries management. At the 
same time, others argue that the integration of policies requires that an effort is made 
to reconcile varying spatial divisions of different policy areas and that the RAC 
regions are not necessarily the most appropriate for this.  
  
Using Regionalisation to Involve Stakeholders more in the Governance System 
The second problem dimension highlights the question of whom to regionalise to. In 
other words—based on the perception that regionalisation must involve at least some 
reshuffling of / or generation of new authorities (broadly conceived) among the actors 
operating in the governance system—an important discussion relates to who should 
‘benefit’ from this and in what way. Based on our research two main issues are 
associated to this problem dimension: 1) authority of stakeholders compared to public 
authorities / governments; 2) role of fisheries sector interests compared to wider 
societal interests, as well as compared to other economic sectors with a stake in the 
regional seas.  
In relation to the first, the point-of-departure of the CFP is a situation 
where the stakeholders’ role at least at the central EU level8 is restricted to that of 
providing advice through the RACs and the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and 
Aquaculture (ACFA), which following an understanding of different levels of 
                                                 
8 Generally mechanisms for involving stakeholders do exist at member state level. 




stakeholder involvement, see Figure 1, represents a low level of stakeholder 
influence—only being a single notch above ‘top-down hierarchical management by 
the state’.  
 
Figure 1. A Typology of Stakeholder Involvement in EU Fisheries Management 
 
 
Top-down hierarchical management by the state 
Mechanisms for dialogue with users and stakeholders might exist, but only minimal exchange of 
information takes place and EU/national governments decide what information to share. 
 
Co-management by consultation  
Extensive formal mechanisms for consultation (and feedback on use of recommendations) with users 
and stakeholders exist, but all decisions are taken by EU/national governments. 
 
Co-management by partnership 
EU/national governments, users, and stakeholders cooperate as decision-making partners in various 
aspects of management. 
 
Co-management by delegation 
EU/national governments have devolved de facto decision-making power to users and stakeholders in 
relation to various aspects of fisheries management. 
 
Industry self-management with reversal of the burden of proof 
The government has devolved wide-ranging management authority to users and stakeholders, who 




(Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær, 2012) 
 
As documented in the previous section, there is widespread agreement that getting the 
decision-making process closer to the stakeholders is a necessary precondition to 
deliver on the legitimacy-dimension. To many, moving the decision-making process 
closer to stakeholders equates to moving from a system where stakeholders are 
exclusively giving advice and thereby being at arm’s length from actual decision-
making to a system where stakeholders are involved in taking decisions in one way or 
the other, either as partners in the process or through self-management. However, 
although a popular perspective, there are also many concerns voiced in this regard, 
including the capacity of various stakeholders, democratic accountability, as well as 
legal problems.   
In addition, an important issue remains the role of fisheries sector 
stakeholders compared to other stakeholders. Here some perceive that industry 
stakeholders should be at the centre while others perceive that regionalisation should 
constitute a break with the current practice of giving industry stakeholders a 
preferential position in the advisory bodies. From the industry perspective, one of our 
interviewees emphasised that the industry (as opposed to other interest groups) should 
remain the key player by suggesting to, ‘bring closer the debates, the consultations, 
even the decision process, to those who would be affected, and the main affected are 
us as fishing organisations, as ship owners’. 
 
Deciding What Authorities to Regionalise  
Probably the most contentious problem dimension in the debate over regionalisation 
proved to be the question of what to regionalise. This includes perspectives on 




whether regionalisation should merely involve strengthening the advisory role of the 
intermediary regional level or if decision-making capabilities should be moved to the 
regional level. And obviously, in case of the latter, the question remains as to 
determine what decisions should be placed at regional level. It seems clear that under 
the CFP a hierarchy of decisions exists, and some decisions are more suited to keep at 
central level and others are better suited for regionalising; however, how people 
perceive that hierarchy varies and is in many cases unclear or unarticulated.9 
In relation to the question of authorities to be given to the regional level, 
the first issue concerns the magnitude of authority to be vested with the regional level. 
Here perspectives spread over a scale ranging from the regional level being purely 
advisory towards the EU central level (generally taking policy-decisions) and / or the 
member states (generally taking implementation decisions), over variations of 
‘binding advice’, to the regional level being awarded specific, limited decision-
making powers on regional matters, which are then expanded as we get further 
towards the end of the scale. In the most pronounced visions of regionalisation only 
authority over the most essential decisions are to be maintained at the central EU level.  
A purely advisory version of regionalisation without any decision-
making competence being delegated is by many considered a weak instance of 
regionalisation; however, this is a relatively uncomplicated type of regionalisation to 
put into practice, as it does not pose legal problems—as one manager put it in an 
interview, ‘it is just a policy recommendation, even as an NGO you can recommend 
something, that is easy, and that has not serious requirements on structure, mandate, 
legal status, and things like that.’ This is a pragmatic argument but is does carry 
weight in the context of policy-reform—not least in circles of managers and policy-
makers. On the other hand, others perceive that there is a great risk that this does not 
create significantly more feeling of regional ownership over management among 
stakeholders than the current RAC system has done, which is exactly a system where 
the regional level provides advice to the central level. Consequently, where this 
approach may provide for regionally more tailor-made management, which will enjoy 
content legitimacy, the benefits in terms of process legitimacy might be limited.  
When considering regionalising some degree of real decision-making 
authority, which is by many perceived as preferable, as it would potentially provide 
for both legitimacy and efficiency benefits, one cited concern relates to the potential 
risk of regionalising too much—in the sense of regionalising authority that rightfully 
should be kept at the central level; e.g. in order to ensure that the industry, which is 
part of a common market, operates on a level playing field. Although room for 
competition between regions should be allowed so that best practice can be 
developed, it is perceived as important that regionalisation does not lead to varying 
degree of fulfilment of the overall objectives and principles across regions. Other 
concerns relate to the legal problems involved in delegating decision-making 
authority as well as the lack of democratic oversight at regional level, where no 
traditional, democratic representative structures exist. 
                                                 
9 We will not go here go into the discussion of whether regionalisation should be about fisheries or 
marine management at large, although this discussion is clearly also related to the question of what to 
regionalise. Although important, this debate did not come out as strongly in our interviews nor the 
position documents, as the discussion over the level of authority to be vested with the regional level. 
Granted, a few of our interviewees argued that regionalisation should really also be about integrating 
fisheries in more general maritime management; however, the predominant perspective seems to be 
that at this point concentration should be on reforming the CFP and insofar that the reform could 
facilitate integrated management then that may be alright but it should not be at the foreground of the 
discussion. In particular, this seems to be the perspective of industry stakeholders. 




Variations in Perceptions of Regionalisation Models  
 
As some of the final questions in our survey we asked our population of RAC meeting 
participants to score their level of approval or disapproval for five possible models of 
regionalisation, ‘archetypes’, plus the option of retaining the present system (referred 
to as ‘Present Structure’), as well as pick their top choice and least desirable model.  
The five regionalisation models, which were intended to help us explore 
aspects of the preferences in relation to the different underlying problem dimensions 
in designing regionalisation, included 1) a ‘Nationalisation model’, a model of 
decentralisation rather than regionalisation, under which the member state level would 
be the new centre for fisheries management decisions; 2 a ‘Cooperative Member State 
Council’ (CMSC) model, under which member states’ authorities would work 
increasingly together at regional level but without formally changing the present 
structures or allocation of authorities; 3) a ‘Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisation’ (RFMO) model, under which member states’ authorities working jointly 
in a regional organisation would be awarded wide-ranging decision-making powers in 
relation to regional fisheries management but where stakeholders would be kept at 
arm’s length as advisors to the process only, 4) a ‘Regional Fisheries Co-management 
Organisation’ (RFCOMO) model, that resembles the RFMO but instead of keeping 
stakeholders as advisors they are invited into the decision-making process as partners; 
and, finally, 5) a ‘Regional Marine Management Organisation’ (RMMO) model, under 
which fisheries management would be taken care of as one of more issues by a 
regional organisation awarded wide authorities for regional marine management at 
large. The three last models can be viewed as variations of a theme, namely regional 
management organisations.  
The full descriptions of the models, as they appeared in the survey, can 
be found in Figure 2. A more thorough discussion of the models and their selection 
can be found earlier in this issue (Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær, 2012).  
 




The member states are awarded the responsibility for the conservation of resources in their own 
Exclusive Economic Zones. Issues relating to shared stocks would be sorted out through a system of 
bilateral agreements between member states or any other arrangements that the member states 
themselves deem necessary. The level of involvement of stakeholders would be an issue for the 
individual member state to decide. 
 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
Under this model the member states would be given wide authority for fisheries conservation on the 
condition that the member states with fishing interests in a regional sea area establish a regional 
fisheries management organisation (RFMO) to deal with fisheries management issues specific to that 
area. A general framework for regional approaches will be provided by the central EU institutions. 
The stakeholders’ input will continue to be channelled through the RAC. However, the RAC would in 
most cases advice the RFMO rather than the central EU institutions. The exact extent to which 
stakeholders’ input is given weight in the decision-making process of the RFMO is up to that 
organisation on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Regional Fisheries Co-Management Organisations 
Under this model the member states would be given wide authority for fisheries conservation on the 
condition that the member states with fishing interests in a regional sea area establish a regional 
fisheries co-management organisation (RFCOMO) to deal with fisheries management issues specific 
for that area. A general framework for regional approaches will be provided by the central EU 




institutions. The RACs would cease to exist; instead stakeholders, scientists, and member states’ 
administrators would work together within the RFCOMO to determine the best strategies for their 
regional area. 
 
Regional Marine Management Organisations 
Under this model the member states would set up regional marine management organisations 
(RMMO) with responsibility for coordinating all matters relating to the regional sea areas. 
Stakeholders from all sectors would be involved in some form—either as advisors or in a more co-
management-like structure. The RACs could continue to operate, but would only be providing advice 
as one of the affected sectors of the RMMO. Alternatively, the current RACs could be opened for a 
wider group of stakeholders. A general framework for regional approaches will be provided by the 
central EU institutions. 
 
Cooperative Member State Councils 
The institutional structure and formal distribution of powers remains largely unchanged. However, 
the member states with fishing interests in a regional sea area establish mini-councils to deal with 
fisheries management issues specific to that area. These mini-councils forward their 
recommendations for formal approval to the overall EU Fisheries Council. The RAC would in most 
cases advice the mini-council rather than the central EU institutions. The exact extent to which 
stakeholders’ input is given weight in the recommendations of the mini-council is up to that mini-
council on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 
It should be noted that the models remain rough outlines of the intended institutional 
structures, closer to fisheries institutional archetypes than fully developed governance 
models. Moreover, the survey participants were specifically asked to disregard legal 
problems of implementing a model so what we gauge is in principle their preference 
rather than what they believe most likely to materialise.  
 
Looking for Regional Differences in the Perceptions of Regionalisation Archetypes 
In the first question relating to the archetypes, we asked the survey participants to 
score their level of approval for each of the variations. The participants could choose 
between answers ranging from ‘I would approve’ (score 1) to ‘I would disapprove’ 
(score 5) with a neutral midpoint and statements of moderated approval or 
disapproval. Figure 3 summarises the four RACs’ and the total population’s aggregate 
approval of all six options (five plus ‘Present structure’). 
After scoring the degree of approval for each of the six models, 
participants were asked to select their top choice and least desirable model with the 
option to select ‘None of the above’ included. Table 1 summarises the frequencies and 
relative percentages delineated by RAC as well as the total for our population for the 
























(N=X. The calculated averages derive from the numerically coded values of the answer choices. A 
mean of 1.0 represents unanimous approval whereas 5.0 indicate unanimous disapproval with 3.0 
representing the neutral midpoint) 
 













0 0 3 5 12 6 8 34 
Row % 0.00 0.00 8.82 14.71 35.29 17.65 23.53 100.00 
Column 
% 
0.00 0.00 60.00 22.73 34.29 31.58 47.06 29.06 
NWW 2 3 2 5 12 4 2 30 
Row % 6.67 10.00 6.67 16.67 40.00 13.33 6.67 100.00 
Column 
% 
40.00 21.43 40.00 22.73 34.29 21.05 11.76 25.64 
Pelagic 1 7 0 4 4 2 3 21 
Row % 4.76 33.33 0.00 19.05 19.05 9.52 14.29 100.00 
Column 
% 
20.00 50.00 0.00 18.18 11.43 10.53 17.65 17.95 
SWW 2 4 0 8 7 7 4 32 
Row % 6.25 12.50 0.00 25.00 21.88 21.88 12.50 100.00 
Column 
% 
40.00 28.57 0.00 36.36 20.00 36.84 23.53 27.35 
TOTAL 5 14 5 22 35 19 17 117 
Row % 4.27 11.97 4.27 18.80 29.91 16.24 14.53 100.00 
Column 
% 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
(N=117. The row percentage indicates the percentage within the RAC with the column percentage 
listed below represents the amount from the RAC making up the model preference) 




Our data shows that there is a statistical association10 between the RAC that the survey 
respondent is most active in and top choice model. This means that a person’s primary 
RAC is somewhat predictive of the model he or she picks as the top choice. However, 
the association between RAC and least desirable model, for which we have not 
provided a table, is not significant due to high disapproval of the Nationalisation 
model dispersed over the four RACs; in total 41.38 per cent picked the Nationalisation 
model as least desirable. Nonetheless, we did notice a stronger tendency for the SWW 
RAC participants to find the Nationalisation model to be least desirable leading us to 
test if there was a geographical divide (see Note 4) on the issue and indeed that turned 
out to be the case.11 Approximately half of those from Southern Europe selected the 
Nationalisation model as the least desirable model whereas this was only the case for 
roughly a quarter of those from Northern Europe. This pattern may stem from a 
combination of Northern Europeans being generally more dissatisfied with the current 
centralised system and Southern Europeans putting more emphasis on access to 
waters and funding opportunities. The finding is supported by the fact that a related 
pattern can be found in connection with the Present Structure, which is selected as 
least desirable by more Northern European than Southern Europeans.  
Returning to Figure 3 above, some findings emerge when examining the 
plot of approval means. First, there is a significant12 split along the four RACs on the 
Present Structure. The North Sea and NWW RACs both disapprove of the Present 
Structure, whereas participants from the Pelagic and SWW RACs fall between neutrality 
and approval of the current system. Consequently, the drive for reform seems 
considerably stronger in the North Sea and NWW RACs. 
Likewise, the results for the CMSC model draw an interesting picture. 
The approval-disapproval rating (Figure 3) for all participants for this model averages 
to 3.00, an indication of exact neutrality or an average of two extremes. Moreover, the 
mean plots reveal that this model sits closest to neutral for all four RACs under 
observation (North Sea, 3.14; NWW, 3.03; Pelagic, 3.05; SWW, 2.86). Looking at Table 
1 and the frequencies for selection as least desirable model, for which we have not 
provided a table, reveals a sort of ‘love it, or hate it’ dichotomy. The North Sea RAC 
displays this phenomenon most clearly as eight (23.5 per cent) North Sea participants 
selected the model as the top choice and seven (20 per cent) chose it as the least 
desirable model. A possible explanation to this might be, that among our models this 
one is likely associated with the largest number of actual practical variations, which 
differ significantly in terms of ‘how far’ they will take regionalisation (Hegland, 
Ounanian and Raakjær 2012). Moreover, this particular model is not as strongly 
institutionalised and might lack the regional identity that many seem to look for in 
regionalisation but to others may be viewed as attraction. 
The RFCOMO model ranked highest in terms of top choice (Table 1), 
exceeding the next top rated model, RFMO by 10 per cent. In terms of approval means 
(Figure 3), the RFMO model averages to a level associated with the greatest degree of 
overall approval (2.50) and the co-management version is associated with slightly 
lower levels of approval (2.64). Notably, as well, in relation to least desirable model, 
these two variations of regional management organisation models receive the lowest 
                                                 
10 The Fisher’s exact produced a value of 0.06, which confirmed significant association between 
primary RAC and top choice of model. 
11 The Fisher’s exact value of 0.01 confirmed significant association between geographic affiliation and 
least desirable model.  
12 The analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirms the statistical significance in the difference in approval 
means by RAC (F=10.07, R2=0.21, p-value=0.001). 




share of selections, both drawing only 3.51 per cent, indicating that these are 
generally favourably perceived and appear as the worst options to very few. The 
approval mean of the RMMO is 2.81, which places it close to the two other regional 
management organisation models. However, the RMMO attracts slightly less top 
choices than the RFMO and considerably less than the RFCOMO. In general the three 
regional management organisation models score relatively high without exhibiting the 
love-hate dichotomy of the CMSC model. The preference for the RFCOMO reflects well 
that many are, as discussed earlier in this article, looking towards regionalisation as an 
opportunity to bring stakeholders closer to the decision-making process. 
In general, in terms of model preferences, it should be noted that the 
Pelagic RAC remains an outlier. The survey participants from the Pelagic RAC are less 
enthused by the models outlined and are less hostile to the current system. Likely, for 
the Pelagic RAC a special solution will have to be made, like it has in the current 
framework, where the Pelagic RAC and the Long Distance RAC exist as the only two 
structured along certain types of fishing rather than along a geographical region. 
 
Perceptions of the Archetypes across the Stakeholder Community 
Although the number of participants in each stakeholder category is not uniform and 
neither does the type of stakeholder dictate preference for particular models, Table 2 
aims to illustrate the diversity of preferences, but also the general convergence of 
preference for regional management organisation models.  
 
Table 2. Top Choice Model by Survey Participant Type 
 









None of the Above 5.5 % 6.7 % 15.4 % 0 % 0 % 
Frequency 3 1 2 0 0 
Present Structure 14.6 % 13.3 % 0 % 0 % 13.3 % 
Frequency 8 2 0 0 2 
Nationalisation 7.3 % 6.67 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
Frequency 4 1 0 0 0 
Reg. Fish. Mgmt Org 20.0 % 26.7 % 0 % 22.2 % 13.3 % 
Frequency 11 4 0 2 2 
Reg. Fish. Co-Mgmt 
Org 25.5 % 20.0 % 61.5 % 11.1 % 26.7 % 
Frequency 14 3 8 1 4 
Reg. Marine Mgmt 
Org 5.5 % 26.7 % 23.1 % 33.3 % 40.0 % 
Frequency 3 4 3 3 6 
Cooperative MSC 21.8 % 0 % 0 % 33.3 % 6.7 % 
Frequency 12 0 0 3 1 
 
(N=107. Percentage and frequency both presented) 
 
As evidenced by Table 2, the three models in the theme of regional management 
organisations gather significant support among all types of survey participants. 
Noteworthy, however, is the limited support for the RMMO among industry survey 
participants compared to other groups. This supports the finding reported earlier, that 
industry puts less value on the issue of integrated management in the context of 
regionalisation than other groups included in the survey. 




Although not statistically significant due to the few conservation representatives, it 
can be noted that eight of the 13 conservationists support the RFCOMO model, which 
suggests that stakeholders—and thereby not necessarily only the industry—should 
have more say in management. It might be in this light that the less enthusiastic view 
of the industry upon this model compared to that of the conservationist should be 
seen; parts of the industry may well view this as a model where they compared to the 
current RACs potentially risk losing a privileged role, since the industry presently 
occupies two-thirds of the seats on the RACs.  
 
 
Discussion and Implications for Policy 
 
So where does this leave us in terms of mapping a way forward for the CFP? Or in 
other words: what are the implications for policy? 
As described, regionalisation is widely perceived as a compelling way to 
approach a range of problems that the governance system of the CFP is suffering 
under. In particular two perceived values of regionalisation seem worth highlighting 
in this this context; namely, on one hand, the general issue of increased legitimacy 
deriving from getting the decision-making process closer to those subjected to 
decisions and, on the other hand, the specific issue of increased ability to respond 
appropriately to regional fisheries management challenges with tailor-made 
solutions—preferably building on detailed local or regional knowledge. In 
combination with the results from our survey (see Table 1), which shows that almost 
80 per cent of the participants prefer one of the ‘true’ models of regionalisation 
(RFMO, RFCOMO, RMMO, or CMSC) over an alternative approach (‘None of the above’, 
‘Present structure’, or ‘Nationalisation’), there seems to be a strong case for moving 
the CFP towards a more regionalised state along the lines of one or a combination of 
the models. 
Nevertheless, that there are strong reasons and a wish to move towards 
regionalisation does not translate into one specific vision for regionalisation. As 
described, there is a range of issues in relation to building regionalisation in practice 
where perceptions differ. Opinions diverge in particular on what authorities to 
regionalise, notably the question of advisory versus decision-making powers, and the 
role to be played by various regional actors, particularly the balance between 
(fisheries sector) stakeholders on one side and governmental authorities on the other. 
Consequently, whereas there is widespread agreement on what regionalisation could 
potentially deliver, there is less agreement on how a regionalised CFP governance 
system might look like. 
A defining cleavage in the regionalisation debate is, as mentioned, the 
question of the level of de facto authority that should be placed at the regional level. 
Here opinions differ on what can to some extent be understood a scale ranging from 
advisory powers only, over decision-making powers on smaller matters, to decision-
making powers on a wide range of issues. Keys to understanding the difference in 
perceptions on this issue include diverging perceptions of what is legally possible, 
what is reasonable from a democratic point-of-view, as well as the importance placed 
on maintaining a ‘level playing-field’ across the EU. 
The issue of the level of involvement of stakeholders at the regional 
level constitutes another contentious issue in the debate. Here the division arises 
between those emphasising that regionalisation should include moves towards more 
genuine co-management, and those who for various reasons prefer keeping 




stakeholders at arms’ length from the decision-making process by continuing the 
current modest involvement of stakeholders. Besides the more traditional legitimacy 
and compliance arguments for increased (fisheries sector) stakeholder involvement, 
further advances towards co-management would, some argue, facilitate the sharing of 
costs between the fisheries sector itself and the public, thereby potentially reducing 
the presently very costly process of fisheries management. On the other hand, there 
are from various sides, including fisheries sector stakeholders themselves, concerns as 
to the readiness of the sector to take on this kind of responsibility. Moreover, the more 
ambitious co-management solutions might be legally more complex and 
democratically more questionable to put into practice than solutions where the 
decision-making authorities are kept clearly within the realm of accountable, public 
authorities. 
The firm dismissal of the nationalisation option, the mixed to negative 
feelings towards the present structure and the low number of people indicating a 
preference for another model than those outlined, leaves us with a situation where, 
although there are frustrations with the EU bureaucracy, fisheries stakeholders do 
generally coalesce on the idea of unified management strategies for shared resources. 
However, they look towards more of these unified management strategies being 
developed for and exercised at a regional level; though there are indications that this 
wish is stronger in the North Sea and NWW RACs than in the Pelagic and SWW RACs.  
Of our four ‘true’ regionalisation models—RFMO, RFCOMO, RMMO, and 
CMSC—it is notable that the RMMO, which presupposes integrated management of the 
various maritime sectors, received relatively few ‘Top choice’ nominations from the 
group of industry stakeholders. The same lukewarm feelings towards maritime 
integration and ecosystem-based approaches among industry stakeholders were also 
reflected in our results on the questions on this as an outcome of regionalisation. The 
fisheries sector stakeholders’ general hesitance to pick ecosystem-based management 
as one of the primary outcomes of regionalisation, indicates that fostering buy-in of 
this key stakeholder segment is a necessary step prior to the possible development of a 
governance system that builds institutional structures specifically intended to integrate 
fisheries with broader maritime management, which certainly does make sense from 
the perspective of ecosystem-based management and is likely also the reason for this 
being the overall top choice among scientists. 
In contrast, it is not the lukewarm reception by the stakeholder 
community that leads us to suggest that the RFCOMO may also not be the most 
appropriate choice as a general model for regionalisation. Rather, this model was well 
received among industry stakeholders and conservationists alike. Nevertheless, the 
concern for stakeholder preparedness voiced by several of our interviewees seems a 
valid intervention. In fact, the RFCOMO to some extent reflects a one-size-fits-all fix 
that potentially fails to acknowledge regional differences. In contrast the RFMO, as we 
have outlined it, remains open to varying degrees of stakeholder involvement at 
regional level being developed over time. In this sense, the RFMO remains more true to 
the philosophy behind regionalisation than the RFCOMO—at least as a standardised 
solution to roll out over the entire EU maritime space. 
Effectively, with the above in mind we are left two feasible ways 
forward towards regionalisation of the CFP: a minimalist Cooperative Member State 
Council model and a more ambitious Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 
model. The preference among stakeholders for the RFMO compared to the CMSC echoes 
the calls for a true commitment to integration of local knowledge, increased 
stakeholder engagement, and the need for more tailor-made management. To many, 




the RACs have not gone far in terms of true stakeholder engagement in the decisions, 
which impact EU fisheries conservation. The CMSC, which also attracts a number of 
top choice selections, may not to the same extent deliver the same level of 
commitment or the increase of stakeholder influence wished for but may still stand as 
an attractive pragmatic next step towards more developed regionalisation, which may 
explain that of all our models this one most clearly divides opinions.  
 Based on our analysis, we are of the opinion that the most appropriate 
and forward-looking move in the coming reform would be towards a solution building 
on the principles of the RFMO model, as we have outlined it. Though the CMSC model 
has the potential to deliver the benefits of regionalisation, it would in combination 
with a strong wish from the stakeholder community of moving in the direction of 
regionalisation appear as lacking in commitment. A move towards a RFMO solution 
would in contrast signal commitment to regional solutions and expertise, as well as 
point forward in the direction of further development of the ecosystem approach to 
management.  
We acknowledge of course that deciding on the RFMO approach as the 
appropriate end goal does not mean ‘end of the story’. A range of challenges remain 
and there are multiple issues to sort out but making a commitment to this approach 
would give guidance in the search for solutions. For further discussion of the way 
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Abstract The 2002 Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reform introduced the Regional 
Advisory Councils (RACs) to enhance stakeholder involvement and correct one of the 
policy’s primary deficiencies, its lack of legitimacy arising from stakeholder 
involvement. While some criticize the 2002 reform as not going far enough to 
alleviate problems of lacking process and content legitimacy, in certain ways the RACs 
may be thought of as representing an interim institutional stage, facilitating better 
information sharing and cultivating stakeholder relationships. Based on a survey of 
RAC participants, this paper illuminates the current capacities and functions of the 
RACs. The paper reveals that the RACs possess additional—often not sufficiently 
recognised—roles and values to the advice they produce as they facilitate 
understanding across and within sectors and interest groups and act as key purveyors 
of information. Additionally, the data also shows mixed feelings of impact among 





The 2002 Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reform introduced a novel set of 
stakeholder bodies, the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs), to provide advice 
primarily to the Commission of the European Communities (Commission) on matters 
pertaining to the fisheries in a defined geographic area or relating to specific fisheries. 
Following good governance principles, which emphasise the importance of public or 
user group participation in policy-making, the EU attempted in this way to address the 
CFP’s poor record of low process and content legitimacy by utilising the strong link 
between stakeholder participation and legitimacy, which can be understood as an 
internalized obligation to comply with rules (Raakjær Nielsen 2003). Nonetheless, 
soon after the 2002 CFP reform was in place, questions regarding the actual extent of 
the stakeholder involvement in European-level fisheries management continued to 
arise (Gray and Hatchard 2003). 
Presently, the RACs manifest an intermediary institutional level between the 
central EU and member state levels oriented toward particular marine regions (and 
specific fisheries). RAC membership comprises fishing industry and non-industry 
stakeholders from the member states who share stocks, habitats, and interests in the 
defined region. With another decadal CFP reform developing, the question is whether 
the RACs have delivered what their architects had hoped or if indeed they merely 





represent relatively weak institutional structures with the weight of power remaining 
at the central EU entities. For a perspective from those involved, it behoves us to 
investigate the RACs’ current capacities and their memberships’ opinions on their 
functioning. The article focuses on the empirical findings related to the RACs and their 
membership through comparisons among four RACs surveyed, stakeholder type, and 
participant’s geographic affiliation.1 
 
 
Background and Methodology 
 
As aforementioned, the RACs came into existence as a product of the 2002 CFP reform 
in an effort to correct one of the policy’s primary deficiencies, a lack of stakeholder 
involvement as identified by the Commission’s 2001 Green Paper (Commission 
2001). Gray and Hatchard (2003) contend that the Commission’s statements related to 
the 2002 reform and surrounding discourse exceeded the detectable change attributed 
to the policy. The central criticism laid against the structure of the RACs is that 
stakeholder input is restricted to the pre-decision phase while the EU central level 
retains its decision-making authority (Gray and Hatchard 2003). The authors are blunt 
with their criticism: ‘All these reservations and restrictions seriously question the 
Commission’s commitment to the principle of participation as a right or entitlement 
of stakeholders’ (Gray and Hatchard 2003: 548). However, co-management, defined 
as a sharing of management between users or stakeholders and state authority, takes 
many different forms ranging in levels of informative participation to devolved 
authority (Sen and Raakjær Nielsen 1996; Hegland, Ounanian and Raakjær 2012).  
Moreover, literature points to other benefits of forums whose sole purpose 
centres on soliciting comments and opinions from the constituency (Halvorsen 2003, 
Chase, Decker, and Lauber 2004). Interactions between different stakeholder groups 
often afforded in such settings benefit both process and content legitimacy. In the first 
instance, stakeholders put a face to a divergent opinion and in ‘high quality processes’ 
a developed rapport may ease arguments on contentious issues and initiate solutions 
(Halvorsen 2003, Dalton 2006). Related to improved content legitimacy, the exposure 
to viewpoints other than ones own fosters understanding of agency or ministerial 
decisions and compromises often necessary in policy areas like fisheries management 
(Halvorsen 2003). Furthermore, in cases where stakeholders feel satisfied with the 
facilitation of the participation process, good will toward the convening entity or 
governmental body can manifest as confidence in the agency’s abilities to handle 
other policy matters and make decisions (Halvorsen 2003). 
The question as to what constitutes a successful participatory process—be it 
related to user groups, wider stakeholders, or the general public—has received great 
attention over the past decade. Dalton (2005) outlines active participant involvement, 
complete information exchange, fair decision-making, efficient administration, and 
positive participant interactions as the five foci in a framework related to high quality 
participation in Marine Protected Areas. In an assessment of existing theoretical and 
empirical work on participation processes in natural resource management, two 
central conditions emerge: a) learning and gaining information via participation and 
                                                 
1 The survey comprises three sections: Background, Current RAC Functioning and Capacity, and finally 
Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy and Regionalisation, of which the first two sections are 
covered in this article. The findings related to the final section of the survey appear in Hegland, 
Ounanian and Raakjær (2012a) in this volume. 





b) granting some decision-making power to participants. So, has the absence of 
decision-making authority undermined the value of the RACs? 
Holding to the issue of decision-making authority, Gray and Hatchard (2003) 
argue that the Commission’s stated interest in increased compliance through 
stakeholder input is largely undercut by keeping the RACs consultative in nature. The 
authors suggest therefore morphing the Regional Advisory Councils into Regional 
Management Councils in order to correct the wayward reform of 2002. But perhaps 
this criticism from 2003 undervalues the evolutionary aspect of institutional reform 
and neglects the need to build institutional capacity? In fisheries the gradual 
development of stakeholder forums often improves the management system as the 
slow pace affords time for collective learning and information sharing leading to more 
successful stakeholder participation forums (Hanna 1995). Additionally, public 
participation literature asserts that those involved in processes become better 
informed over time (Chase, Decker and Lauber 2004), which adds to this notion of 
building capacity. Admittedly, Gray and Hatchard (2003) do point to such benefits as 
they conclude that the 2002 reform did improve communication between the 
Commission and EU fisheries stakeholders.  
The Commission itself also reaches the latter conclusion in its brief and 
overall positive review of the functioning of the RACs from 2008 (Commission 2008), 
which contains other remarks on the positive contributions of the RACs to the CFP 
governance system, such as improved communication between different stakeholder 
groups and the increasing number of recommendations submitted. However, the 
Commission’s evaluation focuses on the technical functioning of the RACs such as 
geographical coverage, composition of RAC bodies, and operational procedures. Gray 
and Hatchard’s scepticism remains certainly deserved in the context of the evolution 
of the CFP. Nonetheless, as their review came only one year after the reform, it will 
likely prove beneficial to look at the RACs after a few years of operation.  
 
Methodology 
Survey participants were solicited for this study between February and April 2010. 
The survey data yield comparisons between the priorities and challenges of four RACs, 
specifically the North Sea, North Western Waters (NWW), South Western Waters 
(sww) and Pelagic RACs. Among the RACs included, the Pelagic RAC faces unique 
circumstances in comparison to the other three because of the migratory nature of 
pelagic stocks and resulting quota sharing with non-EU countries. As a consequence of 
the survey coverage, the data obtained do not illuminate the specific preferences of 
the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Long Distance RACs; yet the overarching themes and 
problems associated with the CFP likely apply to these bodies as well.  
Due to the diversity of the population, respondents had the option to access the 
survey in English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese. We defined the population as 
those who attended a General Assembly, Executive Committee, or first instance of a 
Working Group meeting in 2009. In effect, the survey population totalled 329 
potential participants. Unlike other assessments of the RACs—including one 
completed by the Commission itself—which review the RACs through the seven 
secretariats, this research directly contacted individual participants rather than 
soliciting an aggregated report from each individual RAC. The survey totals 138 
observations, of which 100 participants completed an online questionnaire, 30 
completed a paper version, and eight partially responded online providing enough 





answers to merit inclusion2. The response rate for the survey stands at 41.9 per cent 
(138/329). Participants ranged in age from 23 to 78 years with both arithmetic mean 
and median coming to 46 years. The survey participants included 100 men and 38 
women. For a complete description of the methodology please refer to Raakjær et al. 
(2010).  
Part of the survey intended to measure the challenges facing the RACs and 
assess if RAC participation has altered stakeholders’ trust, access to information, and 
other markers relevant to the success of devolved decision-making. The RACs, along 
with the Advisory Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA), represent the 
primary stakeholder forums in the current CFP arrangement, thus if regionalisation—
through decentralising and possibly devolving power—is to deliver better 
management, we should appraise how well the present model operates.  
 
 
Profile of a RAC Participant 
 
With the longest existing RAC (North Sea) marking seven years in November 2011, 
these forums are in the early stages of development. At this juncture, policy-makers 
and EU fisheries stakeholders have little comprehensive knowledge of who attends 
RAC meetings. Many existing reports on the RACs are, as mentioned, mediated by the 
RAC Secretariats and thus do not provide a direct account from the stakeholders 
themselves. Therefore, this section seeks to provide a profile of who attends these 
meetings and illuminate patterns or discrepancies in RAC participation.  
While compiling the survey population it was clear that a portion attend 
meetings in more than one RAC. In the interest of making inter-RAC comparisons, we 
asked participants to choose the primary RAC in which they were most involved. The 
survey garnered a relatively even distribution of the four RACs under investigation: 
SWW (39), North Sea (37), NWW (32), and Pelagic (28).3 As it will appear later, the 
designated primary RAC provided a means of comparison to analyse the patterns of 
opinions and perceptions pertaining to the RAC performance.  
For the most part, survey respondents demonstrated a great deal of experience 
in fisheries management. In terms of experience, about twenty per cent of participants 
fell into each of the following categories: 11-20 years, 21-30 years, and greater than 
30 years. Twenty-nine per cent worked in fisheries for 2-10 years with seven per cent 
working in fisheries for less than two years.  
Industry stakeholders form a strong presence in RAC meeting attendance with 
nearly half the survey participants indicating their affiliation with this category. The 
survey provided fifteen different participant categories based on those mentioned in 
the Council of the European Union (Council) decision, which forms the legal 
foundation of the RACs (Council 2004). In our account, where we have grouped some 
of the original categories, Industry includes both catching and processing sectors. 
Interest organisations related to recreational fishing, women in fishing, regional 
development, and those who selected the ‘Multiple Interests’ option combined into 
the Multiple Interests category. Conservation, primarily populated by those working 
for environmental NGOs, were left separate from Multiple Interests stakeholders 
                                                 
2 Some participants opted not to answer particular questions. Thus, most questions have less than 138 
responses. 
3 In the web survey participants were required to choose one of the four RACs; however, two persons 
responding to the paper version did not choose a primary RAC. 





because, although many are not explicitly industry related, those groups are 
nevertheless tangentially linked to extractive interests.4  The full breakdown by 
participant type is summarised in Figure 1 with the divisions for each RAC included in 
Figure 2 further beneath. Interestingly, none of the survey respondents chose the 
aquaculture or consumer categories. Although the Commission voiced an explicit 
intention to include these groups in the RACs, it seems as though they are basically 
opting out, either due to lack of interest or because outreach efforts have been 
insufficient.  
 





Combining the number of Multiple Interests with Conservation respondents, the 
survey’s response population approaches the two-thirds/one-third ratio of industry to 
other interests mandated by the EU policy for the RACs (Council 2004). Such a 
mirroring of the RAC membership reflects positively on the representativeness of the 




                                                 
4 Whereas women in fishing and regional development interests in the context of the RACs are often 
closely associated with the commercial fishing industry, this is generally not the case for recreational 
fishing interests. These interests—at European level predominantly represented by the European 
Anglers’ Alliance (EAA)—most often find themselves in opposition to the commercial industry. 
However, at the same time it would not be reasonable to group these representatives within the 
Conservation category, since they do represent an interest and an industry that base activities 
predominantly on the extraction of fisheries resources. 









(N=136. Two respondents did not indicate their RAC) 
 
Although there is some variation in the interest composition of participants when 
organised by primary RAC, Figure 2 shows that in all four RACs Industry stakeholders 
take the largest share of respondents. Notably, the Pelagic RAC has no respondents 
under Multiple Interests and the smallest share of Conservation representatives. 
Meanwhile, Multiple Interests stakeholders are more represented in the SWW RAC than 
in the other RACs.  
RAC participants cover a range of countries, some of which are not members of 
the EU, but that still have people attending meetings as observers, scientists, or other 
experts. The highest percentage of participants came from France and Spain, which 
reflects the prevalence and importance of fishing in those countries. Additionally, 
France borders all four of the RAC areas under observation, which may well have 
bolstered the number of French participants in this particular survey. The number of 
respondents from Denmark and Scotland5, both totalling 8.8 per cent (of the 137 who 
responded to question), also mimics the relatively larger share of fisheries interests. 







                                                 
5 Participants who specifically wrote Scotland populated their own category and are not included in the 
total of United Kingdom participants. Those who simply wrote United Kingdom comprise their own 
separate category. 





Table 1: Geographic Distribution of Survey Participants 
 
Geographic Affiliation Frequency Percentage 
Belgium 3 2.2 
Denmark 12 8.8 
Germany 2 1.5 
Netherlands 9 6.6 
United Kingdom 12 8.8 
Scotland 12 8.8 
Ireland 7 5.1 
Poland 1 0.7 
France 28 20.4 
Portugal 8 5.8 
Spain 20 14.6 
Europe/European Union 16 11.7 
International 5 3.7 
Norway 1 0.7 
Faroe Islands 1 0.7 
TOTAL  137 100.0 
(N=137. One respondent did not indicate geographic affiliation) 
The number of observations for each individual country is too low for reliable 
analyses; however, the country of affiliation has been used to define a North-South 
category. South comprises France, Portugal, and Spain with the remaining countries 
of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Scotland, and the United 
Kingdom populating the North category. Those who designated ‘Europe’ or 
‘International’ as their geographic affiliation combined with Poland6, Norway and the 
Faroe Islands to form an Other grouping, which due to its diversity is generally not 
included in the analyses related to geographical affiliation. 
 
 
Current RAC Functioning 
 
While there is a clear mandate as to why the RACs exist and their legal foundation, 
meeting attendants join these forums for reasons other than the sole purpose of 
providing stakeholder advice. Because many groups of participants total less than ten 
respondents, the analysis focuses on Industry, Multiple Interests, and Conservation. 
For Industry participants improving stakeholder advice and networking were the main 
motivations with a slightly lower emphasis on serving an associated constituency. The 
Conservation representatives also fall in line with Industry counterparts in that they 
see less of a role in serving a constituency; however, for Conservation7 the difference 
between improving advice and serving those represented by the organisation is not 
statistically significant. Multiple Interests participants view, ‘Serve those I represent 
in my organisation’ as a very important8 motivation for participation. 
                                                 
6 Although Poland is an EU member state, unlike Norway or the Faroe Islands, it was included in the 
Other group because it did not fit into the North-South dichotomy.  
7 One Conservation participant selected ‘Not applicable’ on the ‘Serve those I represent in my 
organisation’ measure, but as previously noted this is not included in the associated mean.  
8 The associated mean is 4.88 for a measure with an upper inclusive limit of 5, which equated ‘Very 
important’ on the survey. Statistical t-tests show that Multiple Interest respondents rate this measure 





Importantly, overall all six of the motivations presented in the survey are associated 
with greater than neutral importance. There is, however, a split between the top and 
bottom three. ‘Improve stakeholder advice in the EU’, ‘Network with other 
stakeholders’, and ‘Serve those I represent in my organisation’9 prove to be well-
established motivations for participation. The priority placed on these reasons is 
echoed in the three primary stakeholder groups: Industry, Multiple Interests, and 
Conservation. Nonetheless, the bottom three motivations, ‘Communicate directly with 
Commission representatives’, ‘Interact with scientists who provide fisheries advice’, 
and ‘Observe’ still measure above neutral; but there is a significant difference 
between the motivations ranking third (‘Network with other stakeholders’) and fourth 
(‘Communicate directly with Commission representatives’).10  
Supplementing the statistical findings of the survey, comments left by some 
respondents underscore that participation in RAC meetings helps stakeholders stay up-
to-date on happenings in fisheries management and the perspectives of fellow 
participants. Additionally, respondents indicated that the RACs are a unique entity in 
the EU fisheries policy constellation and thus engaging in such a forum is somewhat 
novel.   
 
Access to Information 
As alluded to in the discussion on motivations, the RACs have proven to be an asset to 
stakeholders not only as advice forums, but also through the increased collection of 
and access to information, a finding also suggested by the Commission’s review of 
the functioning of the RACs (Commission 2008). With the option to choose the two 
main information sources sought in relation to the impacts and implementation of EU 
fisheries management, participants designated the RAC as a primary source. Figure 3 
beneath summarises the findings for each RAC, which illustrates the strong preference 
for the RAC as an information source, in particular for those in the North Sea, Pelagic 
and SWW RACs. The NWW RAC displays a slightly different pattern with a stronger 
preference for ‘Information from industry groups and associations’ as well as ‘Other’ 
sources; however, the RAC category still fields a number of observations for those 
from the NWW RAC. 
When subsequently asked about which specific RAC information sources 
participants employ, written communication from the RAC proves to be the most 
popular. Participants also rely more on industry representatives for information as 
opposed to their non-industry counterparts; however, stakeholder type has some 
bearing on these findings as discussed below. Notably, very few participants do not 
consult RAC materials at all.  
There may not be as much information seeking and sharing across 
organisational lines, however. Industry, Multiple Interests, and Conservation 
participants differ slightly in the sources of information that they seek. Likely the 
                                                                                                                                            
statistically higher than Conservation (t=3.72, p-value of 0.001) and Industry (t=1.79, p-value of 0.08) 
counterparts.  
9 Participants who categorise themselves as a non-interest organisation (i.e. member state 
representatives, scientists, EU Commission representatives) felt some of the questions in the series are 
not applicable, which is somewhat expected for these groups. Those opting for not applicable on the 
motivations measures total to less than ten and are evenly dispersed throughout the different participant 
types. However, on the motivation measure stating, ‘Serve those I represent in my organisation,’ 
fourteen of 135 participants chose ‘not applicable’, many of which fell into the Science/Research, EU 
Commission, and Other categories. 
10 T-test shows statistical difference between means of 4.31 and 3.85 (t=3.66, p-value of 0.001). 





preference for information from industry representatives in the overall question and 
the RAC-specific question can be attributed to the preponderance of Industry 
participants in the survey.  
  




(N=X. Respondents were free to choose two answers from the list) 
 
Industry respondents are less likely to seek information from NGOs and other non-
industry groups, as only 3 per cent often consult such sources (overall question), and 
only 11 per cent of the Industry category seek information from non-industry 
representatives based on the RAC-specific question. In comparison, 47 per cent of 
Conservation respondents consult NGO sources (overall question) and 33 per cent seek 
non-industry RAC representatives (RAC specific question). Nevertheless, Conservation 
respondents still consult industry groups and associations, as 33 per cent of this group 
select the category in the overall question and 47 per cent of the Conservation 
category consult industry representatives of the RAC for information (RAC-specific 
question).  
Finally and importantly, RAC meeting participants themselves see the 
establishment of the RACs as a boon to information access. The vast majority of those 
surveyed say the RAC ‘somewhat improved’ or ‘greatly improved’ access to 
information with 41 per cent electing the latter. While the survey included the option 

































felt as though the RAC has only slightly improved information access. Table 2 below 
details the full set of responses on this measure. 
  
Table 2: Number of Participants Selecting the Answer Options for the Extent to which the 
Establishment of the RAC has Improved Access to Information 
 
 Improved very little Somewhat improved Greatly improved Total 
North Sea 4 19 10 33 
NWW 3 15 14 32 
Pelagic 2 13 10 25 
SWW 2 18 17 37 
TOTAL 11 65 51 127 
 
(N=127. No respondents chose the fourth answer choice: ‘No improvement at all’) 
 
The impression that the RACs have claimed a noteworthy role in information sharing 
system related to the CFP governance system is also covered in the Commission’s 
review, which encourages further development in the area (Commission 2008). 
While the RACs appear successful in aggregating and disseminating 
information, the message is more mixed looking at the data on access to scientific 
expertise to support the work of the RACs. Whereas access to technical and practical 
fisheries knowledge11  is mostly available (presumably through the stakeholder 
representatives on the RAC and their networks), the perceived availability drops for 
expertise on ecosystems and fish stocks (i.e. biologists and ecologists). The 
perception of availability sinks even further in relation to economic expertise, and 
even more so for social science expertise. Except for the Pelagic RAC, all RACs are 
significantly below neutral on economic expertise12 and all four RACs rank below 
neutral for availability of social science expertise.  
 
Table 3: Means Associated with the Availability of Certain Forms of Knowledge and Expertise in Each 
of the RACs 
 
 North Sea NWW Pelagic SWW 
Technical fisheries knowledge 4.0 3.5 4.24 3.46 
Practical fisheries knowledge 4.18 3.44 4.28 3.31 
Scientific expertise on the 
ecosystem and fish stocks 3.18 2.72 3.48 3.06 
Economic expertise 2.47 2.34 3.17 2.49 
Social science expertise 2.18 2.03 2.58 2.36 
 
(N=X. 5 equals ‘always available’, 1 equals ‘never available’) 
                                                 
11 Technical fisheries knowledge relates to matters roughly associated with gear and vessel types. 
Practical fisheries knowledge is mostly gained from day-to-day operations from those who work 
regularly on the water or in onshore fishing related industries. While the survey intended to capture any 
difference in the level of availability of experiential fisheries knowledge through the ‘practical fisheries 
knowledge’ measure, it is likely that many respondents did not detect the nuance in our employment of 
‘technical’ versus ‘practical’ wording. 
12 Neutral is associated with the value of 3; one sample mean-comparison test shows the following: 
North Sea t=  -3.58, p-value: 0.001; NWW t=-4.29, p-value: 0.001; SWW t=-3.20, p=value: 0.01. For 
social science expertise one sample mean-comparison test gave the following results: North Sea t=-
6.47, p-value: 0.001; NWW t=-6.37, p-value: 0.001; Pelagic t=-2.46, p-value: 0.02; SWW t=-3.66, 
p=value: 0.01.  





Comparing RACs on the perceived availability of expertise, there are a few key 
differences to highlight. While all the RACs are unanimous in the feeling that social 
science expertise is unavailable, the Pelagic RAC is significantly more optimistic about 
the availability of economic expertise.13 For scientific expertise on ecosystems and 
fish stocks the NWW and Pelagic RACs stand in stark contrast as five of 32 NWW 
participants feel that such advice is available in comparison to 13 of 25 Pelagic 
counterparts, who feel that way.14 The low scores for economic and social science 
expertise resonate with a suggestion in the Commission’s review to expand the notion 
of scientists needed to support the RACs to economists among others (Commission 
2008). The expertise gap, so to speak, highlights a shortage in resources that would be 
helpful, if not required, were the RACs to evolve from advisory bodies to decision-
making entities.  
Respondent comments underscore the importance of knowledge and expertise 
for the advisory capacity of the RAC. Many emphasise that ‘built-in’ scientific 
expertise would improve debate and advice. Further comments clarify that socio-
economic expertise is largely unavailable while still strongly desired by participants. 
The overarching concern that the RACs do not have access to adequate and sustained 
resources comes through in many of the comments related to information and 
expertise. One respondent encapsulates the argument of many: 
 
The RAC was formed out of desire to work together to reach common 
objectives. The Commission supports these objectives but denies the RAC the 
necessary resources to achieve them. Knowledge and expertise are costly but 
necessary and the RAC does well with the limited finance but could do so 
much better if properly funded (Comment 56). 
 
Feelings of Impact 
With some discussions of regionalisation suggesting that the RACs evolve into 
managerial or decision-making entities, it is interesting to gauge how participants feel 
about their level of impact in the present advisory role. The survey asked respondents, 
‘To what extent do you feel your organisation’s participation has impacted the 
decisions that change the course of fisheries management in the European Union?’ 
Seeing as some survey respondents do not represent an organisation, twelve of the 
130 who responded to the question chose, ‘Not applicable’. Of the remaining 118 
responses, over half selected ‘Somewhat impacted’. Thirty-six per cent were less 
optimistic, replying ‘Impacted very little’ and seven per cent felt their efforts had ‘No 
impact at all’. The smallest proportion, three per cent, reacted positively replying 
‘Greatly impacted’. Figure 4 divides the results of feelings of impact, highlighting a 
modest split among RACs. A total of 53 per cent of the North Sea and NWW RAC 
participants find that their organisation’s participation in the RAC ‘Impacted very 
little’ the course of fisheries management in the European Union. Pelagic respondents 
are less despondent, with only 26 per cent saying that their organisation has ‘Impacted 
very little’ to had ‘No impact at all’. Nonetheless, the RAC means for this measure are 
not statistically different.  
                                                 
13 The ANOVA statistical test revealed the difference among the four RACs (F=4.10, p-value: 0.01). 
Furthermore, 42 per cent of Pelagic respondents chose 4 or 5 (‘always available’) whereas 15 per cent 
or fewer chose the same response in the other three RACs.  
14 The ANOVA statistical test revealed the difference among the four RACs (F=3.76, p-value: 0.01). 





Moreover, it is difficult to draw conclusions from these results alone. The 
interpretation of the feelings of impact can be quite subjective depending on the 
perspective. Those coming from the ‘glass is half full’ paradigm would cite that over 
half the respondents feels that they make a moderate to high impact; the more 
sceptical or cynical among us might be surprised to see that the RACs have in some 
way made stakeholders feel that they are better heard. On the other hand, an equally 
large share of participants do not feel that their role in these advice forums has much 
impact on the policy outcomes—a major tenet of the introduction of the RACs. We can 
probably best employ these results as a baseline to compare as the RACs continue their 
work or as their roles transforms in the context of new governance arrangements.  
 
Figure 4: The Extent to which Survey Respondents Felt their Organisation’s Participation in the RAC 




(N=130. 12 responses of ‘Not applicable’ not included in graphs) 
 
Indeed comments from the survey provide these two different perspectives on impact. 
On the more hopeful side, one participant notes, ‘I do not think that the RACs’ have 
had as great an impact as they should have had. Hopefully this will change in the near 
future’ (Comment 101). Some do not put as much emphasis on the RACs, but see it 
more as one piece in a larger operation to improve fisheries management in Europe, 
‘It is not a principal influencing mechanism but important mechanism for improved 
understanding between Member States and RACs and helpful to input into policy 
development’ (Comment 105).  
Of course, there are a number on the other side who feel frustrated by what 
they consider lack of attention by the Commission, as one Industry person responds, 
‘Not for lack of trying. I attend RAC meetings to put the views of fishermen to the 
Commission. I may as well stay at home but I take the opportunity’ (Comment 110). 





Many participants felt that the Commission does little in the way to support RAC 
recommendations and either ignores or goes on with previously outlined plans. Thus, 
while these results should be compared to subsequent findings on this topic, it would 
seem that the Commission does have room to grow in its attention to stakeholders to 
improve both process and content legitimacy.  
 
Trust and Understanding 
Overall, ‘Trust’ in industry, non-industry, and Commission range from no change to 
increase with none of the means indicating a decrease in trust due to participation in 
the RAC (see Table 4). The means for levels of change in ‘Understanding’ trend 
toward the increase end of the spectrum in comparison to the trust responses, which 
aligns with the plausible hypothesis that understanding of different stakeholder 
priorities, is easier to achieve than trust in those parties.  
 
Table 4: Means Associated with Increase or Decrease in Understanding and Trust for Different RAC 
Membership Categories for Overall Population 
 
 Understanding Trust 
Industry Stakeholders 2.34 2.54 
Non-Industry Stakeholders 2.59 2.76 
Commission Representatives 2.69 3.0 
  
(N=X. The survey asked, ‘Please score the degree to which your level of trust / understanding in the 
following groups has increased or decreased due to your participation in the RAC.’ 1 equals ‘greatly 
increased’ and 5 equals ‘greatly decreased’) 
 
For the full survey population, trust in industry stakeholders ranks significantly higher 
than the trust in Commission representatives and non-industry stakeholders. However, 
in the case of industry versus non-industry stakeholders, the large representation of 
industry members affects the outcome on this measure. Notably, few participants feel 
that their level of trust or understanding decreased through participation in the RAC, 
but interestingly the Commission is not as insulated. Roughly 40 per cent of Industry 
participants feel their trust in the Commission has decreased and about 20 per cent of 
those in the Conservation category feel the same way. Nevertheless, the overall trend 
of these measures reveals that communicating and working together in the RACs is 
associated with heighted feelings of connection across stakeholder type (see Figure 5 
beneath).  
 Participant comments echo the overall lower levels of positive change in levels 
of understanding and trust for the Commission. There is some skepticism toward the 
sincerity of the Commission’s interest in the industry perspective and questions as to 
whether the Commission understands the impact of its decisions (Comments 65, 68, 
72, 78). A respondent elucidates as such, ‘Regarding the EU, generally the 
representation is good and balanced although at times there seems to be almost a 
sense of giving lip-service to the industry and using the RAC as a tick box exercise to 
say they have consulted extensively with industry’ (Comment 65).  
 Comments on the survey from participants help contextualize the numerical 
findings for the trust and understanding measures. In terms of Industry respondents 
indicating that they experience increased levels of trust in fellow industry members, it 
seems as though that interactions on the RAC between industries from other member 
states have led to better understanding and subsequently heightened trust within the 
group. Nevertheless, Industry as well as Conservation and participants from other 





categories indicate that they detect that some RAC participants are more forthcoming 
than others, ‘I think some of the industry and non-industry stakeholders are much 
more open and transparent than others. Some still seem to forget the purpose of the 
RAC at times and pursue their own interests, over and above the interests of all the 
RAC members’ (Comment X), a sentiment echoed in other respondents’ comments. 
Some participants remain focused on their own interests and priorities, which in turn 
results in a mixed feeling of trust and understanding.  
 





(N=X. Reading guide: The first two bars from the left show the development of ‘trust in industry’ 
reported by respectively Industry and Conservation respondents. As an example, approximately 12 per 
cent of Industry respondents report that their trust in other industry actors has decreased by 
participating in the RAC. The third and fourth bars show the development of ‘trust in non-industry’; the 
fifth and sixth show the development of ‘trust in Commission’) 
 
Numerous participants underscore the developing relationship between environmental 
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interests of industry cloud other objectives that are valued by NGOs and other RAC 
participants. On the flip side, some industry members note frustration with the strong 
attention paid to certain conservation agendas by environmental NGO representatives. 
The ubiquity of the industry versus non-industry theme contributes to it being viewed 
as somewhat trite. Nonetheless, one respondent provided a rather colorful analogy for 
the working relationship between industry and non-industry factions, ‘Between the 
NGOs and the industry, it's not so much a matter of trust from my viewpoint but rather 
like an arranged marriage where you don’t choose each other as bedfellows but rub 
along for the benefit of the progeny (=policy outputs). We rub along and understand 
each other better than pre-RAC’ (Comment X). To continue with the metaphor, while 
there is a developing relationship, it seems as though we can stop short of describing 
it as marital bliss, though... 
 
Challenges of the RAC  
To better understand how the RACs operate and where they struggle to meet the 
requirements of operating as a forum for wider stakeholder participation, we 
examined the specific challenges and related levels of difficulty for processes 
surrounding consensus, communication, navigating differences in stakeholder 
priorities, and the like. The survey asked participants to score the difficulty associated 
with six different challenges related to RAC activities. Participants chose from a five-
point scale with 1 associated with ‘Very Easy’ moving up to 5 being ‘Very Difficult’. 
Additionally, if participants felt any of the challenges were not pertinent to them, they 
had the option to check ‘Not Applicable’. In addition to ranking the six challenges, 
the survey also asked participants to select the challenge ‘Most critical to the success 
of [the] RAC.’  
Overall there was a great deal of convergence on the difficulty of the 
challenges among the RACs and stakeholder types. Of the six different challenge 
dimensions, three measures are statistically different among the four RACs and another 
measure divides along geographic lines. Comparisons can be made among the RACs 
on these measures as well as comparisons among the challenge measures themselves 
within a particular RAC.   
Figure 6 beneath illustrates the three measures where the means for associated 
difficulty differ significantly among the RACs. To begin, ‘Reaching consensus’ ranked 
as one of the most difficult challenges for all four RACs. Although perceived as 
somewhat difficult in all RACs there are statistically significant differences between 
the NWW RAC at the top end of the range and the Pelagic RAC at the low end with the 
North Sea and SWW RACs falling in between.15  For the NWW RAC, ‘Reaching 
consensus’ scored significantly higher than any other of the challenges.16 Among the 
challenges presented, ‘Reaching consensus’ was the most frequently selected option 
for the challenge most critical to the RAC’s success. In the case of the North Sea, 
‘Reaching consensus’ was the second most frequently selected with one response less 
than ‘Cultivating better cooperation between industry and non-industry members’. 
Participants from the SWW RAC chose the consensus measure as the second highest 
priority to ‘Balancing small-scale versus large-scale fishing priorities’.  
 
                                                 
15 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) provides basis for statistical difference among four RACs on 
Consensus measure with F statistic of 2.40 and p-value of 0.07.  
16 The difference in means between ‘Reaching consensus’ (4.00) and ‘Addressing different national 
catching sector priorities’ (3.63), the second highest mean, was statistically significant at p=0.10, 
whereas all other measures were statistically different from consensus at levels of less than 0.05.  









(N=X. 1 equals ‘Very Easy’ and 5 equals ‘Very Difficult’) 
 
Building on the themes of trust in the previous section, one respondent ties together 
the importance of consensus and the challenge that lack of trust and understanding 
can present to this goal:  
 
One of the major challenges for the RACs (and a key driver for its success) is 
the need to build trust among members: it is necessary that RACs are not seen 
as a lobby organisation but a forum to provide advice on fisheries 
management measures for some particular fishing areas through sound 
evidence-based advice. In practice, consensus is difficult to achieve 
(especially when talking about reconciling biological and socio-economic 
objectives) because some members still put their own interests before the 
achievement of common goals (Comment 75). 
 
The RACs significantly differ on the measure of ‘Addressing different national 
catching sector priorities,’ which in turn is most pronounced in the division between 
the NWW and North Sea.17 The North Sea RAC participants view this challenge as 
significantly easier than participants in the NWW, SWW, and Pelagic RACs. By contrast, 
the NWW RAC grapples with this challenge more than the other RACs. The Pelagic and 
SWW RACs fall between the North Sea and NWW RACs and closely to one another with 
averages of 3.32 and 3.27 respectively. Figure 7 beneath shows the frequency 
distribution for the answers selected for this challenge grouped by each of the four 
surveyed RACs. 
Nearly two-thirds of the NWW respondents rank ‘Addressing different national 
catching sector priorities’ as somewhat difficult (score 4) to ‘Very difficult’ (score 5), 
whereas less than one-third of the North Sea respondents rate the challenge as such. 
Of the Pelagic RAC survey participants, nearly half regard the challenge as neutral. 
                                                 

























Furthermore, 48 per cent of the North Sea RAC respondents find the challenge 
somewhat easy (score 2) to ‘Very easy’ (score 1). Within the three other RACs, NWW, 
Pelagic, and SWW, respondents selecting those same categories amount to shares 
between 13 and 18 per cent. Additionally, four North Sea RAC respondents find this 
challenge to be ‘not applicable’, which is not reflected in the averages and the answer 
tabulations as aforementioned; by contrast none of the NWW participants believe this 
challenge is not relevant. One NWW participant observes, ‘As an outsider looking in I 
would say the NWW RAC at times seems to struggle to reach a consensus with some 
countries almost vetoing others’ (Comment 45) underscoring the findings on this 
question. Although we cannot say with certainty why this measure likely does not 
score high on difficulty for the North Sea, but the relative similarity of national fleet 
structures in the North Sea countries may be a contributing factor.  
 
Figure 7: Frequency Distribution of the Level of Difficulty Associated with ‘Addressing different 




(N=117. The raw number of participants is displayed in a pie graph to illustrate the differences in 
distribution especially for the North Sea and North Western Waters RAC ) 
 
There is a division between RACs on the difficulty of ‘Responding to specific advice 
requests (“firefighting”)’.18 Both the North Sea and NWW RACs experience greater 
difficulty with this challenge as compared to the Pelagic and SWW RACs. Both the 
Pelagic and the SWW RACs average to slightly below neutral with 2.95 and 2.91 
respectively, while the North Sea and NWW are slightly above the neutral mark with 
3.38 and 3.45 respectively. We speculate that this divide is due to the precarious 
situation of several stocks in the North Sea and to a lesser extent in other waters, 
                                                 
18 Once again, the ANOVA indicates statistical significance with F=2.75 with significance level p=0.05.   





which has led to more demands on providing advice to specific requests, often 
referred to as ‘firefighting’ as compared to the two remaining RACs. However, few 
participants from each of the RACs selected this challenge as the most critical, 
highlighting that it is in any case not one of the most salient issues to RAC 
participants. Nevertheless some respondents do see the need to tackle emerging 
problems as a hindrance to the long-term development, ‘The RAC's firefight most of 
the time leaving very little opportunity to create and deliver higher, longer term 
strategies. This is one of the glaring weaknesses’ (Comment 102). 
While not statistically different among the RACs, survey participants also 
struggle with the challenge of ‘Cultivating better cooperation between industry and 
non-industry interests’. For the North Sea RAC, this challenge ranks highest (3.67) of 
all presented, though in relation to some of the other challenges the difference is not 
statistically significant. However, 12 of the 35 North Sea respondents view the 
relationship between industry and non-industry members as the challenge most 
critical to the RAC’s success. The proximity of the consensus and industry/non-
industry means and the priority placed on them indicates that the North Sea RAC 
struggles with these two challenges, but also sees them as integral to its success. The 
NWW RAC (3.60) and SWW RAC (3.52) fall close to the overall mean and to the North 
Sea RAC average. The Pelagic RAC averages the lowest of the RACs on the industry 
and non-industry challenge (3.16)—statistically lower than the combined average of 
the other three RACs (3.60).19 Bear in mind though that more so than in any of the 
other RACs surveyed, the Industry stakeholders predominate the composition of 
Pelagic RAC respondents with few other stakeholders counterbalancing.  
The results from ‘Balancing small-scale vs. large-scale fishing priorities’ 
reveal an interesting division between participants from southern and northern 
Europe. Among the RACs, the SWW stands apart from the other three, but like the 
Pelagic RAC and the industry versus non-industry measure there is not a significant 
difference in the variance when divided by RAC. Nevertheless, 66 per cent of the SWW 
respondents rank the measure somewhat difficult (score 4) to ‘Very difficult’ (score 
5) while in the other RACs such answers comprise only 45 per cent of responses. In 
addition to the difficulty mean of 3.77, a quarter of the SWW participants select this 
challenge as the most critical to the RAC’s success. Notwithstanding, geographic 
affiliation highlights a starker contrast for the difficulty associated with the proposed 
obstacle and is statistically significant20. A total of 32 per cent of the survey 
participants from the North rate the scale challenge as difficult; in comparison 66 per 
cent of those from the South rank it as such. Like in the case of the SWW RAC, more 
than a quarter of the 52 South participants believe the issue of scale is the most critical 
to the RAC’s success while none in the North category regard scale as the most 
important challenge. Moreover, one UK participant commented that small-scale 
fisheries had no bearing on RAC processes because such fisheries fell under national 
jurisdiction. By contrast, one Spanish participant noted the struggle for balance, 
‘Being a RAC (SWW) in which the critical mass is mostly small-scale fisheries, the 
control of the presidency and secretariat is held by the industrial fisheries’ (Comment 
60 translated from Spanish). These results highlight one of the more pronounced 
cleavages between northern and southern perspectives that we found.  
                                                 
19 Although the ANOVA did not confirm statistical significance among the four RACs, when comparing 
the Pelagic RAC mean with the mean of the remaining three RACs the difference is significant (t=-2.08, 
p-value=0.04). Thus, there is not a split like on other measures, but rather one RAC standing alone.  
20 Comparing responses by geographic affiliation reveals a significant difference between those from 
the North and South with F=7.34 and p-value=0.001.  





There is no significant association between the choice of most critical challenge and 
the RAC membership; however, the North-South divide proved a strong relationship. 
The North Sea, NWW, and the Pelagic RAC participants all rank the consensus measure 
and the cooperation between industry and non-industry members as the first or second 
most critical challenge to the RAC’s success at a share of about 30 per cent within each 
RAC. While SWW participants recognise reaching consensus as a critical challenge, 25 
per cent from this RAC selects balancing small- versus large-scale priorities, the 
highest proportion of the SWW responses.  
There is significant association21 between geographic affiliation and most 
critical challenge chosen. The participants from the North category focus more on 
consensus and cooperation between industry and non-industry members. None of the 
participants from the North category view scale as the most critical issue. On the other 
hand, those from the South category make up 82 per cent of those selecting small- 
versus large-scale as the top issue.22 ‘Reaching consensus’ and ‘Addressing different 
national catching sector priorities’ also rank highly for those from the South category, 
10 of 52 and 9 of 52 respectively.  
‘Communicating in different languages and across cultures’ was included to 
measure if RACs with more diverse composition of countries, such as the NWW RAC 
struggle more than a RAC that is able to communicate almost entirely in one language, 
such as English in the North Sea RAC. Furthermore, to a degree this question aimed to 
gauge the North-South divide without explicitly naming the ostensible phenomenon. 
Unlike the other five challenges, the means for communication measure within each 
RAC range from neutral to relative ease. Moreover, there is little difference in the 
frequency distribution of answers along North-South lines. Somewhat surprisingly, 
communicating in different languages and across cultures does not seem to pose a 





As laid out in the introduction to this article, some criticise the establishment of the 
RACs in the 2002 CFP reform arguing that they did not go far enough to engage 
stakeholders in decision making (Gray and Hatchard 2003). This article aimed to 
probe the operations of the RACs further than the discourse analysed in previous work 
and identify how meeting participants rate these advisory forums. In some ways the 
RACs can be seen as representing an interim institutional stage, facilitating better 
information sharing, and cultivating stakeholder relationships. Displayed through the 
motivations of many interest group participants, people come to the RAC primarily to 
improve stakeholder input to the Commission and represent the interests and 
constituencies of their organisations, but notably also to interact with fellow 
stakeholders. The interest in networking with others is further pronounced in the trend 
toward using the RAC as a primary purveyor of information, both in its written 
communications and—though to a lesser extent—its membership.  
Furthermore, the RAC has proven itself a worthwhile forum in terms of the 
added benefits of understanding and trust. While in many cases the level of trust and 
understanding remains unchanged, there are promising signs that interactions between 
industry and non-industry representatives have increased the level of understanding 
                                                 
21 Fisher’s exact=0.00. 
22 The Other category of geographic affiliation drew the remaining 18 per cent. 





and trust. Moreover, few participants feel as though their level of trust and 
understanding decreased because of RAC interactions. Consequently, the RACs possess 
an additional—often not sufficiently recognised—role and value to the advice sent to 
the Commission in that they facilitate understanding across and within sectors and 
interest groups. However, it should raise some concern that the Commission 
representatives score low on this measure. To some extent it looks like RAC 
participation of both Conservation and Industry respondents has resulted in decreased 
levels of trust in and understanding of the Commission.  
Although communication appears to be an insignificant challenge to many of 
the RACs, they are nevertheless challenged to find consensus and navigate the 
different priorities of the membership either in terms of national designations or 
industry versus non-industry groups. In addition, each RAC or region must address 
particular needs, which in turn necessitate solutions that afford the opportunity to 
tailor policy to certain regional conditions. In relation to this, the resources available 
to the RACs are lacking in terms of the scientific knowledge and expertise available to 
respond to specific advice requests. The respondents especially perceive economic 
and social science expertise as being unavailable in their work within the RAC. 
 
The Direction of the CFP in 2012 
When gathering the empirical material for this article commenced, the 2012 reform 
had only just begun with different stakeholders postulating on where the Commission 
would come down on regionalisation and possible co-management with many trying 
to affect change by submitting comments to the 2009 Green Paper. At that point it 
was a bit easier to behave as a Pollyanna23 when viewing the RACs and the CFP. 
However, with the release of the Commission proposal in July 2011 (Commission 
2011), the dark clouds have propagated over this sunny institutional evolution 
outlook.  
From the findings of this research, it appears that the RACs are doing well, but 
are likely approaching a critical juncture where resources and some indication of 
confidence or acknowledgement of their efforts would at least sustain if not propel 
these forums forward. Nevertheless, mention of the RACs is curiously absent from the 
Proposal apart from scrubbing ‘Regional’ from their titles as a cosmetic adjustment 
for the likes of the Pelagic and Long Distance entities, as well as the creation of an 
Advisory Council devoted to the issue of Aquaculture (Commission 2011). Rather the 
Commission has set its sights on rationalizing EU fisheries. There is no means of 
knowing how such a management scheme would affect the RACs, but certainly it does 
not seem to address the problem of legitimacy, which has rolled over from the 
previous reform (Raakjær 2009).   
Evident from the literature and from the opinions garnered in the survey, 
participants will continue to engage in good faith, but there will come a point when 
many will question the degree of advice uptake into the decisions. Some research 
even warns that a prolonged pattern of no perceptible influence on policy decisions 
will alienate participants even more than no provision of a participation mechanism 
(Halvorsen 2003). If the Commission assumes that engagement with stakeholders is 
fine as it is, making no effort to improve for instance the problem of availability of 
expertise, then they indeed risk alienating those giving their time and effort to RAC 
working groups and Executive Committees. Without support to these bodies the 
murmurs accusing the Commission of only paying lip service to stakeholder 
                                                 
23 A ‘Pollyanna’ is defined as one who is overly optimistic (New Oxford American Dictionary). 





participation as a public relations exercise will likely grow louder with ramifications 
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Abstract In 2006 the stakeholders of the Pelagic Regional Advisory Council (Pe-
lagic rac) contacted scientists with expertise on western horse mackerel and 
asked them to assist the rac in developing a long-term management plan. This 
article reports on that process and contributes to the knowledge of best practices 
for interactive processes between scientists and stakeholders. Overall, the partici-
pants considered the process, which led to the first step of the implementation of 
the management plan from 2008, as a considerable success. As such, the proc-
ess could serve as an inspiration for stakeholders, researchers and policy-makers 
wishing to do similar exercises.
Introduction
The Pelagic Regional Advisory Council (Pelagic rac) is one of several racs set up 
since 2004 to provide advice to the Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries (dg mare), the part of the European Commission that is responsible for 
the administration of the European Union’s (eu) Common Fisheries Policy (cfp). 
racs are stakeholder fora consisting of representatives of the fishing industry, con-
servation groups and other marine fisheries stakeholders. Two thirds of the seats 
in the racs are allocated to the fisheries sector and one third to other interests.
In the late summer of 2006 the Pelagic rac contacted scientists with exper-
tise on horse mackerel and asked them to assist in developing a long-term manage-
ment plan for western horse mackerel. The stakeholders on the rac were in doubt 
about whether the western horse mackerel stock was being harvested optimally 
and suspected that the development and adoption of a management plan was not 
a priority for the fisheries managers in dg mare. Moreover, the Pelagic rac wished 
to explore ways to develop management plans by stakeholder consensus, rather 
than waiting for a plan to arise from the International Council for the Exploration 
of the Seas (ices).
What emerged from this initiative was an interesting process from several 
perspectives. The first is simply as a programmatic way to circumvent the usual 
cumbersome procedures of the cfp that result from it being the only serious effort 
on the planet to directly manage fisheries at a continental scale. As such it offers 
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lessons and cautions for the upcoming 2012 cfp reform.
More than that, it represents an experiment with emerging ways of carry-
ing out science, and may therefore hold lessons valuable beyond the cfp. Fisher-
ies and marine management is a good example of science being performed in a 
context of high stakes and high uncertainty. Western horse mackerel, the subject 
matter in this article, is a valuable commodity targeted to a great extent by very 
large fishing vessels. To exemplify this, the newest such vessel, to be launched 
in Denmark (though not targeting horse mackerel) is said to represent an invest-
ment, including both the vessel itself and the fishing rights needed to keep it in 
business, in the order of one hundred million dollars.
Identifying a sustainable level of harvesting for western horse mackerel is 
quite an uncertain business where common assessment procedures, for various 
reasons, do not apply. Atlantic Horse mackerel (Trachurus trachurus) is a small, 
migratory, pelagic species inhabiting wide areas in the North Atlantic, the Med-
iterranean Sea and the Sea of Marmara. In the North Atlantic horse mackerel 
is divided into three separate stock units: southern stock, North Sea stock, and 
western stock (Clarke et al. 2007; ices 2006). Although western horse mackerel is 
one of the best studied horse mackerel stocks worldwide, the scientific knowledge 
base relating to it remains limited. The relationship between size and age shows 
much overlap between juveniles and adults. Consequently it is difficult to sepa-
rate mature fish from juveniles based on size alone. Western horse mackerel is, 
moreover, considered an indeterminate spawner, meaning that the total number 
of eggs produced by an individual depends on factors that can change during 
spawning. Spawning also takes place over an extended spawning season. This 
implies that an otherwise potentially useful assessment methodology, the annual 
egg production method, is not applicable to horse mackerel. Furthermore, west-
ern horse mackerel recruitment is highly spasmodic; the 1982 year class was more 
than twenty times the average and the 2001 year class is considered much above 
average (Clarke et al. 2007; ices 2006). The only data systematically available for 
management purposes are triennial egg abundance surveys, data on catches and 
on catch-at-age. As a consequence, the spawning stock biomass, recruitment and 
fishing mortality rate (f) cannot be reliably estimated and there are no defined 
reference points for those values (Clarke et al. 2007).
Research Process
We studied the development process of the management plan for western horse 
mackerel by means of several research strategies. We observed five of the seven 
meetings of the Pelagic rac where the development of the horse mackerel man-
agement plan appeared as an item on the agenda. For the two meetings we could 
not attend, we have benefited from information from a stakeholder representa-
tive  with whom we were collaborating. Besides these observations we have had 
access to minutes, presentations and papers from all rac meetings, as well as to 
significant amounts of e-mail correspondence between the involved horse mack-
erel scientists. Finally, after the development process ended, we administered an 
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e-mail survey among key participants in the process. The questionnaire asked 
how they saw the process in retrospect. We distributed the questionnaire to six 
scientists and five stakeholder representatives and received six and three answers 
respectively.
Moreover, the research process has contained elements of ‘action research’, 
where the researcher assumes a position of participant, as opposed to only an 
observer, in a change process – and at the same time observes and researches the 
process to gain new knowledge of the social mechanisms of the process (Hegland 
et al. undated). The eu sponsored safmams research project1 provided an avenue 
of cooperation between us and the Pelagic rac. This was related 1) to the ability of 
safmams to help set up a Pelagic rac meeting on the horse mackerel management 
plan in February 2007; and 2) the involvement of safmams researchers in discus-
sions on the limited response to a questionnaire presented by the group of horse 
mackerel scientists to the stakeholders.
Science and Participatory Modelling
Scientists involved in supporting policy often find themselves required to deal 
with uncertainty in contexts where the stakes are high as is the case with western 
horse mackerel. In this situation scientists are moved beyond their training and, 
sometimes, even their understanding of what it means to do ‘science’. They refer 
to science carried out under these conditions as ‘post-normal’ science.
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) develop two important ideas about how sci-
entists can aid, and be aided, in dealing with these situations of high stakes and 
high uncertainty. The first is the concept of the ‘extended peer community’ as a 
way to guard the quality of science. To deal with new problems in a high uncer-
tainty and high stakes area an open dialogue or ‘extended peer review’ is needed. 
The idea of the extended peer community is close to, but not synonymous with, 
stakeholder involvement in science. Stakeholder involvement in science, as it is 
broadly understood, includes issues beyond the questions of quality control, such 
as how science comes to reflect social values, priorities, and ethics. The idea of the 
‘extended peer review’ focuses on the more limited issue of stakeholder involve-
ment and scientific quality control. The extended peer community is made up of 
the various groups who have perspectives on policy and their own knowledge to 
contribute. Ravetz (1999) argues that effective science-based policies in arenas of 
high stakes and high uncertainty require an open dialogue with all those affected. 
The extended peer community is primarily about quality control, but this quality 
control extends beyond simply ensuring the scientific credibility of results, it also 
extends to the relevance of the result for the policy process and the legitimacy of 
the results as something which is perceived as emerging from a fair and unbiased 
process.
The other important concept is the contrast between ‘knowing-how’ and 
‘knowing-that’. Traditional science has seen itself basically as the second, but post-
normal science requires a new emphasis on the first. Within the high stakes, high 
uncertainty context it is scientific skills in respect to providing ‘rubrics, guidelines 
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and elicitation procedures, for the expression of uncertainty, for the assessment 
of quality, and also for the training in both skills’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990:68) 
that come to the fore. Scientists are not trained to be consultants but it is the skills 
of the consultant that are required here. These are the skills to work with policy 
makers and other stakeholders in a process linking the uncertainty and quality of 
the information with the needs of the policy. They point out that where experts in 
consulting professions normally have very long practical, apprentice-type training 
(for example doctors) after their formal educations, scientists generally do one ma-
jor research project under supervision and are then certified as able to operate as 
independent scientists. They argue that the ideas of skill and craftsmanship can 
be the basis of a way to reformulate the ‘science boundary’, that is the line drawn 
by various social processes between what is and is not science and who is and is 
not practicing science, in areas of high stakes and high uncertainty (Funtowicz 
and Ravetz 1990).
Scientists are often able to model the environmental risks of activities 
such as fishing and provide probabilistic estimates of uncertainty, whereas the ac-
ceptable level of risk and the setting of management objectives – while they have 
important scientific elements – are not strictly scientific issues. One important 
expression of ‘knowing-how’ within an extended peer community, therefore, is 
‘participatory modelling’. Sometimes also referred to as ‘co-modelling’ (Levrel et 
al. 2009), participatory modelling is an interactive process in which stakeholders 
and scientists work together choosing and modelling various scenarios linking 
policies and outcomes. Various modelling approaches, including multi-agent sys-
tem modelling, Bayesian modelling (Boulanger and Bréchet 2005), bio-economic 
fisheries models (efimas 2008) and, as in the present case, simple stock assess-
ment models, have been used as the basis of participatory modelling. Experience 
in several science-based policy arenas has shown that participatory modelling can 
allow decision makers and other interested parties to help scientists to choose the 
most useful simplifications of reality. Because the focus of the discussions is on 
crafting carefully coordinated strategies rather than horse-trading options into a 
lowest common denominator strategy, less time is spent battling over fundamen-
tal values (Andrews 2002). An important aspect of participatory modelling is that 
it forces stakeholders to clarify their objectives and explicitly address the trade-offs 
implied by various strategies (Wilson and Pascoe 2006).
The present article documents the process of participatory modelling as it 
emerged around the management of western horse mackerel. We begin by shortly 
describing the institutional context in which the participatory modelling took 
place. We turn next to the flow of the participatory modelling process itself. Then 
we discuss a series of practical and procedural issues that emerged, before offer-
ing a conclusion.
Institutional Setting
In the eu western horse mackerel is managed under the cfp, which is as a policy 
framework extraordinarily dependent on scientific information in order to func-
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tion (for details see Hegland 2006). The core element of the cfp is a system where 
total allowable catches (tacs) – being quantitative limits (expressed in tonnes) on 
landings – for individual stock units are decided on and allocated to the member 
states on an annual basis, usually based on advice coming from ices. ices, how-
ever, cannot always take on ad hoc tasks or respond as quickly as desired by dg 
mare. Moreover, the scientific community needs to be better at incorporating the 
knowledge of stakeholders in its work, something that ices has not traditionally 
been geared to do. These issues have led to a situation where the almost de facto 
monopoly of ices on providing scientific advice has increasingly been questioned 
and dg mare has invested in creating its own capacity for this. In the case of the 
horse mackerel management plan ices functioned as a final reviewer of the plan 
as opposed to being instrumental in the development of it.
The cfp and the tac system has continuously failed to provide either bio-
logical or economic sustainability. In light of the poor condition of many stocks in 
eu waters, dg mare has in several rounds attempted to modify the tac framework 
and the current strategy involves developing single-species, multi-annual man-
agement plans as an important element (see for instance Hegland and Raakjær 
2008). A key element in several long-term management plans, including the one 
developed for horse mackerel, is a defined harvest control rule (hcr) to improve 
predictability for the industry and secure biological sustainability. Under the cfp, 
hcrs are defined as ‘rules which consist of a predetermined set of biological pa-
rameters to govern catch limits’ (Council 2002, Art. 6(4)). In other words, scien-
tific knowledge on the state of the stock is in principle directly determining the 
size of the tac. This, of course, makes the principles underlying the hcr of utmost 
importance to all stakeholders.
racs were created by dg mare as purely advisory bodies as a tentative step, 
taken within the most top-down command and control fisheries management re-
gime in the developed world in connection with the 2002 cfp reform, towards 
more stakeholder participation in developing fisheries policy. The idea is that the 
stakeholders on the racs will come to a consensus about fisheries management 
and policy issues and this will allow dg mare to weight the political advantages 
of following the rac’s consensus against any differences between the consensus 
and other preferences of dg mare. The racs are from the outset provided by dg 
mare with a small operating budget, which does not include funds to cover the 
considerable time that stakeholder representatives spend on rac work. There are 
also no rac funds for scientific advice. If racs want scientific information they are 
expected to ask dg mare, and if dg mare agrees a request for the information will 
be passed on to ices. In spite of these limitations in both role and funding, the 
racs – particularly the Pelagic and North Sea racs – have developed a great deal of 
institutional momentum during their young lives. Arguably the racs face a num-
ber of problems, but they hold at least the seeds of a possible future eu fisheries 
co-management system (Symes 2007).
The Pelagic rac stands out from most of the other racs because it is not a 
regionally defined stakeholder forum but rather defined by dealing with fisheries 
for specific pelagic species (for example horse mackerel) in all eu waters. In con-
trast, all but one other rac, the long distance rac, provide advice on management 
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issues relating to a specific region. Despite the broad geographic coverage of the 
Pelagic rac, it remains relatively homogeneous in relation to the composition of 
stakeholders from the catch sector, which was in reality the only active stakeholder 
group in relation to the long-term management plan for horse mackerel. Most 
catch sector representatives in the Pelagic rac sit there on behalf of large-scale 
fishing enterprises employing large, highly capital-intensive, modern vessels. This 
is particularly the case for stakeholders from the Northern European countries, 
which are the most important in relation to western horse mackerel. Although the 
enterprises are competitors on the market, the relative homogeneity among them 
means that they often see eye-to-eye on issues relating to management. Moreover, 
many of the fisheries covered by the Pelagic rac have been blessed with relatively 
healthy stocks in later years compared to many of the fisheries covered by other 
racs.
The Management Plan Development Process
In 2006 the Pelagic rac catch sector stakeholders with an interest in western 
horse mackerel came to the conclusion that the development of a management 
plan for this stock would not take place for a long time unless they themselves 
instigated the process. The key stakeholders were of the opinion that the stock 
was being harvested in a suboptimal way and that the development of a long-term 
management plan could lead both to more sustainable fisheries and higher aver-
age catches. As a consequence, the Pelagic rac contacted scientists with expertise 
on horse mackerel and invited them to assist. In response six scientists set up an 
informal ad hoc working group with the aim of developing and presenting various 
strategies for a future management plan.
At the Pelagic rac Working Group (wg) meeting in Brussels in Novem-
ber 2006, when the idea of developing a long-term management plan for horse 
mackerel was presented publicly for the first time, the dg mare representative 
confirmed that a management plan for western horse mackerel was not a high 
priority in dg mare. Moreover, the representative informed the Pelagic rac that 
dg mare leaned towards proposing a cut in tacs for horse mackerel for 2007 vis-
à-vis 2006 in the light of the weak scientific knowledge base and the lack of a 
management plan for the species. dg mare welcomed the suggested efforts by the 
industry and indicated that if the efforts were genuine dg mare would reconsider 
its stand on the tac question (prac 2006). At the same meeting a representative of 
the ad hoc group of scientists introduced the basic biological features and status 
of the stock, the challenges in terms of the limited scientific knowledge base, and 
the current management regime. Preliminary results of simulations on a range of 
different hcr scenarios were outlined. It was decided to aim to have a plan ready 
for presentation to (and validation by) ices’ Working Group on the Assessment of 
Mackerel, Horse Mackerel, Sardine and Anchovy (whmhsa) in September 2007 so 
that it could enter into force from 2008. Finally, the Pelagic rac was presented with 
a number of questions, which the scientists felt that it would be helpful that the 
industry answered. These questions related to issues of stability versus flexibility 
Mast Vol 8_003.indd   80 22-6-2009   14:44:15
MAST 2009, 8(1): 75-96 81 
of tac, the acceptable range of the tac, the preferences of the market in relation to 
sizes et cetera (Clarke 2006). The response from the industry to the questionnaire, 
however, was limited and came in too late to really aid the preparatory work of the 
scientists in advance of the following meeting (Clarke 2007).
At the next meeting in February 2007 in Edinburgh two detailed presenta-
tions of the results of simulations on five different hcr scenarios were held. The 
meeting allowed the first substantive discussions between scientists and industry 
stakeholders. However, considering the limited response from the industry to the 
questionnaire that had been distributed and the need for more in-depth discus-
sions particularly on the question of the hcr, it was decided that the best way to 
go forward was to set up a meeting between the key stakeholders from the indus-
try, the horse mackerel scientists, and the Pelagic rac as organiser and convener. 
At the February meeting the dg mare representative expressed support for the 
process and, notably, the fact that it was taking place outside the ices-system: ‘We 
want to say that the Commission believes that ices is somewhat set in their ways 
and we very much support this initiative. This does not need to go through the 
traditional route.’ (Observer’s notes February 2007).
The following meeting with only key stakeholders present took place in 
April 2007 in Dublin and began with two presentations of results of simulations 
on the five hcr scenarios (Kelly and Campbell 2007; Roel 2007). In one of the 
presentations industry priorities had explicitly been implemented in the scenarios 
(Kelly and Campbell 2007). However, differences in the two presentations made 
it difficult to compare the performance of the hcrs. The outcome of the discus-
sion at the meeting was an agreement on doing detailed simulations on no more 
than three different hcr scenarios; this should then be presented in a comparable 
format at the following Pelagic rac wg meeting (Clarke et al. 2007). To facilitate a 
targeted discussion, the key stakeholders considered it – in the light of the experi-
ences from the February meeting – important to reduce the number of different 
hcr scenarios before presenting them to the entire group of stakeholders for deci-
sion.
As it turned out, one single presentation comparing the simulated perfor-
mance of two fundamentally different hcr scenarios was held at the Pelagic rac 
wg meeting in May 2007: 1) a hybrid between a constant yield and proportional 
catch strategy (referred to as the ‘slope strategy’); and 2) a ‘modified constant yield 
strategy’. Under the ‘slope strategy’ the coming three years’ tac is calculated by 
adjusting a share of the previous year’s tac, based on information from the trien-
nial egg abundance surveys, which monitor the trend of the stock. If the data from 
the egg surveys for the last nine years (three surveys) shows a downwards trend 
the adjustable share of the tac will be reduced while the opposite will be the case 
if the data shows an upwards trend. This approach can be implemented without 
a full assessment of the stock. Under the ‘modified constant yield strategy’ the 
tac is modified based on the overall development of the spawning stock biomass; 
notably this strategy demands an assessment (Kelly et al. 2007; Clarke et al. 2007; 
Roel and De Oliveira 2007).
As the members of the Pelagic rac needed to discuss the implications with 
their home constituencies, the final discussions and a decision on what elements 
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and hcr to include in the long-term management plan were taken at the Pelagic 
rac wg meeting in June 2007. Here it was decided to go with the slope strategy 
(prac 2007d), which did not demand a full assessment to be carried out. Although 
long-term average yields were quite similar in the two simulations, the slope strat-
egy did not impose any limit on tac variation (Kelly et al. 2007; Scientist Two). 
The final draft of the plan (prac 2007c) was formally adopted by the Pelagic rac 
Executive Committee in July 2007, after which it was passed on to dg mare with 
a request to have it submitted to ices for evaluation (prac 2007e). In the fall of 
2007, after having been through its internal committee procedures, ices found it 
to be in accordance with the precautionary principle – initially for a period of three 
years (prac 2007b; ices 2007).
Emergent Practical and Procedural Issues
Scientist/Stakeholder Interactions
Fisheries scientists and industry stakeholders approach modelling from different 
perspectives. Scientists want accurate scientific models; industry stakeholders are 
concerned with practical output rather than accuracy. The traditional argument in 
favour of keeping scientific modelling separated from the influence of industry 
stakeholders is, of course, the concern that stakeholders’ own short-term interests 
will lead to undue influence on outcomes. If industry stakeholders are continuous-
ly arguing based on a notion of achieving highest short-term yields while scientists 
are arguing based on merits of the science and the accuracy of the model without 
taking input from the industry seriously, then the cooperation will not be fruitful.
In line with this concern, Scientist One responded to our questionnaire 
that prior to the process he2 had been ‘concerned that rac members may push 
for unsustainable and non-precautionary approaches’. The scientist, however, re-
ported that he did not feel that this had turned out to be the case. Rather, although 
the stakeholders had different objectives than the scientists, this scientist had the 
feeling that the group had been working towards a common goal and that the ob-
jectives of the industry stakeholders could easily be aligned with the issue of sus-
tainability. Along the same lines, Scientist Four commented that the ‘willingness 
[of the industry stakeholders] to deal openly with trade-offs’ had surprised him.
Our observations confirm that the industry did not push for outright un-
sustainable or non-precautionary elements being added to the models. As an 
example, the industry stakeholders did not argue particularly hard in favour of 
having pulse recruitment included in the models even though this would have 
provided a potential for higher short-term yields as it would have been possible 
to ‘count’ on the future occurrence of a pulse recruitment event when setting the 
tac. The scientists did at an early stage discuss how to incorporate pulse recruit-
ment in the simulation work but left the idea along the way with reference to 
the infrequency of the events (Scientists’ e-mails, January 2007; Kelly et al. 2007). 
Instead of insisting on including the pulses, the industry stakeholders supported 
including a clause stating that if pulse recruitment was detected then the normal 
hcr of the management plan would be revisited – the precautionary way to incor-
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porate pulses (prac 2007c).
Although the general picture is that the industry did not seek to push the 
limits of the precautionary approach, our questionnaire revealed that at least Sci-
entist Two had more mixed feelings vis-à-vis the way that the industry stakehold-
ers approached the process:
My impression is that Industry worked out which harvest control rule had 
the potential of providing higher yields in the short term and therefore 
favoured a particular strategy on that basis. So, the worse elements are 
linked to the very different perspectives/interests stakeholders and scien-
tists may have. This is to be expected but communication and mutual trust 
may not be easy as a result.
Here clear differences arise between the two groups about the basic meaning of 
using science to support policy goals. The same scientist also indicated that he 
does not ‘think stakeholders are particularly concerned about the science and that 
is a concern’. Industry stakeholders were reluctant to take decisions based on the 
‘quality’ of the models alone. They wanted to know the policy implications up 
front, that is to see the implications of various hcrs for the size of the tac. The 
scientists, however, would have preferred that the stakeholders could make a deci-
sion about an hcr ‘in principle’ and then afterwards see the result of the calcula-
tions. It is of course a very different approach to choose a specific hcr based on the 
tac it can deliver, compared to the scientific approach of choosing a specific hcr 
based on its ‘scientific merits’ – and then afterwards calculate the size of the tac. 
But what needs to be understood here is that these ‘scientific merits’ are to a large 
extent about the application of the precautionary approach, which is itself a politi-
cal decision often packaged as a scientific one. Given the general commitment of 
fisheries scientists to the precautionary approach and that the process includes 
an independent scientific evaluation – in this case by ices – after the manage-
ment plan has been developed, the experience from this case suggests that the 
industry stakeholders will not risk trying to push the limits of the precautionary 
approach.
Another important issue, relating to the interaction between scientists and 
stakeholders, is communication. Based on the responses to our questionnaire, par-
ticularly the group of scientists expressed that they were positively surprised about 
how quickly the stakeholders grasped the concepts of the science and became able 
to ‘judge the scientific merits of various schemes’ (Scientist One). On the other 
side, the stakeholders were also positively surprised about the scientists’ ability to 
explain their concepts, so that they could be understood by laymen. Consequently, 
the process was not characterised by significant problems related to the communi-
cation of science. This challenges the common idea (Pálsson 1995; Roepstorff 2000, 
Smith 1995) that scientists and fishers have problems communicating because of 
cultural differences, an idea that has also been qualified by earlier research by one 
of the present authors (Wilson 2003). However, the pelagic fishery is a large and 
important industry and these particular fishermen – or fishermen’s representa-
tives – are highly sophisticated managers, which suggests that there may be less of 
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a cultural gap here than would be found in smaller scale fisheries.
It turned out to be more challenging to find effective tools for feeding in-
formation from the industry stakeholders into the work of the scientists. From 
the perspective of the scientists it was of concern to get clear information and 
objectives that could be used in model development. The scientists drafted early 
in the process a questionnaire for the Pelagic rac stakeholders but the respons-
es to that came in late and only after several reminders. Moreover, although the 
answers were in some respects useful they were in other respects lacking and, 
notably, one major industry player did not answer at all (Clarke et al. 2007). The 
hesitance of the industry might be related to two issues: 1) the nature of the ques-
tionnaire as a communication tool and 2) the nature of the questions posed. The 
questionnaire as a communication tool demands written answers. Based on the 
experiences from the meeting in April with only key stakeholder representatives 
present, it seems that the they were more comfortable discussing freely within 
their mandate compared to having to consult their members to be able to provide a 
fixed answer to a question. Moreover the face-to-face discussion gives the involved 
parties the possibility to add ‘off the record’ explanations to answers. Most impor-
tantly, simply, may be that the industry actors are culturally accustomed to meet-
ings, not to questionnaires. In relation to the nature of the questions one industry 
stakeholder (Personal communication) argued that they had been too ‘concrete’ 
without developing further what that meant. A reasonable interpretation could be 
that the industry stakeholders were uneasy about answering – for example about 
the acceptable size of tac – without really having a clear idea of how their answers 
would be used in the process.
In response to the partly failed questionnaire, it was at the meeting in Feb-
ruary 2007 agreed that the way to get the needed information from the industry 
would be through face-to-face interactions. However, the meeting in February 
also proved that this could not work in a setting where many attendees had only 
marginal interest in horse mackerel. The experiences relating to the meeting in 
February and the partly failed questionnaire led thereby to the decision to set up 
a group consisting of the scientists and the key stakeholders. This turned out to 
be a good strategy and several respondents suggest that this strategy could be 
employed in future processes. However, it should also be noted that some insights 
did come out of the responses to the questionnaire, for example the emphasis on 
stability of tac, which seems to indicate that a questionnaire may be useful, as 
well, but not as the only communication tool.
Role of ices
On the most basic level, the dissatisfaction with the standard way of developing 
management plans under the cfp, in which ices plays a central role, was – to-
gether with the recognition of the comparatively low priority of the horse mackerel 
plan within dg mare – the main argument for developing the management plan 
within the Pelagic rac. In our questionnaire Scientist Five compares the rac proc-
ess to the traditional process, which he argues to be overly bureaucratic and failing 
to put the stakeholders at the centre:
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The best element of the process was the interactive dynamic of work be-
tween scientists and stakeholders, skipping over the, many times, slow 
and/or bureaucratic procedure of the complete path for the process (stake-
holders, national administrations, European Commission and ices, for go-
ing for queries and coming back with answers, which usually make the 
processes of definition of management plans too lengthy). With the se-
lected procedures the pros and contras of alternative management plans 
were quite quickly revised and sorted out by stakeholders, which are the 
ultimate end-users of the management plans.
Besides the fact that dissatisfaction with ices was part of the argumentation for 
starting the process altogether, the presence of the organisation as the final review-
er of the plan may very well have affected the way the participants acted and related 
to each other as well, which may also add to the explanation of the ‘communication 
success’ described above. Consequently, pushing the limits of the precautionary 
approach or in other ways challenge ices’ standard norms would jeopardise the 
approval and implementation of the management plan. Moreover, having the plan 
turned down in ices would discredit the Pelagic rac and the scientists involved. 
Consequently, the presence of ices as a final reviewer of the plan probably func-
tioned as a disciplinary measure particularly vis-à-vis the industry stakeholders. 
Although the scientists and the stakeholders were formally on an equal footing in 
the development process, the plan would eventually have to go through a strictly 
scientific review process, which may have inspired the industry stakeholders to 
conform more to scientific norms than they would otherwise have.
Funding
The racs have recently been accepted as ‘bodies pursuing an aim of general Eu-
ropean interest’, which has entitled them to a permanent budget (Commission 
2006). Although this relieves the racs of the uncertainty of not knowing where 
future funds should come from, which was a concern under the earlier arrange-
ment where the initial ‘basic’ eu funding was decreasing year by year, the amount 
under the new scheme is adjusted to make the racs able ‘to effectively pursue 
their advisory role within the Common Fisheries Policy’ (Commission 2006:10). 
Consequently, if a rac wishes to assume a wider, more proactive role extending 
beyond the purely advisory, for instance by assuming a greater role in developing 
management plans, funding will likely remain a challenge.
It is noteworthy that no conservation organisations took part in the devel-
opment process related to the long-term management plan for horse mackerel. A 
representative of a conservation organisation explained to us that there are at least 
three reasons why conservation organisations choose to focus on ‘iconic species 
such as cod’: limited time, limited knowledge and the basic fee (generally more 
than 1,000 Euro) for participating in a rac, which altogether motivates them to 
concentrate their efforts in as few racs as possible. Consequently, it seems that 
the conservation organisations do not have sufficient funding to participate pro-
ductively in the relevant activities. This raises the question whether the funding 
arrangement for conservation organisations is adequate if the racs develop into 
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more proactive bodies. The conservation organisations are in a qualitatively dif-
ferent position than the industry. Where each industry representative in a rac 
defends the interests of a relatively well-defined, specific group of fishermen or 
processors – often with an interest in a limited number of racs – each conserva-
tion organisation defends the interests of a broader and less well-defined diffuse 
group of citizens – most often with an interest in issues cutting across many or all 
racs (for a detailed discussion of diffuse and specific interest associations in eu 
policy-making, see Beyers (2004)).
In relation to the horse mackerel scientists, two funding challenges 
emerged: salary costs and costs of travel and accommodation. The first issue 
proved least problematic as the national fisheries institutes, where the fisheries 
scientists are employed, proved willing to bear the salary costs since participating 
in this process was of relevance to their work. Covering their travel costs was more 
challenging for the scientists as this constituted an additional cost that the na-
tional fisheries institutes were less inclined to cover. As a consequence, the costs 
of the scientists were covered in an ad hoc fashion by such sources as the safmams 
project, the Scottish Executive, the Pelagic rac itself and the various institutions 
where the scientists worked.
Planning
Several of the scientists felt that the process had been rushed because of the desire 
of the industry stakeholders to have the plan ready by July 2007 to allow imple-
mentation by 2008. The resulting relatively short time between the five meetings 
held from February to July 2007 meant that there was little time for the scientists 
to work on the simulations between them. However, this was not the only problem 
related to the speediness of the process. Scientist Five added that the tight sched-
ule between the last couple of meetings in reality meant that stakeholders who 
were unable to take part in a meeting and/or needed documents to be translated 
were effectively sidelined in relation to the final discussions on the management 
plan. The same scientist also mentioned that it was a problem that the final draft 
of the management plan was never discussed at working group level due to the 
calendar issue but was presented directly by the main industry stakeholders to the 
Pelagic rac Executive Committee in which not all stakeholders have a seat.
The scientists’ feeling of being short on time is probably also related to the 
fact that the scientists had to fit the simulation work in with their other work. No-
tably, although the national fisheries institutes paid the salary, the scientists were 
not convincingly relieved of their day-to-day work to allow them to concentrate on 
the development of the long-term management plan. Several respondents indicat-
ed that they believed a main problem was that the scientists did not have sufficient 
time allotted for the horse mackerel work. A recommendation was therefore that 
in future processes the national fisheries institutes’ commitment to pay the salary 
of the scientists should also include a commitment to relieve them of other work 
(see also Hegland and Wilson 2009).
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Science/Management Discrepancies
For eu tac management purposes one sea area (ices area viiic north of Spain in 
the Bay of Biscay) that is covered by the western horse mackerel stock assessment 
is traditionally combined with another sea area (ices area ixa covering the waters 
off the west coast of Spain and Portugal) covered by the assessment for southern 
horse mackerel. The tac and quotas set for horse mackerel in the combined south-
ern areas include thus both southern and western horse mackerel.
This issue caused considerable debate since the Spanish, Portuguese and 
to a lesser extent French fishermen, who target horse mackerel in the southern 
waters, were concerned that the proposed management plan could set a prob-
lematic precedent for them in terms of size of quotas and where to catch quotas 
(Clarke 2007; prac 2007a; prac 2007f). The communication between the scien-
tists, the fishermen fishing in the northern eu waters and the fishermen fishing 
in the southern eu waters was somewhat complicated by the need for translation 
of the English presentations and discussions into French and Spanish. Moreover, 
as mentioned earlier, the tight schedule towards the end of the development proc-
ess meant that there was insufficient time to have key documents translated into 
the relevant languages to allow all stakeholders to participate in the discussions 
on an equal footing. Nevertheless, the issue was settled with assurance from the 
wg chairman stating ‘that there was no intention to interfere with the relative sta-
bility3 for horse mackerel and that he envisaged the present horse mackerel areas 
being maintained’ (prac 2007e).
Another issue concerned how to handle the at times substantial, unregu-
lated Norwegian fishery for western horse mackerel north of eu waters (ices areas 
iva and ii covering the northern North Sea and the Norwegian Sea). This fishery 
developed in response to western horse mackerel spreading northwards after the 
large year class of 1982 (Roel and De Oliveira 2007) and to be able to implement 
the management plan, which according to its general provisions is designed to 
cover the entire distribution area (prac 2007c), some sort of political understand-
ing would need to be established between the eu and Norway. Historically the 
tac for horse mackerel covers only the eu zone. Nevertheless, during the develop-
ment process various ways of approaching the issue in the management plan were 
aired. The horse mackerel scientists were in relation to this concerned about the 
risk of being dragged into discussions on non-scientific management decisions 
and seemed in this situation determined to protect the ‘science boundary’, which 
was potentially being put under pressure by stakeholders wanting science to pro-
vide answers of a political nature. This was discussed by the scientists over e-mail 
in January 2007 where one scientist wrote the following:
The tac management and division to quotas both spatially and nationally 
is really an issue for the industry and managers to solve. We have a stock 
definition (from homsir [Horse Mackerel Stock Identification Research, 
an eu fifth Framework research project], the findings of which are unlikely 
to change) and the data for the abundance (egg survey) and outtake from 
this area; we can therefore simulate management tactics for this as a sin-
gle area. There is no spatial dimension either in the assessment or in the 
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simulation (at least the one [name of scientist] and [name of scientist] are 
working on), so we can’t provide the workshop with any information on 
how a stock tac might be managed spatially. If this is the case for [name of 
scientist] also then we should make this crystal clear to the industry before 
the question arises.
Consequently, the management plan developed in the Pelagic rac covers the en-
tire area where the western horse mackerel stock is distributed and provides a 
method on how to set a sustainable tac for that area – and notably not only for the 
part of the eu waters where the western horse mackerel tac traditionally applies. 
This means, as it is stated in the management plan, that a general provision for 
the plan is that ‘[a] unified management regime across all areas where the stock 
is distributed’ (prac 2007c) is in place. Whereas the eu is in a position to solve the 
issues related to the southern areas on its own, the same is not the case in relation 
to the Norwegian catches.
In practice ices advised in late 2007 – on the background of the full imple-
mentation of the management plan – that a tac of 180,000 tonnes for 2008, 2009 
and 2010 would be sustainable (prac 2007b; ices 2007). Subsequently, however, 
the general provisions of the plan have not been lived up to, as no unified manage-
ment regime has been agreed on. Nevertheless, the eu adopted a tac of 180,000 
tonnes covering eu waters only4 which ignores the possible Norwegian catches 
outside eu waters. The level of the western horse mackerel tac has been decided 
according to the hcr but for a smaller area than that envisioned by the manage-
ment plan. One of the horse mackerel scientists, in a personal e-mail to us, evalu-
ated the situation like this:
What has happened politically is that the rac have decided to take the results 
of the simulation (in terms of catch) and apply them to the eu only. When we 
warned them that if they did this, either Norway would have to have a zero 
catch or the conditions of the risk perception in the hcr would be violated, 
they said they would deal with this at a political level and that the scientists 
did not need to consider themselves further with the problem.
However, the same scientist also emphasises that the Pelagic rac and dg mare 
as a result of the development of the management plan are starting the work on 
aligning the assessment and management areas for horse mackerel; something 
that ices has advised being done for the last several years.
Conclusion
Although the Pelagic rac to some degree stands out among racs, mainly due to 
the relative homogeneity between and large institutional capacity of the industry 
stakeholders as well as the relatively healthy stocks that the rac deals with, we 
believe that the horse mackerel process nonetheless offers a number of useful 
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lessons for stakeholders, scientists and policy-makers as well as insights to the 
knowledge behind participatory modelling.
On the most basic level the positive end result suggests that it is possible 
to develop a long-term management plan without following the cfp standard pro-
cedure of having it developed within ices – and that industry stakeholders are 
alongside scientists able to contribute positively and actively to the development of 
a biologically sustainable management plan. Besides these very general insights, 
however, the process offers lessons in relation to a number of practical and proce-
dural issues, which may be useful to keep in mind when wishing to design proc-
esses of a similar character in the future. These issues have been detailed in the 
preceding sections. Beneath we outline some more general crosscutting lessons.
While recognising that the Pelagic rac may represent an extreme case in 
respect of variable institutional capacity between the industry stakeholders and 
other interest groups, it still seems that this imbalance represents a challenge on 
a more general level in processes of participatory modelling – at least if the exer-
cise shall extend to all legitimate stakeholders. As evidenced by the horse mack-
erel case, conservation groups, primarily representing diffuse interests, find it 
difficult to stretch their resources and expertise to the entire range of issues and 
arenas that potentially is of relevance to their objectives. As a result these groups 
opted out of the horse mackerel process to focus their attention on issues with 
higher public impact factor; the process of interaction between stakeholders and 
scientists became in this case effectively a process of interaction between industry 
stakeholders and scientists. Although this does not per se disqualify a process, it 
still casts a shadow over it and must stand as a source of concern in relation to the 
potential of participatory modelling as the new way of formulating policy in sci-
ence dependent policy areas. The legitimacy of the output of participatory model-
ling in the policy process will be lower if some stakeholder groups are prevented 
from participating. Arguably, although industry stakeholders have a more direct 
stake in issues relating to the resources they base their business on, most conser-
vation groups seek – at least ideally – to serve less direct but still legitimate inter-
ests of a much wider constituency. It seems likely that the issue of the variable 
institutional capacities of the different stakeholders is something that may need 
to be approached by the legislators, in this case the eu and the member states, pos-
sibly by making funding available to stakeholder groups participating in similar 
targeted policy support actions with scientists.
A related question is an ongoing discussion in European fisheries manage-
ment about the placement of the burden of proof on fishing activities (Lassen et 
al. 2008). If the industry stakeholders were required to show that they are meeting 
standards of sustainability as a condition of their license to fish then the stakehold-
ers with revenue from fishing would be funding part of the scientific process and 
its public review. In the current situation the public is setting the limits on fishing, 
demonstrating that these limits meet standards of sustainability, as well as fund-
ing the monitoring of the fishing activities. If the burden of proof were reversed the 
public would be responsible only for setting the standards of sustainability.
The participation of scientists represented another side of the resource and 
funding problem. The scientists in this process found themselves having partly to 
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base their participation on creative ad hoc funding sources, which hardly consti-
tutes a useful permanent model, and they had problems fitting the involved work 
with other tasks. Consequently, as long as the racs (or other science dependent 
actors) are unable to fund the scientific expertise needed to develop a proactive 
role and strengthen the upstream processes in policy formulation under the cfp 
– then their contributions risk lacking in quality. Anyway, in relation to fisheries 
scientists a possible solution to this problem has to take into account the general 
shortage of qualified manpower within this field. The way forward must therefore 
also involve a rethinking of the policy design of the cfp, which has created a de-
mand for scientific support that exceeds the available capacity.
An additional issue relating to the participation of scientists in modelling 
exercises and policy making with stakeholders was the events following the de-
velopment process. As described, the Pelagic rac recommended a tac of 180,000 
tonnes and the eu later adopted the same tac on the background of the chosen 
hcr. However, this happened without taking into consideration that the hcr was 
only sustainable in so far that certain basic conditions had been met (particularly 
a solution to the issue of Norwegian catches), which was not the case by 2008.5 
There is, of course, nothing new in the fact that scientific advice is not followed in 
a precise manner when it comes to policy because it is only one of several things 
policy makers must consider (Wilson 2009). However, when scientists have been 
involved in close cooperation with industry stakeholders on creating a joint prod-
uct, it does not seem unreasonable to require that stakeholders do their utmost to 
respect the result arrived at when manoeuvring in the political system. If loyalty 
to the integrity of the joint product cannot be expected, then there is a risk that 
scientists try to re-isolate their science from stakeholder influence to avoid being 
taken hostage to unsustainable application of joint products. Although probably 
aware that this will not lead to more useful science, the scientists can more easily 
renounce responsibility for unsustainable policy decisions and protect the science 
boundary in that way.
One could speculate if the Pelagic rac had been more cautious in its rec-
ommendations, if the plan had not been reviewed by ices but rather had been a 
direct output of the participatory modelling process. The fact that ices functioned 
as a final reviewer may have served to ‘mentally allow’ the industry stakeholders 
in the Pelagic rac to resort to ‘business as usual’ when the advice came out, as it 
was no longer ‘their’ advice. This also highlights the role that conservation organi-
sations can play in the process. That the advice of the Pelagic rac was in fact not 
in line with the management plan was not evident without in-depth knowledge 
of the process, which no conservation organisations had; hence they could not as-
sume the role as whistle-blower.
Keeping the concerns expressed above in mind, carefully designed proc-
esses of participatory modelling can assist us in understanding and clarifying the 
science boundary in situations of high stakes and high uncertainty. Such proc-
esses cannot separate science from politics, because in environmental policy such 
separation is an illusion. What they can do is to provide a mechanism for making 
the distinction a bit clearer between discussions of fact and discussions of val-
ues and interests. Doing so increases the transparency of negotiations and builds 
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more rational communications that can lead to stronger mutual understandings 
of the situations being addressed. This can aid in reaching greater sustainability 
and fairer compromises.
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Notes
1 For details see www.ifm.dk/safmams.
2 There was only one female among the scientists and stakeholders. In order to keep her 
anonymous, we will generally use ’he’ when referring to a scientist or a stakeholder.
3 Simply put, the principle of ‘relative stability’ ensures under normal circumstances each 
eu member state a fixed share of the -- to any time -- agreed tac for an individual stock 
unit. Originally these shares were agreed with reference to: 1) historic catches, 2) special 
provisions for fisheries dependent, coastal communities, and 3) compensation for losses in 
catches in third countries’ waters after the adoption of 200 miles exclusive economic zones 
in the mid-70s.
4 The eu tac decision entailed a tac of 170,000 tonnes for the traditional western horse 
mackerel area but does not mention specifically that the remaining 10,000 tonnes vis-à-vis 
the advice were included in the tac set for the southern areas (Council 2008). However, 
that this was in fact the case seems to be indicated by a statement by Commissioner Joe 
Borg indicating that the Council decided to follow the advice of the Pelagic rac in relation 
to the tac for the traditional areas (Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
2007). The advice for a 180,000 tonnes tac from the Pelagic rac was divided in two: 
170,000 tonnes to the traditional western horse mackerel tac area and 10,000 tonnes to 
the combined southern areas (prac 2007g) -- possible Norwegian catches were ignored.
5 In fact, dg mare advised a lower tac than the rac, possibly in recognition of the fact that 
the management plan as a whole could not be implemented in 2008 (Commission 2007).
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